

Country-specific Study Project
Vol. 2

Studies on PAKISTAN

Responses, Articles

**Foreign Policy Research Centre
NEW DELHI (India)**

PREFACE

Foreign Policy Research Centre (FPRC) has launched a country-specific studies project. A closer relationship with these countries is very crucial from India's point of view. Each study seeks to highlight India's relationship in bilateral and international perspective. The initiative which began with Iran is being followed by Studies on Pakistan.

FPRC initiated project on Iran has been recipient of encouragement and kind appreciation from scholars and members of the strategic intelligence community across the globe. This warm support, apart from strategic imperatives of scholastic understanding about Pakistan has led FPRC to embark on yet another project. Extremely crucial in global affairs due to its geostrategic location and by the virtue of its nuclear capability, FPRC's team invited scholars to shed light on studies of Pakistan's foreign relations with global actors and its neighbours.

The Pakistan project is a timely initiative and in our venture, we have the support of national and international scholars who have agreed to come under the umbrella of FPRC to disseminate knowledge on Pakistan. We express our sincere gratitude to them for their cooperation in bringing this project to a successful culmination.

Dr. Mahendra Gaur , Director

Dr. Indira Gaur, Mg. Director

Foreign Policy Research Centre

New Delhi

(www.fprc.in)

Contributors

RESPONSES :

1.Amb. Touqir Hussain

Former Pakistan Ambassador

Senior Visiting Fellow at SAIS Johns Hopkins University and Adjunct

Professor at Georgetown University and the Syracuse University

Washington DC campus



2. Dr.Marvin G. Weinbaum

Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Illinois at

Urbana-Champaign; currently, Director of the Pakistan Studies Center

at the Middle East Institute in Washington



3. Dr. John Calabrese

American University in Washington, DC
Scholar in Residence at the Middle East Institute directing the Middle East-Asia Project (MAP)



4. Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch, SM, VSM (Retd)

Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi



5. Brig. (Retd) Bashir Ahmad

Acting President,
Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad



ARTICLES

- **1.India-Pakistan Relations :**

Lt Gen Kamal Davar (retd)

Served in the Indian Army for 41 years,
First DG DIA and Deputy Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff
One of India's leading military thinkers



Air Commodore ® Khalid Iqbal TI (M)

Consultant to Islamabad Policy Research Institute
for Policy & Strategic Response



Balaji Chandramohan

Visiting Fellow Future Directions International, Perth, Australia



- **2.US-Pakistan Relations :**

Dr.David J. Karl

President of the Asia Strategy Initiative, California



Prof.Mohammed Badrul Alam

Head, Dept. of Pol.Science, Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi



Mahrukh Khan

Affiliated with the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, Pakistan



Ajit Kumar Singh

Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi



Shivani Sharma

Research scholar ,South Asian Studies, SIS, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi



- **3. China-Pakistan Relations :**

Dr.Siegfried O. Wolf

Director of Research at SADF, Lecturer in International Relations and Comparative Politics, SAI,Heidelberg University, Germany



Muhammad Shoab

Fatima Jinnah Women University ; previously a visiting fellow at Ball State University Indiana, USA.Frequently contributes for Daily Times



- **4. Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations :**

Dr. Claude Rakisits

Associate Professor Deakin University, Australia



- **5. Pakistan's Relationship with Russia and CARs :**

Irfan Shahzad

Lead Research Coordinator, Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad



- **6. EU-Pakistan Relations :**

Dr.Siegfried O. Wolf

Director of Research at SADF, Lecturer in International Relations and Comparative Politics, SAI,Heidelberg University, Germany



- **7.Iran-Pakistan Relations :**

Pir-Mohammad Mollazehi

Guest researcher of Iran Review in the field of Sub-continent Issues. had worked with Iran's Radio and Television .He also writes articles and analyses for Tehran International Studies and Research Institute (TISRI)



- **8. Kazakhstan-Pakistan Relations :**

Dr. Malik Augan

Department of International Relations and World Economy
at Al-Farabi Kazakh National University



- **9. Kashmir Dispute :**

Dr. MANAS CHAKRABARTY

Professor of Pol. Science, University of North Bengal, Darjeeling, India



Maria Inayat

Research Fellow at Media Sniffers, Islamabad



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Dr. Shalini Chawla

Senior Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi



Ali Raza

Lecturer ,**AIR University**, Islamabad



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Ambassador Karamatullah K. Ghori

A former Pakistani career diplomat



Dr. Sanchita Bhattacharya

Research Associate,
Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi



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Ambassador Fauzia Nasreen

Senior Adviser, Centre for Policy Studies,
COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, Islamabad



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Group Captain Sultan M Hali

A veteran of the Pakistan Air Force; a pioneer in the electronic media-hosting a bi-weekly English language talk show, “Defence & Diplomacy” on PTV News since March 2009 and now on PTV World since January 2013



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Imran Ali Sandano

Research Fellow at Center of Non-Traditional Security and Peaceful Development, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China



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Nazia Hussain

PhD Candidate

School of Public Policy ,George Mason University Founders Hall, Virginia

RESPONSES

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1.Amb. Touqir Hussain

Former Pakistan Ambassador

Email interview-Studies on Pakistan

1.In his first address to the nation after taking over as Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif said he was for good ties with India. Mr. Sharif offers an important opportunity for India to get a peace process going with Pakistan again. In the dispiriting environment that prevailed over the past five years, this is an opportunity not to be missed. Not engaging with those who feel the need for peace is to cede ground to those who don't. Do you agree?

I agree entirely. From whatever angle you look, the need for friendly relations between the two countries cannot be overemphasized. Not a dictated peace but a peace to the mutual benefit of the parties; and fair, if not equitable. Nations sometimes remain shy of seeking peace because there are pay offs for avoiding it, and political costs for seeking it. Often only a combination of strong compulsions and attractive incentives motivate them to change. I think Pakistan is more advanced than India in making this leap of faith. India is either unsure how to respond or adopting a maximalist position because it feels it has more options. Its strategy seems to be two fold. First to shift the center of gravity of issues away from Kashmir. And then take a hard line position to get pre negotiations concessions from Pakistan. Not so much on Kashmir, where India is hoping Pakistan will be forced by its internal difficulties, to make unilateral concessions which India will not be obligated to reciprocate. In other words take advantage of Pakistan's perceived weakness and get concessions on other issues, terrorism mainly but also other issues. And India has been playing so hard to get that it wants these concessions even to get the real dialogue process going.

But India does not realize that where it comes to dealing with India, Pakistan, rightly or wrongly, does not feel it is that weak and goes out of the way to counter India's strategy by developing leverage in areas where Pakistan feels it still has some cards—economic relationship, trade,

Afghanistan etc. That is what is keeping Pakistan from completing the strategic shift, a shift which India has not even begun in earnest. One or the other has to break the deadlock. India being the stronger party is in a better position to take the risk for peace. And of course Pakistan also has to have the strategic clarity and strength of conviction.

2. Pakistan and India are locked in the Kashmir dispute: What's the way out?

Kashmir issue is very complicated. But the trouble is both Pakistan and India have made it look too simple for their own reasons. Pakistan keeps talking of the UN resolutions, and India keeps harping on Kashmir being an integral part of India. Ideally both need to abandon these two positions in a mutual exchange. As for UN resolutions Pakistanis have to ask themselves how many issues in the world have been resolved by UN resolutions. And India has to ask itself an honest question if you need to keep around 700,000 troops in a territory to keep it under control certainly it is not an integral part of yours. One does not need to keep such massive number of troops in a territory which one calls one's own—and if one does, that questions the legitimacy of the claim. Yes India claims its right to Kashmir by virtue of instrument of accession. But India has to ask herself what kind of legitimacy its claim to Kashmir has if it only rests on a piece of paper, and decades of a dubious political process. The reality is that on the ground the Indian occupation has been rejected by the Kashmiris. Now I am not suggesting India should hand over Kashmir to Pakistan. No. But at least it should acknowledge that it has a serious problem, and that Pakistan even if its claim may be imperfect has a perfect point in challenging India's position on Kashmir.

Kashmir belongs to the Kashmiris. Rather than the international community saying that the dispute should be resolved through bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people, which gives precedence to India and Pakistan over Kashmiris, here is how it should be. Kashmir's future should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people taking into account the interests of India and Pakistan and the need for friendly relations between them and for regional peace and stability.

Now that is easier said than done. That is where India's position that the borders cannot be changed starts making sense since India being in control of the territory holds most of the cards. That is the reality. But it is not a tenable reality. If India wants its position on borders to be

morally defensible then in the ultimate analysis it carries the bulk of the moral, political and historical burden to resolve the dispute. That of course changes the nature of the dispute—to being primarily between India and Kashmiris with Pakistan being a party. Then obviously India has to satisfy both Pakistan and the Kashmiris in order to resolve the dispute.

But marginalizing a weakening Pakistan to make it irrelevant in the dispute and thus as a consequence weaken the Kashmiris and impose India's will on them –the present Indian strategy-- will not work. This way not only will Kashmir dispute be not resolved but also other issues between India and Pakistan. India has to make a choice.

3. What is the essence of Pakistan-US relations since 9/11?

Bruce Riedel has said : “Despite over \$25 billion in American economic and military aid since 9/11, the Pakistani authorities cannot be relied on to fight the danger posed by al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, or LeT.

I would not comment on Bruce Riedel who is very highly regarded here in Washington. I respect his knowledge and understanding. I would however like to make some general remarks on the comments attributed to him that are widely shared in the US. I believe the comments are not quite justified. They reflect widespread media incited public perceptions of unhappiness about Pakistan in the past decade in the US rather than a fair analysis, and do not fully embrace the complexities of Pakistan and the US Pakistan relations .

The fact is Pakistan and the US have had difficult relationship since 9/11. Afghanistan war had come to dominate the relationship far too much and any war related relations are never easy to handle specially if the war is not going well. That was the crux of the problem. Both the US and Pakistan came to see the relationship through their own prisms of pain. Washington was not satisfied with Pakistan's approach to the Afghanistan war that was wholly blamed for the troubled war. And Pakistan had its own grievances. It lost more troops than all the Coalition forces in Afghanistan. The spill over of the Afghanistan war had caused horrendous problems for Pakistan specially by inciting the rise of TTP and its murderous terrorist attacks. And public has been extremely anguished about the drone attacks.

And the economic losses have been monumental. Yes the United States did provide some financial help but most of the money was essentially to reimburse Pakistan under the Coalition Support Fund for the cost in deploying its army and for providing logistics support to the US war effort in Afghanistan. It was not an aid in the strict sense of the word. It was compensation. Indeed its benefits have been far outweighed by economic losses from terrorism and insurgency. Recently the Pakistan Finance Minister put these losses at more than 100 billion dollars.

Washington of course had its constraints. For it the central challenge was how to balance the exigencies of dealing on one hand with Pakistan not only as an adjunct to the troubled Afghanistan war but also as a rival and a “spoiler” as Washington saw it, and on the other managing a relationship with Pakistan that was important in its own right and in some ways posed a bigger challenge than the Afghanistan war. This called for a complex set of policies involving containment as well as engagement, and treating Pakistan both as part of the problem as well as solution. The American foreign policy unfortunately is not susceptible to such nuanced handling specially where issues involved dominate TV headlines every evening and there are many stake holders from the world of politics and intelligence. And Pakistan, seized by unremitting anti Americanism, part legitimately incited by the tragic spill over of the Afghanistan war, part politically inspired and part media instigated, did not make public policy any easier, here in Washington.

Pakistan was where America’s larger and long term interests were involved. That was the strategic reality. The US saw this reality but could not reconcile it with another reality—the political reality of a troubled war. And in an election year it was politics which trumped all other interests. Not only that there were multiple issues and multiple players involved such as Pentagon and intelligence agencies principally CIA whose interests and Pakistan’s interests did not match. And this ended up in a blame game in both the countries. The US thus ended up with an unworkable strategy as it came to treat Pakistan both as an ally and an adversary specially in 2011 and 2012.

The bottom line is the relationship will not move forward if each side keeps approaching it from the stand point of “what is in it for us”. This is a recipe for recurring irritants. In frustration you say there is “trust deficit” but this again obscures the seriousness of the issues involved. The official Washington saw the inner contradictions but the media and part of the think tank community either could not see them or did not want to see them for their own reasons. I would only ask them to

consider just this one point. If the purpose of giving 25 billion was to hire Pakistan to do some specific things to your full satisfaction (with money back guarantee) then it is a very flawed approach to the relations. This way you end up treating Pakistan as a hireling or a mercenary not a partner with its own national interests, constraints, capacity issues and admittedly some element of faulty policies as well (no one country has monopoly over unwise policies). This way the relationship becomes expedient. Then the other side also starts exploiting you. And exploit Pakistan did. But you cannot focus on one side's exploitation. The reality is neither the US nor Pakistan have for much of the history of their relationship occupied a higher moral ground vis a vis each other.

The fact is Pakistan has done a lot to help the US break the back of Al Qaeda as it existed before 9/11. If it has not gone away and has resurged in the form of franchises and found home elsewhere Washington has to do some soul searching itself to see if America's post 9/11 policies, specially the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, and the Afghan Jihad of 80's may have contributed to this break out rather than single out Pakistan for everything that has gone wrong. Yes Pakistan did not abandon the Afghan Taliban. But we have to recognize that dealing with Afghan Taliban is not as simple as is made out here in the US. The troubled Afghanistan war—the causes of which go well beyond the sanctuaries issue-- and the intractability of talks between the US and the Taliban should have already convinced the official Washington, if not the think tank community, of the complexity of the Taliban phenomenon. This is not to deny Pakistan needs to do a serious soul searching of its own. It has a lot to answer for. To begin with it has to do something serious about LeT. I agree. It also has to do something about anti Americanism. And last but not least bring a clear strategic shift in its approach to Afghanistan. As the US withdraws Pakistan will be more on the receiving end with no meaningful help from the US forces on the other side. Only a new strategic approach to Afghanistan that also includes among other things cooperative relationship among Pakistan, India and Iran can help Pakistan and help the US as well. That is what Washington might be hoping for.

Happily the official relations between Pakistan and the US are now improving. Some of the clouds of 2011 -2012 have been lifted. The American Presidential election is behind us. Afghanistan war's mixed results have been reconciled to by the Administration and the Pentagon. Pakistan has had very successful elections. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had a reasonably good visit to Washington in October 2013. And the two sides are doing their very best to start a new chapter of relation based on

lower expectations and a greater recognition of each other's interests, policies and constraints.

Whatever the unofficial perceptions here in Washington the US officials have come to have a more nuanced view of relations with Pakistan. During the Defense Secretary Hagel's recent visit to Pakistan(Dec 9,2013) a senior US defense official accompanying him told reporters that Hagel was in Pakistan "in recognition of the tremendous support that Pakistan has provided in the war on terror". On the economic side also there is a greater mutual understanding. Kerry Lugar Berman legislation has been a commendable American initiative. Of course its full benefits depend on the stability of the future US Pakistan relations and the efficacy of Pakistan's economic policies and governance which need improvement and the two sides are beginning to realize that. The pointers to the future do look somewhat hopeful.

4.What is Pakistan's perception and reaction to the Arab Spring

Pakistan is not overtly expressing its views on the Arab Spring. But my guess is that while the declaratory posture is to remain neutral the real position to some extent feels the policy pressures, if not the influence, of Saudi Arabia and also takes into consideration the US position.

The public position is more complex and varied and reflects a whole range of democratic, Islamist, and sectarian sentiments, not to mention anti Americanism of certain sections of the political opinion.

5. Is the transfer of power, in Tehran and Islamabad, and the formation of government under Rouhani and Sharif in their respective countries expected to bring about a different approach to the challenges, both internal and external, being faced by Iranians and Pakistanis and also to strengthen their bilateral relations?

The transfer of power in Tehran and Islamabad is purely coincidental. But it will no doubt have an impact on their bilateral relations specially as both leaders are trying to break a new ground in the national affairs of their own countries. And they both face immense challenges. Their internal challenges are of course very different from each other. But some of the things they are trying to do at least in foreign affairs may help their bilateral relations. Pakistan is searching for a new approach towards Afghanistan, and Iran is looking for a thaw in the relations with the US. If both succeed in their aims this might improve Pak Iran cooperation in Afghanistan and help ease US objections to the Pak Iran gas pipeline.

6. What Pakistan seeks in Afghanistan? Most Afghans remain highly skeptical of Pakistan's goals in their country, recognizing that Rawalpindi is unlikely to abandon its long-held objectives in Afghanistan, particularly at a time when Western forces are drawing down.

I think Afghans exaggerate their negative perceptions of Pakistan. Rather than take any blame or responsibility for what has happened to their unfortunate country since the overthrow of monarch in 1973 which set off the unraveling of their country they put all the blame on Pakistan. Taliban are not the only problem Afghanistan has. It is time for the Afghans to do some soul searching. Pakistan did not create all those war lords, commanders, drug mafia and the allied corruption. There is a great country and Afghans are a great people but they must realize that given the nature of their history, geography and ethnicities and above all as a consequence of Afghan Jihad of the 80's both Pakistan and Afghanistan have been caught up in a wave of radicalization and violence whose levers are global, regional and local. Pakistan is painfully learning its lessons and I hope Afghans learn theirs. They need each other to fight the sinister forces that are harming them. They therefore have to cooperate. The US might be gone post 2014 but they will still be there. Media and the Think Tank community gets carried away with outdated, exaggerated and much misunderstood, labels like "strategic depth" but I tell you "it was a long time ago and it never happened". If it did, it happened in an Afghanistan that is no more.

Today's Pakistan is concerned about the prospects of continued strife in the country post 2014 at the mercy of multiple local and regional players who will start advancing their strategic purposes by aggressively intervening in Afghanistan. Pakistan now knows it is an Afghanistan no more malleable to Pakistan's wishes than it was in the 90s. Now even the Taliban may not be as compliant to ISI interests as before. Pakistan might thus be saddled with a war it may not win but will have to be in its arena whether it likes it or not. And it could also once again be host to humanitarian crisis of horrendous proportions. The last thing that Pakistan would like to see is a chaotic Afghanistan. Specially Pakistan would hate to see once again a Taliban dominated Afghanistan that "will create a reverse ideological and strategic depth in Pakistan"

Ideally Pakistan would have liked to have American help to strengthen its position in the post-U.S. Afghanistan. But this has not happened. That means Pakistan may have to be more amenable now to a regional solution requiring cooperation between Pakistan, Iran and India.

7. As NATO forces prepare to leave Afghanistan, new alignments of regional powers are emerging. Pakistan-Russia ties are also taking a new turn, and this holds great significance for India and the South Asian region. How far do you agree with this assessment?

I fully agree. And I think it is good for India Pakistan relations as well.

8. Is the emerging China-Pakistan nexus in the post 9/11 period a matter of concern for Indian policy makers?

Only that much a concern as the emerging US India nexus and growing India China bilateral relationship are for Pakistan.

9. The death of Hakimullah Mehshud, leader of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has disrupted the efforts of peace talk between the state of Pakistan and TTP. The TTP has warned Pakistan and the world of more 'disastrous days' ahead for Pakistan. What should be the policy reaction of the Pakistani government to contain domestic terrorism?

I frankly do not know what is going on. My suspicion is the talks are probably a smoke screen. Or something that is necessary given the fact that the media and the Islamists and ultra nationalists have managed to create so much confusion that much of the nation lacks clarity and moral purpose in taking on these forces. And given the fact is Pakistan is now a democracy public opinion does matter. Public wants talks. If talks fail, which is the most likely outcome, it will strengthen the government's hands in taking action against TTP. And the TTP probably knows the strategy of which the death of Hakeemullah Mahsud was one of the precursors. Now it is for the organization to ponder over what is coming and decide accordingly. Right now their strategy is to malign the government on one hand in their propaganda and on the other give it threats. Let us see what happens.

The government has been slowly coming with legal, administrative and political framework of a counter terrorism apparatus and strategy. It was naturally waiting for a new army Chief and the appointment of a new Chief Justice before finalizing the policy. Now that these two appointments are out of the way hopefully the new year should bring greater resolve and clarity.

2. Dr.Marvin G. Weinbaum

Email interview-STUDIES ON PAKISTAN

1. In his first address to the nation after taking over as Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif said he was for good ties with India. Mr. Sharif offers an important opportunity for India to get a peace process going with Pakistan again. In the dispiriting environment that prevailed over the past five years, this is an opportunity not to be missed. Not engaging with those who feel the need for peace is to cede ground to those who don't. Do you agree?

Nawaz Sharif's desire to improve relations with India is driven mainly by his economic agenda. Despite his apparently sincere intentions, progress in negotiations will largely depend upon Sharif's success in winning over the military, which has traditionally monopolized Pakistan's foreign policy. Another challenge for Sharif is how he will deal with entrenched militant organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba whose agenda, aside from wresting Kashmir from the Indians, is to bring India to its knees. Sharif cannot simultaneously pursue policies aimed at accommodating Pakistan's Islamic extremists and also his ambitious economic agenda.

2. Pakistan and India are locked in the Kashmir dispute: What's the way out?

Pakistan's conflict with India is complex and multi-dimensional, the core issue of which is the Kashmir dispute. Given that so much negative investment has been made into this conflict, it would be advisable to instead focus at this time on trying to make progress on other aspects of their relationship. If economic and people-to- people contacts with India improve, an atmosphere could be created for addressing more controversial issues like Kashmir. This was the roadmap devised by General Musharraf's foreign policy team. Resolution of Kashmir will not be the driver of better relations, but can be the product of their improvement.

3. What is the essence of Pakistan-US relations since 9/11. Bruce Riedel has said : "Despite over \$25 billion in American economic and military aid since 9/11, the Pakistani authorities cannot be relied on to fight the danger posed by al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, or LeT.

For the most part, since 9/11, the relationship has been transactional. Pakistan jumped into the fray of the war on terrorism because General Musharraf saw an opportunity to reap economic benefits and avoid international isolation. He sold his u-turn on Afghan policy to an army that could expect to benefit handsomely from a military alignment with the United States. In 2011, following Osama bin Laden's killing and NATO attack on Salala check-post that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers, the relationship showed signs of coming apart. But what has emerged since then is arguably a healthier relationship, one that while built on a narrower set of common interests is more realistic.

4. What is Pakistan's perception and reaction to the Arab Spring?

The reaction has been by and large confined to statements on new developments, like removal of Morsi, or military action in Syria, etc. Pakistan has adopted a more or less independent stance. Aside from promising military assistance to prevent, at Saudi Arabia's request, the fall of the monarchy in Bahrain, Pakistan has avoided direct involvement. Overall, Pakistan has fashioned no consistent policy toward the region. Most Pakistani observers claim that the Arab Spring has little or no relevance to Pakistan's own domestic challenges. Most of the demands made in the Arab countries for popular institutions already exist in Pakistan.

5. Is the transfer of power, in Tehran and Islamabad, and the formation of government under Rouhani and Sharif in their respective countries expected to bring about a different approach to the challenges, both internal and external, being faced by Iranians and Pakistanis and also to strengthen their bilateral relations?

Since elections, both countries have reached out to the international community to help them meet their severe economic challenges. Rouhani has managed to clinch a short-term deal with the US that may have set the ball rolling for a comprehensive agreement. Pakistan's Nawaz Sharif has also reached out to India and the U.S. to improve relations. Both are driven by an economic agenda, but their domestic concerns are very different. Pakistan is facing a crippling energy shortage, a raging insurgency in Balochistan, and the jihadist threat in the rest of Pakistan. Iran's economic troubles are largely the result of international sanctions brought on by its ambitious nuclear program.

If Iran-US relations improve significantly, it would likely increase the chances for an Iran- Pakistan gas pipeline project, which the US currently opposes.

6. What Pakistan seeks in Afghanistan? Most Afghans remain highly skeptical of Pakistan's goals in their country, recognizing that Rawalpindi is unlikely to abandon its long-held objectives in Afghanistan, particularly at a time when Western forces are drawing down.

Pakistan's policies are going to be governed in large measure by the repercussions of US withdrawal for Pakistan's own ability to manage its insurgencies. Pakistan has shed most of its illusions about "strategic depth" in Afghanistan. Pakistan cannot expect to have a subordinated Afghan state. The best that it can hope for is that whatever regime ultimately emerges in Kabul, it is not unfriendly to Pakistan and, most importantly, will not give Pakistan's enemies a strong foothold. A political solution that results in a compromise that allows trusted Taliban to enter into a power-sharing arrangement in Kabul would most suit Pakistan. A total Taliban victory carries too much danger for fear that a radical Islamic regime in Afghanistan would energize Pakistan's insurgency. A civil war is also to be avoided, if only because it would burden Pakistan with millions of new refugees.

7. How can Pakistan alter its nuclear threat perception with the given circumstances? One view being: "It is totally impossible for Pakistan to survive without her nuclear weapons and detaching them from the Indian threat"; on the other hand it is argued: "Pakistan needs to make peace with India. The latter could be achieved by delinking our nuclear policy from India - starting cooperation with the international community in the realm of nonproliferation and disarmament."

Pakistan sees nuclear capability as a counter-balance to India's superiority in conventional weapons. That is not going to change. Cooperation between the two neighbors can take place independently of Pakistan current nuclear policy.

8. As NATO forces prepare to leave Afghanistan, new alignments of regional powers are emerging. Pakistan-Russia ties are also taking a

new turn, and this holds great significance for India and the South Asian region. How far do you agree with this assessment?

Much depends on whether any international forces remain in Afghanistan after 2014. While they are present and the Kabul government is able to hold on, the forces that would lead to a new alignment will probably not be unleashed. However, in the event of a civil war, we could see a rebirth of the alignments that existed during the 1990s when Iran, Russia and India backed anti-Taliban elements. Another possible driver toward realignment with implications for Afghanistan and regime would be were there a rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran.

9. Is the emerging China-Pakistan nexus in the post 9/11 period a matter of concern for Indian policy makers?

Sino-Pak relations have always been strong. They now have an economic dimension that did not exist before. India's trade relations with China are much stronger than China's economic ties with Pakistan, which should neutralize any concerns that India might have. That said, it is important to note that despite the size of trade with India, Pakistan provides a better platform for the advancement of Chinese strategic interests.

10. The death of Hakimullah Mehsud, leader of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has disrupted the efforts of peace talk between the state of Pakistan and TTP. The TTP has warned Pakistan and the world of more 'disastrous days' ahead for Pakistan. What should be the policy reaction of the Pakistani government to contain domestic terrorism?

The peace talks between Pakistan's government and the TTP have no future. There has never been any solid reason to expect a negotiated settlement, given the very different visions of the Pakistani state and the Taliban, other than the fiction of containing them. The TTP will not settle for that. The ingredients for the peace agreement are simply not there.

As far as domestic extremist groups are concerned, Pakistan has finally recognized that it faces a significant internal threat. Military doctrine has apparently been revised to reflect this reality—even while not discounting India as a menace. There is a growing realization that the extremist groups have to be suppressed if a modern democratic state is to prevail. But even while Pakistan's policymakers understand that the challenge

from the militants grows with time, they are likely to continue to distinguish between good and bad jihadists and avoid the hard decisions that will be required to confront the extremist threat.

3. Dr. John Calabrese

American University in Washington, DC

(He teaches US foreign policy at American University in Washington, DC. He also serves as a Scholar in Residence at the Middle East Institute where he is directing the Middle East-Asia Project (MAP). He is the Book Review Editor of The Middle East Journal and General Series Editor of MEI Viewpoints. He is the author of China's Changing Relations with the Middle East and Revolutionary Horizons: Iran's Regional Foreign Policy. He has edited several books and has written numerous articles on the international relations of the Middle East, especially on the cross-regional ties between the Middle East and Asia.

Education

B.A., English and Government, Georgetown University; Diploma (with Distinction), Comparative and International Politics, The London School of Economics; Ph.D., International Relations, The London School of Economics

Contact: jcalabrese@mei.edu or cal@american.edu)

Response to Questionnaire STUDIES ON PAKISTAN

1. In his first address to the nation after taking over as Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif said he was for good ties with India. Mr. Sharif offers an important opportunity for India to get a peace process going with Pakistan again. In the dispiriting environment that prevailed over the past five years, this is an opportunity not to be missed. Not engaging with those who feel the need for peace is to cede ground to those who don't. Do you agree?

The framework for building trust and confidence, and for exploring ways to resolve the most contentious substantive issues dividing the two countries – the Composite Dialogue Process (CDP) – is well established. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif himself (together with his Indian counterpart Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral) proposed this idea in 1997. So, one of the authors of a compromise approach as well as the structure for pursuing peace are in place. Encouragingly, since assuming office earlier this year, Prime Minister Sharif has on several occasions publically called for the resumption of the CDP. The final communiqué issued after the September meeting of Indian and Pakistani parliamentarians likewise affirmed the importance of reviving the

process. One must be careful, however, not to raise expectations too high. After all, since its inception, the CDP has been repeatedly derailed, whether by the Kargil War in 1999 or the Mumbai terror attacks in 1998. Nevertheless, today does constitute another opportunity to revive the CDP and thus reenergize the pursuit of peace. It is an opportunity well worth seizing.

2. Pakistan and India are locked in the Kashmir dispute: What's the way out?

The way out is a comprise solution. One can easily envision the initial stage of a process that leads to such a solution – beginning with the gradual demilitarization and “softening” of the *de facto* border (i.e., the Line of Control) through a regime that permits, and indeed facilitates the movement of people and commerce. Again, the CDP provides a structure through which an incremental path to resolving this dispute can be found. Though Jammu and Kashmir is one of the eight substantive issues incorporated in the CDP, one cannot expect that a final settlement of this dispute will come instantly or easily. Nevertheless, strong, sustained political will on both sides to remain engaged and work together will raise the prospect that such a settlement may one day soon be achieved.

3. What is the essence of Pakistan-US relations since 9/11?

Bruce Riedel has said: “Despite over \$25 billion in American economic and military aid since 9/11, the Pakistani authorities cannot be relied on to fight the danger posed by al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, or LeT.”

It is clear that, at least up till now, US and Pakistan policies to deal with extremist groups have not coincided. Pakistani authorities, particularly the military, have long viewed some groups as instruments of foreign policy. As a result, they have been selective regarding whether in seeking to eliminate, materially support, negotiate or turn a blind eye to such groups.

That said, it is important to emphasize that Pakistan has paid a very dear price for following this approach, as increasingly both the state and the society have become the victims of extremist violence. In addition, Pakistan’s armed forces have suffered significant casualties in their efforts to subdue extremist groups in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Finally, the political risks that Pakistan’s leaders have taken should not be underestimated, as pursuing intelligence and other forms of security cooperation with the United States – especially regarding drone strikes – have been deeply unpopular with the public.

4. What is Pakistan's perception and reaction to the Arab Spring?

Sorry. I have not followed this subject closely enough to comment.

5. Is the transfer of power, in Tehran and Islamabad, and the formation of government under Rouhani and Sharif in their respective countries expected to bring about a different approach to the challenges, both internal and external, being faced by Iranians and Pakistanis and also to strengthen their bilateral relations?

One hopes that the emergence of these new governments marks the beginning of a period of pragmatism. In both instances, the policies taken by their predecessors have undermined their respective country's economic situation and tarnished its international reputation.

6. What Pakistan seeks in Afghanistan? Most Afghans remain highly skeptical of Pakistan's goals in their country, recognizing that Rawalpindi is unlikely to abandon its long-held objectives in Afghanistan, particularly at a time when Western forces are drawing down.

Pakistan seeks a government in Kabul over which it can exert influence. It is most concerned that, in the absence of a substantial improvement in Indo-Pakistan relations, Afghanistan might fall under India's sway and thus fundamentally undermine its strategic position. Thus, Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan and Indo-Pakistan relations are intrinsically related to each other.

7. How can Pakistan alter its nuclear *threat perception* with the given circumstances? One view being: "It is totally impossible for Pakistan to survive without her nuclear weapons and detaching them with the Indian threat"; on the other hand it is argued: "Pakistan needs to make peace with India. The latter could be achieved by delinking our nuclear policy from India – starting cooperation with the international community in the realm of nonproliferation and disarmament."

The development of a bilateral nuclear arms control regime is urgently needed. The Cold War period provides a glimpse of what crisis escalation could have wrought for the superpowers themselves and for the world -- and nearly did. That period also provides some potentially valuable examples of steps that could be taken and measures put in place by two adversaries.

8. As NATO forces prepare to leave Afghanistan, new alignments of regional powers are emerging. Pakistan-Russia ties are also taking a

new turn, and this holds great significance for India and the South Asian region. How far do you agree with this assessment?

I am afraid that I have not followed the trajectory of Pakistan-Russia relations and therefore cannot comment knowledgeably on the "Russia factor".

9. Is the emerging China-Pakistan nexus in the post 9/11 period a matter of concern for Indian policy makers?

The “all weather” friendship between China and Pakistan has long been over-advertised. China has never supported Pakistan unconditionally and has a relatively low tolerance for crisis-inducing or potentially destabilizing behavior by Pakistan. That said, Pakistan does serve China’s interest both as a territorial-maritime commercial corridor and as a means of hedging against the possible deterioration of Sino-Indian relations.

10. The death of Hakimullah Mehshud, leader of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TPP) has disrupted the efforts of peace talks between the state of Pakistan and TPP. The TPP has warned Pakistan and the world of more 'disastrous days' ahead for Pakistan. What should be the policy reaction of the Pakistani government to contain domestic terrorism?

This is an open-ended question and one which, I am afraid, I do not believe I am competent to answer.

4. Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch, SM, VSM (Retd)

(An alumnus of Sherwood College Naini Tal, the National Defence Academy, Khadakvasla and the National Defence College, New Delhi, Major General Dhruv Katoch was commissioned in the DOGRA Regiment on 31 March 1972. Besides the NDC, the General Officer is a graduate of the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington and the Higher Command Course, Mhow. He has vast experience in sub conventional conflict, having taken part in IPKF operations in Sri Lanka as also operations against terrorists and insurgents in J&K and various states of North East India. He has commanded a Sector in Mizoram and a division in Arunachal Pradesh.

The General writes on defence and security related issues. His articles have been published in leading defence journals, magazines and newspapers. He also speaks on these issues at various forums both in India and abroad. Currently, he is the Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies.)

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. *In his first address to the nation after taking over as Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif said he was for good ties with India. Mr. Sharif offers an important opportunity for India to get a peace process going with Pakistan again. In the dispiriting environment that prevailed over the past five years, this is an opportunity not to be missed. Not engaging with those who feel the need for peace is to cede ground to those who don't. Do you agree?*

It is questionable whether Mr. Sharif offers an opportunity to get the peace process going between India and Pakistan. While he has made a number of statements to that effect, both during the Pakistan elections and after assuming power, no supportive action is visible on the ground. Mouthings good intentions in the absence of initiation of concrete measures to realise them is perhaps aimed at a wider international audience to give a façade of peaceful intent, with an underlying hope of garnering international support and to buttress Pakistan's position on the prevailing ongoing disputes with India. There is little to show that Mr. Sharif is supportive of a peace process as his government continues to extend full support to a number of terrorist groups within Pakistan, which they believe to be strategic assets for use against India. In addition, Mr. Sharif's statements on Kashmir at various fora are designed to internationalise a bilateral issue, which is against the spirit of the Shimla accord signed between the two countries. Such actions militate against attempts to improve relations between the two countries.

The argument that India must engage with those who feel the need for peace else ground will be ceded to those who don't is patently flawed and cleverly designed to put the onus of achieving peace on India. Pakistan uses this argument to force concessions from India but fails to live up to its side of the bargain, using precisely such arguments. The issue of grant of MFN (most favoured nation) status is a glaring example. The constituency within Pakistan that seeks peace with India is very small and has limited backing in Pakistan. The Islamisation of society has been a consistent feature of Pakistani policy since independence, which received tremendous impetus during the decade of Zia's rule. The education curriculum in Pakistan continues to spew hatred against India, resulting in strong anti-India sentiment amongst the public. The constituency within Pakistan that desires peace with India would have to address fundamental issues within the country to establish peace between the two countries. Concessions by India are not viewed as victories for this fledgling constituency but are proclaimed as a success

by the larger and totally dominant anti-India group in the government and the military that believes that India can be pressurised on such issues to submit to the dictates of the Pakistani establishment. Indian actions cannot strengthen the minute groups within Pakistan that seek peace with India. That must remain an internal function of such groups.

2. Pakistan and India are locked in the Kashmir dispute: What's the way out?

Many people believe that the Kashmir dispute is the cause for strained relations between the two countries, but in reality it is merely the symptom of the larger ideological differences that prevail between the two countries and the identity conflict that prevails within Pakistan. Pakistan was founded on the belief that Hindu's and Muslims cannot exist together. While the intellectual component of the Indian Muslims' quest for an independent state came from people like Iqbal, Kifayat Ali and Rahmat Ali, the movement for a separate Pakistan was led by Jinnah and his Muslim League. In his Presidential Address to the annual session of Muslim League in 1940, Jinnah made the point that Hindus and the Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs and literature and belong to two different civilisations, based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions, who derive their inspiration from different sources of history and have different epics and heroes. He was of the view that to yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and the final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state. Later, in 1946 while speaking to a group of students at Mamdot Villa in Lahore, Jinnah affirmed that *'In India you can either be an Indian or a Muslim but never an Indian Muslim. This is the rationale for Pakistan.'* The large number of Muslims living in India negates the basis of the two-nation theory, while Islam has not had sufficient traction to keep the Pakistan state together. There is thus an identity crisis within Pakistan, which its people have to resolve. In my view, this is the primary cause of India-Pakistan tension. For India to cede Kashmir to Pakistan would destroy the secular fabric of the country. For Pakistan to do likewise would throw up uncomfortable questions about why Pakistan was created in the first place. In the short to medium term, no solution is likely. For the present, it is important that the status quo be maintained. Pakistan is still hopeful of changing the status quo through armed violence by non-state actors that it maintains to *'bleed India with a thousand cuts'*. Adequate costs have not been imposed on Pakistan's military because of which it continues to

maintain and support terrorist outfits in Pakistan to carry out acts of cross border terrorism within India. This is a low cost option to Pakistan. A solution could perhaps emerge, if the costs to Pakistan, especially its military were to become substantial, which would reduce the motivation to carry out such attacks and dismantle the terror network that it has spawned. Given time, and a peaceful environment, the present Line of Control could emerge as an international border. In an alternate scenario, should Pakistan Balkanise due to inherent ethnic, sectarian and religious fault lines, the breakup of the state would de facto resolve the Kashmir issue.

3. What is the essence of Pakistan-US relations since 9/11? Bruce Riedel has said: - "Despite over \$25 billion in American economic and military aid since 9/11, the Pakistani authorities cannot be relied on to fight the danger posed by al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, or LeT."

The relation is transactional. The US needs Pakistan's support to pursue its objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan relies on US aid to keep the country afloat. US dependence on the overland route through Pakistan to support its forces in Afghanistan has led it to turn a blind eye towards Pakistan's support to the Afghan Taliban. The US is not too concerned about the activities of the LeT and other Punjab based militant groups as they are focused towards India rather than towards Afghanistan. The US perhaps understands Pakistani sensitivity to the situation in Afghanistan, especially Pakistani fears of being hedged in by two antagonistic neighbours on both its Eastern and Western flanks. The relations between the US and Pakistan are likely to continue as at present until such time as the US remains dependent on Pakistan for the support of its forces in Afghanistan. Once this dependence reduces, we are likely to see a cooling off relations between the two countries. While US aid is likely to continue, it is probable that it will be conditional.

4. What is Pakistan's perception and reaction to the Arab Spring?

The Arab Spring is unlikely to influence events in Pakistan because Pakistan already has a history of protest movements against state authorities. The lawyers' agitation against the dismissal of the Chief Justice is a case in point, which subsequently became a mass movement. In any event, Pakistan has a relatively free press and a vocal intelligentsia, which despite decades of military rule was never really suppressed. The Arab Spring is hence unlikely to have any material impact on the events in Pakistan.

5. Is the transfer of power, in Tehran and Islamabad, and the formation of government under Rouhani and Sharif in their respective countries expected to bring about a different approach to the challenges, both internal and external, being faced by Iranians and Pakistanis and also to strengthen their bilateral relations?

The primary obstacle between Iran and Pakistan is the sectarian divide. The quest for dominance between Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia is playing out in Pakistan. Saudi Arabia lends support to organisations such as AhleSunnatWalJammāt (ASWJ earlier known as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba), a banned terrorist outfit in Pakistan, but one that still receives state support. Iran lends support to the Shia minority. The Shia in Pakistan too have a terrorist organisation called the Sipah-e-Muhammad, which carries out retaliatory attacks on the ASWJ leadership. It is believed to have the support of Iran.

While ideological difference will remain, the scope for economic cooperation is likely to get a fillip. The lessening of tensions between the US and Iran could make for increased energy cooperation between Iran and Pakistan. The Iran-Pakistan pipeline could become a reality. Iran has already built its portion of the gas pipeline up to the Pakistani border and could assist in the construction of the Pakistani portion of the pipeline. This would be mutually beneficial to both countries and could strengthen bilateral relations.

6. What Pakistan seeks in Afghanistan? Most Afghans remain highly skeptical of Pakistan's goals in their country, recognizing that Rawalpindi is unlikely to abandon its long-held objectives in Afghanistan, particularly at a time when Western forces are drawing down.

Pakistan's primary focus in Afghanistan is to have influence over whichever government is in power in that state and to deny any influence to India. Pakistan is concerned about the status of the Durand Line, which Afghanistan does not accept. Its key security concern is to avoid being hemmed in by two perceived hostile neighbours on its Western and Eastern flank. This has been a prime reason why Pakistan extended full support to the Afghan Taliban and continues to support the Haqqani network and the Quetta Shura of Mullah Omar. In any post 2014 scenario, Pakistan would like to see its proxies also among the Afghan leadership. Pakistan fears Indian influence in Afghanistan, as it believes that India will use Afghanistan as a base to create instability in Baluchistan. Pakistan is unlikely to change its stance and will continue

to oppose a larger role for India in the region, post the 2014 withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan.

7. *How can Pakistan alter its nuclear threat perception with the given circumstances? One view being: 'It is totally impossible for Pakistan to survive without her nuclear weapons and detaching them with the Indian threat'; on the other hand it is argued: "Pakistan needs to make peace with India. The latter could be achieved by delinking our nuclear policy from India – starting cooperation with the international community in the realm of nonproliferation and disarmament."*

Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme, initiated in 1972 by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, aimed primarily to achieve parity with India. Being the first Muslim nation endowed with the Bomb was a matter of pride, which explains the popular support the programme receives in Pakistan. As of now, Pakistan probably has over 100 nuclear weapons and about 200 ballistic missiles, some of the latter for conventional use. It shows all signs of further expanding its nuclear force, based primarily on highly enriched uranium (HEU), produced at Kahuta. China has played a major role in the completion of the Chasma nuclear power reactor. It also designed and supplied the heavy water Khusab reactor, which plays a key role in Pakistan's production of plutonium.

Pakistan's threat perception is not so much from India's nuclear capability as from its conventional superiority over Pakistan. As such, it does not view nuclear weapons as deterrence only against Indian nuclear capability. It also views her nuclear arsenal as a deterrent against a conventional military attack by India. Through its nuclear capability, Pakistan believes it has effectively countered India's conventional superiority. In Pakistani thinking, possession of nuclear weapons also enables Pakistan to continue to wage a low cost proxy war against India through state sponsored terrorism. Pakistan is unlikely to alter its threat perception, unless a radical change takes place within Pakistan's polity. The Army dictates policy on Pakistan's relations with India and on Pakistan's nuclear assets. The status quo is likely to continue and hence no change is likely in the near to medium term on Pakistan's nuclear threat perception.

8. *As NATO forces prepare to leave Afghanistan, new alignments of regional powers are emerging. Pakistan-Russia ties are also taking a new turn, and this holds great significance for India and the South Asian region. How far do you agree with this assessment?*

Developments in Afghanistan are a key objective of Russia's increased engagement with Pakistan. Russian concerns are primarily on security grounds. A protracted civil war post the withdrawal of the US forces from Afghanistan is a possibility, if the Afghan Security Forces fail to maintain law and order and the Taliban increasingly gets control of large parts of the country. Russia is worried about such a fall out, as terrorism emanating from Pakistan and Afghanistan has the potential of inspiring radical Islamists and flaming violence in Russia's own restive northern Caucasian territories. Opium production and drug trafficking in the region will further exacerbate security concerns. In such a situation, it makes eminent sense for all players in the region to cooperate with each other to bring stability to Afghanistan. The Russia-Pakistan engagement has to be seen in the context of finding a common ground on issues, which have ramifications for the whole Eurasian region. This engagement is unlikely to be at the cost of India's relations with Russia. It would be inappropriate to view the Russia-India-Pakistan triangular relationship as a zero sum game. But India needs to keep a keen watch on the developing situation

9. Is the emerging China-Pakistan nexus in the post 9/11 period a matter of concern for Indian policy makers?

The strategic nature of China-Pakistan ties is a matter of serious concern to India. Defence ties between the two countries have combined material sales and shared geopolitical interests – not least a common enemy in India and a mutual suspicion of the United States. Chinese support and assistance to Pakistan in the development of nuclear weapons and in missile technology exemplifies the strategic nature of the partnership, which directly impinges on Indian security concerns. In the conventional domain, Pakistan is the largest recipient of Chinese arms. Defence cooperation includes the co-development of the JF-17, a fourth generation fighter aircraft and acquisition by Pakistan of four F-22P frigates under Transfer of Technology (ToT) package. Pakistan has received three frigates, built at the HudongZhonghua Shipyard in Shanghai. The fourth frigate, built with Chinese assistance at the Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works, was commissioned in April 2013 as PNS Aslat.

China also assisted in the construction of the Gwadar port, which a Chinese company now manages. The strategic port, offers China the prospect of developing an independent land-based oil supply route free of influence of foreign naval powers. Gwadar could also become China's naval base in the Indian Ocean, enabling Beijing to monitor Indian and

US naval activities. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, during his recent China visit signed an agreement with Beijing over the Gwadar-Kashgar economic corridor and termed it as an important milestone in the history of Pak-China friendship. As per the Chinese, "Gwadar constitutes part of the new silk road, a network of transportation infrastructure that could carry natural resources into China and boost exports from China's western provinces, headed to Europe, Central Asia, and beyond. It could also spur Pakistan's economic expansion and provide a short cut to the sea for Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and other Central Asian interior states. The project is still at the conceptual stage but it provides an ambitious road map for the future expansion of economic relations between the two countries, which could bring huge benefits to both sides. The two priority projects are the upgrading and realigning of the Karakoram Highway and the laying of a fibre-optic cable from the Chinese border to Rawalpindi, which will improve Pakistan's access to international communications networks. The volatile internal security situation in Pakistan could however act as a dampener and investing billions of dollars into an area where security will be difficult to ensure remains problematic.

Another area of concern to India is Gilgit Baltistan, at the confluence of Afghanistan, China and India. Chinese mining companies control the region's much valued mineral deposits of uranium, gold, copper, marble and precious stones. Various sources have cited different numbers of Chinese presence in the region. The numbers range from 4,000 as confirmed by General V K Singh, former Army Chief of India to 11,000, a number Selig Harrison revealed in the first ever report on Chinese presence in the region. These Chinese personnel, who likely also include security personnel, supervise the construction of roads and dams, mining projects and China specific industrial and economic zone in Gilgit and along Karakoram Highway (KKH). The China Road and Bridge Corporation (CBRC) and Pakistan's National Highway Authority are jointly working in upgrading KKH width from 10m to 30m. On the KKH, 22 two tunnels have also been built which could be used for missile storage. China has also stationed a unit of PLA soldiers near the Khunjerab Pass, which may assist their workers and provide security in case Pakistani security apparatus fails. In addition, Chinese telecom companies like ZTE, Zong, Huawei are involved in the management of the telecommunications sector of Gilgit-Baltistan. Chinese presence in Gilgit Baltistan, thus poses serious security concerns to India.

10. The death of Hakimullah Mehsud, leader of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has disrupted the efforts of peace talk between the state of

Pakistan and TPP. The TPP has warned Pakistan and the world of more 'disastrous days' ahead for Pakistan. What should be the policy reaction of the Pakistani government to contain domestic terrorism?

It is an error to presume that the death of Hakeemullah Mehsud disrupted the peace efforts between the state of Pakistan and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Experience states that the TTP talks only on its own terms and it is doubtful if talks would have taken place even if Mehsud were alive. Even if they had taken place, it would have been on terms as dictated by the TTP.

As of now, the Pakistan military has neither the capability nor the will to defeat or defang the TTP. The TTP too lacks the capacity to defeat the Pakistan Army. Domestic terrorism in Pakistan will hence continue as hitherto fore, with neither of the antagonists in a position as of now to change the status quo.

For Pakistan to change the status quo, the establishment would have to operate on multiple fronts. It would have to abjure the idea of using terrorists as its strategic assets and would have to be focused on taking on the TTP head on. More importantly, it would require focusing on education as a key intervention and removing all portions in the syllabi, which preach hate and divisiveness. This in itself is a tall order. Improved relations with India could assist in the process but for that the Pakistan military would have to play a subordinate role to the political establishment. This appears unlikely for the moment. In the near to medium term, the best the Pakistan government can hope for is to maintain the status quo. Its failure to do so will result in the breakup of the state.

5. Brig. (Retd) Bashir Ahmad

**Acting President,
Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad**

(He is a graduate of Punjab University with political science and history, was commissioned in Pakistan Army in 1952 and served in various staff and command appointments (Brigade Major, GSO-I and Colonel Staff of a Division and Command of a Infantry Brigade and Directing Staff National Defence College – now University). He completed M.Sc war studies and defence studies from Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad in 1974 and 1979 respectively. After retirement from the Army in 1982, he helped in the establishment of Institute of

Regional Studies, Islamabad as Senior Fellow. On and off, he has been acting as a President of the Institute as well.)

Answer No.1:

I could not agree more that there is a window of opportunity in South Asia, large enough, for the peace process to make a start and gather momentum, despite the fact that the Indian are in an election mould and the presidential elections in Kabul are due in next few months.

The Indian media should note that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has come into power for the third time, besides being a lucky politician, he is a very successful businessman. To rehabilitate Pakistan's economy is his top-most priority, though some argue that internal peace and security should be his priority-I. Thus, he is perusing a "policy of peaceful neighbourhood" very seriously. And only then, the economies flourish. Mercifully, he has the military also on board.

Answer No.2:

The Kashmir Dispute is a very complex issue. First, we should agree to some high principles like:

- a. There should be no loss of face for India in the final outcome;
- b. Pakistan should not appear to gain a victory, which it has not won on the ground;
- c. The people of Kashmir should come out satisfied.
- d. Lines on the map are not sacrosanct, people and their rights are.

Geographically, it must be broken into small regions, and those which are satisfied the with the status quo should not be disturbed and solution should be searched for those who have taken up arms the status quo like:

- a. Jammu Region is a Hindu majority area, except for a small portion. It is not happy with Srinagar, it could become an Indian union treaty, like so many others;

- b. Ladakh Region is prominently Buddhist and can also become a union treaty;
- c. Azad Kashmir has all the trappings of an autonomous region with “President, Prime Minister, Parliament, Council of Ideology, University Grant Commission, etc. etc. though with a population of less than a district in Punjab Province of Pakistan;
- d. The solution must be found for the Kashmir Valley which is not satisfied with the status quo. It could be reconstituted with minor geographical adjustments with Ladakh and Jammu region. The human ingenuity should find a solution for its “Azadi Slogan” like many other principalities in the EU.
- e. The entire region should be de-militarized and only police forces to maintain internal law and order.

The present line of control should become porous for free trade and travel of people and a joint India-Pakistan Commission to manage the external affairs of the valley.

The above are the broad contours of a solution to this intractable dispute between India and Pakistan and people of Kashmir.

Answer No.3:

The mistrust between Pakistan and USA is mutual. Each can cite many examples of letdown. But now both sides recognize that it is in their national interest to have a broad based and long terms relation with each other.

We in Pakistan are watching with interest the evolving strategic relationship between India and the United States. It seems both are on a discovery mission.

Answer No.4:

Pakistanis have empathy with their Arab brethren and watch with horror to the development in Arab world. Some argue that it was a false spring like Indian summer in the USA.

Answer No.5:

I reckon that the leadership changes in Tehran and Islamabad would lead to a very closer relationship between Iran and Pakistan. And Pakistan would have to address the proxy war going on in Pakistan between the Arab and the Iranian world.

Answer No.6:

Pakistan has learnt a bitter lesson from its previous failed Afghan policy and suffered horrendously. Now it has categorically stated that it has no favorites in Afghanistan. Peace and stability in Afghanistan is in the prime national interest of Pakistan.

Answer No.7:

Nuclear weapons are non-use weapons and only meant for deterrence. Nonproliferation and disarmament are high sounding words and I leave it at that. Our concern should be normalization of relations between India and Pakistan and then peace in South Asia and beyond.

Answer No.8:

I could not agree more, any improvement, which seems to be taking place, between Pakistan and Russian Federation is in the larger interest of South Asia. It would significantly contribute to peace and economic cooperation between South Asia and Shanghai Corporation. If peace returns to Afghanistan then Pakistan can connect South Asia with Central Asia and beyond for trade and cooperation.

Answer No: 9:

Indians are certainly wary of close Pak-China relations, but we see China as a factor of peace in South Asia. Any improvement in Indo-China relations is seen as a positive development by Pakistani intelligentsia.

Answer No. 10:

The death of Hakimullah Meshud is not a setback to Pakistan. He had caused thousands of innocent deaths in Pakistan. Peace talks between the Government and Tehreek-e-Taliban are a bogey, political ploy etc. etc.

Pakistani state must recognize, if it has not already done so, that there are no good Taliban or bad Taliban. The Government of the day should catch the bull by the horn and deal with an iron hand with all kinds of terrorists (Taliban – local and foreign, sectarian, and other militias). The leadership of the day should show resolve and change the national narrative of non-issues like Jihad and drone attacks etc.

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1. India-Pakistan Relations :

PAKISTAN: AN UNCHANGING AND MYOPIC MINDSET

Lt Gen Kamal Davar (retd)

(Lt General Kamal Davar, an Armoured Corps officer, is a distinguished, battle hardened soldier and one of India's leading military thinkers. During his 41 years service in the Indian Army, Gen Davar has served in all theatres of operations and participated in the 1965 and 1971 operations and was wounded in action in the 1965 ops. After commanding the renowned 11 Corps responsible for the defence of the Punjab, Gen Davar was specially selected by the Govt of India to raise the Defence Intelligence Agency after the Kargil Conflict. During his tenure as its first DG DIA and Deputy Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff, many intelligence initiatives were undertaken by him including abroad.

(Lt Gen Kamal Davar writes regularly for the national media and many military journals besides being called upon by various institutions to address them on security and geo-political matters . He is a keen conservationist also and involved in planting trees in Himachal Pradesh besides other environmental preservation endeavours.)

The universally accepted axiom that the only constant is change falls flat when this truism is extended to Pakistan's mindset vis-à-vis India. That Pakistan continues with its consistent albeit a myopic policy of unwavering hostility towards its neighbor India, from whom it was carved out in August 1947, will be merely stating the obvious. Both nations share indelible historic, geographic, cultural and economic links, yet their relationship has been underscored by tensions and hostility. India, though much larger and economically and militarily substantially ahead of Pakistan, inexplicably to many, continues to bear the brunt of a well orchestrated proxy war with undeniable and proven terror underpinnings from Pakistan whom the world has repeatedly categorized as " the epicenter of terror."

The successful transition in Pakistan from one civil government to another in mid May this year-----a first for that nation and undoubtedly

a significant landmark--- and with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif having made all the right noises about establishing peaceful relations with India, during his electioneering, did kindle some hope among the dwindling civil society in Pakistan and the ever optimistic peaceniks in India. That ceasefire violations along the Line of Control(LC) in Jammu and Kashmir, violence and terrorism rearing its ugly head in the Valley having increased since Nawaz Sharif took over, points to a totally different approach in Pakistan's India policy contrary to Nawaz Sharif's diplomatic public assertions. That Prime Minister Manmohan Singh displayed statesmanlike magnanimity and met Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif just before the UN General Assembly(UNGA) session in end Sep 2013, despite much opposition within India, the Pakistani establishment did not reciprocate in the manner they should have. On the contrary, Nawaz Sharif once again, raised the Kashmir bogey during his address to the UNGA despite the fact that the Shimla Agreement 1972 binds the J&K problem to be discussed and resolved bilaterally. Nevertheless, during the same visit to USA, Nawaz Sharif was rebuffed by US President Barack Obama who opined that J&K was indeed a bilateral problem between the two nations.

Last fortnight, while addressing elected representatives in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir(POK), PM Nawaz Sharif allegedly had raised the Kashmir bogey and gone to the extent of stating that a fourth war over Kashmir was more than possible. This highly provocative statement was, however, speedily but unconvincingly denied by the Pakistan Foreign Office which reiterated its peaceful intentions towards India. Nevertheless, it should be abundantly clear to the Indian establishment that Pakistan has not changed its colours whatsoever and persists with its duplicitous behavior vis-à-vis India as its many actions in the past few months reveal.

As is now universally accepted, Pakistan has hardly taken any firm steps to deal with the perpetrators of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack despite India's grave sensitivities on the issue and all the proof including from US intelligence agencies with them. Also within Pakistan, terror groups of many hues, continue to spew hatred and indulge in anti-India propaganda publicly. The 26/11 mastermind Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and his Jamaat-ud-Dawa , the front for the notorious terror group, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) has only intensified its anti-India rhetoric right throughout Pakistan and all with the unstinted patronage of Saeed's old mentors, Pakistan's ISI.

Pakistan's descent into extremism has been going on since the days of the military dictator Gen Zia-ul-Haq who deliberately encouraged the 'Sharia' as the panacea for all of Pakistan's ill and sine-qua-non for its future. Radical fundamentalism has been corroding Pakistan's vitals ever since and affected not only common folk in some of its restive tribal areas or along the contentious Durand Line but urban centres as well apart from influencing many of its state institutions including, regrettably, its Armed Forces. Pakistan, having trained, equipped, funded and nurtured terrorists for terror activities in J&K and other parts of the Indian hinterland and Afghanistan, today is itself at the receiving end with hardly a week passing without witnessing a major terror attack somewhere or the other in Pakistan. As of today, there are nearly 50 terrorist outfits of different shades and sectarian orientation who indulge in terrorist mayhem both within Pakistan and outside the country, the latter at the ISI's behest, primarily in the neighbouring countries.

It may also be noted by the Indian establishment that Nawaz Sharif, in his early years, was also mentored by Gen Zia, and, both him and his younger brother, Pak Punjab CM, Shabaz Sharif, maintain fraternal ties with Hafiz Saeed, the LET chieftain. In addition, the Sharif family is also close to Pakistani sectarian groups like the Sunni Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. Nawaz Sharif had reportedly "ratified the 1993 Mumbai serial blasts by inducting Dawood Ibrahim through his handpicked ISI chief, Javed Nasir", according to former Indian High commissioner to Pakistan, G.Parthasarthy. Thus many Pak watchers do not feel that Nawaz Sharif has had a change of heart, though for diplomatic reasons he talks of peace. It is, off course, a well known fact that since the days of Zia, Pakistan's policy towards India has been built on two pillars, namely, keep talking of peace whilst exporting terror to India ! The US, for long, Pakistan's financial and military mentors, are more than aware of the latter's duplicitous behavior towards them. The former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton's telling analysis of the Pakistanis when she admonished them a few years back that " you cannot rear snakes in your backyard and hope that they will not bite you someday" amply reflects Pakistan's double-dealing ways.

As an independent and sovereign nation, it is Pakistan's prerogative to do what it wants in its foreign relations. However, it is easily comprehensible by all that its relations with China are primarily directed against India. China, with its 'string-of-pearls " strategy, directed against India, with its major cardinal being to hem India in the South Asian box has been employing Pakistan as its proxy against India.

As has been expressed by many analysts, that Pakistan is a low cost but high dividend proxy for China vis-à-vis India whilst China is, for Pakistan a high dividend guarantor of security without any cost to Pakistan against India ! That Pakistan had illegally ceded 5180 sq kms of the territory of J&K (from the POK region) to China in 1963 besides now, according to media reports, leased Gilgit-Baltistan for 50 years to the Chinese are very ominous developments for the entire region. The Chinese, getting more assertive by the day, have already connected their Sinkiang region via the Karakoram Highway to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea at the port of Gwadar in the restive Baluchistan province of Pakistan. Growing Sino-Pak collusion in the region has a starkly clear Indian dimension to it.

As regards, Afghanistan—its troubled eastern neighbor-- Pakistan continues to adopt a sinister approach emerging from its continuing though antiquated policy of acquiring “strategic depth” in the land of Hindu Kush and always endeavouring, through machinations, of having a Pak pliant regime in Kabul. Thus for years, the Pakistan Army and the ISI have nurtured and supported extremist elements like the Afghan Taliban, Al Qaeda, the Haqqani network, warlords like Gulb-ud-din Hekmatyar and considers them its “strategic assets”. With the final drawdown of the US and NATO forces from Afghanistan in 2014, Pakistan and its extremist assets are eagerly waiting to occupy the political and strategic space which will ensue with the departure of the Americans. That Afghanistan portends grave crisis next year is a foregone conclusion. If Pakistan also continues with its myopic policies towards Afghanistan as now, a civil war in hapless Afghanistan is a distinct possibility. That the ISI would have already planned to divert a large number of then out of work terrorists to J&K and other parts of India is thus a plausible scenario which India must factor in its security formulations as early as possible.

As India, its government, the countless dreamers of Indo-Pak amity like the Wagah candle brigade work to create a friendly atmosphere in the sub-continent a few aspects must be emphatically made clear to Pakistan, if it desires improvement in Indo-Pak relations. Firstly, that India will not tolerate any terrorist attacks emanating from across the LC in J&K or any other part of India and will be free to exercise any option in retaliation. Secondly, that Pakistan must get over its unrealistic obsession for J&K and whatever has to be discussed on J&K or any other bilateral issue will be under the aegis of the Simla and Lahore Agreements to which both nations are signatories. Thirdly, India, must make it more than clear that the status of J&K is in fact non-

negotiable and that Pakistan harping on J&K at international forums is a non-productive exercise. In addition, whenever there is any talk of J&K, it has to be for all the areas as existed in the erstwhile princely state of J&K in August 1947 and which thus also includes POK, Gilgit—Baltistan (formerly Northern Areas) and the J&K region with us. India, however, must encourage trade, people to people contacts and other civil interaction between the two nations.

Finally, India must impress upon Pakistan that as Pakistan stands precariously at the edge of an abyss with its very existence at stake, it must change tack, get over its Kashmir obsession and India--centricity in all its formulations to tide over its internal and external problems. India must firmly convey to Pakistan that in reality, it has to heal itself for India wishes Pakistan well and friendly relations between the two nations are imperative for peace and progress of the subcontinent. In addition, Pakistan must understand that cooperation between the two nations over all the contentious issues in neighbouring restive Afghanistan is not a zero--sum game, and, a pragmatic approach by both nations will greatly assist Afghanistan in ensuring stability in that hapless, violence stricken land.

As 2014 portends to be indeed a defining year for the region, for India , in all likelihood, it is going to be a crucial year, both internally and externally. With Afghanistan in turmoil, the departure of the US forces from the region, Pakistan and its” strategic assets “ waiting in the wings, the Indian general elections on the cards and a aggressive China looking for further hegemony in Asia and the Indo-Pacific, a few geo-political crises cannot be ruled out. Thus India’s security establishments will have to factor in and wargame myriad scenarios which may impinge on India’s security next year. The Indian Armed Forces must be conscious of this basic fact that 2014, with the great political divide that exists in India, is indeed critical to India’s future and keeping within constitutional propriety they better be prepared to confront all challenges to the nation’s security without waiting for any political ‘diktats’.

Pakistan's Relations with India since 9/11:

A Pakistani Perspective

Air Commodore ® Khalid Iqbal TI (M)

(Air Commodore (Retd) Khalid Iqbal is Consultant to Islamabad Policy research Institute for Policy & Strategic Response. He holds a Master's degree each in Political Science, Strategic Studies and Business Administration. He is a former Assistant Chief of Air Staff of Pakistan Air Force (PAF). He is a fellow of PAF Air War College and an alumnus of National Defence University. He is a member of adjunct faculty of Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad (Department of Defence & Strategic Studies) and also a member of visiting faculty of Pakistan Naval War College, PAF Air War College and School of Army Air Defence. He is a former chairman of advisory board 'National Defence Times' (2009-10), a member of advisory board of a leading current affairs' blog of Pakistan 'Opinion Maker' and is on the panel of experts of 'Spearhead Research' and Centre for Pakistan and Gulf Studies. He is member of National Academic Council of Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad.

He writes weekly syndicated column for leading English dailies of Pakistan and contributes in various research periodicals. He appears on a number of national and international TV and radio channels as national & international security and current affairs' analyst. He participates in national and international conferences and seminars pertaining to his areas of interest and is member of various consultative groups. His area of interest is International Security. His honours and awards include Tamgha-I-Imtiaz.

Disclaimer: Views expressed in this article are of the writer in his personal capacity, and do not reflect the views either of 'Islamabad Policy Research Institute' or any government/semi government organization of Pakistan.

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Abstract

Events following the 9/11 attacks caused a paradigm shift in Pakistan-India relations; resulting into enduring degradation in an already fragile association. The relationship could not take the stress of 9/11 and went into a tail spin. Traditionally, Pakistan-India bilateral is constituted by a combination of animosity, zero-sum game, militarism, and an obsession of distrust from both sides. This baggage supports a psyche of opportunism. Twelve years on, the relationship is yet to re-emerge from the shadow of 9/11. There are no problems between the two countries that cannot be solved through dialogue. The question is, how can

dialogue be made the sole and continuous method and how can its derailment by single, unexpected events, be avoided. The basic discourse which pervades Indo-Pak relations is whether specific disputes must first be solved before true normalization can be achieved or whether individual disputes are more easily resolved in an overall atmosphere of mutual trust and cooperation. Pakistan's need for peace is greater; India can live with the present state of affairs, however it stands to benefit greatly from a transformed relationship. Despite setbacks, saner elements in both countries continue to work for normalization of relations. As of now, Pakistan-India relationship is erratic; it needs an urgent and bold course correction. It needs to be managed in a professional way, circumventing the emotive pitfalls. The fault lines are too well known to both sides; it would be naïve to expect a durable and robust relationship to co-exist with these fault lines. In short to medium term, relations between India and Pakistan are likely to maintain a bumpy trajectory, akin to roller coaster. In terms of progress it would be one step forward and two backwards. If persistent and consistent effort is made by the leadership of both sides to resolve flashpoint disputes and strengthen bilateral crisis management mechanism, then one can hope for evolution of sustainably stable relationship in long term timeframe. Till then the relationship would continue muddying through in an erratic way, lacking continuity, reliability and durability.

Historic Baggage

India and Pakistan, by all standards, are ideally placed to create and sustain, among themselves, an environment of peace and cooperation. They have an ancient shared history and are heirs to a common and proud heritage.¹ However, the mutual mistrust between the two largest communities that led to division of British India into Pakistan and Bharat frequently comebacks in circles to haunt any meaningful effort towards sustainable normalization of bilateral relations. About half a million Muslims and Hindus were killed in communal riots following the partition of British India. Millions of Muslims living in India and Hindus and Sikhs living in Pakistan cross-migrated; it was one of the most colossal transfers of population in the modern era. A large number of

¹ Dr Humayun Khan and Salman Haidar, "Stability in South Asia: Time for a lasting Peace between India and Pakistan," *Criterion Quarterly*, vol. 7, no. 2 (April-June 2012): 61-73, <http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/stability-in-south-asia-time-for-a-lasting-peace-between-india-and-pakistan/> (accessed October 20, 2013). This essay has been jointly written by Dr Humayun Khan, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan and Salman Haidar, former Foreign Secretary of India and reflects the commonality of thought on Indo-Pak relations of two opposing sides.

those who survived the traumatic events of communal riots are still alive, the pain persists.

Unfortunately, this relationship is perpetually on tenterhooks, ready to ignite, like a tinderbox on mildest pretext. On the outbreak of any crisis, first thing that happens is breakdown of communications, followed by rapid climb on escalatory ladder to a level just a rung or two below actual shooting level, from where neither further climb is tenable nor a graceful descent is viable. Most of the times friendly countries and international entities take upon themselves to diffuse tension between the two countries of South Asia. While there have been numerous meaningful initiatives for improving the relations, these have generally short lived. Though a number of treaties and Confidence Building Measures (CBM) have endured the pressures, over all the relationship has all along been a brittle one.

Unfolding of 9/11 Crisis

September 11 attacks or 9/11, as it is commonly known, came as a surprise to the entire world as indeed to Pakistan and India. Event made a paradigm shift in Pakistan-India relationship; there was colossal instant damage due to immediate Indian articulations and follow up actions, resulting into enduring degradation in an already fragile relationship. The relationship has yet not been able to re-emerge from the shadow of 9/11. Condemnation of 9/11 attacks was worldwide. These attacks also were widely damned by governments of the countries traditionally considered hostile to the United States, such as Cuba, Iran, Libya, and North Korea.² Leaders in most Middle Eastern countries, and Afghanistan also denounced the occurrence. Both Pakistan and India joined the international community in deploring the incident, expressed sympathy with the victims, their families and the people and government of the United States. Both pledged to work with the US to overcome the crisis. However, the two countries embarked upon divergent trajectories.

Pakistan-India relationship is constituted by a combination of animosity, zero-sum game, militarism, and nuclearisation alongside a feeling of distrust from both sides.³ This baggage supported a psyche of

² Iraq was the only exception. Iraq was a notable exception; with an immediate official statement that "the American cowboys are reaping the fruit of their crimes against humanity."

<http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC-491180> (accessed October 22, 2-13).

³ Nabila Gul, "Post-9/11 Pakistan-India Relations," *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. 57, no. 3 (July 2004): 67-77,

<http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/41394058?uid=373329601&uid=3738>

opportunism. The relationship could not take the stress of 9/11 and went into a tail spin. Post-9/11 American campaign for war against terrorism provided India an opportunity to isolate Pakistan and to persuade the international community to declare Pakistan a “terrorist state.”

Instead of taking a regional approach towards the emerging situation, India hurriedly decided to unconditionally jump into American lap to foreclose the options for Pakistan. Ironically, since then both are in a state of competition in earning American attention, favour and support; hence when necessary America pitches both against each other, and when such purpose is served, America sermons the two actors of South Asia for peace and cooperation.

A day after the attacks, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) promptly passed Resolution 1368, which condemned the attacks, and expressed readiness to take all necessary steps to respond and combat all forms of terrorism in accordance with the Charter.⁴ On September 14, 2001, the US Congress passed the ‘Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists’ and granted the President blanket authority to use all "necessary and appropriate force" against those whom he determined "planned, authorized, committed or aided" the September 11 attacks, or who harboured said persons or groups.

North Atlantic treaty Organization (NATO) held an emergency meeting of the alliance's ambassadors in Brussels. The secretary

832&uid=2134&uid=2&uid=70&uid=3&uid=373329331&uid=67&uid=62&sid=21102805609753 (accessed October 21, 2013).

⁴ United Nations Security Council resolution 1368 was adopted unanimously on September 12, 2001, expressing its determination to combat threats to international peace and security caused by acts of terrorism and recognising the right of individual and collective self-defence. The Council condemned the September 11 attacks in the United States. The Security Council strongly condemned the attacks in New York City, Washington D.C. and Pennsylvania and regarded the incidents as a threat to international peace and security. It expressed sympathy and condolences to the victims and their families and the United States government. The resolution called on all countries to co-operate in bringing the perpetrators, organisers and sponsors of the attacks to justice and that those responsible for supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organisers and sponsors would be held accountable. The international community was called upon to increase efforts to suppress and prevent terrorist activities through co-operation and implementation of anti-terrorist conventions and Security Council resolutions, particularly Resolution 1269 (1999). Resolution 1368 concluded with the Council expressing its readiness to take steps to respond to the attacks and combat all forms of terrorism in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

general, Lord Robertson, promised the United States that it could rely on it for assistance and support, and pledged that those responsible would not get away with it.⁵ This marked the first invocation of Article 5, which had been written during the Cold War with an attack by the Soviet Union in mind. The Bush administration announced a War on Terror, with the stated goals of bringing Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda to justice and preventing the emergence of other terrorist networks. “Coalition of the Willing” began to evolve at a rapid pace as dozens of countries joined the bandwagon. War drums could be heard loud and clear.

World’s most powerful country was attacked on its own soil, first time since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour during World War II. America had dropped two nuclear bombs on Japanese cities, when Japan was on the verge of unconditional surrender. Objective of using the nukes was to humiliate the Japanese people as a nation, and to avenge the disgrace of Pearl Harbour. Japan continues to be humbled as American troops are still stationed on its soil. Ever since, American psyche to react with disproportionate use of military force, had not changed much. To carry out 9/11 attacks, four American passenger airliners were hijacked by 19 hijackers of Middle East origin; rest is history. None of the planes or hijackers was from Pakistan, India or Afghanistan. The incident had occurred at continental distances from the region. Within hours after the September 11 attacks, Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld speculated on possible involvement by Saddam Hussein and ordered his aides to make plans for striking Iraq.⁶

⁵ “Reaction from around the World,” *New York Times*, September 12, 2001, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/12/us/reaction-from-around-the-world.html>(accessed October 21, 2013).

⁶ Joel Roberts, “Plans for Iraq Attack Began On 9/11,” *CBS News*, September 10, 2009, 1:33 p.m., <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/09/04/september11/main520830.shtml> (accessed October 21, 2013). *CBS News* has learned that barely five hours after American Airlines Flight 77 flowed into the Pentagon, Defence Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld was telling his aides to come up with plans for striking Iraq—even though there was no evidence linking Saddam Hussein to the attacks. That’s according to notes taken by aides who were with Rumsfeld in the National Military Command Centre on Sept. 1—notes that show exactly where the road toward war with Iraq began, reports *CBS News* National Security Correspondent David Martin. At 2:40 p.m. in the afternoon of September 11, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld was issuing rapid orders to his aides to look for evidence of Iraqi involvement, according to notes taken by senior policy official Stephen Cambone. “Best info fast. Judge whether good enough hit S.H”—Meaning Saddam Hussein—“At same time. Not only UBL”

While America was still struggling to put together the scanty pieces of intelligence and construct the jigsaw for determining “Why, Who and How” of the event, India was quick to jump the gun. Soon after the attacks India emphatically declared that they knew the location of terrorist camps in Pakistan’s federally administered tribal areas (FATA). India further claimed that these terrorists had not only hit the Americans in a big way, but they also routinely strike in the Indian Territory as well.

Within hours of the 9/11 attacks, India offered the Americans its military bases, proposed to share the intelligence and conduct combined operations against the terrorists’ camps in Pakistan. Definite evidence is not available to determine whether it was a gross error of judgment on India’s part or a deliberate exterior strategic manoeuvre to limit Pakistan’s options. Probably it was a combination of the two. Best course of action for India would have been to issue a generic sympathising statement, offer assistance in general terms; then wait and see the things unfold. The indecent haste with which India became a self proclaimed victim and hence party to the 9/11 event would continue to fascinate the international security analysts for times to come.

India had wittingly or unwittingly played its role to bring the war to its own region, especially to a third county—Pakistan. Most suitable post 9/11 option for Pakistan would have been to stay neutral in the conflict, just host the refugees and let Americans do the anti-terrorist operations. However, the spanner from India had effectively scuttled this option. From now on Pakistan was under compulsion to unconditionally side with America.⁷

(Osama bin Laden), Cambone’s notes quoted Rumsfeld as saying. "Need to move swiftly—Near term target needs —go massive—sweep it all up. Things related and not." Top Muslim organizations in the United States were swift to condemn the attacks on 9/11 and called "upon Muslim Americans to come forward with their skills and resources to help alleviate the sufferings of the affected people and their families". Top organizations included the Islamic Society of North America, American Muslim Alliance, American Muslim Council, Council on American-Islamic Relations, Islamic Circle of North America, and the Shari’a Scholars Association of North America. Along with massive monetary donations, many Islamic organizations launched blood drives and provided medical assistance, food, and shelter for victims.

⁷ Brigadier AR Siddiq, “No Reunion, But Union Possible in Subcontinent,” *Daily News* (New York), March 29, 2012), <http://india.nydailynews.com/politicsarticle/f170bac17a33abf159fa3ec173644704/no-reunion-but-union-possible-in-subcontinent-pakistani-writer#ixzz2idl8tJa0> (accessed October 24, 2013). Recalling India's reaction to

No country ever blamed Pakistan of any role in the making of 9/11 crisis; nevertheless, India was eager to seize the moment and cut Pakistan to size (not necessarily physically), in unison with America, and if Americans did not oblige, it would do it at its own. It also chose to use the opportunity to draw parallel between Kashmir freedom struggle and acts of international terrorism to erode the credibility of freedom struggle of Kashmiri people and deprive it of international sympathy and support; this was aimed at weakening the international support for Pakistan over one of its core national interests.

The Dice Begin to Roll

The enormity of the event was palpable; the sole super power was sure to act violently, like a wounded bear.⁸ Pakistan's foremost priority was to save itself from serious fallouts of the conflict and preserve its territorial integrity. Pakistan tried to persuade the Taliban government to handover Osama bin Laden for trial. The Taliban government of Afghanistan had agreed to handover Osama for an independent trial in a third country, even then America chose to attack Afghanistan. Other than restoration of grace, there are varying views about the causes leading to this decision, all supported by convincing logic; some of these are rather incriminating for the United States itself. Approximately one month after the terrorist attacks, the United States led a broad coalition of international forces to overthrow the Taliban regime from Afghanistan for their alleged harbouring of al Qaeda. On October 7, 2001, the War in Afghanistan began when the US and British forces initiated aerial bombing campaigns targeting Taliban and al Qaeda camps, then later invaded Afghanistan with ground troops of the Special Forces; by November 12, Kabul had fallen. Tens of thousands of people attempted to flee Afghanistan, Pakistan, already home to a large number of Afghan

the US post-9/11, Siddiqi said: 'Jaswant Singh, the then defence minister (foreign Minister), offered everything to the US, including naval bases, even before (then Joint Chiefs of Staff committee) General Colin Powell and the US president telephoned India for help. But they called (then Pakistani army chief and president Pervez) Musharraf, after which he pledged support, Siddiqi said, on pointing out the difference, said on 29 march 2012. Brigadier (R) Siddiqi is a former Director of ISPR.

⁸ Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoire* (London: Simon & Schuster, A CBS Company, 2006), 201. "The next morning I was chairing an important meeting at the Governor's House (Karachi) when my military secretary told me that the US secretary of State, General Colin Powell was on phone...Powell was quite candid: "you are either with us or against us"...I told him that we were with the United States against terrorism...We did not negotiate anything. I had time to think through exactly what might happen the next."

refugees from previous conflicts, announced to close its border with Afghanistan on September 17, 2001; however, due to porous nature of border, it could not stop the influx of refugees.⁹

Challenges for Pakistan

9/11 brought numerous unique challenges for Pakistan in the realm of statecraft: both in the context of interstate and intrastate. Soon after the event, finger pointing towards Afghanistan added to the worries of Pakistan. Though Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was not directly blamed at state or government level for its involvement, its territory was used by the perpetrators of the crime. And international community expected the incumbent Afghan government to apprehend and hand over the culprits to America for trial. Afghanistan instead wanted the trial to take place at a neutral venue. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were the only three countries of the world that had extended diplomatic recognition to the Taliban led government of Afghanistan. Soon after 9/11, Saudi Arabia and the UAE withdrew their recognition, and Pakistan became the only window through which international community could reach out to the Afghan government. Afghanistan's ambassador to Pakistan Mullah Zaeef became the sole contact point between his country and the world. After the fall of Taliban government, Mullah Abdusalam Zaeef's diplomatic immunity was invoked.

Taliban regime was strongly supported by Pakistan. India firmly opposed the Taliban and criticized Pakistan for supporting it. India established its links with Northern Alliance as India officially recognized their government. Within the international community, there was a perception that Pakistan had propelled the Taliban to power and that Pakistan had ample leverage over the Afghan government of that time. Hence, international community expected Pakistan to play a constructive role to convince the Afghan government to meet the American demand of handing over the nominated fugitives. Pakistan made an all out effort including sending a Clergy delegation to convince the Taliban government to comply with the American demands. However, good sense did not prevail and the Afghan government chose the path of defiance.¹⁰ India had continued to recognise the government of ousted President Rabbani. In the post 9/11 setting India in close

⁹ "US president's Speech to the United Nations," *CNN*. November 10, 2001, <http://edition.cnn.com/> (accessed September 4, 2014).

¹⁰ "National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States," <http://www.9-11commission.gov/> (accessed October 24, 2013).

coordination with Iran persuaded the Northern Alliance to attack Taliban government from the North; it hastened the fall of Kabul. Components of former Northern alliance continue to have a major share in the Afghan government.

Pakistan aligned itself with the United States against the Taliban; it permitted the coalition access to its military bases, and arrested and handed over to the US over 600 suspected al Qaeda members.¹¹ In December 2001, a number of prominent Afghans met under the United Nations auspices in Bonn, Germany to decide on a plan for governing the country. As a result, the Afghan Interim Administration (AIA)—made up of 30 members, headed by a chairman—was inaugurated on December 22, 2001, with a six-month mandate to be followed by a two-year Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA), after which elections were to be held. On the same day Security Council authorized the establishment for six months of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas. Mr Hamid Karzai after being chosen by the delegates of the Bonn Conference in December 2001 became head of an interim government. India campaigned for larger share for the Northern Alliance in the transit government to prevent the formation of an Afghan transit government by pro-Pakistan elements. India succeeded to a great extent, the Afghan government is over represented by ethnic minorities. Hamid Karzai was elected as President in 2004 and then re-elected in 2009. Next presidential elections are scheduled on April 5, 2014. Due to restriction imposed by the Afghan constitution, Karzai cannot contest for the third term. While supporters have praised Karzai's efforts to promote national reconciliation and a slowly growing economy, critics charge him with

¹¹ "Musharraf 'bullied' into Supporting US War on Terror: Ex-General," *Z News*, December 11, 2009, http://zeenews.india.com/news/south-asia/musharraf-bullied-into-supporting-us-war-on-terror-ex-general_586640.html (accessed on October 24, 2013). Islamabad: Pervez Musharraf was "bullied" into supporting the US in its war on terror, claimed Pakistan's former Chief of General Staff Shahid Aziz, who also accused the ex-President of deceiving other army officers and corps commanders in the decision leading up to the anti-Taliban campaign. Aziz said the decision to support America was taken unilaterally before a crucial corps commanders meeting took place. The former Pakistan's Chief of General staff underlined that Musharraf was "bullied" into supporting the US in the war on terror. The corps commanders were reluctant to support the US, he told Dawn news in an interview. Aziz said that the corps commanders wanted to remain neutral in the war against the Taliban instead of actively supporting it. Aziz also said that Pakistan's army intelligence had informed them about Indian lobbying, calling for attacks on both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

failing to stem corruption and drug trade, and the slow pace of reconstruction and reconciliation.

War Comes to Pakistan

When Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan ceased to exist as a state, its militant elements melted away into the civil society and started escaping into nearest countries. Almost in the same timeframe, Indian parliament was attacked on December 13, 2001;¹² India accused Pakistan of this incident and massed its forces on its international border with Pakistan in a threatening posture. This diverted Pakistan's attention from its western borders as all military assets had to be deployed on the eastern border to thwart any misadventure from the Indian side. This made Pakistan's porous border areas with Afghanistan as the first choice for the militants who were escaping from the mopping up operations by the ISAF. It was beyond the resources of Pakistan to maintain a constant vigil on the border. Though a number of such infiltrators were arrested, proverbially, it was only the tip of the iceberg. Slowly the terrorist cells began to reorganize, reconstitute, and network. Outlawed sectarian and separatist entities as well as criminal gangs also found it safe to associate with the Taliban. Over the years it became a potent force. By 2005, these elements began conducting tactical operations to challenge the writ of law enforcement agencies; they could hit the hard and soft targets at the places and timings of their choosing and generate a sense of perpetual insecurity throughout the country.

In December 2007 the existence of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan was officially announced under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud.¹³ On

¹² Now there is some inconclusive evidence that it was a false flag operation, as part of series of such operations to embroil Pakistan to deploy its assets along Indian border, so that western border could be left off guards, whereby hardened Afghan combatants being chased by the invading forces could cross over to Pakistan. These combatant melted away into the society, dispersed themselves throughout Pakistan. They were to later regroup rearm and pose threat to internal stability of Pakistan. This threat became quite serious by 2005. Again there is inconclusive evidence that India did play a part in facilitating these groups. Afghanistan provided its soil to India for established a number of Consulates along Pak –Afghan border to organize, finance, and facilitate such groups. First time proof of such involvement was handed over to PM Manmohan Singh, by his counterpart, during NAM Summit at Sharm-al Sheikh. Later, the issue was again raised with Dr Singh by PM Nawaz Sharif during their meeting on the side lines of 68th UNGA on September, 29, 2013.

¹³ Hassan Abbass, *A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan* (NY: CTC Sentinel, WestPoint, January 2008), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/17868/profile_of_tehrikitaliban_pakistan.html (accessed October 31, 2013).

August 25, 2008, Pakistan banned the group, froze its bank accounts and assets, and barred it from media appearances. The government also announced bounties on prominent leaders of the TTP.¹⁴ All these steps were to have only nominal effect as mechanism to implement such declarations did not exist. TTP soon became an umbrella organization of 16 major and around 50 medium and small size militant outfits. Perpetuality of tactical level terrorist activity and over-claiming of the incidents by the TTP helped in larger than life projection of these terrorist entities. Beside wide spread public perception, there are credible assessments that besides other foreign support, Indian intelligence sources had made deep inroads into some of these entities; especially the outlawed sectarian organizations. Indian intelligence agencies have heavily invested to make their enduring contacts amongst these organizations and local notable in FATA and Baluchistan for post 2014 usage.

Duplicity Galore

Ironically, revelations made a decade later, by Admiral Kumar, the then Chairman of Indian Chiefs of Staff Committee, show that after pushing Pakistan in to war which was not of its making. India made a *volte face* over its initial *generous* offers to the US. American administration had sent Admiral Dennis Blair, the then head of the US Pacific Command to New Delhi during the last week of November, 2001. He came with three specific military demands—fleet support for US military ships in Mumbai and Goa, 'stage-through' facility at Indian Air Force bases for US long range bombers and Indian ground troops in Afghanistan.¹⁵ The requests

¹⁴ Syed Saleem Shahzad, "Setback for Pakistan's Terror Drive," *Asia Times*, August 2008, Hong Kong, http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JH27Df01.html (accessed October 31, 2013).

¹⁵ Josy Joseph, "Post-9/11, US Sought India's Military Help for Afghan Ops," *Times of India*, Septemebr 11, 2011), http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-09-11/india/30141684_1_three-service-chiefs-chiefs-of-staff-committee-admiral-sushil-kumar (accessed October 13, 2013). "These three demands were placed before the cabinet committee on security chaired by PM Vajpayee, and attended by then home minister L K Advani, defence Miniser Fernandes, external affairs minister Jaswant Singh, Mishra and military chiefs. The meeting saw at least two members of the CCS making 'vigorous pitch' for accepting the three US demands. 'They cited the global war on terror and wanted us to join without any conditions,' the source said. As the debate heated up, Vajpayee said, 'Let's listen to our military chiefs' and turned to the three service chiefs. Admiral Kumar as the chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee took the opportunity to air

were rejected after Prime Minister Vajpayee overruled a divided cabinet committee on security (CCS). India took the decisive U-turn and refused to join the military operations in Afghanistan. These demands were placed in the last week of November 2001; by then Kabul had already fallen. The counter argument during the CCS meeting was that the US and its allies operations in Afghanistan did not enjoy UN mandate that India had not declared war on Afghanistan.¹⁶

If these revelations are correct, it speaks of opportunism of Indian leadership. The arguments put forward in the November 2001 CCS meeting were equally valid immediately after the 9/11 attacks, however, the positions taken by India on these two occasions were poles apart. From now on India was to take a back seat and draw pleasure out of the multi-dimensional squeeze that was to come to bear upon Pakistan. The only thing India was to do was to keep-up unrelenting pressure to preclude any sigh of relief for Pakistan. Had India not pressured Pakistan, immediately after the 9/11 attacks, to side with the US, in all probability, Pakistan would have made a similar decision as done by India in November 2001.¹⁷

The United States was not the only casualty of 9/11. The fall-out of the attacks was to hit Pakistan with similar enormity but in a different way—protracted bleeding through million wounds. Pakistan continues to

the views of the three service chiefs and put forth the Force's opposition to US proposals. The counter argument was that the US and its allies operations in Afghanistan did not enjoy UN mandate and also India had not declared war on Afghanistan. The UN Security Council would approve the setting up of the International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan only on December 20—almost a month after the NDA-led government debated the US request for military assistance. 'Yeh toh bilkul baath hai,' Vajpayee had said in his characteristic style, putting an end to what would have been a historic turn in India's military conduct. Admiral Blair had dropped enough hint of his mission, saying the US was looking forward to building an unprecedented 'non-traditional and unconventional' military-to-military ties with India. Though there has been speculation through the decade about the exact nature of US demands, the specifics remained a closely-guarded secret."

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Nevertheless, within Pakistan there is a strong view that General Pervaiz Musharraf was in dire need of legitimacy, he jumped to decision to meet that requirement. He is also accused of taking a one man decision and succumbing to pressure after a single telephonic call from the Secretary of State. Though real time pressures on a statesman can never be simulated to find the exact cause and effect relationship of a particular decision, the Indian factor certainly added to the pressures.

face the ramifications to this day. No other country has faced as many threats and challenges on as many fronts. Pakistan stood with the United States and it stands with the entire world, in opposing terrorism. Yet Pakistan faces threat from within and from outside. An interesting front is public opinion at home, though most Pakistanis condemn the 9/11 attacks, there is also a strong reaction on the way America responded to it, and the way Pakistan continues to side with it. Such sentiment initially harboured by the religious right has almost become mainstream national narrative. It is reinforced by the previous memories of the way America abandoned Pakistan after the Soviet exit from Afghanistan, and the fear of its replication. No wonder, for Pakistan, the wartime trivialities like drone attacks have gathered almost unmanageable political baggage.

People of Pakistan also have a historic inclination of measuring the Pak-US bilateral relation in comparison to the US-India relationship. Preferential treatment extended by the US to India on various counts since 9/11, to the detriment of Pakistan's core national interests, has not gone down well with the public sentiment, some of the annoying actions and gestures by America are: US-India Agreement 123; support for Indian claim to the UNSC seat despite India being a defaulter of UNSC resolutions on Kashmir; over pampering India to a super power status despite its derisive performance with respect to UN Millennium Development Goals; the unrelenting US support for Indian entry into four strategic/nuclear export cartels without its being an Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) member state, and despite being the only country that blocked Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations at the Conference of Disarmament (CD) followed by casting a negative vote for the CTBT at the UNGA; and above all an American effort to give a major role to India in post 2014 Afghanistan. One of the major causes of anti-America frenzy in Pakistan is the public perception that Pakistan has suffered enormously by embracing an unnecessary war; and instead of compensating Pakistan, at least for material losses, American is further accentuating the strategic imbalance between the India and Pakistan.

Replicating the pattern followed during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, India is, unfortunately once again on the wrong side of the history. It opposes any meaningful American political engagement with the Taliban, who should now be called militant political groups. It also supports indefinite stay of American forces in Afghanistan.¹⁸ Inviting

¹⁸ Jayant Prasad, "Post-Taliban Afghanistan, 12 years on" *Hindu* (New Delhi), November 13, 2013, <http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/posttaliban-afghanistan-12-years-on/article5345400.ece> (accessed

extra regional forces to invade a country in one's own neighbourhood and then striving to prolong the stay of such forces¹⁹ may fetch some short term benefits, but is not likely to bode well in the context of regional stability in medium to long term timeframe.

Pakistan's Vulnerabilities

After the 9/11 attacks, as the intelligence estimates became clearer and credible, it became pretty sure that America would strike Afghanistan, for which it required land access to Afghanistan. There were only four such land routes: one semi developed access through Iran; two fully functional routes through Pakistan²⁰ and one, partially functional and circuitous, route through Central Asia. Keeping the US-Iran animosity, latter could deny its route and get away with. Route through Central Asia was not developed enough to handle the requisite level of logistics and was 4-5 time expensive than routes through Pakistan.²¹ Routes leading to Afghanistan through Pakistan were the shortest and cheapest. Militarily the only viable option America had for attacking Afghanistan was through Pakistan. If Pakistan did not agree, the US in unison with India could opt for forcible usage of Pakistan's land routes and airspace. Keeping in view the general and genuine wave of sympathy for America, the UNSC would have been too eager to authorise it. There was a remote, though real, possibility of Indian and American forces marching together to Afghanistan through Pakistan. Territorial integrity of Pakistan could have

November 14, 2013). Jayant Prasad has served as India's Ambassador to Afghanistan, Algeria, Nepal and the UN Conference on Disarmament.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Two land routes link Pakistan and Afghanistan through Torkham and Chamman passes. Americans could bring their war logistics by ships to the port city of Karachi and then transport it by road to Afghanistan.

²¹ This route now commonly known as Northern Distribution Network (NDN) is not fully geared up even now. When Pakistan stopped the supply lines passing through its territory following the attack on Pakistani Border post in 2012, American logistics system came under tremendous pressure as time line approached the 100 day pre-dumping mark. Oil supplies could only be transported through two routes running through Pakistan and this turned out to be a critical vulnerability, as American soldiers had to go on rationing, especially air conditioning of their tents was quite painful. During Chicago NATO Summit of May 2012, President Obama refused to meet President Zardari on the sidelines of summit, he just shook hand and said we shall meet after you re-open the supply lines.

been at risk. India would have been delighted with such a response. Pakistan hardly had a viable alternative option.²²

As if Indian pressure was not sufficient, threats from the American side to Pakistan were quite potent, and compelling. Richard Armitage spoke of bombing Pakistan to 'Stone Age'; and there was an over arching American rhetoric: "Either you are with us or against us." Former President Parvez Musharraf recalls that he took it as a "blatant ultimatum."²³ He narrates that, Pakistan's director general of Inter Services Intelligence (DG ISI) who happened to be in Washington, told him about his meeting with the US deputy secretary of state, Richard Armitage. He had told DG ISI that not only Pakistan had to choose the sides, and if it chose to be with the terrorists, then be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age. President Musharraf recalls that he mentally war-gamed against America and concluded that Pakistan would lose. "I also analysed our national interest. First, India had already tried to step in by offering its bases to the United States. If we did not join the United States, it would accept offer". The speedy changes in the global strategic environment emanating from these incidents coupled with regional pushes coming to shove hard, threw up enormous strategic challenges for Pakistan.

Hence, Pakistan decided to allow the Americans substantive access to Afghanistan through land and air under the innocent looking terminology 'logistics facilities'. While doing so, President Musharraf faced fierce domestic opposition from public, politicians and dissenting opinions from within the military leadership; some of senior generals, who opposed the decision, were shown the door and pliant ones were assigned the key slots. Jockeying between the devil and deep blue sea, Pakistan chose to become "the frontline state against global war on terrorism". Indeed, Pakistan was coerced into war through multi-dimensional pressures.²⁴

²² "A decade after 9/11; US and Pakistan on Path of Divergence" September 21, 2011, <http://tacstrat.com/content/index.php/2011/09/21/a-decade-after-911-us-and-pakistan-on-the-path-of-divergence/> (accessed October 24, 2013).

²³ Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire*, 201.

²⁴ *Express Tribune* (Islamabad), July 15, 2013. According to India's Times of India (TOI) newspaper, RVS Mani, who as home ministry under-secretary signed the affidavits submitted in court in the Ishrat Jahan 'fake encounter case', has said that Satish Verma, until recently a part of the Central Bureau of Investigation-SIT probe team, told him that both the 2001 attack on Indian parliament and the 2008 Mumbai attacks were set up "with the objective of strengthening the counter-terror legislation (sic)". Mani has said that Verma "...narrated that the 13/12/2001 (attack on parliament) was followed by Pota (Prevention of

Given the pressures, initial decision to side with America was logical and correct. However as soon after as politically and diplomatically possible, there should have been a course correction to secure the best bargain. Such correction did not come. At that time Pakistan was ruled by a quasi-military set up which was desperate for international legitimacy. Siding with Americans, though out of necessity, brought the regime additional benefit of legitimacy. Democracy related sanctioned were promptly waived off by America.

During this crisis, Pakistan's bargain skills vis-à-vis America were far poorer as compared to the ones on the eve of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Real time and fast moving pressures were tremendous. Through official channels the US had made it clear that time was of the essence. Options remained limited and diminishing due to competitive bidding by India. Pakistan tried to get its foreign loans totalling US\$ 8 billion rescheduled but was able to get relief of only rescheduling US \$1-2 billion. On September 22, the US lifted the economic and military sanctions that had been imposed against Pakistan under the Pressler, Glenn, and Symington Amendments and Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act. The US clearly demonstrated and communicated its motivation, its demand, a credible threat and its urgency to Pakistan. Additionally, its flexible strategy of employing carrots and sticks, not only allowed Pakistan to quickly concede to the US demands, but the carrots allowed the government to "sell" the agreement to a population that was relatively anti-America. The second relief was to keep India off Pakistan's back; Americans faithfully did that.

India on Pakistan Bashing Spree

On its part, India did not give up; it set out to erode the newly revived Pak-US relationship by painting Pakistan as an epicentre of terrorism, playing double game and plotting to embroil Americans in the region on long term basis to remain relevant. The then Indian Home Minister, L K Advani, in a statement on 16 September 2001 said, "The world cannot disregard the fact that over a decade, Pakistan and now Taliban have been promoting terrorism. They have been giving refuge and asylum to all those indulging in terrorist violence."²⁵ Mr Jaswant Singh, during an interview in Washington in October 2001, said that the international community must recognize that, "perpetuation of Taliban regime is to perpetuate terrorism...the Taliban is a product of the machinery of

Terrorist Activities Act) and 26/11/2008 (terrorists' siege of Mumbai) was followed by amendment to the UAPA (Unlawful Activities Prevention Act)."
²⁵ *Hindu*, 17 September 2001.

Pakistan. Pakistan has continued to aid it, finance it, equip it, and continues to do so.”²⁶ He also stressed that, “the only epicentre for the spread of terrorism in that region, including in Central Asia, Iran and in India, not simply in Jammu and Kashmir, but also other parts, the focus of terrorism has become Afghanistan and Pakistan.”²⁷ A car bomb exploded near the Jammu and Kashmir State Assembly on October 01, 2001, killing 27 people; attack was blamed on Kashmiri separatists; the main purpose was to paint the struggle for independence as a terrorist activity and create an anti-Pakistan hype, which was to come handy later. Occasional noises were also made about the safety of Pakistani nukes, on the pretext of their falling into the hands of terrorists.

At international level, India deftly exploited the sensitivities of Western countries to tarnish the image of Pakistan. India, however, did not succeed in its efforts to persuade the international community to categorically declare Pakistan a terrorist state. Simultaneously India also set out to meddle in domestic politics of Pakistan by exploiting traditional fault lines. It frequently provided platform and logistic facilitation to separatist ethnic elements, especially from Baluchistan. All this reinforced the smaller country’s belief that its primary security threat was from India. While supporting the international effort against terrorism, Pakistan was poised to guard its backyard—India. With the passage of time traditional opinion that existential threat emanates from India got further reinforced alongside the perception that problems emanating out of Afghan conflict are transient in nature, and would stand mitigated when Americans leave the region. However, the real threat calculus lies somewhere between these two positions.

Operation Parakram 2001-2

Despite massive Indian troop’s deployments along the international border for at least one year, justified by some dubious false flag operations,²⁸ America did not give India its nod for crossing the line. India’s first major attempt at military coercion achieved only limited success. Operation Parakram, launched in the wake of the December 13, 2001 *terrorist* attack on Indian Parliament, was the first full-scale Indian mobilisation since 1971 Indo-Pak war. It began on December 15, 2001 after the Indian Cabinet Committee on Security’s decision and was

²⁶ “Jaswant support to NA,” *Times of India*, October 3, 2001.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Express Tribune* (Islamabad), July 15, 2013.

completed on January 3, 2002.²⁹ This military deployment exposed India's inability of timely deployment to be able to seize the opportunity. While the Indian formations responsible to defend the border – “holding” or “pivot” corps – were ready for battle within 72 to 96 hours of receiving orders, the three “strike corps” (1, 2 and 21 Corps) took almost three weeks to complete their mobilisation because their fighting echelons are based at long distances from the border. Hence, it was only in the first week of January 2002 that major offensive action could have been undertaken by the Indian land forces.³⁰ By then international diplomacy had worked its way and the crisis had been diffused. The moment of opportunity was lost for India. Worst was behind Pakistan, moreover it was able to demonstrate its capacity and capability to complete its military deployment swiftly, well before the Indian military could achieve its order of battle (ORBAT) and attain desired offensive posture.

Key to avert the crisis was indeed in Pakistan's swift and successful handling of post 9/11 crisis, within the constraints that be. At least theoretically, and conditionally, workarounds were quickly found for the seven American demands handed over to President Musharraf by the US Ambassador, Wendy Chamberlain on September 13, 2001.³¹ American success in swift dislodging of Taliban regime in Afghanistan was mainly due to logistics support provided by Pakistan. Pakistan had earned the good will of America and other important countries. Therefore, they were poised to step in with astute diplomatic manoeuvres to keep India off Pakistan's back.

On President Musharraf's commitment in a nationally telecast speech on January 12, 2002, that Pakistan “will not permit any terrorist activity from its soil.” India backed-off, but troops remained in place at their war deployment areas along the international border and the three strike corps remained poised in their concentration areas. Indian deployment finally ended on October 16, 2002 when Indian CCS belatedly recognised that the law of diminishing returns had already

²⁹ Brig. Gurmeet Kanwal, “Lost Opportunities in Operation Parakram,” *Indian Defence Review* (Net Edition), December 13, 2011, <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/lost-opportunities-in-operation-parakram/> (accessed October 22, 2013).

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire*, 204. Some of these demands were ludicrous like “curb all domestic expression of support (for terrorism) against the United States and its allies.” Such a demand depends on the interpretation of what constitutes verbal support for terrorism and on the limits of dissent and freedom of expression.

been operative for many months.³² To justify the flap of Operation Parakram, Indian CCS declared that troops were being “strategically relocated” and constant vigil would be maintained, especially in J&K.³³ Soon Kashmir was to become the most militarized zone of the World as India permanently lodged over 600,000 military personnel there, empowered by sweeping powers and blanket immunities.

India had learned a lesson in statecraft that while rapidly climbing the escalatory ladder, flexibility should be kept for face saving climb down. This year long hanging on a notch or two below the highest rung of escalatory ladder had cost the two countries a lot in terms of money. Indian response to Mumbai attacks was quite muted as compared to Operation Parakram.

Cold Start Doctrine or Pro-active Operations

As for Parakram fiasco, though some heads rolled for command failure in Indian military hierarchy, the ignominy was too big to stop the buck there. Non-human escape goats had to be invented for damage containment; legacy equipment and longer interior lines were blamed. And far-reaching doctrinal remedial measures were suggested by the military to shift pressure from the military tier to political tier of leadership.

These gimmicks were to lead towards doctrinal adjustments in the name of “Cold Start Doctrine” later renamed as “Proactive Operation”³⁴ and rhetoric articulations about execution of “massive nuclear strikes” in case of terrorist attack on India originating from Pakistan; or in case Pakistan uses tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs)

³² Brig. Gurmeet Kanwal, “Lost opportunities in Operation Parakram.”

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Col. Anil Athale, “Cold Start Doctrine,” *Indian Defence Review*, 26:2 (April-June 2011), http://www.indiandefencereview.com/search/?idr_search=idr&search=cold+start+doctrine+&searchsubmit=Search (accessed October 22, 2013). Under American pressure (on Pakistan’s behest), Indian government distance itself from the term Cold Start Doctrine, terming it a military though process. However, practically requisite military reorganization is at a fairly advanced stage under the garb of “Proactive Operations.” Critics are of the view this through this reorganization India is regressively embracing the erstwhile concept of “Blitzkrieg”. And by doing so strategic potential of the army would stand compromised.

against India.³⁵ Indian defence budget has more than doubled since Operation Parakram.

Indian Military Build-up

In the context of blaming the legacy equipment for the Operation Parakram fiasco,³⁶ Military high command was able to convince the political leadership for an ambitious allocation worth US\$ 120 billion, spread over a long term. This marked a major transition from low to mid-tech Russian equipment to hi-tech American and European war machines. Space programme and cyber warfare came as new capability additives. Ongoing integrated missile development programmes got additional boost to meet targets like ICBMs with MIRV capability. Strategic capabilities like nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers, long range military air transport aircraft and around 150 high technology multi-role fighter attack aircraft are on order. An anti ballistic missile (ABM) system is being setup. Military formations have undergone

³⁵ Shyam Saran, head of the National Security Advisory Board articulated in April 2013 that India would retaliate with strategic weapons against Pakistan if a 26/11 like attack occurred on its land. He cast these remarks as his personal views. However, many in India and outside saw his statements as articulating official policy on a sensitive issue, while maintaining deniability. The Times of India, for example, said Saran was “placing on record India’s official nuclear posture with the full concurrence of the highest levels of nuclear policymakers in Delhi.” He visualizes an escalatory ladder that triggers with a sub-conventional event or a terrorist attack. After which Pakistan tries to dissuade India from carrying out punitive conventional retaliation, by deploying its tactical nuclear weapons and India responds by using strategic weapons. Saran warns that any nuclear attack—whether by strategic or tactical weapons—would be met by “massive retaliation” from India. This will be “designed to inflict unacceptable damage on its adversary.” “Any nuclear exchange once initiated, would swiftly and inexorably escalate to the strategic level.” “Pakistan,” he declares, should “be prudent not to assume otherwise as it sometimes appears to do, most recently by developing and perhaps deploying theatre nuclear weapons.” Most importantly Saran’s escalatory scenario lays bare an underlying frustration that India’s Cold Start Doctrine has been challenged if not blunted by Pakistan’s TNW response. India is no longer committed to no-first-use nuclear. Its current policy is ready-arsenal and deterrence by punishment.

³⁶ Admiral Sushil Kumar, former Navy chief, “Operation Parakram was the most punishing mistake.” Last updated on November 4, 2011 19:36 IST. “There was no aim or military objective for the Operation Parakram...I don't mind admitting that Operation Parakram was the most punishing mistake for the Indian Armed Forces, Kumar said in New Delhi, addressing a seminar on limited wars in South Asia-against a nuclear background. He maintained that the government then lacked any political aim or objective for deploying the army along the Indo-Pakistan border, <http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-nuclear-mindset-we-have-is-a-false-sense-of-security-admiral-sushil-kumar/20111104.htm> (accessed October 24,2014).

massive reorganization to keep pace with new doctrinal compulsions. Fancy ideas of limited warfare under nuclear overhang were floated by the Indian military to deflect efficiency related criticism.

These actions indicate that India is striving to enhance its military outreach well beyond the region. This capability could however be unleashed entirely against Pakistan, on as required basis. Over 80 percent of Indian arsenal is Pakistan specific and most of its military command and control structure is Pakistan perched. India's robust economic growth supports such rearming, thus creating dilemmas for Pakistan. As of now Indian defence budget is seven times the Pakistani defence budget. "SIPRI Fact Sheet March 2013" states that:-

India was the world's largest importer of major conventional weapons in 2008–12. Its arms imports, accounting for 12 per cent of global imports, were 109 per cent higher than those of China, the second biggest arms importer. India imported 59 per cent more arms in 2008–12 than in 2003–2007. In 2008–12 it improved its long-range military capabilities with the import of such items as over 100 Su-30MKI combat aircraft from Russia, 3 A-50E airborne early warning aircraft (combining components from Israel, Russia and Uzbekistan), an Akula nuclear-powered submarine from Russia and the first of 8 P-8I anti-submarine warfare aircraft from the USA.³⁷

Strategic Dimension

In a series of test launches, an Agni V missile was last test launched from Wheeler's Island on September 15, 2013. Every time India test-launches a new ballistic missile, officials from the defense industry go giddy about the next missile, which they say will be bigger, more accurate, fly longer, and carry more nuclear warheads.³⁸ Until now, all Indian ballistic missile types have carried only one warhead each, an

³⁷ Paul Holtom et al, "Trends in International Arms Transfer, 2012," *SIPRI Fact Sheet*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Solna, Sweden: March, 2013), 1,3,4,6.

³⁸ Hans M. Kristensen, "India's Missile Modernization beyond Minimum Deterrence." Hans M. Kristensen is director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists where he provides the public with analysis and background information about the status of nuclear forces and the role of nuclear weapons. He specializes in using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in his research and is a frequent consultant to and is widely referenced in the news media on the role and status of nuclear weapons, <http://blogs.fas.org/> & <http://www.fas.org/> (accessed October 9, 2013).

important feature that is in line with India's minimum deterrence posture. However, India's Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) has declared that the next Agni variant will be equipped to carry multiple warheads. While the single-warhead Agni V is a major defense weapon, the multiple-warhead Agni VI will be a "force multiplier," declared the former head of DRDO. Moreover, the DRDO chief said that all future missiles will be deployed in large canisters on road or rail mobile launchers to get "drastically" shorter response time with an ability to launch in "just a few minutes."³⁹ In 2007, Avinash Chander, who has since been appointed to head the DRDO, said the next Agni variant would have a range of over 5,000 kilometers and "be a multiple warhead missile with a capacity to carry four to 12 warheads."

Agni V is not Pakistan specific. However, if the Indian government has authorized quick-launch capability, it is bad news for South Asia. The combination of multiple warheads, increased accuracy, and drastically reduced launch time indicates that India is gradually moving from minimum deterrence doctrine towards a more capable nuclear posture.

The most important thing in a second-strike posture is not how fast India can react but simply that it can retaliate after absorbing the first strike. The ability to launch quickly is only relevant if India plans to conduct a first strike against its adversaries. Planning for first strike would contradict India's no-first-use policy. Nor is a quick-launch capability necessarily "more stable," it could significantly decrease stability both in peacetime – by stimulating Chinese and Pakistani planners to further increase the responsiveness of their nuclear missiles – and in a crisis by shortening decision time and increasing risk of overreaction and escalation. Statements made by Indian defense officials over the past few years about increasing the payload, responsiveness, and accuracy of nuclear ballistic missiles are worrisome signs that India may be moving towards acquiring nuclear war fighting capabilities.⁴⁰

After nuclearisation of India and Pakistan, Ashley J. Tellis had concluded in his monumental book "India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal" that out of various posturing options, India would most likely choose a 'Force-in-being' option falling in between the recessed deterrence and ready arsenal. The implications of this posture would be that Indian nuclear capabilities will be 'Strategically active' but "operationally dormant." Practically this would mean retaining the ability to undertake retaliatory strike within hours to weeks. This kind of posture would be demonstrative of Indian restraint, while providing it deterrence capability vis-à-vis both China and Pakistan. The other advantage could be avoiding the cost of maintaining a ready arsenal.⁴¹

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Hans M. Kristensen, "India's Missile Modernization beyond Minimum Deterrence."

⁴¹ Naeem Salik, *The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear deterrence: Pakistan's Perspective* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 219-239.

Indian nuclear targeting policy indicates that despite Indian claim that it exercises centralized control over its nuclear weapons and the authority to release the nuclear weapons vests in the prime minister, there has to be pre-delegation of authority to field military commanders to use the nuclear weapons, it is also supported by the C² model adopted by India.⁴²

Pakistan's plugging of gap in its deterrence, arising out of India's evolution of the Cold Start Doctrine, with the development of the short range Nasr missile has led to a bizarre hysteria from Western analysts and their Indian counterparts about Pakistan's contemplation to use battlefield nukes on its own territory. This is not true; however, Nasr has certainly poured icy water on Cold Start Doctrine.

India's Afghanistan Focus

Afghanistan has traditionally remained the focus of Indian regional policy.⁴³ One of the objectives of this focus was to counter balance Pakistan through politico-military pinpricks, on as required basis. Indian military operation Parakram and Brass-tacs Exercise were conducted at critical stages when Pakistan was focused on its western border for managing the Afghan conflict. Unfortunately, India policy on Afghanistan has all along been on the wrong side of the History...supporting the invading extra-regional forces and disregarding the popular Afghan sentiment.

Post-9/11, the US campaign for international war against terrorism and the US operation against the Taliban regime in November 2001 was a blessing in disguise for India, as it provided it with an opportunity to re-establish its influence in Afghanistan. Mr Jaswant Singh, then Indian External Affairs Minister, during his visit to the US in October 2001, stressed that the international community should support the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. "India has never recognized the Taliban as a legitimate regime. We have continued to recognize the government of Afghanistan as represented by President Rabbani. They have formed the Northern Alliance...it should be the effort of the international community now to strengthen the legitimate government of Afghanistan."

⁴² Zafar Iqbal Cheema, *Indian Nuclear Deterrence: Its Evolution, Development and Implications for South Asian Security* (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2010), 353-357.

⁴³ Fahmida Ashraf, "India-Afghanistan Relations: Post-9/11," http://catalogo.casd.difesa.it/GEIDEFile/INDIA%C4%90AFGHANISTAN_RELATIONS_POST-9-11.HTM?Archive=191494691967&File=INDIA%ADAFGHANISTAN+RELATIONS+POST-9-11_HTM (accessed October 31, 2013).

Post-9/11 Indian efforts in Afghanistan to re-establish its influence have been broadly focused on three aspects: a major role in the reconstruction process and economic development; building linkages with the Central Asian States; and attempting to marginalize Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan. As observed by an Indian analyst, Ramtanu Maitra, "The Taliban-Pakistan nexus was wholly unacceptable to India, and the US invasion of Afghanistan to oust the Taliban in the winter of 2001 was most cordially welcomed by New Delhi. India also welcomed the United States efforts to break the Taliban-Pakistan alliance and install a non-fundamentalist Karzai..."⁴⁴ Still, India has failed to marginalize Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan as Pakistan has extended support to the Karzai government and is co-operating in reconstruction and capacity-building of institutions in Afghanistan.⁴⁵

India is among the major contributors to Afghanistan's reconstruction process and is helping in diverse areas, including infrastructure; communications; education; healthcare; social welfare; training of officials, including diplomats and policemen; economic development; and institution-building. India has invested heavily in various sectors, including hydro-electricity projects, road construction, agriculture, industry, telecommunications, education, and health. India is investing in a big way to enhance trade and economic co-operation with Afghanistan. During the visit of the Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, to India in March 2003, India and Afghanistan signed the Preferential Trade Agreement. During the visit to Afghanistan of the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, in August 2005, India and Afghanistan signed two Memoranda of Understandings (MoU) and an Agreement for Co-operation. As part of efforts to promote integrated rural development, Manmohan Singh announced the adoption of 100 villages in Afghanistan. On October 04, 2011, Afghanistan also signed a comprehensive bilateral Agreement on Strategic Partnership with India.⁴⁶ India provides military training to Afghan police and Army. Through most of the innocent looking development projects like road

⁴⁴ "India's Irons in the Afghan Fire," *Asia Times Online*, 26 October 2004, <http://atimes.com/>

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ Agreement on Strategic Partnership between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Republic of India. <http://mfa.gov.af/Content/files/Agreement%20on%20Strategic%20Partnership%20between%20Afghanistan%20and%20India%20-%20English.pdf> (accessed November 14, 2013).

building, training and health, India has been clandestinely proliferating its military footprint by executing these activities through the Indian organizations staffed mainly by its retired military /civil armed forces personnel like Border Road Organization etc. Indian direct investment in Afghanistan exceeds well above US\$ 10 billion. Now based on this investment India is laying claim for its role in shaping post 2014 Afghanistan, and a permanent strategic role in that country.

Pakistan has expressed concerns regarding opening of numerous Indian consulates along Pak-Afghan border. The number of the Consulates is far more than the consular activities in these areas. There is credible evidence that these Consulates are being used as launching pad for separatist and terrorist elements. Evidence on this activity has been shared with India on more than one occasions, handing over of a dossier by the then Pakistani Prime Minister to his Indian counterpart on the eve of 15th NAM summit held in Sharm-al-Shaikh, in 2009, is a public knowledge. The July 07, 2008 Indian embassy bombing in Kabul was a suicide attack that was promptly blamed on ISI; however no credible evidence was provided to Pakistan.

India has many interests in Afghanistan, none of which poses existential threats to Pakistan. Attempt to encircle Pakistan is not likely to work. India is not likely to have a pliant government in Afghanistan irrespective of the composition of post 2014 Afghan government. Maximum leverage that India could accrue over Afghan government is periodic anti-Pakistan pinpricks. In a provocative essay for Brookings, "A Deadly Triangle," William Dalrymple argued that Afghanistan had become the site of an Indo-Pakistan proxy war. Pakistan's attitude to India, he explained, is shaped by its fear of being caught in an Indian "nutcracker": trapped between an age-old enemy to the south and a war-ridden, pro-Delhi state to the north. But such analyses quickly collapse under scrutiny. India's ability to construct a two front dilemma for Pakistan is grossly over projected.

The Central Asia Factor

Post-9/11, India's interest in Afghanistan is also based on the fact that Afghanistan could be developed as a bridge between India and Central Asia. President Karzai, during his visit to India in April 2006, invited Indian companies to invest in Afghanistan. He said, "We will be very happy for Indian companies in Afghanistan to produce their goods and to have Afghanistan as a hub or launching pad for those products in Central Asia".

Both India and Pakistan are interested in establishing trade and broader economic links with the Central Asian region. This region with its rich resources of energy, oil and gas, enormous mineral resources, and a huge consumer market is quite lucrative for both the countries. India and Pakistan are part of the project to develop Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline project, Central Asia South Asia electricity project— commonly known as CASA 1000— also interest the two countries. Pakistan provides the shortest and cheapest transit land routes to Central Asian and beyond. The only prerequisite is calm in Afghanistan.

In a desperate attempt, India has heavily invested in Iranian port of Chahbahar and has built a road from this port to Hajigak pass in Afghanistan. First container moved to Afghanistan via Chahbahar on July 27, 2013.⁴⁷ “But it doesn’t mean an end to exports via the Wagah border between Pakistan and India. However, the Chahbahar option is more economical and profitable for Afghanistan,” Pajhwok Afghan News quoted Abdul Qadeer Mustafa, spokesman to the Export Promotion Agency of Afghanistan (EPAA).⁴⁸ The port serves as alternative to the Pakistan’s Karachi Port for Afghan imports from the Middle East, however it may not be so viable for Indian goods transportation to Afghanistan and beyond. Indian cargo would take around 14 days to reach Afghanistan via Chahbahar as compared to one day via land route through Pakistan’s border check post of Wagah.

An Indian analyst, Meena Singh Roy, has observed in one of her articles, “India as an extended neighbour of CARs has major geostrategic and economic interests in this region. After emergence of the Central Asian Republics as sovereign states, India established diplomatic relations with them and was interested in promoting economic and cultural co-operation. It was also concerned about Pakistan’s influence in the Central Asian region. However, India needed the Afghanistan link to maintain its contacts with the Central Asian states. With the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the marginalization of Indian influence, India faced difficulties in maintaining its influence in the Central Asian region. However, because of its links with the Northern Alliance, it did maintain some links with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.”

⁴⁷ “India-Afghan Direct Exports Begin First Time in History Chahbahar Port,” *Indian Defence Forum*, <http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/subcontinent-central-asia/53138-india-afghan-direct-exports-begin-first-time-history-chahbahar-port.html> (accessed November 15, 2013).

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

India completed the refurbishment of a military base at Ayni in Tajikistan: the process began in 2002 and has been accomplished at a cost of US\$10 million.⁴⁹ Apart from Russia, US, and Germany, India is the fourth country to have a military air base in Central Asia. Initially, India was planning to deploy MiG-29 fighters at Ayni; however, due to the reservations expressed by Pakistan, Tajikistan has allowed India to deploy only Mi-17V1 helicopters. The base is of strategic importance to India, and existence of fighter attack jet capable infrastructure is a point of concern for Pakistan, because such bases can be activated within 48-72 hours for undertaking full spectrum offensive air operations. As observed by an Indian analyst, Sudha Ramachandran, “A base at Ayni allows India rapid response to any emerging threat from the volatile Afghanistan–Pakistan arc ...It also gives New Delhi a limited but significant capability to inject special forces into hostile theatres as and when the situation demands...in the event of military confrontation with Pakistan, India would be able to strike Pakistan’s rear from Tajik soil...Ayni has to do with India’s growing interests in Central Asia as well.”⁴⁹

Retooling India-Pakistan Relations

The story of an enduring Indo-Pakistan rivalry is a familiar one, in which the neighboring states, born of a bloody partition, are trapped in an endless cycle of conflict. This storyline perpetuates two false and destabilizing trends. The first is a static understanding of Indo-Pakistan relations, pessimistic in its fixation on their violent history. The second is a reductive understanding, in which the emphasis on security obscures the long and successful record of cooperation– there is a need to re-think India-Pakistan relations and retool them.⁵⁰

The two countries have maintained a patchy ceasefire over the LoC in Kashmir since 2003. Current spate of ceasefire violations began in January, 2013; by the close of year such incident could be around 200, far exceeding last year’s total of 117.⁵¹ Things came to a crisis

⁴⁹ “India Makes a Soft Landing in Tajikistan,” *Asia Times*, March 3, 2007, www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IC03Df0I.html (accessed October 6, 2013).

⁵⁰ Ram Mashru, “Rethinking Indian Pakistan Relations,” October 15, 2013, <http://despardes.com/opinion-rethinking-india-pakistan-relations/> (accessed October 18, 2013). This blog first appeared in *The Diplomat*.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

situation is September, 2013 when, just short of high-profile talks between Nawaz Sharif and Manmohan Singh on the sidelines of 68th UNGA session, militants of unknown identity killed eight Indian security personnel and a civilian. The attack was deliberately timed, and follows a pattern of attempts by vested interests to frustrate the bilateral peace process. Dr Singh, despite domestic electoral compulsions, could not be provoked to the level of calling off the talks. However, the bilateral was grossly de-scaled...from a breakfast meeting to a display of glass of water. Narendra Modi, the BJP's prime ministerial candidate, had advised Dr Singh to skip his meeting with Nawaz Sharif.

Indian leadership's post 9/11 strategy of portraying Pakistan as a terrorist state continues to be the main obstacle in normalization of relations. While addressing the 68th session of the UNGA Manmohan Singh chose to denounce Pakistan as the "epicenter of terrorism", and denied the existence of Kashmir issue by declaring it as an "integral part of India" and hence not negotiable. This was Manmohan Singh's harshest ever anti-Pakistan diatribe from the UN platform. It came as a disappointment to the well wishers of stable and peaceful Paki-India relationship because only a day earlier, from the same podium, Nawaz Sharif had extended an olive branch to India and offered to work together for peaceful settlement of all outstanding issues including Kashmir. Moreover, India's President Pranab Mukherjee, while on a foreign trip to Belgium, violated the diplomatic norms and went overboard to condemn Pakistan for failing to apprehend terrorists operating from its soil.⁵²

Since coming to power, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has been making peace overtures towards India. Across the border, there is a sense of stasis. Singh can do little between now and next year's general elections. Ironically, Indian elections have traditionally been contested and won on the basis of anti-Pakistan rhetoric. In Pakistan, relations with India do not figure out anywhere in the election campaign. After the Indian elections, Pakistan aims to engage the new government constructively.

Confronting the Issues

⁵² "Push for Regional Peace: Indian President accuses Pakistan of Exporting Terror," *Express Tribune*, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/613817/push-for-regional-peace-indian-president-accuses-pakistan-of-exporting-terror/> (accessed October 6, 2013).

Both countries are mired in lingering disputes of various kinds. They need to come out of a state of denial and face these issues, with courage and perseverance, to settle them. Singh-Sharif talks in New York were a significant achievement⁵³. These talks represented a return on the vast political capital both leaders have invested in making Indo-Pakistan relations durable. To carry forth the process, on December 12, 2013, Special Assistant on Foreign affairs to Prime Minister of Pakistan, Tariq Fatemi, handed over a letter from Mr Nawaz Sharif along with a peace dossier to Dr Singh⁵⁴. In his letter to Dr Singh, Prime Minister Nawaz said that his government was willing to go ‘the extra mile’ to improve ties with New Delhi⁵⁵.

India and Pakistan have locked their horns over water disputes, rising frequency of referral of water issues to international dispute management structures under the Indus Water Treaty (IWT)—Neutral Expert and Court of Arbitration—speaks volumes about inadequacy and fragility of bilateral conflict resolution capacity of the two countries.

Territorial disputes have been allowed to ferment; these have in turn gathered immense political baggage, hence making any bilateral bold initiative unlikely. To gain some territory, India is keen to settle the Sir Creeks issue quickly and is not interested to make any progress for an early settlement of Siachen and Kashmir disputes.

Simmering Kashmir

Kashmir continues to simmer after 9/11. No meaningful peace initiative between India and Pakistan can stand for itself if the Kashmir issue is circumvented. However, India is in no mood to cede space; that too during this timeframe when Pakistan is preoccupied with combating terrorism of various kinds, including that sponsored by India itself.

There has been a persistent Indian campaign to malign the freedom struggle of Kashmiri people by equating it with international terrorism. Most of the incidents of violence which take place in Indian Held Kashmir are promptly projected as acts of terrorism and are blamed on Pakistan. Another finger pointing towards Pakistan is on the count of cross border infiltrations. Both of these do not stand the test of scrutiny, rather they reflect on the perseverance and tenacity of Kashmiri people for achieving their right of self determination as documented in UN resolutions. Indian regular forces stationed in Jammu and Kashmir are around 600,000, in-addition there is strong presence of state and central reserve police contingents. Kashmir is

⁵³ Ram Mashru, “Rethinking Indian Pakistan Relations.”

⁵⁴ *Express Tribune* (Islamabad), December 14, 2013.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

dubbed as the most militarized zone in the world. These forces are empowered by repressive powers through Armed Forces Special Powers (AFSP) Act.⁵⁶ In addition a number of empowering statutes like Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act (POTA), Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) and Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA)⁵⁷ etc are operative in Jammu and Kashmir. These laws grant sweeping powers and immunities to the law enforcing agencies. Kashmiris on the Indian side like to associate themselves with Pakistani national events like the Independence Day, and observe similar Indian events as black day. A number of Confidence Building Measures like intra-Kashmir trade, transportation and easement of visa regime etc have not been able to sustain. Now India has decided to build a 198 km long, ten meter high, great wall on the LoC, on the pretext of stopping alleged cross border infiltrations, this would be in addition to existing two layers of fencing, and between these two layers is the obstructive razor sharp concertina wire.⁵⁸ While Berlin wall could not stand against the will of the people of the divided city, India is trying to relieve the legacy in the footsteps of Israel's West bank fortifications.

Chief Minister of IHK, Omar Abdullah, has said on more than one occasion that presence of Indian armed forces in the territory is directly related to the graph of violence. Former Indian Army Chief General V K Singh has recently stated that Indian army has been regularly doling pay-outs to IHK ministers for "stabilizing." He claimed that the army has paid all ministers in IHK since independence, and that everyone in the system, including the defence ministry, has been in the know. Army has been giving money to ministers to "ensure that the people are kept together". "The army transfers money to all the ministers... there are various things to be done. As part of the stabilising factor in held Kashmir, as part of the activities to be organized," V K Singh told a TV channel. Responding to VK Singh's confession, the veteran Hurriyet leader, Syed Ali Gilani said: "We are not surprised, and we know that for the legitimization of forced control of Kashmir, they are regularly being paid for their covert services." He further said, "VK Singh's statement supports our claim that election drama in the past was manipulated and stage-managed through the secret fund supplied by agencies."

Human Rights abuses in Jammu and Kashmir

⁵⁶ "Jammu and Kashmir assembly discusses AFSPA," *Times of India*, October 1, 2013, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-10-01/india/42577092_1_afspa-army-personnel-kathua-and-samba (accessed November 5, 2013).

⁵⁷ "TADA Court Issues Notice to CBI on Perarivalan's Plea," *Times of India*, September 20, 2013, [http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/Terrorist-and-Disruptive-Activities-\(Prevention\)-Act](http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/Terrorist-and-Disruptive-Activities-(Prevention)-Act) (accessed November 5, 2013).

⁵⁸ "India Mulling Constructing Wall?," *Business Recorder* (Karachi), November 24, 2013.

Numerous HR organizations of international repute, like Amnesty International, have been pointing fingers towards HR violations in the Indian held Kashmir. Apart from repressive laws, mass graves⁵⁹ have also been discovered in various parts of Indian portion of Kashmir, these atrocities are presumed to have been committed since the resumption of liberation moment in 1989, since then this movement has been following a roller coaster profile, picking momentum for a short periods, going in to lull for a long duration and then resurfacing. The latest upsurge took place in 2010, when rejuvenated movement took the forms of social media campaign and stone pelting (sangbaz fight) on the security forces' personnel.⁶⁰

Samjhauta Express Bombings

Samjhauta Express is an international train that runs from New Delhi, to Lahore, and is one of two trains to cross the India-Pakistan border. The February 18, 2007 Samjhauta Express bombings was a premeditated terrorist attack. At least 68 people were killed, mostly Pakistani. Prasad Shrikant Purohit, a senior serving Indian army officer, presumably associated with cadres of a shadowy Hindu fundamentalist group, was later identified and investigated as a key suspect responsible for the bombing.⁶¹ Five years down the line, investigations are still on and the culprits are yet to be punished.

⁵⁹ Amnesty International, "Thousands Lost in Kashmir Mass Graves," <https://www.amnesty.org/fr/node/4619> (accessed November 6, 2113). "Amnesty International has urged the Indian government to launch urgent investigations into the mass graves, which are thought to contain the remains of victims of human rights abuses in the context of the armed conflict that has raged in the region since 1989."

⁶⁰ Vijaita Singh, "Stone-pelting Incidents Up Six-fold in J&K," *Indian Express* (New Delhi), October 14, 2013, <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/stonepelting-incidents-up-sixfold-in-j-k/1182209/> (accessed November 6, 2013). "After a brief lull, stone-pelting is back in Jammu and Kashmir. Compared to 2012, this year there has been almost a six-fold increase in the number of times protesters resorted to stone-pelting on security forces. According to data collected by the CRPF, the central police force deployed across the state till September has already witnessed 318 such incidents compared to 55 in 2012. The number of security personnel injured in such incidents has increased more than three times."

⁶¹ Vinay Kumar, "Recent Arrests May Help NIA Crack Blast Cases," *Hindu* (New Delhi), December 27, 2012, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/recent-arrests-may-help-nia-crack-blast-cases/article4242292.ece?ref=relatedNews> (accessed November 6, 2013). "Three recent arrests by the National Investigation Agency may throw new light on the 2007 Samjhauta Express blasts, the May 2007 Mecca Masjid blast in Hyderabad and the Malegaon explosion in Maharashtra. Rajendra Chaudhary alias Samandar, who was arrested, last week from Ujjain district of Madhya Pradesh, had allegedly planted explosives aboard the Samjhauta Express. The train blast claimed 68 lives on February 18, 2007....The Malegaon blasts in 2006, probed by

Mumbai Attacks 2008

The 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai killed over 173 and wounded 308 persons. The sole surviving gunman Ajmal Kasab who was arrested during the attacks was alleged to be a Pakistani national. In May 2010, an Indian court convicted him on four counts of murder, waging war against India, conspiracy and terrorism offences. He was sentenced to death.⁶² India blames the Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistan-based outlawed militant group, for planning and executing the attacks. Indian officials demanded that Pakistan should extradite suspects for trial; whereas there is no extradition treaty between the two countries. India also blames that given the sophistication of the attacks, the perpetrators "must have had the support of some official agencies in Pakistan".

Islamabad has since contested the claims and demanded evidence. India provided sketchy evidence in the form of incomplete record of interrogation, captured weapons, candy wrappers, Pakistani brand milk packets, and telephone sets. At professional level such pieces of evidence cannot stand scrutiny, as all these could be concocted. These claims need thorough investigation and corroboration, a judicial commission is still investigating the event, a seven-member Pakistani component of the commission last visited India in September 2013 to cross examine the witnesses⁶³. The only survivor of the attack was hanged by India on November 21, 2012; this decision has surprised the professional legal experts.⁶⁴ He was neither given access to Pakistani investigators nor to the judicial commission. During the initial phase of his trial, the Indian government appointed defence council had abdicated under duress. It would have been in the fitness of things if Ajmal Kasab was executed after the conclusion of investigations.

Fugitives Issue

Maharashtra's Anti-Terrorism Squad, were blamed on nine Muslim men. The arrested men claimed that they had been framed. Most of them were freed on bail by court last year. Malegaon was chosen for bomb attacks twice as it has a sizable Muslim population. In 2011, Swami Aseemanand admitted that radical Hindu and right-wing extremists were behind the 2006 blasts. He, however, retracted his confession."

⁶² "Ajmal Kasab Hanged and Buried in Pune's Yerwada Jail," *Times of India* (New Delhi), November 21, 2012 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-11-21/india/35256891_1_ajmal-kasab-mercy-petition-mumbai-terror (accessed November 6, 2013).

⁶³ "Pakistan judicial commission arrives in India to question witnesses in 2008 Mumbai terror attacks", Updated: September 21, 2013 22:26 IST <http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/pakistan-judicial-commission-arrives-in-india-to-question-witnesses-in-2008-mumbai-terror-attacks-421865> (accessed on December 22, 2013)

⁶⁴ "Ajmal Kasab Hanged and Buried in Pune's Yerwada Jail," *Times of India* (New Delhi), November 21, 2012 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-11-21/india/35256891_1_ajmal-kasab-mercy-petition-mumbai-terror (accessed November 6, 2013).

India often accuses that some of the most wanted Indian fugitives, such as Dawood Ibrahim, are present in Pakistan. On 11 May 2011, India released a list of 50 "Most Wanted Fugitives" hiding in Pakistan.⁶⁵ This was to tactically pressure Pakistan after the killing of Osama bin Laden in his compound in Abbottabad. After two comic errors in the list received publicity, the Central Bureau of Investigation removed it from their website pending a review.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ "India Releases List of '50 Most Wanted' Fugitives," *Hindu* (New Delhi), May 15, 2011, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-releases-list-of-50-most-wanted-fugitives/article2009382.ece> (accessed November 19, 2013). "India on Wednesday came out with a list of 50 'most wanted fugitives' hiding in Pakistan. They include underworld don Dawood Ibrahim, 26/11 mastermind and Lashkar-e-Taiba founder Hafiz Saeed and dreaded terrorist Zaki ur Rehman Lakhvi. The list, which was given to Pakistan at the Home Secretary-level talks in March, has Hafiz Saeed on top, followed by Major Iqbal, a suspected serving Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) officer, who also figures in the FBI indictment in a Chicago court in connection with the 2008 Mumbai attack. The release of the documents comes two days after the government made public the names of five Pakistanis, who figured in the second charge sheet in the Chicago case for having taken a leading part in the Mumbai attack conspiracy. It also comes in the midst of an acute discomfort for Pakistan over the charge of sheltering al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden, who was killed in a US Special Forces operation at Abbottabad. Interestingly, Pakistan's Interior Minister Rehman Malik said on Tuesday that Dawood Ibrahim was not in his country. The Wednesday list also includes Jaish-e-Mohammed chief Maulana Masood Azhar, principal accused in the 2001 Parliament attack case. He was released in exchange for the hostages in the 1999 Kandahar hijack of Indian Airlines plane. Another big name in the list is Illyas Kashmiri, accused of transnational crimes and conspiracy to commit various terror acts in India. Kashmiri figures in speculative reports as the one tipped to become the new al Qaeda chief. The others in the list are Dawood's close associates, Memon Ibrahim alias Tiger Memon, Shaikh Shakeel alias Chhota Shakeel, Memon Ayub Abdul Razak, Anis Ibrahim Kaskar Shaikh, Anwar Ahmed Haji Jamal and Mohammed Ahmed Dosa, all involved in the 1993 Mumbai serial blasts. Hizbul Mujahideen chief Syed Salauddin, Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front founder Amanullah Khan, Punjab terrorists Lakhbir Singh, Paramjit Singh Panjwar, Ranjit Singh alias Neeta and Wadhawa Singh were also named as most wanted fugitives. The names of the Mumbai terror attack case accused Sajid Majid, Major Sameer Ali, Sayed Abdul Rehman alias Pasha and Abu Hamza were included in the list".

⁶⁶ "Goof-up in the List of Fugitives Given to Pakistan," *Hindu* (New Delhi), May 18, 2011, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/states/goofup-in-the-list-of-fugitives-given-to-pakistan/article2025887.ece?pref=relatedNews> (accessed November 19, 2013). "The Union government has ordered an inquiry into the goof-up in the preparation of the list of '50 most wanted' fugitives, submitted to Pakistan two months ago, as it included the name of a terror accused living in Thane, a Mumbai suburb. Wazhul Kamar Khan is an accused in the 2003 Mulund train blast, which killed 11 persons. He was arrested but granted bail and was found living at Thane with his family. His name figured as Khan Wazhul Kamar at

Areas of Cooperation

India-Pakistan relationship must be credited with continued perseverance and tenacity. Despite serious difficulties both countries have been able to maintain sustained cooperation in many areas. On February 10, 2011, India agreed to resume talks with Pakistan which were suspended after 26/11 Mumbai attacks. Cooperation over water, trade and talks has survived changes in government, of various political hues, on both sides. There is fair degree of optimism for trade-led rapprochement. India has granted most favored nation status (MFN) to Pakistan, and Pakistan is in the process of doing so. During past decade bilateral trade has increased almost six-fold, from \$370 million per year to \$2.4 billion. Besides, there is a huge volume of informal trade via UAE and Afghanistan. The two countries have also maintained ties through South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), a regional body that encourages interaction in relation to commerce, culture and technology. Most importantly, the two sides continue to cooperate on confidence building measures (CBMs) in Kashmir and other areas. During their talks in New York, Dr Singh and Mr Sharif reaffirmed their commitment to CBMs and also agreed, for the first time, to bring senior military officials⁶⁷ to the table in the effort to restore the ceasefire.

Bilateral Economic Cooperation

Both India and Pakistan are passing through delicate political times. India is getting ready to hold the next general elections. Pakistan has a new government in place. In both cases, the governments face economic challenges.⁶⁸ For the last several months the South Asian currencies have been under stress.⁶⁹ The Indian rupee has lost nearly 20 per cent of its value in terms of the American dollar since the beginning of the year. The Pakistani rupee lost close to 14 per cent of its value in the same period. Both governments have taken some steps to stabilize their currencies. Both have had some success. But in focusing on the value of their respective currencies they have made one big mistake that will prove to be politically costly. They have opted for stabilization over growth. The markets will continue to be skeptical for as long as the

serial number 41. The embarrassment prompted the government to quickly order a probe, official sources said. The list was prepared in consultation with the Maharashtra police, the National Investigation Agency and the Central Bureau of Investigation.”

⁶⁷ Both sides agreed that their Directors General Military Operations would meet to hammer out the procedures for sustaining cease-fire in Kashmir.

⁶⁸ Shahid Javed Burki, “A Common Economic Recipe for India and Pakistan,” Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), Singapore, *ISAS Insights*, no. 230 (October 4, 2013), www.isas.nus.edu.sg.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

policy makers don't change their long-term course. To some extent the policy makers in Islamabad have their hands tied because of the programme they have signed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The choice they have to make is between growth and stability. With sharp declines in GDP growth in India over the last year and a half, the country needs to lower interest rates to reignite growth. With Pakistan's economy stuck in a recession for the last six years, it is also the lowering of the interest rate that should be the policy of choice. In both cases, however, the currency markets and inflation have pushed the policy makers in the opposite direction.⁷⁰ The Indian Government has chosen to allow its performance to be determined essentially by the prices that people have to pay for the items of everyday consumption. Inflation has been relatively high in recent months. The new Pakistani government seems half-inclined to treat the level of prices as an important test for his ability to restore economic health to the country. In adopting these policy decisions, the two governments are making serious political mistakes. Their economic performance will be determined by the rates of growth of their national economies and not by the modest changes in the level of prices.⁷¹ There is a need to give a clear signal to the markets on both sides that the policymakers have well-thought-out strategies in place to address the long term issues faced by the two countries. India has greater degrees of freedom of options than Pakistan.

Trade

India and Pakistan would mutually benefit from bolstering bilateral trade. Yet, potent forces on both sides work against it.⁷² When Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif took the reins of power in June 2013, he made an all out effort to send positive signals, he only received embarrassing rebukes. Therefore the naysayers on both sides have become further emboldened. India is keen to get most favored nation (MFN) status from Pakistan. However, there are serious reservations in the context of disadvantage it would bring to Pakistan's industrial and agricultural sectors. The provisions of the World Trade Organization lay out procedures and regulations about tariff parity; these do not, however, cater for the non-tariff barriers (NTB) currently protecting Indian industry. Moreover, Indian government provides heavy subsidies to its agriculture sector through direct and indirect means.⁷³ Wheat and rice are the two staple crops in India and state has virtually taken over these two crops. India's subsidy to its energy sector helps in keeping the end product prices low. Another factor that makes India more eager to push its product into Pakistan and beyond is its increasing trade with China

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Tridivesh Singh Maini (bharatpress), "Pakistan: Trade Goods, Not Allegations," *Diplomat*, October 7, 2013.

⁷³ "A Citizens' Guide to Energy Subsidies in India," *International Institute for Sustainable Development*, 2012, Manitoba, Canada, 6-30, http://www.iisd.org/gsi/sites/default/files/ffs_india_czguide.pdf (accessed November 17, 2013).

that now exceeds US\$ 80 billion per annum. India has become a dumping ground for cheaper and low quality, yet publicly popular, Chinese products; hence India is under pressure to find external markets for its domestic products.⁷⁴ Under the existing circumstances, Indian products would do to Pakistan's economy what Chinese products have done to the Indian economy. Due to these apprehensions, the prospects of a sustainable bloom in formal bilateral trade are not very promising. Both countries will have to work at technical levels and India will have to take concrete steps to create space for Pakistani products into Indian market. Furthermore, persistent political volatility between the two countries does not provide enabling environment to build investors' sustained confidence.

Ironically, there are misperceptions on the Indian side as well that in case of trade and commerce with Pakistan only the latter would reap benefits. Those in India who oppose trade with Pakistan forget the fact that many Indian businesses are likely to gain.⁷⁵ Though during 2011-2013 conversation did take place in the economic sphere, it is a pity that economic ties between both countries are a victim of a sub-section of the two societies—hardliners who look at the bilateral relationship through a skewed lens.

President of the Southern Gujarat Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SGCCI) India, Kamlesh Yagnik, during his visit to Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI) on November 27, 2013 said that it is possible to enhance the existing \$2 billion trade volume to \$25 billion in the next 10 years through collective efforts of business communities of Pakistan and India.⁷⁶ "I am confident it can be achieved through collective efforts of the business communities and governments of both countries," Yagnik said. He added the two countries were doing trade through three channels – direct trade, circular trade and informal

⁷⁴ Ananth Krishnan, "8 Per cent Slump in Indian Exports to China Widens Trade Gap," *Hindu* (New Delhi), August 11, 2012. "Indian exports to China fell by 8 per cent in July—the biggest decline in Chinese imports from any major country—further widening an already record trade deficit that has increasingly strained trade ties. Indian exports to China fell to \$12.9 billion after seven months of this year, according to figures released here on Friday. Imports fell 3.3 per cent to \$26.6 billion, taking India's deficit to \$13.7 billion. Officials said the fall was largely on account of the steep decline in the export of iron ore following recent bans. Iron ore, which is by far India's biggest export product to China, fell by almost 50 per cent in the first six months of this year to \$3.3 billion, down from \$6 billion in the same period last year," <http://wtocentre.iift.ac.in/thematic/pdf/thematic2013/Bilateral%20and%20Regional/China.pdf> (accessed November 11, 2013).

⁷⁵ Tridivesh Singh Maini (bharatpress), "Pakistan: Trade Goods, Not Allegations". *The Diplomat*, October 7, 2013.

⁷⁶ "Mutual Benefits: Pak-India Trade Can be Enhanced to US\$ 25 Billion," *Express Tribune* (Islamabad), November 28, 2013, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/638055/mutual-benefits-pak-india-trade-can-be-enhanced-to-25-billion/> (accessed November 28, 2013).

trade. The direct trade includes legal channels and other formal ways while circular trade involves Indian export products available in other countries which are imported by Pakistan. Commenting on India's most-favoured nation (MFN) status, he said "it will help increase formal trade and result in taking the existing trade volume to new highs." He also suggested that instead of trading in dollars, a currency swap agreement should be signed by both governments that would prove favourable for them. During this visit KCCI President Abdullah Zaki and SGCCI President Kamlesh Yagnik signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) for strengthening cooperation between the two chambers. KCCI President Zaki urged both governments to ease visa restrictions, improve roads and railway infrastructure, tackle issues of non-tariff barriers, set up investment and banking channels and open some crossing points for trade.⁷⁷

Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)

India and Pakistan have instituted several confidence-building measures (CBMs), since the 9/11 attacks, to lower tensions between the two countries. Most significant is Pakistan's readiness to grant the Most Favoured Nation status to India. Other CBM's include more high-level talks, easing visa restrictions, and restarting of cricket matches between the two countries. Cross LoC trade, Srinagar-Muzaffarabad and Poonch-Rawalakot bus service have eased the cross LoC movement to a large extent. Some improvements in the relations are seen with the re-opening of a series of transportation networks across the India-Pakistan border. Prime Ministers of the two countries met in New York in September 2013, and in December 2013 Pakistan has sent a peace dossier to India that contains concrete proposals for sustainable peace. Pakistan has also proposed setting up of a joint body for crisis management under the joint chairmanship of the National Security Advisors of the two countries.

Disaster Management

Even during strained relations, the two countries have been extending helping hand to each other during natural calamities. For example, During Gujarat earthquake, Pakistan had sent a plane load of relief supplies to India from; it carried 200 tents and more than 2,000 Blankets. Furthermore, President Musharraf called the Indian PM to express his 'sympathy' over the loss from the earthquake.⁷⁸ Likewise during the 2005 Earthquake in Pakistan India had offered generous aid to Pakistan.⁷⁹ Indian and Pakistani High Commissioners consulted with

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ "Rival Pakistan Offers India Help," *BBC News*, January 30, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1139807.stm (accessed November 19, 2013).

⁷⁹ "India Offers Pakistan \$25m in Aid," *BBC News*, October 27, 2005,

each other for coordinating the relief work. India also offered aid to Pakistan during 2010 flash floods. Such generous gestures always signal an added spirit of friendliness and cooperation between India and Pakistan.

Social Relations, Cultural Links and People to People Contacts

India and Pakistan have deep rooted cultural similarities. Almost identical social customs, cuisines and languages underpin the historical ties between the two. Pakistani singers, musicians, comedians and entertainers have enjoyed widespread popularity in India, with many achieving overnight fame in the Indian filming industry Bollywood. Likewise, Indian music and films are very popular in Pakistan. Being located in the northernmost region of the South Asia, Pakistan's culture is somewhat similar to that of North India. The Punjab region was split into Indian and Pakistan portions. The Punjabi people are today the largest ethnic group in Pakistan and also an important ethnic group of northern India.

The founder of the Sikh religion was born in the modern-day Pakistani Punjab province, in the city of Nankana Sahib. Millions of Indian Sikhs routinely come to Nankana Sahib for visiting their holy places. They have always been appreciative of the hospitality extended to them and high standard of upkeep of their holy places. The Sindhi people are the ethnic majority group of the Pakistan's Sindh province. Many Hindu Sindhis migrated to India in 1947; hence India became home country for a sizable Sindhi community. A large number of Muslims who migrated from India to Pakistan during independence still maintain family links in India.

Urdu and Hindi are the tow names of the same language, both use different scripting alphabets. Though the written communication is limited, it is widely spoken and understood in the two countries. Standard Urdu is mutually intelligible with Standard Hindi. Both languages share the same Indic base and are almost indistinguishable in phonology and grammar. Most linguists consider them to be two standardized forms of same language; when speaking colloquially, a speaker of Urdu has no trouble understanding a speaker of Hindi, and vice-versa. Apart from Hindustani, India and Pakistan also share a distribution of the Punjabi (written in the Gurmukhi script in Indian Punjab, and the Shahmukhi script in Pakistani Punjab), Kashmiri and Sindhi languages.

Intermarriages

Divided families frequently perform interstate marriage. Some Indian and Pakistani people marry across the border otherwise as well. However these are mostly intra-faith marriages. In April 2010 a high profile Pakistani cricketer, Shoaib Malik married the Indian tennis star Sania

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4381982.stm (accessed November 19, 2013).

Mirza. The wedding received much media attention and appreciation in both the countries⁸⁰. However, hard liners have been opposing such marriages. For example, Shiv Sena chief, late Bal Thackeray flayed tennis star Sania Mirza for her decision to marry Pakistani cricketer Shoaib Malik, saying: "Henceforth, Sania will not remain an Indian. Had her heart been Indian, it wouldn't have beaten for a Pakistani". Thackeray added: "For Shoaib, India is an enemy, not only in sports arena but also in the battlefield". Outrageous reaction by the hardliner Hindu outfits on intra-faith marriages is highly illogical and it only brings bad taste to the mouth. On Pakistani side there is no such reaction and public welcomes such marriages.

Sporting ties

Pakistan and India have traditionally maintained robust sporting contacts. However, sometimes during tense political environment, India has resorted to severing these contacts. Cricket and hockey matches between the two (as well as other sports to a lesser degree such as those of the SAARC games) have often been political in nature. They draw lot of public frenzy from both sides. On the other hand, in tennis, Rohan Bopanna of India and Aisam-ul-Haq Qureshi of Pakistan have formed a successful duo and have been dubbed as the "Indo-Pak Express"⁸¹. Chief Minister of Pakistan's Punjab visited Indian state of Punjab to be the chief guest at World *Kabbadi* Championship in Ludhiana city on December 14, 2013. The title was contested by national teams of the two countries⁸².

Diasporic Relations

The large size of the Indian diaspora and Pakistani diaspora in many different countries throughout the world has created strong diasporic relations. British Indians and British Pakistanis, the largest and second-largest ethnic minorities living in the United Kingdom respectively, have friendly relations with one another. It is quite common for a "Little India" and a "Little Pakistan" to co-exist in South Asian ethnic enclaves in overseas countries. There are various cities such as Birmingham, Blackburn and Manchester where British Indians and British Pakistanis live alongside each other in peace and harmony. Both Indians and Pakistanis living in the UK fit under the category of British Asian. In 2006, a "Friends without Borders" scheme began with the help of two British tourists. The idea was that Indian and Pakistani children would

⁸⁰ "Sania's Heart Not Indian as It Beats for Pakistani," *Indian Express* (New Delhi), April 2, 2010, <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/sanias-heart-not-indian-as-it-beats-for-pakistani/599144/> (accessed November 19, 2013).

⁸¹ "The Indo-Pak Express Rolls On," *Economic Times*, September 10, 2010, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-09-10/news/27599621_1_indo-pak-express-bopanna-and-qureshi-zeballos (accessed November 19, 2013).

⁸² *Pakistan Observer* (Islamabad), December 15, 2013.

make pen pals and write friendly letters to each other. The idea was very successful in both countries that the organization found it difficult to manage the traffic of correspondence.⁸³ Similarly in the Middle Eastern countries, the two diasporic communities co-exist in a cordial way. Nevertheless, any tensions between the two countries immediately reflect in the diasporic relations the world over.

The Way Forward: Let Diplomacy Take the Lead

There are no problems between the two countries that cannot be resolved through dialogue. However, the relationship is rather complex, and while suggesting a way forward there is always a risk of either oversimplification or overstatement. All the major political parties in Pakistan and India are in favour of improving relations between the two countries. The key question is, how can dialogue be made the sole and continuous method and how can its derailment by single, unexpected events, be avoided.

The basic discourse which pervades Indo-Pak relations is whether specific disputes must first be solved before true normalization can be achieved or whether individual disputes are more easily resolved in an overall atmosphere of mutual trust and cooperation. Strained relations between the two are a serious impediment in the way of achieving respective national aspirations. There is a need that both sides should strive to create a lasting environment of mutual trust and freedom from fear.

Despite setbacks, saner elements in both countries continue to work for normalization of relations. In 1999, Prime Minister Vajpayee undertook his ground breaking 'Bus yatra' to Lahore, where both sides signed the Lahore Declaration. Unfortunately, the spirit of Lahore Declaration did not survive long.

At the SAARC meeting in Islamabad in January 2004, the two sides agreed to start a composite dialogue that would address all issues, including Kashmir. The spirit of the Islamabad agreement received added impetus by the observance of a ceasefire along the Line of Control in Kashmir and the successful tour of the Indian cricket team, during which the public on both sides gave enthusiastic demonstrations of friendship. The dialogue process continued satisfactorily for four years, until disrupted by the Mumbai attacks in November, 2008.

At the SAARC meeting in Thimpu, Bhutan, in 2010, the two Prime Ministers agreed to a limited resumption of talks and soon afterwards, the Foreign Secretaries were able to expand the agenda to cover all subjects which had been under discussion in the composite dialogue. The first meeting of Foreign Ministers in the summer of 2010

⁸³ "Friends without Borders," <http://www.friendswithoutborders.org/> (accessed November 19, 2013). "All across India, tens of thousands of children have begun writing heartfelt letters to the students in Pakistan. All across Pakistan, tens of thousands of children are replying with heartfelt letters back. New connections are being made. New friendships are being formed."

was a fiasco, but the second meeting, which was held in Delhi in July 2011, showed a positive approach by both sides.

Since assumption of power in June 2013, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has embarked on a peace offensive. Despite domestic political pressures, Dr Singh appears willing to revive the stalled dialogue process. Likewise, Nawaz Sharif has shown remarkable perseverance in improving relations with India.

Some useful progress on various issues and a measure of improved mutual confidence has indeed been achieved during recent summit level meetings. A favourable opportunity arose out of the private visit of President Zardari to Ajmer in April 2012. He held talks with the Indian Prime Minister in Delhi; and among other things, renewed the invitation to the Indian leader to visit Pakistan. The spirit was carried forth during the meeting of two Prime Ministers in New York in September 2013. Hopefully, after the upcoming elections the new government of India would respond to Nawaz Sharif's peace overtures positively.

Moreover, Track II efforts have made a significant contribution towards lowering the tempers. Recently, India and Pakistan have also agreed to resume secretary-level trade talks. Director Generals Military Operations from both sides have met after a gap of eleven years. Multi-channel formal talks have indeed picked up momentum.

The two most inflammable issues that could jeopardize the peace process are Kashmir and terrorism. There are hopeful signs that mutually acceptable solutions to both can be found. On Kashmir, the back channel that Manmohan Singh and Musharraf had set up did make considerable progress. Indeed, according to some, it had worked out a framework for a settlement. To move forward courageously on the Kashmir issue and build on the progress already achieved is the main task before the two countries. The crucial point in any settlement on Kashmir must remain its acceptance by the Kashmiri people.

Unfortunately, the agreed CBMs related to Kashmir are not being implemented in their true spirit, but they do represent the essential elements of a settlement and are doable. Some incremental progress on this front was achieved at the Foreign Ministers' meeting in July 2011, but much more can be done. For example, the frequency of the bus services across the LOC was increased and some facilitative steps for cross-border trade, including an expansion in the list of tradable commodities, were introduced. If the agreed CBMs are faithfully implemented, further steps like coordinating mechanisms on common issues like the environment, water, tourism etc should not be difficult. Basically, the main purpose of a settlement must be to bring comfort to the inhabitants of Kashmir, to put an end to the violence, the killings and the abuse of human rights by Indian security forces and to enable them to live a normal life in peace. The achievement of this objective is by no means impossible, but this requires a degree of trust and cooperation, in the overall sense.

A settlement of the Kashmir problem would also be of great value in addressing the vital issue of water. Although the Indus Water Treaty

has held its way for more than fifty years, there has recently been an increase in violation of the Treaty by India. A dispute over water will have disastrous consequences for bilateral relations and it is imperative that both sides should seek to preempt this by entering into talks about joint efforts in water management and to arrest environmental degradation in the upper reaches, causing depletion in water flow. In this regard Advisor to Prime Minister of Pakistan on Foreign Affairs and National Security, Mr Sartaz Aziz Pakistan has suggested demilitarization of Siachen.

On terrorism, the obvious need is for both countries to cooperate in defeating this menace. Regrettably, a number of terrorist incidents in India have wrongly been attributed to have originated from Pakistan. However, there have been voices from within responsible people of India that some high profile incidents, like attack on Indian parliament and Mumbai attacks, were false flag operations. Prompt hanging of the two surviving characters of these incidents, Afzal Guru and Ajaml Kasab, adds further credence to such opinions.

India must stop sponsoring the terrorist acts and separatist elements in Pakistan. In the overall context, however, the absolute necessity of a cooperative effort to fight terror is clear. This would involve effective institutional arrangements for intelligence sharing, border controls, effective joint anti-terror mechanisms and so on. Talks between the two countries have addressed this issue on a priority basis and there is agreement that firm action will be taken against the culprits. This would apply to both sides, wherever the culprits are found. It is now essential that institutional arrangements for such cooperation be strengthened.

Apart from these two major issues, there are a host of other problems like Siachen, Sir Creek, the Wullar Barrage, trade, visas, drug trafficking, nuclear transparency etc. On some of these, like Sir Creek and Siachen, negotiations are reportedly in the final stages and an early conclusion would greatly strengthen the peace process.

On Afghanistan issue, Pakistan has a vital stake in how the issue is resolved, but India's interest in Afghanistan is questionable. The Afghan problem has the potential of adversely impacting Indo-Pakistan relations. If it is allowed to become an additional point of discord between the two, the negative fallout on stability in South Asia will be enormous.

The nuclear issue could be addressed so that the two countries can show to the international community that they are responsible nuclear powers and pose no threat to the region or the world. There already exists an agreement on non-attack on each others' facilities. The area of agreement could be expanded. To avoid nuclear arms proliferation, both countries could undertake not to build and deploy ABM systems. For settling nuclear issues, India needs to take Pakistan's concerns regarding conventional arms asymmetry seriously. Offer of Strategic Restraints Regime from Pakistan side is still on the table and offers viable options.

In the critical field of economic development, common ground could be explored for mutually beneficial trade and economic relations. A major advance has been made with Pakistan agreeing to give MFN status

to India. Two countries have agreed to resume secretary level talks on trade. This will remove a major obstacle in the way of trade, though both countries will need to work out arrangements to avoid damage to each other's economy.

TAPI pipeline project to carry gas across the subcontinent has picked up momentum and it could become a reality. There are yet many unexplored venues. In the wake of Iran's nuclear deal with P 5+1, even IPI stands a fair chance of revival. Such projects would enhance bilateral dependencies and reduce tensions.

Official efforts need to be supplemented by those at the people to people level. It is encouraging to note that a number of non-official bodies have been set up to promote good relations. These include civil society, parliamentarians, journalists and business organizations. The key to any lasting relationship is that the people on both sides should want it. They can only show this if they can easily meet each other with a minimum of restrictions⁸⁴.

During crisis, mob mentality has often taken better of the Indian political leadership; yet, most of the times, crisis stability has held its way. There is a need to enhance the crisis management capacity at bilateral level. This could be done by forming a joint commission co-headed by the two National Security Advisors; such commission could take charge of the situation in case of any major crisis and resolve it in a professional diplomatic manner, well short of frantic military mobilizations.

India needs regional stability to continue its march forward without unnecessary distractions. For this, India needs to project itself as a good neighbour to other countries of South Asia. Pakistan finds itself as the biggest victim of terrorism and is putting in its best efforts to overcome this menace. To make this happen, India should facilitate creation of enabling environment⁸⁵, rather than resorting to opportunistic exploitation of situation.

Conclusion

For centuries, both countries have enjoyed a unity which brought together a variety of religions, cultures and traditions, resulting in a good deal of fusion and commonality of norms. Even under the British, this coexistence continued. As independent States, they have so many practices and values that they share and which they could build upon for immense mutual benefit. Unfortunately, none of this has happened and relations between India and Pakistan have never achieved a stable and positive character.⁸⁶ Mostly expediencies have prevailed upon prudence. Aroma of relationship has been more of feuding tribes than of responsible states competing and collaborating simultaneously.

⁸⁴ Dr. Humayun Khan and Salman Haidar, "Stability in South Asia."

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

Stephen P. Cohen in his new book, “Shooting for a Century: The India-Pakistan Conundrum”, presents a dark outlook: “It is important to get them to understand that they’re both digging a hole for each other...The standard Indian view has been ‘let’s ignore Pakistan or let’s destroy Pakistan – let’s not deal with Pakistan’ [...] But clearly, many sensible Indians understand that if Pakistan goes under, then India is going to suffer more than anybody else”.

As of now, Pakistan-India relationship is erratic; it needs an urgent and bold course correction. It needs to be managed in professional way, circumventing the emotive pitfalls. The fault lines are too well known to both sides; it would be naïve to expect a durable and robust relationship to co-exist with these fault lines. This relationship is operational in two layers, the leadership tier and people-to-people tier. Often at the time of crisis leadership tier fails to display statesmanship and is swayed by mob mentality. In short to medium term, bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan are likely to maintain a bumpy trajectory, akin to roller coaster. In terms of progress it would be one step forward and two backwards. If persistent and consistent effort is made by the leadership of both sides to resolve flashpoint disputes and strengthen bilateral crisis management mechanism, then one can hope for evolution of sustainably stable relationship in long term timeframe. Till then the relationship would continue muddying through in an erratic way, lacking continuity and durability. Though both sides share the responsibility to work towards achieving robust functional relationship, larger onus lies on India on two counts; firstly in case of resolution of most of disputes, Pakistan is likely to be the beneficiary; and secondly, being a larger and more powerful country, India has to bear the greater burden of strategic patience. □

Indo-Pakistan relations in contemporary times

Balaji Chandramohan

(Balaji Chandramohan is a Visiting Fellow with Future Directions International, a policy think tank based in Perth. He alternates his life between New Zealand and India.)

A zero-sum game may be explained as an interaction where one participant's *gains result* only from another's *equivalent losses*. In contemporary International Relations, the best example of a zero-sum interaction is between India and Pakistan.

This is not new. Both India and Pakistan have had been exchanging barbs at regular intervals since their independence in 1947. But what's new is that Pakistan has started to behave like a 'Revisionist State' after a gap of nearly more than a decade. No prizes for guessing why Pakistan behaves as such, though it has been shown up to the whole world by Wikileaks. With the United States and other Western powers' failure in Afghanistan (which it planned), Pakistan as a nuclear power can act as both an inseparable twin and a big brother on its western border.

With this new assertiveness, Pakistan has probably returned to the era from the 1980s up to 2001, when it enjoyed the run of Afghanistan; allowing it to target its domestic audience with anti-Indian sentiment. The contract for this is handled by Pakistan's military which has acted as a de facto power center in Pakistan despite the civilian leadership under Nawaz Sharif showing restraint and reckless with his relationship with India.

Pakistan's military will never allow India-Pakistan relations to warm up properly for the simple reason that it needs anti-Indian rhetoric to secure huge budget allocations. On the other hand, Pakistan is supervised only by active state apparatus; and no prizes for guessing that they are military.

India can laugh to itself, but may also be laughed at by others because of its incorrect policy towards Pakistan. The Indian foreign policy establishment under the aegis of Dr. Manmohan Singh thinks that it can 'engage' with Pakistan peacefully and use its new-found economic strength to venture into the outside world and project 'soft power'. Although after the Mumbai attacks the Indian establishment decided to snub Pakistan in any sort of bilateral talks, the ruling United Progressive Government's second term has been mostly occupied with the talks on Pakistan.

It's laughable because the Pakistani representatives keep changing. Not so long ago, India was engaging with someone from Pakistan wearing a military uniform who proceeded to don civilian clothes. His name was Pervez Musharraf. Now, the simple question is: where is he? (He is in self-imposed exile in London.)

One of the oddities of international politics is why despite being close to a failed state and haven a proven record for exporting terrorism, Pakistan has so far largely escaped disaster from outside. The answer lies in the support it receives from the United States.

Pakistan in global geo-strategic game

Questions of strategy tend to be analyzed within the context of recent history and the foreseeable future. In order to fully understand the Pakistan conundrum however, one needs to go back further.

Pakistan was created by the British in 1947 as a separate state for the Muslims of India. It simultaneously prevented the Soviet Union from gaining access to a warm water port along the Indian Ocean. Indian national leaders had dreaded the disintegration of the Turkish Empire after World War I and warned against the rising specter of Arab nationalism in the Middle East but Pakistan perfectly served the Western interest.

Although the problem of Pakistani terrorism began during the Cold War, for the duration of the conflict, the United States maintained close ties with the Muslim nation. Pakistan simultaneously checked Indian, Iranian and Russian pretensions and helped the Americans mend fences with Red China in the 1970s. With the exception of the decade between the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, America has been compelled to court Pakistan ever since the end of World War II.

India has long found itself caught in the middle of the American-Pakistan dynamic. Presidents since Dwight Eisenhower up to Barack Obama have praised India for its democratic traditions and potential but all that rhetoric appears to amount to little when they return to Washington and gaze at a map.

Geography matters far more in international relations than national leaders do for unlike them, geography never changes. Geopolitics shape the actions that nations take far more than the values they uphold can. This is why the United States would like India to focus eastward, on Southeast Asia, instead of westward, toward Pakistan.

American geostrategy has historically been influenced by three thinkers — Alfred Thayer Mahan, Halford Mackinder and Nicholas J. Spykman. Of

these, Spykman, a Dutch-American and critic of both Mahan and Mackinder comes closest to modern day American strategic thinking.

If Mahan proposed to dominate the oceans and Mackinder asked to concentrate on what he called the “heartland,” Spykman suggested that in order for a nation to attain hegemony, it should seek to control the “monsoon lands” or the rimland. “Who controls the rimland rules Eurasia,” he declared. “Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.”

If the United States are to remain a superpower into the twenty-first century, it has to secure its presence in the monsoon lands. It needs a base from where to balance against Indian, Iranian, Russian and Chinese designs. It needs Pakistan¹.

Afghanistan and China factor in Indo-Pakistan relations

There's one surprise element which is rarely talked about in Indo-Pak dialogue: it's not Kashmir, but China. Pakistan's all-weather friendship with China means Pakistan can annoy India to suit its whims and fancies. There seems to be an understanding in China's establishment that India is an irritant as it rises to become an international power. To curtail India, China is following a 'balance of power' policy, providing impetus to Pakistan to bleed India. This can be done more without U.S. troops in Afghanistan. While India is actively occupied with Pakistan, China can extend its influence across Asia-Pacific, Latin America and Africa without competition.

All of this has irritated Beijing in that it has understood that, to clip the wings of the spreading India, China must first 'box-in' India in South Asia. That is precisely the strategy of Beijing in aiding Pakistan to follow an aggressive posture in its diplomatic relations with India. With India being distracted in Pakistan, and with the US distracted in Afghanistan and Iraq, China can expand quickly in Asia; that is, it can clearly establish many more 'strategic condominiums' in the world.

Already, the signs are visible as India's Foreign Ministry is deeply embroiled in Pakistani sentiment. The whole world is laughing at India because the Indian strategic establishment, including PM Dr. Manmohan Singh, doesn't seem to understand this. Or if it understands, it is under pressure from the U.S. to engage with Pakistan so that Uncle Sam can win brownie points in Afghanistan. This web needs to be understood in the context of Indo-Pak relations.

What is the future? India can do very little as Pakistan expects to install the rule of its proxy in Afghanistan; U.S. troops will vacate Afghanistan in 2014. This means that Pakistan and China, in the absence of the U.S., might start looking inwards - with Asia left under the leadership of Beijing and Pakistan breathing down India's neck.

Pakistan's basic problem," the participants at Wikistrat write, "is the army's control of virtually every economic enterprise in the state and its refusal to allow internal introspection of anything military." As long as the army remains in power, directly or by proxy, systemic reforms are highly unlikely to be implemented.

Pakistan's military and intelligence services still consider a war with India the most lethal threat to their nation. This makes it extremely difficult for the Pakistanis to cut their ties with radical Islamists in their frontier area and Afghanistan as this hinterland is supposed to provide their army with "strategic depth" in the event of an invasion. India, according to Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies' analysts, is consciously exacerbating this tension.

India has stepped up its financial investments in the government of Hamid Karzai, knowing full well that these investments will go waste come 2014 when the Americans withdraw, for no better reason than to force Pakistan to continue its destabilization of Afghanistan and sully its already bad reputation with NATO. This is expected by the Indians to result in the diplomatic, political, military and economic isolation of Pakistan starting 2014.

India has engaged in a repeated and steady stream of ballistic missile defense tests, ostensibly to offset Pakistani intermediate range ballistic missiles but this resulted in Pakistan proactively going in for a nuclear and missile force expansion.

Fear of Pakistan's nuclear weapons eventually falling into terrorist hands and America's unlikely willingness to intervene militarily on a sufficiently large scale in the country are deemed to force Washington's hand toward implementing a plan of seizing Pakistan's nuclear weapons.

Indeed, the disintegration of Pakistan is seen as a prerequisite to fully institutionalizing India's alliance with the United States by its civilian leaders. India's armed forces are afraid that their freedom of action against Pakistan would be compromised by too close a relationship with the Americans. Hence India's decision to European fighter jets earlier this year. "India's prime ministers—cutting across party lines—therefore have followed a two pronged policy to shore up the American alliance."

Cold start and Pakistan

India claims that its military doctrine has moved to a “proactive” and “offensive” approach in recent decades. The Indian Army doctrine released in 2004 has popularly been dubbed as “Cold Start.” Though officially the army denies it, India does have plans to attack Pakistan and occupy the country with minimal civilian losses. India’s contentious doctrine was framed after the India-Pakistan military standoff in the wake of the terrorist attacks against the Indian Parliament in December 2001. The army immediately mobilized under the code named “Operation Parakram” but the international community intervened to stop Indian troops from advancing into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. India then understood the need for a strategy which could produce swift results in penetrating Pakistan before any intervention from the international community, including the United States, could prevent it.

With this in mind, India framed the Indian Army Doctrine 2004. The Army Doctrine is updated every five years and has two parts. The first is accessible and declassified while the second is kept secret. Pakistan claims that these classified plans entail Cold Start.

In a future conflict, India reckons to be on the initiative that moves it from a reactive and defensive position, to a proactive and offensive position. India’s military doctrine dubbed ‘Cold Start’ reflects this shift. The doctrine envisages penetrating the entire India-Pakistan frontier. The strike corps is expected to strike deeper if Pakistan is recalcitrant. The effect of air power and missile strikes on the Pakistani military and civilian infrastructure would be punitive; in addition to leaving a devastated Pakistani population. Projecting naval power against Pakistan’s largest city, Karachi, would have a grave impact on the economy. Even if India launches coordinated operations, there are several limitations inherent in its operational strategy. The nuclear dimension warrants that such “military strikes would either need to be restricted in depth into enemy territory and spread in geographical expanse, or limited in scope to carry out deeper, narrow thrusts into adversary territory in order to remain well away from expressed red lines of the nuclear threshold.” The contours of India’s Limited War doctrine are perhaps deliberately vague for security reasons. It is also logical that India would be cognizant of one of the principal lessons from the GWOT – avoiding a likely asymmetric war counter. India would, prefer a ‘short, sharp war, and, as in the Israeli case in Lebanon and Gaza, pull out as early as it can. These two measures would enable India not only to avoid any nuclear tripwire, but also avert an irregular war by Pakistan in occupied territory.

In a situation involving limited Indian war aims, Pakistan would respond with its defensive formations and use its strategic reserves in an offensive mode wherever possible. A Pakistani offensive, though in keeping with

Pakistan's doctrine of 'offensive defence', may not eventuate in the event of an early war. Following the imposition of costs through air action, India expects to see hostilities terminated through international pressure. Air operations and pivot corps operations by India would reduce the windows available for launching Pakistani offensives inside Indian territory, which may prove very costly for Pakistan. Besides, there would be little scope for launching forces into Indian territory in the face of India's broad front attacks. As demonstrated at Kargil, India would wrap up any gains it may make eventually. Pakistan may employ only a small proportion of its forces in defensive operations, seeking instead to preserve most of its forces for post-conflict internal political purposes, allowing its Army to stay at the apex of Pakistan's political pyramid. In any post-conflict scenario military losses would compromise the Pakistan Army's grip on power. Termination of India's limited offensives would enable Pakistan to declare victory of sorts by claiming that it held up India's conventional might with only a partial use of its forces. In such a circumstance, both states would be satisfied in having met respective conflict aims. India would have inflicted punishment on Pakistan and Pakistan would claim to have withstood it. Such a juncture of positive perceptions would be useful to begin strategic engagement for peace making and long term conflict resolution.

The foregoing indicates that Pakistan's conflict strategy is likely to comprise the following elements: war avoidance; conventional defence; counter offensive with strategic reserves; a resort to asymmetric war; and preservation of military assets. For Pakistan the nuclear dimension of the conflict would include a high nuclear threshold; nuclear signaling for deterrence; catalyzing external pressures; and, preservation of nuclear assets from attrition. Pakistan has mooted the 'Samson Option' only as a last resort.

That deterrence would hold is the understandable refrain. Pakistan has always tried to maintain adequate conventional capability to fight India. It is aware it risks national suicide if it uses nuclear weapons first. The Pakistan Army is aware that Pakistan would be held accountable by the international community for breaching the 'nuclear taboo'. Since the least provocative nuclear use option is use on its own territory, an accounting post-conflict would restrain the finger on the proverbial nuclear button. In military terms there are no realistic operational and tactical gains for Pakistan in resorting to nuclear first use that India cannot counter through retaliation.

However, even if deterrence holds, ignoring the possibility of its breakdown would not be prudent. Analysing the Pakistani case study on militarized decision making, Julian Schofield writes: "In a military-dominated government, the absence of strong representation from other key departments, particularly the foreign and domestic ministries, gives the central decision-makers the illusion that they are operating without

political limits...its resulting war-proneness is due to an absence of any institutional counterbalance...military governments are more likely to favour war at times when it is tactically opportune.” The outbreak of war matters as much as its conduct. The Pakistan Army, in control of nuclear weapons, has been known to be short on strategic acumen, the Kargil intrusion being a famous example. Its involvement in internal politics has further eroded professionalism at the top. Given the army’s current commitments on the Western border it may rely more on its nuclear deterrent in a war in the East. It may be pressured to use nuclear weapons by right wing elements within the Army-Intelligence apparatus. Additionally, conflict needs to be tempered by Clausewitzian notions of ‘chance’, ‘friction’, ‘fog’ ‘passion’ and the influence of misperception².

Even if India sets out to wage a limited war and Pakistan exercises nuclear restraint, the manner in which the war unfolds could surprise both. Lastly, two points should give pause. The first immediate concern is nuclear terrorism, and, the second is the possibility of Pakistan becoming Talibanized.

India’s Grand Strategy and Pakistan

India is at “the epicentre of four collapsed empires” – Qing, Ottoman, British and Soviet, and “trapped between four lines” – Durand, McMahon, Line of Control, and Line of Actual Control, leading to its “strategic confinement”.

India’s strategic culture permits a limited use of force for political objectives but has not traditionally been seen as expansionist or expeditionary. Political and military elite agreement on the limited use doctrine has helped preserve the status quo in civil-military relations. As in other democracies, India’s strategic culture is a product of the interaction between the civilian security bureaucracy (defense and foreign ministries), the military command and the political leadership, although in practice civilian input into military operational decision-making on strategic and tactical matters is limited by concerns about corporate autonomy and institutional interference.

Joint Warfare that reports to the Integrated Defense Staff which was set up in 2001 following the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee which was formed following the Kargil border clash with Pakistan. The IDS is the first step towards the creation of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) which has not been taken by the Government as it not found consensus among Indian political parties. The primary aim of the Integrated Defense Staff and its policy unit Centre for Joint Warfare

studies is to achieve integration and training of joint warfare professionals.

Every aspiring Great Power tries to project its own power outside its own “Sphere of Influence” through hard power military base. In that context, India offers a curious case as it tries to graduate from being a regional power in South Asia with a continental strategic orientation to great power aspirations in Indo-Pacific adding a maritime dimension to its existing strategic culture, Central Asia falls slightly out of its radar logically.

However, India’s only military base outside its territory is in Central Asia’s Tajikistan named Ayni which if properly defined is in Russia’s own backyard. 1) India is Russia’s all-weather friend and vice-versa and despite that India’s power-projection is not welcomed in Moscow. The reason is obvious as Russia is under increased pressure to check any more multiple actors with Great Power ambitions in Central Asia where it has established its own unstated Monroe Doctrine.

Under the above caveat, it offers a good case study of India’s strategic culture and the compounding problems that it faces in graduating itself from being a regional power to a great power.

India’s strategic orientation since independence has been primarily defensive which in fact worked well during the Cold War between Soviet Union and the United States. But with the end of the Cold War, New Delhi began to work its own strategic priority especially in the 1990s that a forward presence in Central Asia is required facilitated with the emergence of Tajikistan as an independent nation.

It was backed by a clear strategic goal to have increased influence in Central Asia keeping in clear view of the fact that an anti-Indian Taliban was gaining ground in Afghanistan with tactic support from Pakistan. India’s military intelligence established contacts with Tajik counterparts to get more access to the then Northern Alliance to fight out Taliban all before 9/11. At that point India was running a military hospital on the Tajik territory close to the Afghan border to serve the injured Northern Alliance soldiers.

Ayni air base in Tajikistan happens to be India’s first and only foreign military base* since Independence in 1947. Ayni lacks the classic military operational aspect as it still needs the tick off from Russia for having India’s fighter aircrafts. According to media reports, India has spent \$70 million between 2002 and 2010 to renovate the Ayni base. India has extended the Ayni runway to 10,500 feet and installed state-of-the-art navigational and air defense equipment there.

It could be argued that despite the inter-service rivalry between Indian Army and Air force, the latter's repeated prodding in containing the Pakistani army's presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia was the reason behind India looking to have a Air Force base in Tajikistan though with limited operational capabilities.

If the Air Force base has to be operational then it will also have the logistics for sharing intelligence with say Russia and may be even Iran all that can be first achieved if Tajikistan gives a nod.

In other words, Tajikistan itself might be reluctant to play host to India's increased military presence which might annoy Moscow. With reluctance from both Tajikistan and Russia, there is a very little chance for India to project its ambitions in Central Asia.

However, there is just one variable which can work in India's favor. With the withdrawal of the U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops from Afghanistan in 2014 and with increased Pakistan army's involvement in region, there is every chance that there might emerge a consensus for India to play a role in the Central Asia region. Under that context, Indian establishment might ask Russia to consider its case for upgrading the existing facilities in Ayni as an exchange.

All this depends on how situations start unfolding in other part of the world or to be precise in the newly coined Indo-Pacific region. It's understood that the United States' strategic priorities has started shifting from Middle-East oriented counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations to more Indo-Pacific-oriented aimed at containing China's increased maritime presence.

India is already on board with Washington on that and so as many countries in Asia-Pacific starting from Australia, New Zealand, Vietnam, South Korea, Japan, and Indonesia. Pakistan, an all-weather friend of Beijing, will be clever enough to exploit the new Cold War between Washington and Beijing for its own economic gains.

Russia is the key player and in many ways one can argue the decider if Washington and Beijing gets in a classic Cold War for resources. In that case, Moscow will try to extend its leverage both on its East and West by not allowing for any increased NATO presence first in Central Asia and so in Eastern Europe. Further, Washington might also be pressured to allow increased Russian military presence in the Central Asia and even in Afghanistan for it to concentrate its own military assets in the Indo-Pacific region aimed at containing China.

Therefore, the argument could be extended on how Moscow will allow for India's increased presence in Central Asia with a military base in Ayni

orienting towards Pakistan furthering India's land based strategic orientation. Further, India will be under pressure on whether to extend itself in Indo-Pacific region by strengthening its naval presence and joint-warfare capabilities or by giving more teeth to its existing continental warfare oriented army-air force combination.

In other words, it could be argued what will be New Delhi's strategic priority either aimed at containing China's presence in Indo-Pacific along with Washington or checking by Pakistan's increased involvement in Afghanistan

For sure, with the withdrawal of the NATO troops in Afghanistan, China might want to have Kabul as a spring board for having more access to resources in Central Asia which might not go well with Moscow. In that case, with increased Chinese presence in Central Asia and with fissures in the existing détente between Moscow and Beijing, India might be welcomed by the former to have greater military presence in Central Asia starting with Ayni which might be welcomed by both Moscow and Washington even if the variable option that the Taliban doesn't increase its existing foothold in Afghanistan with active support from Pakistan intelligence and army.

This opens up a new chapter in the existing Great Game in Central Asia. If China wanting to play an increased role in Central Asia for its resources with tactic support from Pakistan, then Moscow will not hesitate to allow India's increased military presence in Central Asia which includes having a base in Ayni by which it can share active intelligence.

In conclusion, in recent times India has started as a process of its expanding Great Power ambitions by giving more focus to its out of contingency operations and it's to be seen whether first such a policy will include strengthening existing Air Force base in Ayni and so whether such an initiative will be welcomed by other countries such as Russia, Tajikistan, or even Washington. ³

In conclusion

Despite having a continental strategic focus with land-based threats from China and Pakistan, India's strategic culture has been defensive so far. This defensive strategic orientation has been extended to its maritime dimension. This is about to change, however, as it develops robust maritime capabilities.

The Indian Navy, which is the fifth largest in the world, forms the basis of India's power projection capabilities in South-east Asia. India still does not have the sophisticated capacity for joint amphibious attacks, for

which a greater synergy among the services is required. India, despite not being a traditional naval power, like the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia or Japan, has invested considerable effort in increasing the operational capability of its navy. The Indian Navy has transformed itself from a coastal defence force to a 'blue-water' fleet.

China understands that with increased Indian maritime capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region it constrains its own ambitions in the region. Therefore, an increased military presence in India's northern borders means that New Delhi will shelve its expanding maritime capabilities therefore enabling Beijing to increase its own naval presence in the Indo-Pacific region. Beijing is on the road to that as the recent border incident in Lakadh is an example of, keeping India busy on its Northern borders for it to expand its maritime capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region⁴

The other way to keep India busy is to make Pakistan more aggressive which in turn will make India to focus more on its continental strategic orientation and get fixated in that rather expanding along its maritime domain incurring more allies in New Delhi's fold.

Notes

- 1) Geo-Politics of the India-Pakistan dialogue
<http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/India-Pakistan/balaji-chandramohan-Geo-Politics-of-the-India-Pakistan-dialogue>
- 2) Towards a Proactive Military Strategy: 'Cold Start and Stop'
http://www.idsa.in/strategicanalysis/35_3/ProactiveMilitaryStrategy_aahmed
- 3) India relies on Ayni for its Central Asian presence
<http://www.universalnewswires.com/centralasia/general/viewstory.aspx?id=13319>
- 4) Sino-Indian Naval Great Game in Indo-Pacific Region
<http://www.diplomatist.com/dipom07y2013/story018.html>

2. US-Pakistan Relations :

U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Bringing India Back Into the Equation

Dr.David J. Karl

(David J. Karl is president of the Asia Strategy Initiative, an analysis and advisory firm based in California, focused on the intersection of politics and economics, and heads its practice on South Asia. He also is a senior director at Geoskope, a cross-market knowledge company. He previously served as director of studies at the Pacific Council on International Policy and was project director of the Joint Task Force on Enhancing India-U.S. Cooperation in the Global Innovation Economy that was organized by the Pacific Council and the Federation of Indian Chambers & Industry. He also has served as an adjunct professor at the University of Southern California and Occidental College, an elite liberal arts institution in Los Angeles.

Dr. Karl comments frequently on the politics, economics and international relations of South Asia on his blog site, [Chanakya's Notebook](#). He received his doctorate in international relations at the University of Southern California, writing his dissertation on the India-Pakistan strategic rivalry, and took his masters degree in international relations from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies).

2014 will be a pivotal year for U.S. policy in South Asia. The extended NATO military mission in Afghanistan will come to an end, none too soon [judging by U.S. public opinion](#). Although it remains to be seen whether the Obama administration's plans to keep a limited military contingent behind will materialize, Washington's rapidly shrinking presence in the country will bring to an end its reliance on the (epically dysfunctional) security relationship with Pakistan that the 9/11 attacks a dozen years ago brought about.

Moreover, the opposite effect just might take place in U.S.-India relations, especially if the upcoming parliamentary elections produce a government in New Delhi capable of rejuvenating India's economic prospects and responding more energetically to China's strategic exertions. Were this to happen, the country would once more seen by Washington as an attractive geopolitical partner and U.S. interest in accommodating Pakistani regional concerns diminished even further. The Bush administration's ["de-hyphenation" policy](#) – one that pursued relations with India and Pakistan independent of the other – would also re-emerge in full.

In these circumstances, Pakistani policy will have come full circle. [Speaking to the nation](#) a week after the 9/11 attacks, Pervez Musharraf justified his acquiescence to /U.S. demands on Afghanistan by arguing that America would otherwise turn to India for help and leave Pakistan diplomatically and militarily isolated. Now, in the coming years, this nightmare scenario for Pakistan appears increasingly likely: Left alone to deal with the growing chaos in Afghanistan and its spillover into Pakistan itself, while Washington deepens its strategic partnership with Islamabad's arch-nemesis.

A growing number in U.S. policy circles (examples [here](#), [here](#) and [here](#)) believe that such a scenario would be just desserts for Pakistan's egregious double game in Afghanistan. Notably, Bruce Riedel, who led the Obama administration's first review of AfPak policy, now [advocates](#) "containing" Pakistan, while others [argue](#) that Washington must learn to say no to Islamabad. Joining these voices, Husain Haqqani, Pakistan's immediate past ambassador in Washington, [declares](#) that both countries should stop pretending they are allies and amicably "divorce."

Dampening the impulse for a tougher line, however, is the fear that the Pakistani state is in ever-present danger of collapse and vulnerable to a jihadi takeover. A raft of new books, with such titles as [Pakistan on the Brink](#) and [The Unraveling: Pakistan in the Age of Jihad](#) , underscore the widely held view that the country is coming apart at the seams. According David Sanger's new book, [Confront and Conceal](#), President Obama worries about Pakistan's disintegration and the resulting dispersion of its expanding nuclear stockpile. Indeed, the *Washington Post* [reports](#) that, due to counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation concerns, no other country receives as much attention from U.S. intelligence agencies. Washington's worries about the security of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal are so acute, that the intelligence community's budget on tracking "the spread of illicit weapons divides the world into two categories: Pakistan and everybody else."

These policy crosscurrents were on display during the 2012 Republican presidential primary season: When Texas Governor Rick Perry urged a cut-off in aid to Pakistan, Michele Bachman, the Tea Party leader, admonished that the step would be counterproductive and "naïve" because "[Pakistan is too nuclear to fail](#)." Curiously, Asif Ali Zardari, the former Pakistani president, used similar language with his U.S. interlocutors. Referring to the insurance behemoth at the center of the Wall Street bailouts, he compared his country to AIG and [argued](#) that it is "too big to fail."

The Obama administration sought to manage these dilemmas by moving bilateral relations beyond its narrow, transactional basis and onto a broader and more sustainable foundation. Officials reasoned that the way to elicit reliable Pakistani cooperation in Afghanistan was to address Islamabad's acute security anxieties regarding India as well as its fears of American strategic abandonment once Washington wound down its involvement in the Afghan war.

Thus, two weeks before the November 2008 presidential election, Mr. Obama [declared](#) that resolving the perennially-inflamed dispute over the Kashmir region would be one of the "critical tasks" for his administration. Once in office, he moved to appoint a high-profile envoy (in the person of Richard Holbrooke) to mediate the Kashmir issue—similar to U.S. efforts to broker the Middle East peace talks. This initiative [proved stillborn](#) in the face of vehement Indian opposition but for several years afterwards the administration sought to [minimize New Delhi's influence](#) in Kabul out of deference to Islamabad's sensitivities.

In late 2009, as the administration was gearing up its surge of military forces to Afghanistan, Obama wrote to Mr. Zardari [offering an expanded strategic partnership](#), including additional levels of military and economic assistance. [Zardari's response](#) was largely ambivalent but was adamant that India was waging a "proxy war" using "Afghan soil to perpetrate violence in Pakistan."

About a year later, shortly before Mr. Obama undertook a state visit to New Delhi, he held a White House meeting with Pakistani army chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani to reassure him that American overtures to India were not directed against Pakistan. [Kayani replied](#) by submitting a 14-page note accusing the United States of "causing and maintaining a controlled chaos in Pakistan. The real aim of U.S. strategy is to de-nuclearize Pakistan." This is a [widely-held belief](#) within the Pakistani military establishment. Indeed, when journalists asked Kayani about his first thoughts when he learned of the U.S. commando assault on Osama Bin Laden, he [answered](#): "I thought they had come for our nuclear weapons."

Another prong of the Obama administration's strategy was to shore up Pakistan's development prospects and strengthen its democratization process. The centerpiece here was the 2009 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, better known as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman (KBL) bill, which authorized \$1.5 billion annually in non-military assistance to Pakistan over a five-year period.

More than four years on, however, it is clear that the Obama outreach to Pakistan has failed. A major reason, as the Pakistani actions noted above demonstrate, has to do with Islamabad's skepticism about the longevity of U.S. assurances as well as its deep-rooted Indophobia. Whatever the conceptual merits of "de-hyphenation" in U.S. policy in South Asia, it proved difficult in practice to edge closer strategically to New Delhi without heightening suspicions in Islamabad and Rawalpindi.

Another factor is the dissonance created by the exercise of U.S. hard power – specifically the campaign of drone warfare conducted to great effect in Pakistan's tribal areas – and the soft power imperative of improving America's standing in the country. The difficulties in straddling this gap (see [here](#) and [here](#) for background) reportedly led to the resignation of Cameron Munter, the U.S. ambassador in Islamabad in mid-2012. And as a [recent survey](#) by the Pew Global Attitudes Project makes clear, Pakistanis have come to dislike America more than any other country.

Nor has the KLB legislation worked out as envisioned, as recent reports issued by the International Crisis Group (ICG) and the Center for Global Development (CGD) highlight. The [ICG report](#) commends the Obama administration's desire to broaden engagement with Pakistani civilian institutions and civil society groups. But it also criticizes the administration's focus on using civilian aid to build large, complex infrastructure projects as a way of winning over public opinion. This approach, the report argues, does not directly address pressing development priorities and is dependent for its success upon corrupt, opaque and dysfunctional Pakistani government agencies.

These themes are echoed in the [CDG report](#), which contends that U.S. development efforts in Pakistan suffer from a number of self-inflicted wounds. These include the lack of a coherent overarching strategy, crippling bureaucratic dysfunctions inside the U.S. government, and a short-sighted preference for projects that advertize a "Made in the USA" label over less visible but more worthy ones.

Due to these factors and more, much of the KLB economic development funds [remain unspent](#). And with frustration with Islamabad rising in Washington, many in the U.S. Congress are ready to pull the plug on assistance to Pakistan altogether. Indeed, the lack of legislative support has caused the Obama administration to [drop long-standing plans](#) to allow duty-free exports to the United States of textiles and other products made in or near Pakistan's violence-plagued tribal areas.

So where should U.S. officials go from here? Given the legitimate grievances about Pakistani duplicity as well as the dwindling dependence on Islamabad, an approach based on containment or benign neglect will no doubt be emotionally satisfying. But in view of America's enduring regional interests, it is difficult to see how Washington can remain indifferent to its fate or sustain a policy of severing links with Islamabad.

Broader geopolitical considerations also militate for continued U.S. engagement. Pakistan is, after all, the world's sixth most populous country – estimated to soon overtake Brazil to move into the fifth slot; about half of its population is comprised of discontented people under age 25. Its Muslim community is the world's second largest and is projected to overtake Indonesia's in size in the next 3-4 decades. Pakistan's internal evolutions will thus exert a major influence on how the global ummah [comes to terms with modernity](#).

Finally, given Islamabad's great capacity for causing grief in the neighborhood, Washington cannot possibly hope to cement a strategic partnership with New Delhi while leaving the Indians to deal with Pakistan's numerous instabilities by themselves.

So, if the United States needs to remain engaged over the long haul, how should it do this? The first is to recognize that for all of the hopes invested in the KLB program, perhaps the most effective mechanism these days for bolstering Pakistan's economic stability involves India. The Pakistani government [realizes](#) it is in desperate economic straits and that closer trade ties with India constitute a much needed lifeline. The military establishment is also said to understand that the eastern border needs to be stabilized so resources can be focused on combating rising internal security threats.

Despite the common civilizational and historical bonds that permeate South Asia, as well as the unified market forged by the British Raj, the region today is remarkably [fragmented economically](#). If enhanced trade ties were to develop between South Asia's largest economies, they would produce significant economic dividends – for analysis, see [here](#), [here](#), [here](#) and [here](#) – and (eventually) security benefits for both countries. They also would help strengthen Pakistan's civil society vis-à-vis an overbearing military leadership, as well as empower the country's [liberal-minded elements](#) to combat the rising swell of religious extremism and political violence.

The United States should reinforce these promising dynamics by launching a Marshall Plan-like effort geared toward the expansion of

cross-border economic linkages between India and Pakistan. This initiative would be aimed at helping the two countries, on a joint basis, upgrade and expand the meager transportation infrastructure presenting connecting them. It would support projects that increase road and rail linkages, as well as the number and capacity of customs posts. It would help provide resources for modernized seaport facilities that enable more two-way trade. And with each country plagued by chronic power shortages, it would help bankroll cross-border energy projects such as joint electrical grids or the proposed natural gas pipeline connecting Central and South Asia via Afghanistan.

An austerity-minded U.S. Congress, especially one clearly at its wit's end with Islamabad, would certainly raise questions about funding this initiative. But it need only entail a modest level of expenditures – say, \$50-75 million per year over a five-year period – and could be paid for by redirecting funding already authorized under the KLB act.

The United States also should liberalize its trade policies toward Pakistan. With the textile industry employing a huge number of Pakistanis, many observers have suggested – including this recent Council on Foreign Relations [task force](#) – that opening up U.S. markets to Pakistani textile imports would energize the country's economy in a way that no aid program could.

Alas, no American president is likely to expend political capital fighting domestic textile interests to make this happen, even though the only real loser would be Chinese exporters. But it should be possible to grant preferential treatment to products made by joint Indian-Pakistani business ventures – that is, Pakistani companies that have received a threshold amount of Indian investment and vice versa. This would include textile exports but also products generated by Indian information technology and business process outsourcing firms collaborating with their Pakistani counterparts.

Obviously, these steps offer no magic bullet for quickly transforming Pakistan's disquieting internal dynamics or its fraught relationships with India and the United States. But they would be creative investments in nurturing promising developments already underway in South Asia, as well as promoting Pakistan's moderates. There may be long stretches when such efforts appear in vain but they could end up making a good bit of difference.

Complex Dynamics of U.S.-Pakistan Relations

Prof. Mohammed Badrul Alam

Head, Dept. of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences
Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi

Framing the relationship within Realist theoretical discourse of International Relations:

“No nation can have a sure guide as to what it must do and what it need not do in foreign policy without accepting the national interest as that guide. ...Universal moral action can not be applied to the action of states”(Hans J. Morgenthau, 1951)

“There are several de facto regimes in the world that we do not recognize. We act, in this respect, as our national interests dictate.”(John Foster Dulles, 1959)

“The State’s interests provides the spring of action” (Kenneth Waltz, 1979)

“States seek power and they calculate their interests in terms of power” (Robert Keohane, 1986)

“The international system is anarchic. The most basic motives driving states is survival” (John Mearsheimer, 1994)

“States are motivated primarily by national interests” (Robert Gilpin, 1996)

“Pakistan and United States have always had a strategic partnership, a strategic relationship all along. We have laid the foundations of a very strong, sustainable, broad-based and a long-term relationship between Pakistan and United States.”(Pervez Musharraf, 2006)

“In the past, we too often defined our relationship with Pakistan narrowly. Those days are over. Moving forward, we are committed to a partnership with Pakistan that is built on a foundation of mutual interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust. ...”(Barack Obama, 2009)

A quick glance of past sixty years of U.S.-Pakistan relations shows eight broad patterns.

1. Evolution of Friendship with US, 1947-53

Letter by Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad AliJinah in October 1947 seeking US assistance

Prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan's visit to Washington, DC

Vice President Richard Nixon's visit to Pakistan in 1953

Pakistan trying to catch up with India both militarily and economically

South Asia under the shadow of Cold War

2. Formal Alliance with US-led western security architecture, 1953-62

Pakistan as 'America's Most Allied Ally'

US-Pakistan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1954

Washington's fear of Soviet Expansionism

Pakistan joining SEATO (1954) and CENTO/Baghdad Pact (1955), two US-centric western regional defense pacts

Pakistan permitting the United States to fly its U-2 spy plane from Peshawar airbase and the plane being shot down by the Soviets

Eisenhower's visit to Pakistan in 1960

Kennedy's offer of military aid to Nehru during the 1962 Sino-Indian war

3. Re-visiting the alliance system and move towards transition, 1962-1971

Kennedy's 'pivotal' strategy by providing aid to both India and Pakistan

Ayub Khan's displeasure

India-Pakistan war of 1965 and suspension of military assistance by US

LBJ-The Alliance Unravels

Pakistan facilitating secret trip made by Dr. Henry Kissinger to China in 1971

India-Pakistan war on 1971 and US 'tilt'

4. Back to popular election and Non-alignment fold by Pakistan, 1972-1979

US seen as an unreliable ally in the aftermath of creation of the new nation, Bangladesh

India's 'Peaceful Nuclear Explosion' and Pakistan expressing concern

US resuming limited military aid to Pakistan in 1975

General Zia-ul-Haq staging a coup in 1977

Pakistan joining Non-Aligned Movement in 1979

5. Joining the Bandwagon with US on Afghanistan, 1979-1990

President Carter cutting off military aid to Pakistan under the Symington Amendment over its (Pakistan's) covert construction of a uranium enrichment facility

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and Pakistan termed as a 'front-line' state

U.S.-Pakistan: Partners Again

President Reagan's massive \$3.2 billion economic and military aid package to Pakistan

Pressler amendment in 1985 made it mandatory for the President to certify the Congress that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear device as a condition of receiving aid

Soviet Union withdraws from Afghanistan in 1988 and concern again is raised over Pakistan's nuclear activity

6. Pakistan's Puzzle during the Post-Cold war era, 1990-2001

President George H.W. Bush suspending aid to Pakistan by cutting all military funds under the Pressler amendment resulting in non-delivery of 71 F-16 fighter jets

US disengagement from Pakistan and Afghanistan causes growing resentment in Pakistan and critics calling the relationship as 'transactional'.

Living with Nuclear Pakistan: Pakistan and India conducting nuclear tests in 1998

In Kargil war of May-July 1999, Nawaz Sharif agreeing to withdraw Pakistan's army from Kargil after meeting President Clinton in Washington, DC

General Pervez Musharraf staging military coup on October 12, 1999, by ousting elected Sharif government

7. 9/11 and its impact on U.S.-Pakistan relations, 2001-2010

Musharraf becoming a key Bush ally after 9/11 and supporting US war on terror

Between 2002 and 2008, US aid to Pakistan crossed \$12 billion

In 2004, A.Q.Khan's confession of supplying nuclear-weapons technology to North Korea, Iran and Libya

July 2004, President Bush declaring Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally

Musharraf stepping down as Army Chief in 2007 and later from the Presidency

Assassination of former Prime minister Benazir Bhutto

Asif Ali Zardari comes to power after the election

Asif Ali Zardari as President and Yusuf Raza Gilani as Prime minister

Extension of service for General Ashfaq Kayani

8. US Af-Pak Policy and after, 2010—

President Obama in 2009 appointed 'Bulldozer' Richard Holbrooke as special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan

US strategy to 'disrupt, defeat and dismantle' Al Qaeda

US approving \$7.5 billion in aid for Pakistan over the next five years under Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act

Failed car bombing on May 1, 2010, by Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani-American to blow up New York's Times Square and subsequent US threat to Pakistan

Current issues:

1. Pakistan-US Security Cooperation and the nuclear issue
2. Role of Pakistan's military and ISI: Civil-military relations
3. Pakistan-India Tensions, the Kashmir issue: Can Pakistan be a 'normal state'
4. The China Factor
5. Events in Afghanistan and its fallout
6. The Iran-Pakistan-Turkey Pipeline Project
7. Death of Osama Bin Laden, Al Qaeda and domestic/international terrorism in Pakistan
8. A.Q.Khan networks and US non-proliferations efforts
9. Pakistan as a 'failed state'
10. Issues related to Democratisation, Governance deficit, Human Rights violations

Forecasting the future:

Short Term (1-5 years)

Pakistan continue to be a hot spot and sanctuary for Talibans

WikiLeaks and its fall out for Washington-Islamabad equation

End game in Afghanistan to determine evolving geo-strategic situation in West Asia/Central Asia

ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence agency) as a game changer in a radicalized Pakistan
Predator Drone attacks and UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) placing the civilian government in a delicate situation
Unstable situation in Waziristan and FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas)
Blow Hot and Blow Cold with India via-a-vis the peace process and Pakistan's 'Grand Strategy'
American Dilemma between a Warm Embrace and Deadly Embrace
A repeat of Egypt and Tunisia might have domino effect in and around Pakistan
Pakistan's growing nuclear arsenals and its impact on nuclear deterrence
SAARC becoming a case of 'Institutional Darwinism'?

Long term (5 years and beyond)

Need for Re-booting of U.S.-Pakistan relations
US looking for strategic depth in South Asia and Central Asia
Energy Security becoming a paramount issue
De-hyphenation, hyphenation, re-hyphenation roller coaster to continue
Iran might pose US its biggest security challenge: Is it the advent of Global Jihad?
Maritime Security of sea lanes in the Arabian Sea and Gulf
Water Security vis-à-vis Indus river
Possible China-Pakistan effort toward 'strategic encirclement'
US-India co-hegemony/co-leadership in South Asia
Emergence of interdependent/interconnected Asian community
Assertive India staking its global prominence as a major hard and soft power and its likely impact on Pakistan
Emergence of nationalism in Pakistan and its likely fallout
Bridging the autocratic-democratic (Pakistan/USA)
Concert of Power (cooperation/rivalry)
Threat of WMD, bio-terrorism

The Essence of Pakistan-US relations since 9/11

Mahrugh Khan

(Mahrugh Khan did her M.Sc in Defense and Strategic Studies from Quaid-e-Azam University. She has been affiliated with the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, Pakistan. Her area of research is Pakistan – United States relations and Baluchistan. She has assisted the Abbottabad Commission (Osama bin Laden Commission) as a research analyst with the Government of Pakistan.)

Since inception of Pakistan, its motivation to overcome Indian hegemony in the region as well as to balance its military and economic disparity led it to join hands with United States. America at that time was also looking for partners in South Asia to curtail the communist expansion and turned to Pakistan, following India's choice of non-alignment.

US aid levels to Pakistan peaked in 1962 when Pakistan aligned itself with the west by joining two regional defense pacts, the South East Asia Treaty Organization [SEATO] and the Central Treaty Organization [CENTO]. However, this partnership faced extreme lows in following years.ⁱ Although, the relationship between Pakistan and US invigorated in the 70's, but it was short lived and faced another dive when Pakistan started to develop its nuclear program in response to India.ⁱⁱ

Carter administration, at that time imposed sanctions on Pakistan under which US terminated all its military and economic aid to Pakistan. The relationship rebounded in the early 1980's following Soviet invasion in Afghanistan when for the second time US fully extended its hands to Pakistan ceasing all sanctions. US which prior to the Soviet invasion followed a low profile policy for Pakistan changed its policy immediately, during this era US provided unaccounted military aid to Pakistan. The Carter administration initially offered Pakistan a \$400 million aid packageⁱⁱⁱ which was rejected by then Pakistan's President Zia-ul-Haq

terming them as 'peanuts'. Regan administration provided Pakistan with \$3.2 billion aid package for five years.^{iv}

Pakistan was once more reviewed as an ally and an important partner in order to curtail and overcome the Soviet expansion. The Soviet left Afghanistan in the late 1980's and US henceforth, no longer considered Pakistan as a partner or an ally. Soon after withdrawal, US afresh its sanctions on Pakistan with the Pressler Amendment, followed by Glenn Amendment, Symington Amendment and finally the Democracy Sanctions.

When 9/11 happened, Pakistan and US relations were at its lowest, where US had imposed a full range of sanctions. US immediately set out to build an international coalition. Within the first 24 hours, US received a UN Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of force, and NATO invoked Article 5^v for the first time in its history.^{vi} Although US was self sufficient in its resources and means, it needed Pakistan's support to enter into Afghanistan and sustain itself. Since Afghanistan is a landlocked country, US required logistical support, air bases and air space along with other important maintenance and help for which it turned itself towards Pakistan.

The initial diplomacy was carried out by the US Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin through its embassy in Islamabad. Although, Pakistan was never directly threatened by US if it goes against its wishes, U.S officials did initially cleared it to Pakistan that if Pakistan will not cooperate, it will be included in the State department's list of 'terrorist-sponsoring nations'^{vii} which would foreshadow the possibility of US aggression on Pakistan.

Initially the services and cooperation provided by Pakistan to US were categorized under a tentative frame work of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement [ACSA].^{viii} Under which Pakistan was bound to act as a 'logistics enabler' providing US with logistical support, fuel

transportation, food for its troop's medical services, communication gear etc.

Later the tentative agreement was officially brought into practice under the umbrella of Operation Enduring Freedom [OEF]. Pakistan's cooperation for OEF continued to take shape on September 24th, when a combined Task Force from the Department of Defense and Department of State negotiated with the government of Pakistan on a broad set of agreements. Some of the specific assistance provided by Pakistan was: five active air bases along with 4 million liters of fuel per day; Pakistan also provided use of air space facility to US planes in order to launch air operations in Afghanistan, and use of naval facility to US coalition's ships at Pasni. All of the facilities initially were without any reimbursement mechanism.

Pakistan for more than a decade has been the front line state in the 'War on Terror' (WoT) and is a major non-NATO ally and has been among the main recipient country of US aid and assistance in the past as well as today. Washington's primary strategic objective in the war remains the same, i.e. ensuring greater Pakistani participation in the war against terrorism especially and to find sanctuaries in South and North Waziristan. Such assistance has manifested itself in a calibrated flow of military aid and equipment to Pakistan.

Since 1948, United States has pledged more than \$30 billion in direct aid; about half for military assistance. Two thirds of this total was appropriated in the post-9/11 era from FY2002 to FY2010.^{ix} However, the assistance has considerably fluctuated over the years, but after 9/11, aid to Pakistan has continuously raised due to Pakistan's strategic importance as a front line state in War on Terror.

In the first three years, after September 11, the United States extended grants to Pakistan equaling \$1 billion and of \$1 billion in debt. In June 2003, the US announced a \$3 billion assistance package for Pakistan to

start in October 2004 and to be distributed over five years, with roughly equal amounts going to economic aid and security assistance.^x It included a \$ 600 million emergency cash transfer in September 2001 to Pakistan.

U.S also began reimbursing coalition partners for their logistical and combat support to US military operations in the War on Terror.^{xi} In December 2001, Congress passed the “Defense Emergency Response Fund” which allowed the Secretary of Defense to reimburse coalition partners like Pakistan for their logistical and military support for US military operations. This funding became known as Coalition Support Funds [CSF].^{xii} To provide defense with maximum flexibility, congress passed a Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2002;^{xiii} major part of military assistance to Pakistan as assigned in form of Coalition Support Funds – intended as reimbursement for Pakistani assistance in the War on Terror.^{xiv}

Since 2002 US initiated a series of support programs in Pakistan under which it covered many grounds actively involved and operating with U.S on war on terror. These were funded by the US and included support programs like CSF reimbursement, foreign military financing program, security development plan, peace keeping operations, military and Frontier Corps education and training, and counter narcotics funds.

In Pakistan’s case the process of reimbursements is determined according to the documentations and receipts provided which sum up the amount of expenditure done on logistics and military support provided in combat. The process of reimbursement is rather a complex web of different offices working together. Under the December 2003 guidance and oversight process, Pakistan requires submitting its claim for reimbursement to the Office of Defense Representative, Pakistan [ODRP] at the US embassy in Islamabad. According to Comptroller guidance, ODRP would assist the Pakistani military in formulation the

reimbursement claim before sending the claim to CENTCOM.^{xv} CENTCOM then conducts its own independent review of the claims made and review it with the US military expenses.^{xvi} The final report as well as the recommendation is forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for further approval.

However the Congress continued to provide funding for Pakistan through Defense without requiring specific accountability controls until 2008.^{xvii} CSF has reimbursed a broad range of Pakistani military operations, including navy support for maritime patrols and interdiction operations; air force support for combat air patrols, reconnaissance and close air support missions, airlift support, and air traffic control, army military operations in the FATA, and increased management requirements at the Pakistan Joint Staff Headquarters.^{xviii}

US CSF Reimbursements to Pakistan, October 2001 through June 2007

US CSF Reimbursements	US Dollars [in millions]
October-December. 2001	\$300
January-December. 2002	\$847
January-December.2003	\$753
January-December.2004	\$1,221
January-December.2005	\$915
January-December.2006	\$1,070
January-June.2007	\$453

Source: GAO analysis of Defense Oversight documentation.^{xix}

About two-thirds of US aid from FY2002-FY2010, \$13.3 billion has supported security assistance in Pakistan. Of that, about \$9.4 billion has been funded through Defense Department appropriations.

President Obama first announced his strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan in March 2009. This broadly underlined counterinsurgency

efforts and also affirmed significant economic development assistance for Pakistan which had largely been ignored earlier. The greatest challenge since has been to plan a sustainable short and long-term stability strategy by providing physical and socio-economic security to as much of the population as possible by using available resources efficiently.

With Obama administration coming to office, military relations became stronger. Both parties agreed that separate but conducive military operations would be carried out in the war on terror, which included, intelligence sharing which incorporated the additional dimension that collective secret / surprise operations would be carried out if necessary.

None the less, in an effort to more productively channel US security assistance so as to specifically strengthen Pakistan's counterinsurgency capabilities, the Pentagon proposed, and Congress later endorsed, creation of a dedicated fund, the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund [PCF], later designated as the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund [PCCF].^{xx} PCCF is intended to be limited in time and purpose to address Pakistan's current urgent needs as it struggles against militant extremists within its borders. Funds are mainly targeted towards capacity building of Pakistan's security forces directly engaged in combat operations.

The primary lines of operation continues to be; training and equipping Pakistan's security forces with focus on the Pakistan Army, the Special Service Group, Pakistan Army Aviation, training and equipping of the paramilitary forces engaged in active combat along Pakistan Afghanistan border as well as in FATA.

Pakistan has been using Foreign Military financing^{xxi} [FMF] grants since 2001. Government Accountability Office, US states in its report and testimony as of July 2011 that the Congress has appropriated \$2.11 billion for FMF grants to Pakistan since Fiscal Year 2001, out of which

Pakistan has used about \$1.86 billion to acquire various defense articles, services or training. Pakistan under the FMF has also been granted US defense supplies under the Excess Defense Articles [EDA].

The figure below provides a yearly breakdown of list of items Pakistan purchased under the FMF grants:

Description and quantity	Year(s)	Value (dollars in millions)
P-3C avionics maritime patrol aircraft upgrades and related support (7 aircrafts)	2003,2005,2006,2008	507.6
F-16 mid-life updates (35 jets)	2006	476.4
TOW IIA anti-tank missile launchers and missiles (121 launchers, 6,212 missiles)	2005,2007,2010	213.1
Harris radios (2,335 radios)	2004,2005,2007,2010	213.1
TPS-78 radar systems (6 systems)	2004	96.9
Technical support team at Shahbaz Air Force Base	2010	82.1
C-130E transport aircraft refurbishments (6 aircrafts)	2003	75.9
USS McInerney frigate refurbishment	2010	58.8
Cobra helicopter refurbishments and support (12 helicopters)	2003,2004	53.5
Self-propelled M-109A5 howitzers (115 howitzers)	2006	52.5
Aircraft training	2002	7.6
Frigate training	2010	6.0
20 mm ammunition (600,000 cartridges)	2009,2010	5.2
Helicopter spare parts	2004	2.6
Electronic warfare equipment (signal jammers, expendable chaff, flares, etc.)	2002	1.9
PVS-7 night vision devices (300 devices)	2004	1.5
Aircraft spare parts	2003	1.3
Total committed		\$ 1,858.4

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data.^{xxii}

Economic Assistance

The US government opened the USAID mission in Islamabad in 2002. From FY 2002 through the first quarter of FY 2010, USAID has provided more than \$3.54 billion (including emergency economic assistance) to address needs in education, health economic growth, and good governance, as well as in earthquake reconstruction assistance.^{xxiii} Economic assistance for Pakistan from FY 2002-FY 2010 has totaled more than \$6.5 billion.^{xxiv}

Since 2001, the majority of US assistance to Pakistan – more than \$ 20 billion – has gone to Pakistan’s military. Recognizing this imbalance in support, the 2009 legislation introduced by Senators Kerry and Lugar sought to “promote an enhanced strategic partnership with Pakistan and its people” by authorizing \$7.5 billion over 5 years in non-military aid for democratic governance, economic freedom, investments in people, particularly women and children, and developments in the regions affected by conflict and displacement.^{xxv} On September 24, 2009, the US Congress passed a new bill that was signed into law by President Obama on October 15 the same year. The Kerry-Lugar Bill (KLB) as it was named under the Enhanced Partnership Act 2009, attracted severe opposition and criticism in Pakistan despite the fact that it aimed at improving the civilian sector and socio-economic conditions of the country.

The Bill was compared to the controversial and unpopular Pressler Amendment of 1985, because of its attached conditions; it gave the impression of attacking Pakistan’s sovereign status and humiliating its army’s efforts in the war on terror. The US has defended the KLB by portraying it as an effort to cultivate long-term commitment with Pakistan on a civilian platform.

Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Funds

(In millions of current US \$)

	FY2010	FY2011	FY2012 Estimate	FY2013 request
ESF	\$1,292.0	\$918.9	\$864.7	\$928.3
GHCS-	\$29.7	\$28.4	—	—
USAID	\$170.0	\$114.3	\$116.0	\$124.0
INCLE	\$23.9	\$24.8	\$20.8	\$19.3
NADR	\$1,515.6	\$1,086.4	\$1,001.5	\$1,071.3
Total				


Notes: ESF-Economic Support Funds; GHCS-Global Health and Child Survival; INCLE-International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR-Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs.^{xxvi}

The key concept of KLB was to reach directly to the people and invest funds in social development. It seeks to shift focus from military assistance to public expenditure, assuring improvement across multiple sectors including education, health, providing livelihood and building new public institutions. Hence, it is a distinct step since aid in the last decade has largely been dominated by defence expenses. Economic approach under KLB is innovative in four notable ways:^{xxvii}

1. It focuses on alignment with Pakistani priorities;
2. With a focus on visible infrastructure projects;
3. Focus on priority sectors and regions vulnerable to violent extremism; and
4. Whole of government effort that taps expertise from a variety of US agencies

Regardless of its meaning and purpose, the bill attracts anti-American sentiments and chalks out continuing trust deficit even though it aims at long-term commitment with Pakistan.

U.S. Bilateral Economic Assistance to Pakistan, 1998-2009
(in millions, constant 2009 \$US)



NOTE: Does not include \$2,554 million in military assistance for the period 1998 to 2009.

Source: US Overseas Loans and Grants.^{xxviii}

Despite million of dollars worth of aid and assistance to Pakistan, the US is still seen as an unreliable ally. Decades of alienation, sanctions and considerate unpredictability has left a bad taste in mouth in Pakistan. Only one-tenth of all the aid given in the past few years has been spent on education, health care and other socio-economic projects. The rest is directly invested in the military operations through coalition support funds or otherwise. While the default role for a donor country is to spend aid money, money alone cannot bring success. In sector after sector, the interventions most important for development in Pakistan suffer from insufficient financing, but from poor policy and poor implementation.^{xxix}

Pakistan's economy is in a constant pressure after WoT, the fighting has cost Pakistan thrice more than the aid provided by US. It has cost lives of thousands of Pakistanis including more than 3000 security personnel, loss of infrastructure internal displacement. Economy in Pakistan has been the main sufferer, since 2006 the economy of Pakistan has nosedived with rising rates of unemployment and inflation. Over the past decade the economy of Pakistan has been in a decline. The economy was subjected to enormous direct and indirect costs which continued to rise from \$42,669 billion in 2001-02 to \$13.6 billion by 2009-10, projected to rise to \$ 17.8 billion in 2010-2011 and moving forward.^{xxx}

Post OBL Scenario:

Although Pakistan remains of great value to US, it has become increasingly clear since the killing of Osama Bin Laden that US government aid to Pakistan is plagued by a complexity that belies claims of a strategic partnership.^{xxxi} Soon after the event of May 2, 2011; two amendments were proposed in United States House of Representatives to cut \$2 billion US aid to Pakistan. The first amendment proposed cutting \$1 billion in US aid which provides funds to Pakistan under the endowment US governments gives to the countries that are partners in its War on Terror. The second amendment was presented which proposed a cut off of \$1 billion in funds which US provides Pakistan for its counter-insurgency efforts.

In the wake of killing of Osama Bin Laden, Pakistan and U.S relations has taken a new shift. The already tense relations have become a question of debate in Islamabad and in Washington. In the back drop of the event a great deal of debate on the Capitol Hill has focused on the efficacy of US aid to Pakistan.^{xxxii}

U.S in its Fiscal Year 2012 Budget has provided Pakistan with \$ 1.9 billion in assistance to promote a secure, stable, democratic and prosperous Pakistan with focus on energy, economic growth, and agriculture, the delivery of health and education services, and strengthening the government of Pakistan's capacity to govern effectively

and accountably. At the military front the US budget for Fiscal Year 2012 included \$1.1 billion for the Pakistan counterinsurgency Capability Fund to provide critical equipment and training for Pakistani security forces, increasing the ability of the Pakistani government to combat insurgents inside Pakistan and eliminating the insurgent's capacity to conduct cross-border operations.^{xxxiii}

Obama's Second Term as President; Challenges for Pakistan

Pakistan and US relationship has always been a marriage of convenience, however, relations after the 1971 debacle posed great challenges yet the relationship remained normal despite all odds. United States has always supported democratic governments in Pakistan, however circumstances have compelled the United States to support dictatorships, like for example during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which left no choice for the US, but to support General Zia ul Haq and similarly, the 9/11 attacks, which forced the US to support a military regime in Pakistan.

Relations between Pakistan and US over Obama's first term were marked with deterioration and severely nosedived – the relationship experienced countless unpleasant events like Raymond Davis incident, the Abbottabad raid and Salala incident. The second term of President Obama comes with no surprises for Pakistan. Not just because of the obvious bearing, but also because Obama's first term as president is considered to be an experiment in which different policies were applied and tested. Obama in his second term might act bolder or have more space to decide policy options and challenges. Despite an obvious victory Obama still faces a divided congress between Democrats and Republicans' who control the Senate and the House of Representatives.

Success in Afghanistan and relations between Pakistan and US has been tied together since the beginning of 'War on Terror'. The narrative in Pakistan is that the 'second verse will be same as the first' with a few minor policy arrangements and changes; with the deadline of US exit

from Afghanistan Obama's second term agenda for Pakistan seems to be more complex. For Pakistan the major question remain the same – what will Obama's second term as President bring for Pakistan, what policy narratives will be now in store for us?


- Drone Strikes: Obama in his third and final debate vouched to continue drones strike inside Pakistan as being part of US geo-strategic policy in the region and one of the most effective ways to damage Taliban network across the Pakistan Afghanistan border. However, while the legality of covert drone strikes have been questioned and challenged many times, they are one of Obama administration's key national security policies. The drone campaign is very controversial and deeply unpopular in Pakistan
- North Waziristan Campaign / Haqqani Network: Military operation in North Waziristan can very well cover most of the US agenda for Pakistan in the second term of Obama as President. The withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan will create more security conditions for Pakistan. Hence, Pakistan is reluctant to launch an offensive against the Haqqani network. Malala incident, however, has raised pressure on Pakistan from the civil society within and international community abroad to launch at least a small scale offensive in the area. The reluctance comes from the fact that launching a full scale or even a small scale operation that in area will create more security problems for Pakistan, and may allow militants to disperse in other parts of the country.
- Nuclear Security: US have always been very critical about the safety of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Nuclear safety has been a point of friction in many bi-lateral discussions. US fears that if terrorism is not controlled in the country, Pakistan nuclear weapons may fall into wrong hands. Pakistan, after 2005, has taken many steps for the security of its nuclear weapons in order

to increase international confidence. It has implemented new security procedure plans as well as personnel security programs.

Pakistan and US relationship in Obama's second term will be prone to frequent mismanagement – quoting examples like that of NATO strikes inside Pakistani border and Raymond Davis affair. The two sides need to get back to the drawing board and think out of the box. Washington interest in this part of the world has to accommodate the national interest of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Pakistan and US relations have been closely tied together since the beginning of WoT. Nonetheless, Obama in his first term, while announcing his initial WoT strategy very immaturely tied Afghanistan and Pakistan together in one frame, not realizing that both are two different entities with completely two different ground realities. Where the Bush administration focused on eliminating Al Qaeda operatives; Obama's administration concentrated more on targeting Taliban, its foot soldiers and safe havens inside Pakistan.

U.S. Seen as Enemy



PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q105b.

Source: Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project.^{xxxiv}

Nonetheless, key obstacle between Pakistan and US is not entirely Afghanistan but, both the countries coming together on bilateral terms. US experts have often seen Pakistan through Afghanistan lens, which has complicated matters. In Pakistan, the corridors of power believe that the US is entirely insensitive to Pakistani concerns in Afghanistan.

In the past, many Pakistani-Americans had supported the Republican Party largely because it was felt that Republicans favors Pakistan more than the Democrats does. This pattern worked over the years until President Bush took office and War on Terror began; many civil liberties were restricted of Pakistani-Americans which resulted in an overwhelming support to President Obama in 2008 elections. Although President Obama in his first term did show off his militaristic rhetoric towards Pakistan, the concern of Pakistani-American settled in US was what he will do in domestic front.

Reconciliation with the Taliban

Though Kabul has introduced a broad national reconciliation programme which gives equal representation to minorities in Afghanistan's political mainstream, concrete results are yet to be produced. Its effectiveness remains under the scrutiny of the US, NATO and the Afghan government. Oversight of some of the main issues at hand and substantial governance deficiency in Kabul to develop an active mechanism to address the causes of isolation at the local and national levels has made the effort of reconciliation with the population excessively difficult. In these circumstances, the most challenging factors facing the:

1. Influencing and developing trust with the population by providing them economic incentives and opportunities, and
2. Developing rifts between Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives in the region

Reconciliation is a long and difficult process that requires time and patience. A policy of engaging high-ranking Taliban commanders has its

own dangers; high-level militants will only come to terms when they are in a position of weakness. To build momentum it is necessary that the US and NATO initiate efforts from an individual level. Reintegration involves more than simply giving money and political benefits to Taliban. At a minimum, Pakistan, US, and Kabul ought to address three main concerns:

1. Providing jobs and other business and economic opportunities,
2. Addressing root causes of extremism such as education, tribal rivalry and discrimination, and
3. Providing security to people

The main challenge to a successful reconciliation process remains that of creating a split between the Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives. The overall strategy will be much easier to implement once this goal is achieved and Al Qaeda has been driven out since the Taliban have benefited principally from the relationship over the years. This cooperation has given them the capability to fight in large numbers, provided them with finances to buy arms and ammunition, introduced suicide bombing as a war strategy and provided trainings for suicide attacks and target killings.

Many Taliban factions have now realized that coming into the political mainstream is a better option. According to a report in *Times*, the Hizb-e-Islami group, since clashing with Taliban elements, has already come forward and pursued talks with US and NATO forces. The report noted that the delegation was headed by former Prime Minister Qutbuddin Helal who is a deputy to Gulbuddin Hekmetyar. Hizb-e-Islami is one of the three major Taliban groups that were initially acknowledged to be major security threats to US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. However, it is generally believed that because of differences between the three groups, which until recently were working together; Hizb-e-Islami has come forward to negotiate with the regime in Kabul.

In some ways this has justified the new strategy of reconciliation with extremists in Afghanistan. It remains to be seen whether this will be a sustainable strategy; as this paper has argued, many steps need to be taken to incorporate local populations within the policy at large if this indeed is to be the case. The perception is that US is not sincere in reconciliation talks with the Taliban and is only seeking to break the movement from within. Similarly, the perception in Washington is that Pakistan is the number one spoiler in Afghanistan; and that the Haqqani network actually is the veritable arm of the ISI. Also, believing that it is Fata, not Afghanistan, that poses the real threat to the US, and that Pakistan wants to continue treating Afghanistan as its — and only its — backyard and nothing more.

Conclusion:

Though Pakistan and United States share decades of friendship, the relationship has remained unstable. In order to understand the current relation that Pakistan and US shares it is important to understand the relation both the countries have shared in the past. Events, like arrest of the CIA contractor Raymond Davis and the killing of Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden in Pakistan – have put strains on bilateral relations, making uncertain the future direction of US aid to Pakistan.^{xxxv}

Throughout the 1990's, United States essentially ended military cooperation and arms sales to Pakistan. It was only after the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, that the Bush Administration chose to re-engage with Pakistan in the area of defense cooperation, and was willing; once again, to consider and approve major weapons sales to Pakistan.^{xxxvi}

Cumulative impact and widespread perception in Pakistan and many Pakistani abroad still remains that the relationship with US continues to be a transactional one. In US, lack of instant compliance by Pakistan is almost universally regarded as a confirmation that Pakistan is an unreliable ally. The pressure point, at the moment is that both the

countries have some realization that Pakistan and US cannot afford to be on the opposite sides when it come to Afghanistan. This keeps them from rupturing ties. Had the governance issue as well as internal issues in Pakistan been stable, Pakistan and US relationship would have been better, risks reduced and a lot that needs to be done now to fix this relationship wouldn't have been necessary.

Nearly all of Pakistan's major multilateral partners have committed to increase their funding to Pakistan over the next few years. The World Bank tripled its committed support for Pakistan in FY2009, reaching an all-time high of \$1.7 billion. The Asian Development Bank, which disbursed a record \$1.9 billion in 2008, loaned an average of \$1.5 billion annually through 2011. The UK's Department for International Development has pledged to double assistance to Pakistan to approximately \$250 million per year. Thus, the increases in US aid are part of a larger phenomenon of increased international support for Pakistan's development.^{xxxvii}

Over the last decade, Pakistan has played a vital part in the fight against terrorism, suffered tremendous casualties, and witnessed worsening security conditions as well as a deteriorating economy. Compared to any other nation involved in the war, its physical and material sacrifices have been immense. Reneging on the multi-year pledge of billions of dollars; cuts at the very core of the desire to build a relationship with the Pakistani people.^{xxxviii} However, a thorny set of obstacles stands in the way of the United States and other donors as they try to scale up development spending in Pakistan. The sheer scale of the country's population and development challenges requires effective mobilization of local resources and local institutions.^{xxxix}

End Notes and References

- i. In 1960 US backed India in a war with China, where on the other hand Pakistan extended its assistance to China.
- ii. India in 1974 carried out underground tests of its nuclear device in order to develop its own nuclear capability. This automatically alarmed the military insecurities that Pakistan posses against India and Pakistan

- in retaliation and in order to maintain deterrence in the region developed its own nuclear program. However, the attitude of the then US administration was more lenient towards India as compared to Pakistan.
- iii. A. Z. Hilali, “Costs and Benefits of Afghan War for Pakistan”, <http://www.khyber.org/publications/pdf/afghanwarcosts.pdf>
 - iv. K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan – US Relations”, Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief for Congress, January 28, 2005, <http://www.fas.org/man/IB94041.pdf>
 - v. NATO Article 5 is among the basic NATO principles which states that, if one NATO country is subjected to an arm attack from outside the country, the (armed) attack / assault will be consider an attack against all other NATO countries and deemed necessary action will be taken to assist the ally. For more detail:
 - a. <http://www.nato.int/terrorism/five.htm>
 - vi. Liam Collins, “United States Diplomacy with Pakistan Following 9/11”, May 16, 2008,
 - a. <http://wvs.princeton.edu/research/cases/coercivediplomacy.pdf>
 - vii. Terrorist sponsoring nations are the countries which are determined by the US as countries that sponsor or provide to terrorist organizations. Currently there are four terrorist sponsoring countries determined by US – Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Syria; the countries continue to have ties with terrorist groups. More details:
 - a. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65476.pdf>
 - viii. ACSA formerly known as NATO Mutual Support Fund, is an agreement negotiated on a bilateral basis with US allies or coalition partners that allow US forces to exchange most common types of support, including food, fuel, transportation, ammuniton, and equipment. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/acsa.htm>
 - ix. Susan B. Epstein, K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan: US Foreign Assistance”, Congressional Research Service, June 7, 2011, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41856.pdf>
 - x. Touqir Hussain, “US-Pakistan Engagement”, Special Report 145, United States Institute of Peace, August 2005, <http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr145.pdf>
 - xi. “Increased Oversight and Accountability Needed over Pakistan Reimbursements Claims for Coalition Support Funds”, Report to Congressional Requesters, June 2008, United States Government Accountability Office, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08806.pdf>
 - xii. “US Oversight of Pakistan Reimbursements Claims for Coalition Support Funds”, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, June 24, 2008, United States Government Accountability Office,
 - a. www.gao.gov/new.items/d08932t.pdf
 - xiii. “Increased Oversight and Accountability Needed over Pakistan Reimbursements Claims for Coalition Support Funds”, Report to Congressional Requesters, June 2008, United States Government Accountability Office, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08806.pdf>
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The Essence of Pakistan-US Relations since 9/11

Ajit Kumar Singh

(Ajit Kumar Singh, a Research Fellow with the New Delhi based Institute for Conflict Management is involved in research on Conflicts in South Asia. He has written extensively on all the Conflicts engulfing South Asia. His works have been published in several journals, magazines and news papers, both online and print. He has been extensively quoted in media. After completing his M.Phil. on "Emergence of Afghanistan as Buffer between Tsarist Russia and British Indian Empire (19th Century)", from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, he is pursuing his Ph. D. from the same School on "The Ethnic Conflict and State Structure in Afghanistan: 1989-2001")

Since its inception in 1947, Pakistan has always remained a close ally of the United States (US), albeit facing dangerous disruptions on several occasions. The reason is simple. Both these nations have a set agenda behind forming this tie which has almost remained unchanged. While Pakistan has sought to maintain this tie as it has been and remains fixated to India, the US has always looked upon Pakistan as a strategic ally which can help it thwart 'Soviet expansionism' in the region. Unsurprisingly, the US has, sometimes overtly and sometimes covertly, rallied around Pakistan's interest in India in lieu of Pakistani assistance in helping US maintain its hegemonic supremacy in the region.

The outline of the relationship was re-defined, though in a forceful manner by the US, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks (better known as 9/11) launched by the al Qaeda upon the US in New York City and the Washington D.C., killing almost 3,000 people. Indeed, soon after the attack, the US Government gave an ultimatum to Pakistan either to join the USA or to side with al Qaeda's terrorism and its harbourers, the Taliban. It went further warning Pakistan to be ready to 'be bombed back to the Stone Age.'¹

Writing about the essence of Pakistan US relations in the aftermath of 9/11, Amin Saikal notes:²

In declaring Pakistan as a partner of the USA in what then President Gorge Bush called the 'war on terror', commencing with the 'Enduring Freedom Operation' in Afghanistan in October 2001, Pakistan President General

(retired) Pervez Musharraf forged a new and robust alliance with them... Musharraf needed Washington's partnership to help him consolidate power and lead Pakistan out of the dire predicaments in which it was placed. On the other hand, the Bush administration need Pakistan as a key state for not only toppling the Taliban and redirecting Afghanistan, but also successfully executing its war on terror strategy with wider aims than what it wanted to achieve in Afghanistan.

Musharraf did consolidate his power in Pakistan as he got the US backing. In the most dramatic turnaround of events, virtually all sanctions that were put on Pakistan in the aftermath of Nuclear Explosions of 1998 as well as that following the military coup brought by Musharraf were lifted. Freed from the possibility of sanctions, US assistance to Pakistan began to flow.

The successive Governments in Pakistan too continued to get US assistance in form of huge financial aid. A report presented in April 2013 by Congressional Research Service for the US Congress to Congress reveals that Pakistan received a total of USD 25.91 billion from the US in terms of military and economic aid since September 11, 2001. The US had budgeted approximately USD 17.22 billion in military and USD 8.68 billion in economic assistance to Pakistan during the period; thus making it the largest source of bilateral aid to Pakistan, says the report. The break-up of security related aid shows that from 2002 to 2012 Pakistan got USD 10.68 billion as Coalition Support Fund, USD 2.75 billion as Foreign Military Financing, USD 2.35 billion under Pakistan Counter insurgency Fund, USD 312 million for global training and equipment, USD 265 million out of Counter-Narcotics Funds of Pentagon, USD 27 million under International Disaster Assistance, USD 717 million under International Narcotics Control and Law, and USD 115 million under Anti Terrorism Assistance.³

Meanwhile, after becoming President Barack Obama in 2009 enunciated a new Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan. Talking about Pakistan he stated on March 27, 2009,⁴

...The people of Pakistan want the same things that we want: an end to terror, access to basic services, the opportunity to live their dreams, and the security that can only come with the rule of law. The single greatest threat to that future comes from al Qaeda and their extremist allies, and that is why we must stand together. The terrorists within Pakistan's borders are not simply enemies of America or Afghanistan -- they are a grave and urgent danger to the people of Pakistan... It's important

for the American people to understand that Pakistan needs our help in going after al Qaeda. This is no simple task. The tribal regions are vast, they are rugged, and they are often ungoverned. And that's why we must focus our military assistance on the tools, training and support that Pakistan needs to root out the terrorists. And after years of mixed results, we will not, and cannot, provide a blank check. Pakistan must demonstrate its commitment to rooting out al Qaeda and the violent extremists within its borders. And we will insist that action be taken -- one way or another -- when we have intelligence about high-level terrorist targets. The government's ability to destroy these safe havens is tied to its own strength and security... To avoid the mistakes of the past, we must make clear that our relationship with Pakistan is grounded in support for Pakistan's democratic institutions and the Pakistani people. And to demonstrate through deeds as well as words a commitment that is enduring, we must stand for lasting opportunity. So today, I am calling upon Congress to pass a bipartisan bill co-sponsored by John Kerry and Richard Lugar that authorizes \$1.5 billion in direct support to the Pakistani people every year over the next five years -- resources that will build schools and roads and hospitals, and strengthen Pakistan's democracy...

However, Islamabad expectedly has failed to deliver on its promises. The military mullah combine which has the final say on all the issues concerning Pakistan have not allowed any positive development on this front. In fact, the relations between the two countries have deteriorated on several occasions on this issue with mistrust gaining prominence.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton accused members of the Pakistani Government in 2010 of practically harboring Osama bin Laden. "I'm not saying that they're at the highest levels, but I believe that somewhere in this government are people who know where Usama bin Laden and Al Qaeda is, where Mullah Omar and the leadership of the Afghan Taliban is, and we expect more cooperation to help us bring to justice, capture or kill those who attacked us on 9/11," she said in an interview on CBS "60 Minutes". Republican Edward Royce, ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on terrorism, similarly said, "The United States has been routinely suckered by the government in Pakistan,"

Royce said. "We can say we will cut that (funding) off unless we get these changes."⁵

Again, during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on September 22, 2011, Admiral Michael Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, highlighted the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Agency's role in sponsoring the Haqqani Network - including attacks on American forces in Afghanistan. "The fact remains that the Quetta Shura [Taliban] and the Haqqani Network operate from Pakistan with impunity. Extremist organizations serving as proxies of the government of Pakistan are attacking Afghan troops and civilians as well as US soldiers... History teaches us that it is difficult to defeat an insurgency when fighters enjoy a sanctuary outside national boundaries, and we are seeing this again today. The actions by the Pakistani government to support [the Quetta Shura Taliban and the Haqqani Network] --actively and passively-- represent a growing problem that is undermining U.S. interests and may violate international norms, potentially warranting sanction. In supporting these groups, the government of Pakistan, particularly the Pakistani Army, continues to jeopardize Pakistan's opportunity to be a respected and prosperous nation with genuine regional and international influence." Though he said that now is not the time "to disengage from Pakistan", he conceded that America should now "reframe our relationship."⁶

In a more recent indictment of Pakistan's policy on counter-terrorism, in a joint statement released by the White House on October 23, 2013, following President Obama and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif meeting in US, it was stated: "The two leaders emphasized that no country's territory should be used to destabilize its neighbors."

Moreover, summing up the US frustration, Ted Poe, US Congressman 2nd District of Texas, have stated:

Madam Speaker, Pakistan is a disloyal, deceptive, and devious ally of the United States. Pakistan harbors Taliban terrorists that are at war with our troops in Afghanistan. Pakistan hid out Osama bin Laden. Pakistan put the Pakistani doctor that helped the United States take out "the devil of the desert" in prison for 30 years. Pakistan is playing the United States for a nation of fools. Otherwise, why would our Government just send \$1.2 billion to Pakistan? Haven't we learned that Pakistan takes our money and slyly and seditiously uses it for purposes

counter to U.S. interests? Pakistan has become the Benedict Arnold ally of America. Why do we pay Pakistan to hate us? Madam Speaker, they will do it for free. No American taxpayer money to Pakistan. Use that American money in America. Freedom-loving nations that give Pakistan money in the delusive hope of fighting terrorism are sailing the ships of the foolish--and the United States has become the admiral of the fleet.⁷

Evidently, the relationship between the two nations post 9/11 revolves around the issue of cooperation on counterterrorism. While the US has made several overtures to win Pakistani support, Islamabad has failed to stand up to the expectations as radical Forces within the country have gained more strength in these years. With such Forces expected to gain more strength in days to come, it is highly unlikely that US will be able to bring any significant change in Pakistani policy of duplicity. It is therefore imperative for Washington to look beyond Pakistan in its pursuit of an able ally in its war against terror in the region as the epicenter of terror has shifted from Afghanistan to Pakistan.

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Pakistan-U.S. Relations Post-9/11:

From Mutual Dependence to Trust Deficit

Shivani Sharma

(Shivani Sharma is a research scholar at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, pursuing M.Phil in South Asian Studies at the School of International Studies. She is working on "Impact of war on terrorism on the Identity Politics in Pakistan, 2001-2013". It's more of a unconventional study where she is looking at the discursive representation of War on terrorism in the West which harped on the war on terror discourse affirming United States self identity as the beacon of democracy, 'progress' and 'modernity' in contradistinction to an "Islamist" other. While deliberating upon this, she will be making an analysis of the "Jihadi" groups narratives in Pakistan and investigate how the Pakistani society and state whose identity since inception is in flux has responded to those war on terror narrative discourses.

(She did her Masters in Political Science from Hindu College, University of Delhi and secured 2nd position in the University for which she was awarded Academic Excellence Award.)

Introduction

Pakistan and the United States have had a tumultuous and varied relationship since Pakistan's inception in 1947. Pakistan has been an alliance partner to the United States during the cold war and served as a key player, a 'frontline state' to the U.S. to counter Soviet expansionism in Afghanistan in 1979. However, their relationship has been far from an alliance based on shared values and interests; rather, are borne out of the exigencies of the evolving situations based on their national interests, confronting different enemies and pinning different expectations to their association.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on powerful American symbols, the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, by the radical terrorist groups marked a new era of Pakistan-U.S. relations. The National Security for combating terrorism (White House, 2001) defined the 9/11 attacks as "acts of war against the United States of America and its allies, and against the very idea of civilised society". The goal of the counter terrorism mechanisms remained to deny sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists. Whereas, the main objective of the anti-terror policy formulated by the United States has been to make it a global fight, work with willing and able states and enable the 'weak' and

‘reluctant’ states to join the international community to fight the menace of terrorism.

The 9/11 attacks not only transformed the global strategic environment but once again brought the geo-politics to the fore. Despite Washington’s pursuit of de-hyphenated relations with India and Pakistan in the post cold-war era, the 9/11 attacks drifted U.S. attention toward Pakistan. The American intervention in Afghanistan, with a core mandate of dismantling al-Qaeda, the group which according to the U.S. was responsible for the attacks has had a serious impact on its immediate neighbour, Pakistan. Geographically adjacent to Afghanistan and the former supporter of the Taliban regime, Pakistan proved to be a vital member to the U.S.-led coalition in its strategic operation to combat terrorism. Whereas, Pakistan was initially reluctant to join the Western coalition of forces to fight the threat of terrorism. However, Wendy Chamberlin, the then new U.S. ambassador to Pakistan bluntly stated that the September 11 attacks had changed the fundamentals of the debate, and, Pakistan needed to “act with the U.S-not to urge dialog but to act.”

The terrorist attacks of 9/11, therefore, brought the U.S.-Pakistan relations to a close partnership, now built around counterterrorism. However, the relations between the two states have fluctuated over the years based on lack of commitment from the Pakistani side, indo-centricity governing Pakistan’s polity, U.S. covert operations in Pakistan and the encroachment of Pakistan’s state autonomy. The U.S. administration also implemented Obama’s Afghanistan-Pakistan policy in the year 2009, which primarily focussed upon engaging and focussing Islamabad on the common threat, assisting Pakistan’s capability to fight extremism, increasing and broadening assistance to Pakistan, exploring other areas of economic cooperation with Pakistan and strengthening Pakistan’s government capacity to fight the threat from within. The following are some factors that determined the course of relations between U.S. and Pakistan in the last one decade of war on terrorism.

‘Indo-Centricity’: Main variable in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

Pakistan, as per the statements made by the Pakistani officials was forced to join the global war on terror and change its policy towards its erstwhile ally, the Taliban. The reluctant State of Pakistan received a terse message from the U.S. Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage, employing the U.S. old cold war maxim of “you are either with us or against us” to pressurize Pakistan to join the West. Though, the then

Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence director, Mahmud Ahmed, understood the message as a threat, that, “Pakistan will be bombed back to the Stone Age” if they do not comply with the American demands. In his memoirs, the then Army Chief of Pakistan, Musharraf, relates that he “war gamed” the risks that would entail, if Pakistan continued to align with the Taliban. Musharraf, succinctly stated that, Pakistan’s policy is derived from its concerns about India. He also reiterated that, Pakistan’s alliance to the U.S. was not because of an inherent strategic alignment but it was to counter any Indian advantages. He explained to the Pakistani public, *“They (India) want to isolate us, get us declared as a terrorist state. In this situation if we make the wrong decisions it can be bad for us. Our critical concerns are our sovereignty, second our economy, third our strategic assets (nuclear and missiles) and fourth our Kashmir cause.”*

Musharraf in his address to the nation alluded to the U.S. threat and suggested that India would benefit if Pakistanis did not co-operate with the Americans. He stated that Pakistan has to make a sacrifice on the Afghan front so that the Kashmir front could remain active. Joining the Western forces in the global cause of terrorism gave the then President Musharraf, the opportunity to cast off the nuclear sanctions and rehabilitate Pakistan’s standing in the community of nations. Therefore, ‘self interest’ and ‘self-preservation’ became the two main guiding principles that governed General Musharraf’s decision in joining the Western forces.

Former ambassador Bill Milam, a seasoned South Asia hand, has significantly stressed that the “India –Centricity of the Pakistani mindset is the most important factor and variable” in the future of the country. Maleeha Lodhi, former Pakistani ambassador to the United States, too stated, that the most important strategic imperative for the Pakistani national security bureaucracy is the competition with India and the obsession with India in Pakistani life is likely to frustrate its relations with the U.S. President Bush acknowledged the ‘indo-centricity’ governing Pakistan’s polity and its counterterrorism policy. According to Bush, “Part of the problem was Pakistan’s obsession with India. In almost every conversation we had, Musharraf accused India of wrongdoing.” Four days after 9/11 the Pakistani ruler had told Bush that the Indians were “trying to equate us with terrorists and trying to influence your mind.”

Therefore, in an attempt to side the international community towards the Kashmir cause and to limit India’s role in the Afghan war or in the

government that would follow the Taliban, Pakistan decided to join the war on terrorism. The United States on the other hand, have tried to maintain a neutral stand on the Kashmir issue and perceived it to be a bilateral issue between Pakistan and India. The first meeting between the two Presidents, Obama and Zardari at the White house took place in 2009. President Obama noticeably stated, “We do not begrudge your concerns about India, but we do not want to be a part of arming you against India.” However, the former Pakistan ambassador to the U.S., Husain Haqqani in his recent book, “Magnificent Delusions”, cited the reference of President’s Obama letter to the former Pakistani President, Zardari, hinting at addressing Pakistan’s often-stated desire for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. However, the U.S. administration over the years have tried bringing Pakistan and India together and envisions a stable South Asia with new patterns of co-operation between them.

MUTUAL DISTRUST

Distrust runs strong in the relationship between Pakistan and the United States. The selective implementation of counterterrorism policies by Pakistan, support for groups, such as Haqqani network, that actively target American interests in Afghanistan and the U.S. and covert operations in Pakistan are the major irritants in the relations between the two states. Despite the constant history of mistrust between the two states, they are mutually dependent on one another.

After making Pakistan join the war on terror, the U.S. presented to Pakistan a list of nonnegotiable demands which included unequivocal condemnation of the 9/11 attacks, denying al-Qaeda safe heaven in Pakistan , sharing intelligence information, granting over –flight rights, and breaking diplomatic relations with the Taliban. There were also several specific requests for logistical support. While agreeing to most of the demands, Musharraf on the other hand, is believed to have rejected the demands on the landing rights and access to the naval and air bases. He stated, “*How could we allow the United States ‘blanket over flight and landing rights’ without jeopardising our strategic interests? I offered only a narrow flight corridor that was far from any sensitive area. We allowed US only two bases-Shamsi in Baluchistan and Jacobabad in Sindh and only for logistics and aircraft recovery. No attack could be launched from there. We gave no ‘blanket permission’ for anything*”.

Pakistan’s value to the U.S. since 9/11 in the military sphere has been limited. Though, nevertheless it has played a noteworthy role in partnering and assisting the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the U.S.

in attacking the al-Qaeda presence in the country's major cities. In one of the most important of such cases, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, the 3rd ranking al-Qaeda leader was captured in 2003 in Rawalpindi, the home of Pakistan's army command. Two other important al-Qaeda leaders, key lieutenants of Osama Bin Laden, Ramzi Bin-Al-Sheikh and Abu Zubaydah were caught in Faisalabad, at a safe house belonging to Lashkar-e-Tayyiba. By 2006, according to Musharraf's account, the Pakistanis had helped capture 670 al-Qaeda operatives.

However, except for these and several other cases, the Musharraf regime and its successors have shown little initiative on its own in finding and breaking up either al-Qaeda network or the networks of sympathetic Islamic extremist groups that give sanctuary and help to al-Qaeda. The Pakistanis did not go into the al-Qaeda safe heavens in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and other tribal areas as those areas had never been policed by the central government, and the Pakistan's Inter-Service-Intelligence (ISI) had only limited capability to do so.

Pakistan's commitment towards eradicating terrorism has been always questioned and is seen with suspicion by the U.S. and the international community. Several countries' intelligence services stressed Pakistan's position as "a principal recruiting ground and logistical support for global terrorists". New York Times correspondent Carlotta Gill, visitor to the border towns of Quetta and Chaman found signs of Pakistani authorities encouraging the insurgents, if not directly supporting them. The US Defence Secretary Robert Gates in 2007 reiterated the same line of argument by linking the Islamist extremist groups with the rogue ISI and its alliance with the Taliban. Zahid Hussain, a respected Pakistani journalist, cited evidence of the active involvement of two ISI Director Generals, Hamid Gul and General Javed Nasir with Islamic radical movement linked to the al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

Musharraf's policy of selective counter-terrorism, fighting only an arm of the jihadist Frankenstein when he had to and tolerating the greater parts, did not save Pakistan from the rise of the extremists. Pakistan continued to "warehouse some extremists and left others untouched". The banned militant groups re-emerged under new names, and courts freed the detained leaders, claiming lack of evidence. Despite, partnering with the CIA in the battle against al-Qaeda, the ISI continued its problematic ties to the Taliban, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad and other jihaadi groups. The rise of new militant groups such as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Pakistan strand of Taliban has also increased the internal challenges of terrorism in Pakistan, threatening

the state's stability. Pakistan's continued tolerance to these extremists groups strained bilateral relations with Washington and has not been perceived as a "mature" partner by the United States.

Although, Bush had invested heavily in securing Pakistani co-operation against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, he found that "the Pakistani military spent most of its resources preparing for war with India. According to President Bush, "Part of the problem was Pakistan's obsession with India". Its troops were trained to wage a conventional battle with its neighbour, not counterterrorism operations in the tribal areas. The fight against extremists came second."

On September 13, 2011, the terrorist attack at the American embassy in Kabul spearheaded the already challenged relations between the two states. The U.S. special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Marc Grossman blamed the Afghan Haqqani network for perpetrating the embassy attacks and showed discontent at the continued ISI support to these elements. Over the course of time the two nations clashed over the actions of Raymond Davis, a CIA contractor who had killed two Pakistanis in Lahore on suspicion of trying to rob him. The Pakistani ISI fuelled protests over American efforts to spy on Pakistan through men like Davis. However, many in West believe that the Davis issue was orchestrated by the Pakistanis in order to curtail U.S. unilateral CIA operations within Pakistan.

Aftermath the episode, Pakistan Army Chief General Kayani pressed the demand on the US to send back their military and intelligence personnel engaged in unilateral covert operations in Pakistan. With the assistance of Pakistan intelligence and the militant groups like Jamaat-ud-dawa the event sparked widespread protests and demanded death sentence for the CIA contractor. General of the ISI lieutenant Sujha Pasha demanded deep cuts in the CIA presence in Pakistan and also the withdrawal of U.S. personnel involved in training Pakistan's forces.

U.S. relations with Pakistan took another serious turn with the proliferation of Pakistani nuclear technology to countries like North Korea, Iran and Libya and the activities of the father of the Pakistani bomb, A.Q. Khan. Though, the U.S-India civil nuclear deal of 2006 and the acceptance of India's legitimate status as a nuclear power aggravated the wave of discontent and betrayal among the Pakistanis.

Before U.S. and Pakistan could maintain a stable equilibrium, the relations deteriorated and came to a standstill on May 1, 2011, when U.S. Navy SEALs conducted their clandestine operation to kill a

recognized international terrorist, Osama bin Laden in his fortified compound in Abbotabad. Pakistan's initial official response to the event was a statement issued by the Foreign office describing bin Laden's death as "a major setback to terrorist organizations around the world." It also said the US operation "illustrates the resolve of the international community including Pakistan to fight and eliminate terrorism." However, the position in Islamabad began to shift pressing "deep concerns and reservations on the manner in which the Government of United States carried out this operation without prior information or authorization from the Government of Pakistan". Moreover, the then Islamists and hardliners in the military described the operation against bin Laden as U.S. aggression on Pakistan soil threatening Pakistan's territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Though, the US government raised many hard questions about Pakistan's commitment towards the cause of terrorism. The Americans concluded that Pakistan's failure to combat terrorism went beyond its law enforcement agencies and armed forces incompetence. The recent report leaked by Al-Jazeera from the Pakistan council concluded, that the non-detection of Osama bin Laden was a result of incompetence and negligence and insists that, for the ISI this is a far more serious charge than connivance with rogue elements. Though, two-thirds of Pakistanis polled condemned the U.S. military action and professed it to be an encroachment on their state sovereignty.

The attacks on Bin laden left a deadlock in the U.S.-Pakistan relations. Rather than embracing the truth about Bin Laden's hiding, the army co-opted with political elites to defend its institutional position and demanded a review of bilateral relations with the U.S. The U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry on a visit to Islamabad described it as "a critical moment" in the U.S.-Pakistan relations. He further states, "If there is no improvement in the current situation between the two nations, it will become increasingly difficult to convince people at home of the need to give aid to Pakistan". The US thereby, withheld the aid of worth \$800 million to Pakistan. Admiral Mullen projected discontent over Pakistan army's unwillingness to be honest in its dealings with America. He described the Afghan Haqqani terrorist network as "a veritable arm of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency" and stated that "the support of terrorism is a part of their national strategy."

The relations between the two states were at its all time low when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) soldiers in Afghanistan engaged in a fire fight with Pakistani soldiers stationed at the Salala

checkpoint which left 24 Pakistani soldiers dead. The “Salala incident” was a defining moment in the already challenged and troubled relationship as Pakistan government immediately closed down all NATO supply routes to Pakistan which caused the U.S. an additional cost of approximately \$100 million per month. Though, after several months Pakistan agreed to re-open the supply lines in exchange of an increase in the aid from the U.S. This incident, therefore, helped both the governments realize the need to co-operate and acknowledge their mutual dependence.

DRONE WARS

The U.S. covert operations in Pakistan are a major irritant for many Pakistanis. Though, for the Americans, drones is a key national security tool, the Pakistanis, while acknowledging its use in hindering militant operations, find it to be counter-productive, fueling terrorism in the state.

On Feb 26, 2007 CIA Deputy Director Steve Kappes warned Musharraf during an unannounced visit to Islamabad that the tribal areas along the border with Afghanistan had become a safe heaven for both the Taliban and al-Qaeda. After realising that Musharraf and Pakistan army were unable or unwilling to deal with the problem, the United States ramped up the use of armed drones. The U.S. began using drones to target al-Qaeda and its allies in Pakistan in 2004, but the pace of the attacks and the deterioration of relations between the two states picked up notably in August 2008. The U.S. administration made a unilateral decision to carry out attacks without seeking any permission from Pakistan. The decision was made in order to diminish the risk of the Taliban or al-Qaeda being tripped off by sympathisers in the Pakistani military by passing on the secret information to these groups. Of the more than 350 drone strikes the CIA has mounted in Pakistan over the past nine years, none have occurred outside of Pakistan’s tribal areas. The extension of the drone program to the “settled areas” would have caused significant problems for the ever fragile U.S.-Pakistan relationship.

Though, it was only on January 30, 2012 that President Obama made his first public comments about the covert drone program confirming that the United States conducts “very precise, precision strikes against al-Qaeda and their affiliates. The administration also maintains that international law does not prohibit the use of lethal force against an active enemy “when the country involved consents or is unable or unwilling to take actions against the threat.”.Drones according to the

Americans, are able to go where American soldiers cannot and are the most successful tactics to deal against the terrorists. . The Drones have killed many senior al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives including TTP chiefs Baitullah Mehsud(2009)and Hakeemullha Mehsud(2013) who led an extensive campaign of attacks against Pakistan authorities.

The Pakistani officials and the common public opinion in the state perceive the drones as an attack to their state autonomy and sovereignty and cause 'collateral damage'. The New America Foundation conducted polls in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and found that almost 90 percent of the respondents opposed U.S. military operations in the region. The government officials on the other hand, have repeatedly condemned the attacks. The newly elected Pakistan prime minister, Nawaz Sharif repeatedly urged an end to the drone strikes, "Drones indeed are challenging our sovereignty. Of course we have taken this matter up very seriously. I think this is a very serious issue, and our concern must be understood properly." On his recent visit to the United States he reiterated, "Drone strikes must be stopped to ensure better relationship between Pakistan and the U.S." Former President Asif Ali Zardari informed the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan and Central commander David Patraeus during his visit in 2008 that "continuing drone attacks on our territory, which result in loss of precious lives and property, are counterproductive and difficult to explain by a democratically elected government. It is therefore, creating a credibility gap." Whereas, the Islamist parties have used the drone strikes as a mobilizing tactics to increase the recruits by staging large protests in Punjab, North West Frontier province and Sindh.

The Pakistani officials are also alleged of privately supporting the drone strikes. Confirmation of official Pakistani support for the strikes came in April, 2013, when Pakistan's former President Pervez Musharraf acknowledged to CNN that his government had secretly signed off on U.S. drone strikes under the Bush administration. Musharraf claimed that Pakistan's government signed off on those strikes "only on a few occasions, when a target was absolutely isolated and had no chance of collateral damage." Over the years the drones have become a major issue governing the U.S.-Pakistan relations.

The involvements of Pakistani officials have also driven the Pakistani Taliban to temporarily break their truce with the government. The former TTP chief's spokesman, Bahadur, stated, "Pakistani government is clearly involved in these attacks by American spy planes so we will target government interests as well as foreigners." The two recent drone strikes

launched by the U.S. immediately after Prime Minister Sharif's visit to U.S. in Nov, 2013 resulted in the death of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan Chief, Hakeemullah Mehsud. The death of TTP chief in the midst of the dialogue process with the government further tensed the Pakistan-U.S. relations.

ECONOMIC –MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Pakistan benefitted immensely in terms of both economic and military aid from the US, so much so that the direct and indirect cost of Musharaf's nominal co-operation brought staggering \$25 billion to Pakistan by 2012. Between 2001 and 2011, the United States spent over \$ 8.8 billion in non-military assistance to Pakistan. Much of that increase was the result of the famous Kerry-Lugar Bill which invited much controversy and criticism and authorised a tripling of civilian aid for the 2009-2014 period. The former U.S. Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton described the Kerry-Lugar-Berman aid as a demonstration of American "goodwill towards the people of Pakistan." The bill gave the approval of \$7.5 billion grant for the non-military purposes to the Pakistan government which were unfortunately taken over by the military for sophisticating and modernizing its technology. Civilian aid often works at cross purposes with the much larger military aid program, as security assistance strengthens the very military bureaucracy that impedes democracy and governance programs funded through civilian aid.

From 2012 and beyond, many analysts foresee a far more narrow, issue based engagement, often referred to as "transactional ties" and a setting aside of the kind of broad strategic partnership envisioned by the late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, President Obama's Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Whereas, on the other hand, Pakistan's top military spokesman stated, "From here on, we want a very formal, business like relationship. The lines will be drawn. There will be no more of the free run of the past, no more interpretation of rules". The vicissitudes of U.S. aid to Pakistan has led many Pakistanis to resent the United States.

Since 2001, the United States has allocated approximately \$17 billion in military support for Pakistan, of which \$10 billion is reimbursement to Pakistan for supporting U.S. military activities through the Coalition Support Fund. The aid also included a fresh batch of F-16 aircraft, some frigates for the navy, and updated equipment for the army. Though, the Pakistani military has often not spent assistance money in line with U.S.

desires. U.S. assistance money intended for counter-terrorism or counterinsurgency activities are frequently spent on weapons that are only useful for conventional military engagements.

THE FUTURE OF THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT

President Obama's announcement in 2009, promising the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan and transferring the country's security to the Afghan security forces within a timeline caused worry to the Pakistanis. A non-viable political settlement in Afghanistan can prove disastrous for Pakistan. The thirty years history of Afghan crises shows that Pakistan has played a major role in solving the Afghan puzzle. Pakistan because of its geographical proximity, unique ethnic overlap and cross border affiliates has come to play a very dominant and prominent role in the Afghan peace settlement process. Pakistan has always looked at Afghanistan with the objective of gaining a "Strategic depth" in the region vis-a-vis India and, therefore, tries to delimit India's influence in the post 2014 Afghanistan.

The United States on the other hand, understands the importance of the State of Pakistan in promoting the Afghan peace settlement process. Despite the growing mutual distrust between them, the two states continue to stay dependent on one another. The close partnership and considerable influence of Pakistan Establishment on their former ally, the Taliban, might possibly foster the peace process by bringing them to a negotiating table with the U.S. and the Afghan government.

Pakistan however, realises its importance in the peace process and attempts to settle it by making regional dialogues. Standing up against the U.S. influence in the region, Pakistan and Afghanistan recently called for an Afghan led peace initiative free of foreign intervention at the third annual Pakistan-Afghan-Iran trilateral summit in 2012. The latest peace agenda of the Afghan High Peace council and the Roadmap 2015 also signals the importance of increased co-operation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The roadmap which was leaked in November, 2012 gave Pakistan its much desired role as the principal party in the peace process. It ensured a pro-active role of Pakistan asking for the release of identified Taliban detainees held in Pakistan, using its influence on Taliban to cut off ties with the al-Qaeda operatives and committing to work with Afghanistan and the U.S. on finalization of modalities for safe passage.

Pakistan is seen as a key diplomatic partner in the peace process. The U.S. and Afghanistan had long pressed Islamabad to free Baradar, the

second in command of Taliban, a figure that could help persuade Moderate Taliban leaders to come to the negotiating table with the West and the Afghan government. Therefore, the U.S. has given Pakistan a bigger hand in the Afghan led peace process and have realised its indispensable role. Pakistan on the other hand, attempts to downsize the importance of U.S. in the peace deliberations.

Hence, the Afghan peace process brought both the states together despite their irreconcilable differences. Both the states are in dire need of one another to make this process a success. Though, both Pakistan and the United States remain divided on the issue of how to engage with the Afghan Taliban. The United States has designated the Haqqani network as a foreign terrorist organization and has been pushing Pakistan to do more against them in North Waziristan. While on the other hand, Pakistani policy makers do not believe that there can be a viable political settlement without them.

CONCLUSION

Husain Haqqani, the former Pakistan ambassador to U.S. states that, “the relationship between the United States and Pakistan is a tale of exaggerated expectations, broken promises, and disastrous misunderstandings”. He further believed that half-hearted and time limited transactions rather than an honest dialog over shared interests seem to be the default pattern in U.S.-Pakistan relations. The American critics of Pakistan point out that Pakistan has always pursued its own agenda, which seldom coincides with American interests, whereas, one of the obstacles of successfully resetting the U.S.-Pakistan relationship in Pakistan is the public opinion. In the post 9/11 period, majority of Pakistanis continue to view the United States through a negative lens and view it as an “enemy of Pakistan”. Where Pakistan speaks of America’s continual betrayal, of America promising much and delivering little, America finds Pakistan’s commitment to terrorism as duplicitous.

Despite the history of constant misunderstandings, Pakistan will remain a U.S. priority in the post-2014 co-operation for many reasons such as: presence of nuclear weapons in Pakistan and the fear of it going to the hands of extremists, Pakistan’s ability to become a “substitute” Afghanistan providing sanctuaries to al-Qaeda and other extremists groups, and its geographical position, a potential buffer between Central Asia and South Asia. Whereas, Bruce Riedel, former CIA officer suggested a process of “engagement”. According to him, U.S. must precede its relations in a manner that strengthens Pakistan’s civil-elected

leadership. Other areas of co-operation would include civilian assistance, developing capability to fight the global jihad and foster trade and economic ties. Therefore, Bruce Riedel described the U.S-Pakistan relations as a deadly embrace that needs to be transformed to a union of minds with a common purpose of defeating the Jihadi monster.

Hence, Pakistan's relations with the U.S. have been dwindling over the years. The present relations are based entirely on self-centric national interest and are circumstantial and situational to the needs of the two countries. There is a growing recognition in both countries that the relationship is more "transactional" rather than "strategic". However, the relationship needs re-definition, based on recognition of divergent interests and acceptance of disagreements.

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3. China-Pakistan Relations :

China's Role in Pakistan: International and Domestic Implications

Dr.Siegfried O. Wolf

(Director of Research at SADF, Lecturer in International Relations and
Comparative Politics, SAI,Heidelberg University, Germany)

Introduction

The growing activities of the People's Republic of China in Pakistan are increasingly coming under the scanner of strategic analysts along with worrying the international community, along with India - sharing borders with both the states -,for the past few years (cf. PTI, 2013a). Having maintained a rather 'behind-the-scenes' support for Islamabad for decades, Beijing, today, is exercising its influence more publicly (Wolf, 2013d; 2013c; 2013b; 2013a). Besides Chinese concerns about the security of its investment and business activities, it seems obvious that the identified strategic and economic benefits of cooperation with Pakistan are outbidding the risk perceptions. Nevertheless, besides the fact that Islamabad sees Beijing as its 'all-weather-friend', there are no doubts that Pakistan-China relations have seen remarkable ups and downs (cf. Jacob, 2010, 1; cf. Kardon, 2011). For each assessment of these bilateral ties, it is necessary to recognize the existence of serious flows and setbacks in Pakistan-China interaction. Having this in mind, this article deals with the issue of China's role in Pakistan and its impact on internal, regional, and international implications. After a brief

elaboration on the historical development of Pakistan-China relations, selected cases of China's activities in Pakistan, mainly Balochistan, Gilgit-Baltistan and Gwadar port will be in the spotlight. It will be argued that the relations between Islamabad and Beijing are not only highly imbalanced, but also have the potential of taking a non-favourable turn for economic development as well as democratic consolidation in Pakistan. In this context, it is pointed out that the establishment, or the ruling elite, of Pakistan is most likely gaining remarkable profits out of the Pak-China cooperation, but only on the expense of the provinces and the regional population. This is mainly due to a lack of fair mechanism of revenue sharing from national resources as well as a lack of political will and capacities to implement federal elements. Furthermore, following additional arguments will be made: First, there is a lack of understanding or ignorance of the Chinese mindset and intentions among Pakistani leaders. Second, Beijing will be never an alternative partner (understood as replacement) for the United States. Third, India is an important but not the central issue in Pak-China relations.

Historical Background: Geneses and Development of Pakistan-China Relations

Generally, Pakistan and China share a relatively long, 'special relationship' (Prakash, 1999, 125). In other words, since Pakistan came into existence in 1947, it kept a close diplomatic eye on China. Faced with the need for allies as a result of the confrontation with India (cf. Wirsing, 2003), Pakistan became the first Islamic country to recognize the People's Republic of China in 1950 (one year after India). Diplomatic

ties got established between both countries in 1951 (cf. Jetly, 2012, 1). This appeasement strategy of Islamabad towards Beijing continued during the first Bandung conference in 1955 in which the Pakistani leaders assured the Chinese premier Chou-en-lai of having no fears to Chinese policies of aggression (cf. Verma, 1999, 111). In this context, Pakistanis also voted in favour of granting China a seat in the United Nations and sided with Beijing in the then newly appeared issues over Taiwan and Tibet (cf. Zaki, 2010, 31, 51). This marked the beginning of mutually supportive relations, which considerably increased after the Sino-India War of 1962. Since then, Pakistan and China have regularly exchanged high-level visits resulting in numerous agreements (cf. Sattar, 2010). For example, both countries resolved their border disputes, signing a border agreement in 1963, to the dismay of the Indian government which accused Pakistan of illegally ceding territory of Pakistan-administered Kashmir to China. Consequently New Delhi sent an 'emphatic protest' pointing out that Islamabad is not entitled to negotiate with China at all about disputed territories, especially not the areas which were handed over to the Chinese (cf. Verma, 1999, 114). Furthermore, both countries started cooperating on major development projects on Pakistani soil, most noteworthy of which is the construction of the 1,200 km-long Karakoram Highway, the highest international road connecting China and Pakistan (Mitra/Wolf/Schöttli, 2006, 298)¹. This infrastructure project is not only of enormous commercial but also tremendous strategic value to Beijing (cf. Verma, 1999). In this context one should state that, the ongoing Gwadar port project on the Makran

coast in the province of Balochistan is another remarkable example that showcases the way in which China combines development projects with clear strategic and security interests (Wolf, 2013d). Besides these infrastructure focused development projects, China provides military equipment and nuclear technologies as well as established cooperation with Pakistan in the field of communication, tourism, mining, energy, and counter-terrorism -especially against the Pakistan-based militant groups operating in Chinese Xingjian province (cf. Zaki, 2010; Masood 2004; Singh, 1999; Sawhny, 1999). Another milestone in the Pak-China friendship is marked by the signing of the "Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good-neighborly Relations between the People's Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan"² (cf. Niazi, 2006). The treaty binds both signatories to desist from joining "any alliance or bloc which infringes upon the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of the other side" and got renewed in 2010³ and in July 2013 with the signing of "Common Vision for Deepening China-Pakistan Strategic Cooperative Partnership in the New Era"⁴.

However, it also demonstrated the disturbing impact Chinese enterprises have on Pakistan's political and socio-economic developments. The activities of Beijing in Gilgit-Baltistan are therefore exemplarily.

Domestic Dimension – Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan in Focus

Regarding the negative effects on the political landscape, several observers state that Chinese activities are reinforcing the inequalities that already exist between Islamabad and the provinces in all spheres of state and society (cf. Wolf, 2013a; 2013b; 2013c; 2013d). Basically one

can identify similar developments in Gilgit-Baltistan and Balochistan. Regarding Gilgit-Baltistan, the implications of the increasing cooperation between Islamabad and Beijing became evident when China started investing heavily in major development projects such as the Karakorum Highway - which is until today the only highway in Gilgit-Baltistan connecting this neglected area with the rest of the country. This was made possible, among other determinants, mainly because of the Pakistan-China boundary agreement. From a Pakistani perspective this was interpreted as a cunning move, since it reduced the amount of disputable landmass administered by Islamabad and also appeased China - a much needed ally. In this context, it is imperative to note that Gilgit-Baltistan is also of great significance to China. Only a politically stable Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistani control seems to serve Chinese interests, which would imply secure access to the Arabian Sea (cf. Harrison, 2010). But like in other cases, for example neighbouring Afghanistan, the respective people do not play a factor in the bilateral state relations, especially when it comes to political participation and decision-making or sharing economic benefits. In consequence, having the perception of being treated like an 'internal colony', there is a significant increase in demands for greater autonomy and self-governance, even independence by sub-national groups within Gilgit-Baltistan. Additionally suffering from dramatic economic underdevelopment and a poor social infrastructure, despite rich natural resources, the inhabitants of Gilgit-Baltistan are getting further alienated from the Pakistani state. However, instead of addressing the issues

raised, Islamabad has responded in its usual way by promising reforms and to a certain degree deciding on them but not implementing them, either because of endemic corruption, the shortage of resources or lack of political will. Most likely a combination of all these factors could come into play, which may subsequently lead to the use of all kinds of political instruments to maintain control over the region - ranging from threatening and harassment of the opposition to physically attacking protesters and carrying out targeted killings of political activists. Subsequently, being not only confronted with socio-cultural and religious deprivation through the Sunni Islamisation policy, but also with politically-economic marginalisation and coercive suppression, Gilgit-Baltistan is witnessing periodical militant upheavals in form of riots and other acts of violence. The disproportionate reaction of Pakistan's Security Forces is causing further discontent and creating an unending vicious circle of violence. In this context, the obvious rise of Chinese security forces in this area is alarming (cf. Harrison, 2010; cf. Chaudhuri, 2011).

Just as in Gilgit-Baltistan, there is also tremendous criticism among the people of Baluchistan against the State of Pakistan for systematically excluding them from decision making procedures and depriving them from their fair share of national revenues(cf. Wolf 2013b; cf. ICG, 2006). In Baluchistan, sentiments of neglect and exclusion are gaining momentum as the local population increasingly feels exploited from two sides; the government in Islamabad and the Chinese developments activities (cf. Wolf 2013a; cf. Recknagel/Siddique, 2013; Ali, 2013). The

recent transfer of management of Gwadar from Singapore's PSA International to the state-owned China Overseas port Holding company on January 30, 2013 (Agencies, 2013), is paradigmatic for several reasons.

First, regarding Balochi criticism, the transfer is unconstitutional because the decision was made in Islamabad and not by the Council of Common Interest (CCI) which would include the provinces (Chief Ministers) in the decision-making process - a requirement following the 18th Amendment. Article 154 (1) of the constitution states that major ports, as listed in Part II (5) of the Federal Legislative List, are a subject in the domain of CCI (cf. IPP, 2011; ICG, 2006). Therefore, it is argued by the antagonists of the transfer that the exclusion of the Baloch from the transfer of Gwadar to the Chinese is a breach of constitutionally guaranteed provincial decision-making power (cf. Butt, 2013). The government, in response, claims that for the very same reason, i.e. the fact that Gwadar is a port, it automatically falls under the authority of the Ministry of Ports and Shipping in Islamabad and therefore is not of any concern to a provincial government - a legal technicality that is highly debatable. Clearly, this is a case that needs unbiased clarification by the Supreme Court. But here the question arises how far the Supreme Court is willing to go. A verdict that challenges the transfer would not only provoke the executive/government, which conducted the deal, and the armed forces, which are hoping to improve their navy base facilities(cf. Bokhari/Hille, 2011), but also the national establishment in general of whose members include most of the judiciary. In the past, it

seemed that the judges were busier with matters relating to their own cause -especially when it comes to improving their status in the political power structure of the country- instead of taking care of the concerns of the provinces. Such matters would include strengthening federalism, revenue distributions, protection of minorities, tackling religious fundamentalism, education, and corruption. It will be interesting to observe to which extent the constitution is used by the Supreme Court as an instrument in its attempt to keep the executive and the soldiers in check or to enhance the stability of the political system as well as to grant all people in Pakistan their legitimate rights, even if it is against the partial interest of the 'own folks'. The Baloch leaders want to rely on the constitution in order to solve the Gwadar problem and related issues (cf. Butt, 2013). No matter what the Supreme Court's actions would imply, the transfer has once again enhanced the impression among many Baloch that Islamabad is doing everything to ensure and protect Chinese interests in their province at the locals' expense (cf. Wirsing, 2008).

Second, based on the assessments of several Baloch groups and international observers, it has become increasingly apparent that there is a strong correlation between Chinese activities in Pakistan and human rights violations(cf. Wolf 2013a). There are strong indications that in order to protect Chinese interests in Balochistan, Islamabad and its security apparatus won't hesitate to apply extra-legal measures to eliminate any opposition towards Chinese activities in the region. According to international human rights reports, various kinds of repressive tactics are applied including abductions, arbitrary arrests,

torture, and unlawful killings. Some of the latest dramatic examples of 'kill and dump' activities (cf. AI, 2011, 2010) were Mehboob Wadela and Arif Rehman (cf. AHRC, 2011), both key figures in the Baloch movement who were critical of China's role and presence in Balochistan. It comes as no surprise for many unbiased Baloch experts that these crimes are committed with 'flagrant impunity'. Journalists who are trying to shed light on these occurrences are frequently subjects of so-called 'target killings'. Having this in mind, the proclaimed 'new freedom of press' in Pakistan needs a careful assessment when it comes to provinces in Pakistan in which China exercises its interests. It seems that the Chinese don't mind oppression of the Baloch movement because they pose a threat to Chinese workers in the region, Chinese commercial and security interests (cf. Haider, 2005). The latter relates to Beijing's fear of spill-over of secessionist-driven instability in its own troubled Xinjiang region (cf. Khalid Rahman, Rashida Hameed, 2009). An independent Balochistan would most likely embolden independence movements in territories under China's control.

Third, Chinese activities in Pakistan have severe implications for the latter's civil-military relations. After the ousting of Pakistan's latest military ruler, Pervez Musharraf, and the subsequent elections in 2008, it seemed that the troubled civil-military relations were improving. But this does not imply that the soldiers ceased to exercise political influence (cf. Rizvi, 2013). At least, there were rudimentary signs that civilians were trying to reclaim decision-making power in a significant number of policy fields, which had traditionally been dominated by the all-powerful army.

However, since January last, year after a six-day visit of then General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani in Beijing, the Chinese started a policy of boosting the image of the army by emphasizing the contribution of the soldiers for strengthening the strategic ties and cooperative partnership between both countries and appreciating the tremendous efforts of the armed forces in fighting terrorism (cf. ET, 2012; cf. Raman, 2012).⁵ This is a clear indication that the Chinese are quite comfortable with a Pakistani military being in charge of strategic and security related aspects of governance (cf. Raman, 2012). This is not a new phenomenon as it can be observed in China's relations with states where it deems the army as the most reliable and influential political actor. In spite of the fact that China has refrained issuing official statements that could be interpreted as its siding with the Pakistani army, it is disturbing the civil-military equation in Pakistan. Undoubtedly, this is to the detriment of the decision-making ability of civilians. The exercise to build up the soldier's prestige and crucial role in strategic affairs is creating a political climate in which it will be easier for the army to undermine the position of the democratically elected political leaders as supreme authority in all policy fields (cf. Wolf, 2013f; 2013e). In other words, China is indirectly supporting the notion that decisions in strategic and security matters should be reserved domains for the soldiers. In consequence, this is challenging the notion of civilian control of the military which is a necessary ingredient for liberal democracy and its consolidation (cf. Croissant/Kuehn/Chambers/Wolf, 2011; 2010).

Fourth, in the recent years, it was obvious that China was holding back to initiate new mega project in Balochistan because of the instability and threats towards Chinese workers in Balochistan (cf. Wirsing, 2008; Haider, 2005). It preferred to extend its engagements in Pakistan to 'safer' areas like Gilgit-Baltistan where the Islamabad has granted Chinese companies numerous mining licences and the permission to build up all necessary infrastructure for exploration and exploitation of the region (cf. Jacob, 2008). Also here, Islamabad did not deem it essential to consult the local people and the institutions. But it is important to note that China's scepticism in Pakistan's military capabilities to suppress the Baloch national movement was certainly encouraging Baloch militants as well as political leaders to continue their struggle. However, the current massive moral, diplomatic and material support by the Chinese for the Pakistan army will not help to convince Islamabad to look for a political solution thus will motivate it to continue the repressive tactics of the past in Balochistan (cf. Wirsing, 2008). In contrast, it will further enhance the unwillingness of the national elite to implement policies in accordance with the 'Aghaz-Huqooq-i-Balochistan' (the Beginning of Rights of Balochistan). This so called 'Balochistan Package' was supposed to reduce the sense of deprivation and alienation and to ensure political, economic, and cultural rights for the Balochi (cf. Grare, 2013, 12).

Besides these dramatic impacts on the political sphere, China's role in Pakistan is responsible for far-reaching socio-economic distortions in the country too. Here too again Gwadar serves as an extraordinary example.

Basically there is a general consensus that Gwadar is a non-starter until today. Islamabad has put the blame of Gwadar's disappointing performance on the Balochi insurgents along with the former port authority, PSA International from Singapore. However, one major cause of commercial failure, namely lacking road and rail connections and the omission to establish a special economic zone, can hardly be blamed upon the Singaporeans. In fact, the acquisition of land that is necessary for the construction if such vital infrastructure was blocked by civilian and/or military authorities.

Hence, the accusation from Islamabad that the local political opposition and militant insurgencies are largely responsible for Gwadar's economic difficulties lacks substance and is a distortion of facts, causes and consequences. If the establishment would grant the Baloch their legitimate political rights, introduce an appropriate mechanism of sharing the revenues of resources exploited in Balochistan, and enhancing local ownership in development projects, there would be most likely much fewer objections against Gwadar. But Islamabad appears not to have used any of these options in its policy approach towards Balochistan and other regions (cf. Baloch, 2013). In contrast, the federal government worsened the situation by issuing work permits and licenses for the Chinese. As a result, Gwadar and other Chinese projects in the country are not creating a noteworthy amount of jobs for the unemployed Pakistani youth (cf. ICG, 2006). Additionally, instead of pushing joint ventures with local entrepreneurs foreign, companies get favoured significantly. Consequently, the Baloch get no fair access to business and

job opportunities in their own province. And as if this were not already enough, the Baloch are getting more afraid to be confronted with enhanced 'guided migration'. In other words, Islamabad is encouraging workers from Punjab and Sindh to settle down in Balochistan, and especially in Gwadar, to take over the jobs that are left for Pakistanis. With the Chinese takeover, this process will most likely be enhanced (cf. Recknagel/Siddique, 2013).

International Dimension – The Case of Gwadar

“Gwadar is now a potential hub for trade and commerce in the region” (cf. Raza, 2013). With these words, the then President Asif Ali Zardari expressed Pakistan's hopes to turn the Sino-Pak project into a national and regional gateway, hoping that it will boost the country's feeble economy. Given the fact that Beijing is the principal financial sponsor of the port and that -since January 2013- it is managed by a Chinese company, Islamabad expects that Gwadar will give new impetus to China-Pakistan relations. Furthermore, Gwadar must be seen as an indication that India is not the central concern or theme in the bilateral ties between Islamabad and Beijing (cf. Jacob, 2010, 217-218,222; Garver, 2001, 24).

The fact that Gwadar is located outside the Strait of Hormuz, near some of the world's busiest shipping routes, supports Zardari's statement. However, this is only a fractional part of the whole story.

First of all, when taking into consideration the numerous unfavourable determinants for the Gwadar port project, many analysts remain sceptical towards the future of the project. For example factors such as

the endemic poverty prevalent in the province of Balochistan, increasing opposition by large sections of the Baloch people, political instability, deteriorating security situation, and lack of infrastructure and connectivity with the hinterland cast a dark shadow on the fortunes of Gwadar. Hence, there is an imminent threat that this expensive mega project will have little, or no, economic value. In brief, from an economic point of view, Gwadar looks like a 'white elephant' which just came out of the blue in, quite literally, the middle of nowhere (cf. Mills, 2006). Having this in mind, one should raise the legitimate question: what are the real intentions of Pakistan and China behind the Gwadar project? Are they motivated solely by economic interests or by military interests as well? Is it part of a long term strategy of Chinese preparation for a potential new Cold War-scenario between Beijing and Washington in the Asia-Pacific region? To tackle this puzzle, observers are emphasizing that one should draw the attention more towards the strategic and security aspects of Gwadar.

From a Pakistani perspective, the objective behind Gwadar is ostensibly beyond the economic argument. Being a brainchild of the Pakistani Armed Forces, naturally the port should serve more than commercial purposes only. Gwadar is envisioned as the regional transshipment hub for energy, services and cargo between Afghanistan, the Central Asian Republics (CARs), China and the Gulf. However, given the fact that Afghanistan and the CARs are increasingly linked with Iran's Chabahar port (through the support of India) the importance of Gwadar as a regional transshipment hub is significantly reduced. But in security,

military and strategic terms, the port remains of tremendous significance (cf. Haider, 2005).

First, it can serve as a listening post to monitor –and, if necessary, to disturb– one of the most important sea lanes for globally traded oil. The potential threat of energy security has severe political and strategic implications especially for Asian economies like India, Japan, Vietnam or Philippines among others which are in conflict with China over resources and territories. In other words, some strategists in Pakistan might be intrigued by using Gwadar as a political asset to improve its bargaining power in the context of other regional conflicts, namely Kashmir or water disputes.

Second, in case of an armed confrontation with India, Gwadar is in a much better geostrategic location than Karachi's Port. Therefore, Gwadar would reduce the dependence of Pakistan's Navy on the much more vulnerable ports in Karachi (cf. ICG, 2006, 14; Wirsing 2008, 16). There are indications that the Navy has its very own interests regarding Gwadar, especially in upgrading the port with naval facilities. By failing to hand over the piece of land (which belongs to the Navy) that was necessary for the establishment of a special economic zone at the port, the venture was significantly hampered. Consequently, Singapore's PSA International, the company which was responsible for managing the Gwadar port project before the authority was handed over to China, was forced to give up by the Pakistani authorities. Without a doubt, the Chinese were more appealing for Pakistan as a partner than the

Singaporeans which, unlike their Chinese counterparts, were interested in the port from a purely economic perspective.

Third, it seems that Gwadar is intended to be the cornerstone of an attempt to forge a new strategic triangle between of Pakistan, China and Iran. Islamabad's trilateral ambitions are driven by Tehran's intentions to build a refinery and the recently signed Iran-Pakistan pipeline- which would subsequently serve China's energy requirements (cf. ICG, 2006, 25-26). Besides the economic interests, the bottom line for Iran, Beijing and Pakistan is that all three states share ambiguous relations, to say the least, with the US and Indian and aim to limit the influence of New Delhi and Washington as much as possible in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. And last but not least, all three have a keen interest to suppress the Baloch national movement which is challenging their interests.

In order to understand the complexity of the Gwadar issue, one should also shed some light on Chinese interests in this project. Regarding official statements by Beijing, Gwadar is of utmost importance for energy security and trade. But unlike Pakistan –which publicly expresses its desire for a naval base operated by the Chinese- Beijing remains relatively quiet regarding the 'non-commercial' dimensions of the strategically well-located deep-seaport.

Consequently, analysts are wondering about Beijing's intentions in Gwadar. Several assessments indicate that the Chinese takeover of the port is not only part of a long-run strategy to secure its energy routes but also a tool to expand control over maritime straits in the Indian Ocean, especially the eminent chokepoint in the Strait of Hormuz (cf.

Masood,2004). Around 20 per cent of the world's oil and 60 per cent of Chinese energy requirements coming from the Middle East have to transit this bottleneck. Therefore Gwadar -connected with Western China via the Karakorum Highway- offers China an alternative route via Gwadar. Basically China is facing what has been called 'the Malacca dilemma' meaning it is highly dependent on the congested and narrow Strait of Malacca between Malaysia and Indonesia for its imports of natural gas and oil shipments (cf. Kardon, 2011, 11-12). In case of a conflict, this gateway could easily be blocked. In this context, one should mention that the Malacca Strait is under virtual control of Washington. USA has permanently stationed several fast Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore and the port of Singapore has facilities specially designed for US aircraft carriers (cf. Axe, 2011).

Therefore, Gwadar for China is much more than a backup option for the Malacca route. It's an ideal staging ground for all kinds of maritime activities. Nevertheless, China has demonstrated restraint regarding any further engagement in Gwadar, besides providing most of the necessary funds (cf. Wirsing, 2003). However, this policy seems to have changed since the latest agreement in January, allowing Beijing to take over control of the port this year. The 'rediscovery' of China's enthusiasm regarding the commercial build-up is generally understood in the context of military and strategic considerations. Taking the growing influence of China in Pakistan and the 'new strategic depth' in the relation between both countries into account (cf. PTI, 2013b), it will be absolutely certain that Islamabad will grant basing rights for the Chinese Navy if Beijing

were interested. This would grant China for the first time the possibility to use a port in the Indian Ocean for its ships and submarines. Furthermore, the option for regular refuelling, refurbishment and repair and other services available, would allow China to exercise extensive sea control in the area. This does not only serve the purpose of protecting the increasing volume of Chinese nautical mileage in the region but should also be interpreted as a response to India's blue-water navy build-up and the presence of US maritime forces. Having this in mind, one must clearly state that Pakistan serves the Chinese interests to "counterbalance India's pre-eminence in South Asia" (Jetly, 2012, 2).

Therefore, Gwadar under Chinese control has the potential to function as a 'game changer'. Until now, besides some periodic naval visits, brief exercises, and some military-maritime cooperation with the Seychelles, China had no opportunity to operate with warships into the Indian Ocean on a permanent basis. In order to bridge this gap of insufficient capabilities regarding the manoeuvrability and reach of its vessels, China supports several port constructions not only in Pakistan but also in Sri Lanka (Hambantota port), Chittagong and Sonadiya, near Cox's Bazar (cf. Ali, 2013). Additionally, China is also wooing the Maldives to gain more leverage. Of course, officially all these projects are supposed to push economic development and cooperation. However, since Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have an interest in maintaining cordial relations with India, it is highly unlikely that China will receive similar offers regarding strategic-military cooperation like the one from Islamabad. With Gwadar as a potential naval base, China will have an effective bridgehead in one

of the most sensitive and important areas for global energy security (cf. Recknagel/Siddique, 2013). With regards to the massive build-up of China's naval capabilities, it is unlikely that the future of Gwadar will be only a port reserved for commercial ventures. As such Gwadar will serve as a key node and game changer when it comes to reshaping the traditional power structure in Southern Asian regarding the control over the access to energy and other natural resources. Hence, it is important to point out that while there is ample reason to cooperate, China is primarily doing so to push its own strategic agenda.

First, China has more than once acted 'half-heartedly' when Islamabad reached out for support from its so called 'all-weather' friend (cf. Jetly, 2012,7). Taking the persistent talk about the 'thrust factor' in China-Pakistan relations into account, it seems that Pakistan's political decision-makers have a very selective memory when it comes to incidences in which China abandoned Pakistan. Just to recall, China did not back up Pakistan militarily in its 1965 and 1971 wars with India. It even turned its back diplomatically on Pakistan during the Kargil crisis of 1999 by supporting Washington's call for Islamabad to withdraw its troops from the Indian side of the Line of Control in Kashmir. The Chinese position during this conflict helped to improve its relations with India which had turned sour over a couple of issues, including the 1962 border war, several territorial disputes, and issues concerning Tibet and the Dalai Lama. Furthermore, by adhering to strict neutrality in the 2002 crisis between India and Pakistan, Beijing also failed to live up to Islamabad's expectations. The statement that China is a 'friend of both

countries', must have come as a major disappointment to the Pakistani security establishment at that time.

Second, the above mentioned decisions can also be partly seen as fortunate for South Asia and beyond because it helped to limit the conflicts to its regional sphere. Nevertheless, the Chinese did not do much to prevent the region from these wars -initiated- by Pakistan- in using its growing influence on its 'ally'. In contrast, by offering military hardware and technical supplies it sent out the wrong signals towards Islamabad contributing to enthusiasm about a potential success of upcoming war efforts. In contrast, both the 1965 and 1971 wars ended in national disasters for Pakistan and increased international isolation. Furthermore, it led to a systematic genocide and countless war atrocities in Bangladesh (cf. Casaca, 2013). The role of Pakistani security forces during the killing of three million Bangladeshis, along with mass rapes, still remains to be adequately clarified and legally addressed. Obviously, Beijing's strategic thinkers at that time were using China's relations with Pakistan as a proxy for maintaining the high level of conflict in South Asia in order to extend its own influence at the expense of the US and India(cf. Curtis/Scissors, 2012).

Third, besides the India-Pakistan conflict, also in Afghanistan, China is following its own strategy by doing business through outbidding non-Chinese private companies which can't compete with largely funded Chinese state enterprises. This will seriously hamper the development of a healthy Afghan economy in a long term perspective. This is gaining more momentum, since China is not willing to get involved in a

sustainable reconstruction and reconciliation process in the country, which would not only serve Afghanistan, along with the whole region, but particularly Pakistan.

Fourth, the fact that Pakistan's military is at war with the Taliban and in the light of worsening US-Pakistan relations, leading to a reduction of US aid, the economy of Pakistan can experience a severe strain making it more dependent on China. Therefore, the fact that Pakistan political leaders immediately played up their ties with Beijing after the US raid on Osama bin Laden's compound in Pakistan in May 2011 can be seen as a proof (cf. Curtis/Scissors, 2012). In this context, it is significant to note that the Chinese were willing to maintain a 'normalized' relationship with the Taliban government in Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001. In order to protect its economic interests in the Afghanistan-Pakistani region, Beijing might be allured to continue this strategy in dealing with Taliban and associated extremist forces. In other words, when it comes to Chinese support for combating militant fundamentalism, there is potential threat of another disappointment for Pakistan's elites.

Fifth, in relation to the aforementioned point, is the fact that China is indirectly enhancing Islamic fundamentalism and militancy in Pakistan. Facing subnational movements, militancy and terrorism in territories under its own control, Beijing should be a 'natural ally' against terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, it appears that the Chinese prefer to benefit from the US-led 'war against terror' by taking a 'free-ride'. In other words, where Washington does not receive much 'bang for their bucks' from Pakistan, Beijing is able, with the help of Islamabad, to reap

the benefits of Washington's stabilization efforts by concentrating on the economic exploitation of the 'AfPak' region. This undoubtedly emboldens the Taliban and associated groups since it indicates that there is a powerful neighbour who is willing to stay more or less neutral which might offer some potential room to manoeuvre in the future. This view gains more significance in the light of Indo-Pakistani relations. In order to contain India's influence and hegemonic aspirations in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, China is fuelling tensions between Islamabad and New Delhi -a modus operandi that plays straight into the hand of religious extremists in Pakistan.

Conclusion

China's activities in Pakistan have an extraordinary influence on the country's domestic development, both in political as well as socio-economic terms. But most important is the high leverage into the decision-making process dominated by the country's establishment, represented by the civilians in Islamabad and the military top brass in Rawalpindi (that hosts the Military General Head Quarters, the GHQ). Keep this in perspective, an extremely worrying factor for the people in the regions is that China, a country not categorized as a free democracy by Freedom House (2013)⁶, has an increasing influence over affairs in Pakistan, a country which is struggling and trying to establish democratic structures in midst of various crises. This Chinese influence should be monitored with significance at a time when the people, at large, are demanding for establishment of democracy in the country. But

taking into account the deplorable state of human rights and the authoritarian style of Chinese governments, there is no doubt that China is not interested in supporting any improvements in this direction in its neighborhood, especially Pakistan. Being able to establish cordial working relationships with Pakistan's various military regimes (or military backed and controlled civilian governments) and benefitting from their respective options to enforce major development projects such as sidelining regions in decision-making, use of force in suppression of oppositional movements, there might not be much of interest by China for enhancing any democratic transition. In consequence, the phenomenon of hampering democracy through outside powers, which started with the military-to-military-contact based US-Pakistan relations would merely be continued by an autocracy-influenced development policy pushed by China's economic interests. In sum, the Chinese activity in Pakistan makes it more difficult to restore peace and stability in the country

Finally, regarding the international context one must state that if China decides to turn Gwadar into a naval base, this will have severe implications on the security structure of the Indian Ocean. At the moment, there are indications that this could happen. Hence, this step definitely redefines the rules and conditions of a 'new great game' over influence in the whole region. Nevertheless, Islamabad's decision-makers have to be aware of several conditions in the gamble for regional hegemony which will be played out: first, its asymmetric power relations with Beijing; second, that China is not always on the same political and

strategic page as Pakistan; third, Pakistan is a significant but not one of the major players involved in China's grand strategy; and fourth Pakistan's people and regions like Baluchistan and Gilgit-Baltistan have to pay the price due to the Gwadar project. Islamabad has to realize - even if it might be the most important Chinese ally in South Asia- that it is only one of many 'junior partners' of China in Asia. Therefore, it is most important that -in the words of South Asian expert RizwanZeb- "Islamabad needs to invest a lot more in understanding the Chinese mindset and the compulsions and limitations of the relationship" (Zeb, 2012). However, at the end of the day, China's aspired strategic footprint might be too big for Pakistani boots.

Notes :

1. Karakoram Highway links China's Sinkiang (Tsiensing) province to Pakistan's northwest, construction that was completed in the 1980s (Masood, 2004).
2. See also Joint Statement Between the People's Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 26 November 2006, Islamabad: <http://pk2.mofcom.gov.cn/sys/print.shtml?/bilateralcooperation/bilateralagreement/200706/20070604805667>
3. See Joint Statement between the People's Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, Press Release: <http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=806>.
4. For the full text of the document, please see: Xinhua 6 July 2013, http://www.china.org.cn/world/2013-07/06/content_29343538.htm.
5. See also for General Kayani's last visit: <http://www.nation.com.pk/national/29-Oct-2013/kayani-meets-top-chinese-leadership>.

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Sino-Pak Relations in Post 9/11 Era

Muhammad Shoaib

(Muhammad Shoaib is a researcher and an academic based in Pakistan. He was previously a visiting fellow at Ball State University Indiana, USA. He teaches at Fatima Jinnah Women University. Besides, he has vast publishing experience both in research writings and op-ed submissions. He frequently contributes for Daily Times. His research areas include International Politics of Asia Pacific, Security Policies of South Asian States and Politics of regional integration.)

Pakistan has probably considered China as an alternative to the US especially in the post 9/11 era; after all, the US has already outmanoeuvred the Islamic republic in the post-Cold war era. Though the Sino-Pak relations are asymmetrical in nature since 1950s, yet the interdependence as an aftermath to the Indo-China war has transformed into Pakistan's dependency on China.

In the post-Cold war era, political landscape of the region became complex and intellectually challenging to understand the shifting dynamics of the enduring rivalry. And both nations remained immersed in maintaining this rivalry. However, as far as Pakistan was concerned, it moved towards overwhelming reliance over China for security from the perceived Indian threat that kept growing even after renaissance of the front-line phase in another American war in the region. China therefore remained the top priority for Pakistan for its future procurements ranging from nuclear plants to assault rifles. In fact, cooperation in defence-related procurements further strengthened the bilateral relationship, because Pakistan's military defence needed to keep up with the rival's ever growing defence posture.

China has become the largest exporter of arms to Pakistan in the recent times. And there are multiple reasons for this development. The Chinese military technology is cheap and purchasable. Secondly, it is likely to end Pakistan's dependence on the US-made weaponry whose delivery has always been uncertain primarily in context of the Pak-US relations during regional crises. Above all, not only China provides Pakistan with weapon systems, but also gives necessary assistance to develop the same systems within the country under licence of joint-production, which is another but rather a modern form of dependency. In this regard, Pakistan has only changed its base for import and, to some extent, assured availability of new weapons.

Secondly, Pakistan has serious and probably genuine concerns vis-à-vis the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal. The Pakistani leadership, in response to the deal, will probably strive to convince China for the same treatment as India has received from the US. In addition, the country has also got a

genuine reason i.e. power crisis which demands development of new energy resources. Pakistan's policy with respect to India, regionally and internationally, has always been reactionary and it seems obvious the Pakistan's reader that the state would try to follow the Indian acts, for instance civilian nuclear deal with China following the Indo-US deal.

Every nation normally prefers two aspects in bilateral relations: economy and security. The sequence of the former and latter is based on the nation's interests. In case of Pakistan, security has always remained the primal factor in policy making and India as the primary source of threat. Pakistan's policy towards China presumes aspiration for military modernization and impulses the country's foreign policy. Given the timeline of the Pak-China relations after 9/11, most of the joint ventures were either directly related to weapons' production or indirectly served the cause of enhancing the country's military might. For instance, in 2001, a joint-ventured Sino-Pakistani tank *Al-Khalid* ([MBT-2000](#)) was operationalized. Later, in 2002, Gwadar port project started where China was the primary investor. Pak-China joint-ventured [multirole fighter aircraft JF-17 Thunder](#) was formally inducted in Pakistan's air fleet in 2007. In following year, both countries signed an agreement to build a railway track along the Karakoram Highway to link China's rail network to the [Gwadar Port](#). China also supported Pakistan to build a strong navy and, in 2008, the Sino-made [F-22P](#) frigate became operational in the Pakistani Navy.

Furthermore, both countries enhanced intelligence sharing network. For instance, Inter-services Intelligence Agency (ISI) arrested several suspected [Uyghur](#) terrorists seeking refuge in Pakistan working against the Chinese interests in Xinjiang. In addition to joint ventures, both allies also concentrated on (battlefield) interaction of their forces. Pakistan and China conducted a joint anti-terrorism drill in 2010. In 2011, Pakistan showed interest in purchasing air to air SD 10 missiles from China for its JF-17 thunder fleet. Above all, in 2013, Pakistan decided to hand over management of the Gwadar port to a state-run Chinese company after taking it back from Singapore's PSA international.

Economy is a second-grade preference in the bilateral relations. Pakistan's policy making on economy (historically) remained under control of the civilians and, therefore, could not become top priority of the leadership. Thus, it does not seem unreasonable to argue that the latter can sacrifice its economic benefits for more security. And it is possible that this asymmetrical relation between these two preferences is likely to persist in near future.

Pakistan's interest in economic development in comparison with military aid and development is probably inarguable. For instance, Most

Favourite Nation (MFN) status is yet a new phenomenon in South Asia and states are still reluctant to give this status to their immediate neighbours. Same is the case with Pakistan. Although it is in favour of Pakistan (in many aspects) to give India the MFN status, a majority opposes this policy and states that the Indian exports will put an end to competitive edge of the local industry. One wonders when it comes to China, because the Chinese exports have already inflicted this damage on the local industry. The abundance of made-in-China commodities in Pakistan has already resulted in closure of many industries, especially the small ones. However, the most prominent development in the Pak-China relations is undoubtedly the Gwadar project, which has become a core topic of discussion, and concern to some extent, in the post 9/11 era.

As far as Pakistan's decision with respect to the Gwadar port is concerned, it seems a rational choice on the part of the policy makers. American rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific region may constrain China in near future to (further) develop alternatives in the Malacca Strait. And in this regard, Pakistan is undoubtedly the best available choice for China. China is likely to invest more capital in the port. Pakistan, in turn, will benefit from the China's presence in Indian Ocean and enjoy security vis-à-vis the Indian naval threat. Secondly, this facility will also boost Pakistan's trade and provide it with new options, because other ports in the country are currently unable to bear the burden of trade. In other words, this facility, if fully operational, will prove a blessing in disguise for the country.

Moreover, China's presence in Balochistan will also result in economic development of the most underdeveloped province in the country. In fact, the Chinese authorities will find it inevitable to build new roads, bridges and bypasses in the region to reduce time and cost in addition to securing their facilities. Pakistan, in response, will get multiple facilities without spending a lot on development projects in the insurgency-torn region that has already been heading towards secession from the federation.

The case of Gwadar is remarkable especially in the context of American retreat from the region, China's aspirations to have a blue-water-navy and growing Indian naval and, overall, conventional capability. India has always been the paramount concern in Pakistan's defence and foreign policy making. Any of new Indian defence purchases inevitably brings in implications for Pakistan's security. Pakistan, on the other hand, is yet unable to measure it up; and therefore, it seeks alternative options to balance the growing Indian military might whether through transforming from assertive to derivative nuclear command, developing tactical nukes or relying over another great power as a counter-weight to the so-called preeminent security threat.

Pakistan is likely to remain the most pro-China country in the world. Secondly, the Chinese are undoubtedly skilled in using soft power, especially their smile diplomacy, to avoid direct confrontation with any country in the region. Pakistan, despite the fact, will try to utilise its alliance with China as a counter-weight to India. And for this very cause, it is likely to facilitate China's interest in its territory in near future.

4. Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations :

Pakistan-Afghan Relations post-2014: The Great Unknown

Dr.Claude Rakisits

Associate Professor Deakin University, Australia

(Dr Claude Rakisits is Associate Professor in Strategic Studies at Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia. His PhD, which he obtained at the University of Queensland in 1986, examined national integration in Pakistan. He has taught in Australia, Canada and Switzerland. Before going into academia, Associate Professor Rakisits had almost 20 years of experience in the public sector, including in the Departments of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the Office of National Assessments. In addition to his academic writing, he writes and comments on developments in Pakistan and Afghanistan for the Australian and overseas media on a regular basis. His publications can be viewed on his homepage: www.geopoliticalassessments.com)

The one year count down to the withdrawal of the remaining 80,000 NATO-led forces from Afghanistan has truly begun. The big question on everyone's mind, particularly in Kabul, Islamabad, Brussels and not least Washington, is what can we expect to happen in Afghanistan once the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) permanently leaves Afghanistan. While no one can answer that question with certainty today, one can nevertheless draw the contours of what could happen on the basis of how two critical factors develop between now and the end of 2014, when the ISAF forces are scheduled to leave. These two factors are: first, whether the Kabul government will sign the American-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) which determines whether residual US forces will remain in Afghanistan post-2014; and, two, the Afghan peace and reconciliation process and how it proceeds from now until December 2014. Let me examine each of these factors separately before analysing what impact these will have on future Afghan-Pakistan relations.¹

The BSA, which was broadly agreed to between Washington and Kabul after many tortuous months of negotiations between the two governments, was put to a vote in November 2013 by a 2,700 men strong *loya jirga* which had been appointed by President Karzai himself. And although he had declared that he would abide by the *jirga's* decision prior to the vote, President Karzai most bizarrely promptly rejected their overwhelming vote of support for the signing of the BSA. The BSA is meant to allow Washington base a few thousand troops, probably around 9,000, in Afghanistan to help train the country's security forces as well as a few hundred special forces to conduct counter-terrorism operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters. The importance of the BSA is not so much in that it would assist the Afghan government with the continued required training of its security forces but it would also be a green light for other countries to also leave a residual force of about 3,000 troops to perform the same tasks along the American forces. Put differently, the BSA is the critical portmanteau of which all other Western forces hang off. The NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, welcoming the *jirga's* vote, has made it very clear that it was important that the Afghan government give the BSA a "timely signature", as this would provide the legal framework for the NATO-led mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces post-2014.²

Not surprisingly, the Obama administration has not been pleased with President Karzai's decision to ignore the *jirga's* verdict. And it certainly has not been impressed with Karzai's latest demands before he would consider signing the BSA. These are: no operations by foreign forces in residential areas, a sincere start of a peace process with the Taliban and the holding of transparent elections.³ These latest demands are confusing and not necessarily in America's gift to deliver. Dr Susan Rice, President Obama's National Security Adviser has made it very clear that a delay in the signing of the BSA risks forcing the US to pull all the troops out of Afghanistan, leaving none behind - the "Zero Option".⁴ At the time of writing, the impasse remained unresolved.

Turning to the second critical factor, the Afghan peace and reconciliation process, in determining how Afghanistan is going to fair after December 2014, it is reasonable to say that it is not going well on this front either. President Karzai formed the Afghan High Peace Council in 2010 in order to kick start a negotiated peace with the Taliban. After many false starts, there seemed to be hope when the Taliban opened an office in Doha, Qatar in June 2013. Unfortunately, President Karzai took offence with the Taliban's high profile beginning and accused it of acting as an alternative government to the one in Kabul. President Karzai has since demanded that the Taliban move its offices to either Turkey or Saudi Arabia. Neither country appears to be interested in hosting the Taliban. In early December 2013 members of the Afghan High Peace Council travelled to Pakistan to meet with Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the deputy leader of the Taliban, who was recently released from Pakistani custody. According to news reports, the meeting went very well and could be a "turning point" in breaking the impasse in the peace process.⁵ However, according to reliable official Afghan sources, the meeting was a non-starter and accomplished nothing.⁶ The latter version would appear to be closer to reality given that the Taliban has never considered the Karzai government legitimate and only a stooge of the Americans. The foreign affairs adviser to Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Sartaj Aziz, has effectively confirmed that version of the meeting when he stated that the Taliban was unwilling to enter into negotiations with Kabul.⁷ Moreover, there is absolutely no incentive for the Taliban to enter into negotiations with President Karzai. There are two reasons for this.

First, President Karzai's term ends in April, making him a lame duck. There is no guarantee that whoever succeeds him following the presidential election would follow up on anything that would be agreed between him and the Taliban - if anything could be agreed to in such a short period of time. Second, why would the Taliban even bother to enter into serious negotiations with the Karzai government given that it knows that even if a BSA were to be signed only a small residual force of a few

thousand troops would remain in the country. Such a small force would be no match to counter the Taliban. Notwithstanding all the statements and hyperboles by Western leaders and UN officials that Afghanistan is now a much more secure place and that massive progress has been made,⁸ it is undeniable that the Taliban is far from being a defeated fighting force and, on the contrary, it has expanded far beyond its strongholds in south eastern Afghanistan.⁹ According to the American commander in Afghanistan, the ISAF forces are bracing themselves for a nasty, violent winter of Taliban attacks which would be contrary to the traditional lull in fighting during the winter.¹⁰

Before I turn to what the present state of these two factors - the BSA and the peace process - mean for future Afghan-Pakistan relations, let me first briefly examine what Pakistan is seeking in the bilateral relationship.

Islamabad wants a 'friendly' government in Afghanistan post-2014. And this means, one that is not closely allied with its arch-enemy India. The signing of an Indo-Afghan strategic pact in October 2011 did not help matters in that regard, particularly given that India will be boosting its military training of the Afghan army and police and forging closer security and trade ties. Given its lack of strategic depth, Pakistan does not want to have two neighbours to worry about, particularly if they are allied to one another.

Pakistan also wants a stable Afghanistan, one which does not threaten its national interests. It would appear that increasingly the government in Islamabad realises that the military's previous policy of supporting the Taliban would be bad for Pakistan's stability in the long-term. Accordingly, it is urging that all ethnic groups be represented in a post-2014 national government, one that is not ruled or dominated by the Taliban.¹¹ Indeed, the long-term ramifications for the stability of Pakistan in having the Taliban included in the government in Kabul could potentially be very bad. Such an Afghan government would give

the Pakistani Taliban and fellow *jihadists* a massive moral and psychological boost to their terrorist endeavour to impose the *Shariah* throughout Pakistan. Moreover, there would be absolutely no guarantee that because Islamabad facilitated the return to power of the Taliban that it would in turn be friendly to the Pakistani government in the future. So in the long-term, Pakistan would be weakened because of having to deal with an internal insurgency quite possibly assisted by a post-2014 Afghan government whose members the Pakistani intelligence and army had nurtured in the past.

Reinforcing the futility and the danger to Pakistan's national interests of seeking a return of the Taliban in Kabul is the recent major policy shift in Islamabad that has jettisoned the long-standing concept of Afghanistan as 'strategic depth' as a counter-measure to an Indian military attack. In a recent testimony to the Senate, national security and foreign affairs adviser to the Pakistan prime minister, Sartaj Aziz, stated that this concept was 'totally outdated' and needed no more importance.¹² Put differently, this means that Pakistan no longer sees the misplaced need to try to 'control' a friendly government in Kabul - a policy objective which we have seen was never achieved or achievable. Even when Pakistan-supported Taliban was in power in Kabul in 1996 onwards, it refused to recognise the Durand Line as the *de jure* international border between the two countries. President Karzai recently re-enforced this Afghan stance by stating that no Afghan government would ever recognise the Durand Line as the border.

Unfortunately, as the situation stands today, there is little likelihood that Islamabad will achieve its two foreign policy objectives of having a friendly *and* a stable Afghanistan if the BSA is not signed and there is no peaceful negotiated political settlement in Afghanistan. The most probable scenario in that case is a weak central government in Kabul, without outside military and financial support, which quickly splinters and is militarily threatened by the Taliban and other Afghan insurgency

groups, such as the Haqqani Network and Hekmatyar, both based in the Pakistan's tribal areas. In that case the Taliban and its ideological fellow travellers take over Kabul and provide support to the Pakistani Taliban in the form of weapons and strategic depth. This would further threaten an already fragile state which has been struggling for years to manage a virulent insurgency, principally, but not solely, in the north west of the country. Such a scenario would be very bad news for Pakistan and the region. Washington would be extremely worried about the safety of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and whether these could fall in the hands of the Pakistan Taliban.

Because such a scenario would be catastrophic for all, it is critical that the Kabul government sign off on the BSA as soon as possible in order to ensure the long-term presence of the US military and allied countries. At the same time Pakistan needs to put more pressure on the Taliban to negotiate in good faith with Kabul. A negotiated political agreement can only be better than one which sees fighting breakout as soon as the ISAF troops leave. The last thing Pakistan would wish to see is a repeat of the 1992-1996 Civil War which wracked Afghanistan and led to the spill-over into Pakistan of millions of refugees. Given the parlous state of the Pakistani economy, this is a development Pakistan would not want to have to deal with.

As we know, Pakistan and Afghanistan have had many shared 'experiences' since Partition. Accordingly, for historical, operational and strategic reasons, Pakistan must be engaged as a full partner in the peace and reconciliation process. Of course, Pakistan's involvement in future negotiations is no guarantee that there will be peace post-2014 but it would certainly give peace a better chance. Pakistan would have a stake in the game and therefore an incentive to make the eventual peace agreement work. This has repeatedly been put forward by the US administration. Moreover, because Pakistan is so critical to the stability of the region, the US and the Coalition forces in the lead up to 2014 will

be putting a lot of pressure on Islamabad to push the Taliban to negotiate in good faith. And, hopefully, Islamabad will take heed of Washington's call.

There is enormous economic potential between the two countries which would benefit not only Pakistan and Afghanistan but the whole region, including India and China. No one has any interest in seeing Afghanistan descend back into chaos and destruction as it did in the 1990s, least of all Pakistan. So this is their chance, probably the last one, for the two countries to put all their efforts in finding a peaceful solution to a situation which could turn very nasty indeed. One thing is definitely sure: once the Western forces leave Afghanistan in 2014 they will not return, regardless as to what happens post-2014. So this is the time for Pakistan and Afghanistan to stop blaming each other and to take responsibility of where they want their countries to go in the future.

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 5. Kamran Yousaf, "Fragile Peace Process: Officials Claim Progress in Secret Afghan Talks", The Express Tribune, 9 December 2013.
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 10. Margherita Stancati, "Commanders in Afghanistan Brace for Violent Winter", Wall Street Journal, 19 November 2013.
 11. Ibid, p. 21.
 12. Zulfiqar Ahmad, "Afghanistan no Longer Considered Strategic Depth", Business Recorder, 19 December 2013.

5. Pakistan's Relationship with Russia and CARs :

Emerging trends in Pakistan's relationship with CARs and Russia

Irfan Shahzad

(Irfan Shahzad is working with the Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad, as Lead Research Coordinator. He has an M Sc. in International Relations and has been focusing upon subjects including China, Central Asia and Eurasia, development, and globalization. Irfan is also an award winning journalist and contributes to Pakistani and international media on subjects of national and international significance.)

Past few years have witnessed some major developments believed to be reshaping Pakistan's relationship with former Soviet world¹, towards the better. Not only the long pending energy and infrastructure related projects involving Central Asian Republics (CARs) are coming to the fore – bringing Pakistan closer to the nations with which it has deep rooted ethnic, cultural, historical and religious links – but a new semblance of warmth, though not consistent, has also been seen in the ties between Islamabad and Moscow.

As far as the overall relationship between Pakistan and CARs during past twenty two years after the disintegration of USSR is concerned, it can best be described as far from ideal, characterized with one step forward and two steps backward kind of progress. While the world has been drumming up Pakistan's so-called 'Strategic Depth' approach not only towards its immediate neighbor Afghanistan but beyond, involving CARs, the fact of the matter is that Islamabad actually never had any proper strategy for building even a modest relationship with the region known today as Central Asia after centuries long periods of region's colonization, first by the Tsarist Russia and then at the hands of Soviet Bolsheviks.

No doubt that public opinion in Pakistan has always been supportive of a deep and closer relationship between Pakistan and CARs since their emergence on the global map in 1991. Successive Pakistani governments have tried in varying degrees with isolated steps from time to time, though with actual measures taken falling drastically short of a required comprehensive strategy and people's aspirations.

Bilateral ties with individual CARs as well as efforts for developing a greater regional harmony in the form of a reinvigorated Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) remain far from ideal, and marred by unfortunate mistrust emanating primarily from different perceptions on terrorism and extremism; regional and extra regional influences over

CARs' old guard that continues to rule the region, and above all instability rather continuous war in Afghanistan.

Pakistan established diplomatic relations with all the CARs soon after their independence, and moved quickly to establish communication linkages with Tashkent and Almaty in early 1990. National Bank of Pakistan was quick to open its branches and offices, agreements and MoUs were signed while inter-governmental ministerial level commissions were established. Besides, high level visits involving heads of state and government from Pakistan were conducted in early to mid 1990s.

However, the euphoria proved to be short-lived. As the desire and urge expressed from the both sides could not be matched with corresponding infrastructure development and economic interaction; due mainly to lack of direct land linkages and hampered badly by devastatingly Afghan infighting; Tajikistan's own civil war and not-so-cordial relations between CARs themselves; Pakistan's open support for the Taliban regime which was seen with suspicion in almost all the CARs, and later the US campaign in the region in the name of war on terror. Air communication links broke down quickly, only to be restored very recently. Pakistan's trade, investment, and people to people contacts remain negligible as of today² what to say of any 'strategic partnership' with any of the CARs.

Nonetheless, there has been a realization in Islamabad and the capitals of CARs that there is no way forward but to explore the avenues of mutual cooperation. Not only the CARs themselves are eager to find new markets and routes for what they produce – mainly energy resources – but energy shortages and requirements of countries such as Pakistan and India are also paving the way for greater pushes for enhanced interaction. International backing is also available for the same.

Thus, the signature projects of today revolve around energy. Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan and India (TAPI) pipeline project, though on table for almost two decades, has been revived with the parties involved signing several MoUs for the purpose. Another MoU between Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan has recently been concluded to transport – in summer months when the demand for electricity is high in Pakistan and low in Central Asia – 1000 megawatts of Tajik (initially) and possibly Kyrgyz (later) hydro-power to Pakistan under internationally backed Central Asia-South Asia CASA-1000 project.

While the two projects are being generally seen as ushering the region into a new era of enhanced cooperation; there are also some voices in Pakistan calling for caution, arguing that projects such as CASA-1000 will make Pakistan be seen as taking sides in the bitter relationship between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, stained because of the very water resources that Tajikistan will be utilizing to export electricity to Pakistan.

Similarly, there are question marks on the technical and financial viability of TAPI as well. There is also a feeling in Pakistan that international community is supporting these projects for two main reasons: firstly because the West particularly America wishes to ensure that in their efforts to break free from the shackles of Moscow, CARs do not fall altogether in the Chinese lap and road is paved for increased involvement of and linkages with China. Secondly, the objective is to provide Pakistan with alternatives to the Iran-Pakistan pipeline. Nonetheless, the two projects are moving ahead albeit at a slower pace particularly in case of TAPI.

Sustainable peace and long-term stability in Afghanistan – that lies right in between Pakistan and CARs and an unfortunate nation whose instability has undoubtedly kept the broader region from realizing its true potential – is also emerging as a common agenda of cooperation. In the last months of 2013, key civil and military officials from Pakistan have been seen reaching out to Central Asian Republics (CARs) – exchanges that hold a great deal of significance for regional security and stability, particularly in the wake of anticipated draw-down of NATO troops from Afghanistan, after a devastating war of 13 long years.

First, it was General Kayani – Pakistan’s then Chief of Army Staff – visiting Tajikistan at the end of August 2013. Then Sartaj Aziz – advisor to Pakistan’s prime minister on security and foreign affairs – visited Kyrgyzstan for the summit of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), having the opportunity to interact with leadership of all the CARs except Turkmenistan, in mid-September. This was followed by another visit by General Kayani, this time to Kazakhstan, days later, for exploring mutual security cooperation as well as joining of hands for a peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan.

Why this renewed focus on Pakistani leadership’s exchanges with CARs for security and stability related cooperation, where Pakistan’s main interest, exhibited so far, remains economic and energy-oriented? The visits have a clear message: Islamabad values the role of CARs in post-withdrawal stability of Afghanistan, and resultantly the region as a whole.

CARs leadership also understand, and have expressed it as well, the un-ignorable significance that Pakistan assumes and the role it has to play viz a viz Afghanistan. SCO as an organization – of which four of the five CARs, i.e., Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are members – has not only been expressing concern over the evolving situation in Afghanistan but has also been appreciating Pakistan’s efforts and sacrifices.

On the bilateral level as well, this developing unanimity of views and mutual accommodation of approaches is visible. During his visit to Tajikistan, General Kayani also reviewed the regional security and

situation in Afghanistan with President Emomali Rahmon. Tajikistan shares border with its southern neighbor; therefore, the situation after the ISAF withdrawal is also the main issue of the Islamabad's agenda with Tajikistan, and other CARs.

All the CARs are contributing towards Afghanistan in one form or the other, in their respective capacities. In this backdrop, it is all understandable that Pakistan's establishment is reaching out to countries of Central Asia, particularly Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, for ensuring stability in the post-2014 Afghanistan. Besides Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, the role of other CARs and need for closer collaboration with them *viz a viz* Afghanistan is also realized well in Islamabad.

While economic and energy interests are important, and so are the people to people contacts that must be renewed, security and stability indeed tops the agenda for any regional outreach. It is therefore hoped that Islamabad will continue to seek joining of hands with CARs in years ahead. Institutional framework is available; not only for bilateral but also for regional cooperation.

Pakistan and Russia have also been warming up to each other during last three years or so, starting with Putin's declaration in 2010 that Pakistan and Russia are allies in "every sense of the word." Russians have offered help in rehabilitation for Pakistan Steels Mills (PSM) that they helped build during the times of USSR in 1970s, and also to invest in energy and infrastructure sectors. First ever 'strategic dialogue' between the two nations was held at the end of August 2013, and seeds of closer defence cooperation were sowed with visits of heads of armed forces. This warming towards however is very much reflective of the hard geo-political realities that the two sides are faced with. Islamabad wishes to reach out to Moscow to show that it is not wholly solely in the US' straightjacket, since the relations with Washington started deteriorating despite Pakistan being an 'ally' since 2010, and Russians have also been trying to give a message to India – in the wake of latter's increasing leaning towards the West, particularly US in recent years – that they also may consider other options in South Asia.

Nonetheless, the warmth is yet to become a partnership, as both sides have their own limitations. It is so far evident that neither can Pakistan leave the US altogether, nor does Russia find it feasible to turn its back towards India. Therefore, the tone of Russian leadership on issues involving Pakistan, primarily 'terror' and regional stability, has visibly been different while talking to the Pakistani and Indian leadership, on separate occasions. Putin's own refusal to come to Pakistan to attend Pakistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan and Russia quadrilateral summit, clouded the budding ties in uncertainty. As a whole, this may be a rapprochement, but a reset is yet to become visible.

In the nutshell, it can be summed up that Pakistan's relationship with CARs and Russia is showing the signs of qualitative and qualitative improvement, but there still is a long way to go. Considering the increasing regional, rather global significance of CARs, and Russia's resurgence at the world stage, it is in the interest of Islamabad to try and forge closer partnerships. Sustained efforts are required in the years ahead to make mutual interactions and cooperation bear the desired fruit for the common good of the region's people.

¹While the former soviet world comprises 16 independent sovereign nations, the scope of this write-up is limited to the five Central Asian Republics (CARs), i.e., Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and Russia.

²For instance, Pakistan's combined exports towards CARs remain less than 0.1 % of its total exports in last two financial years, 2011-12 and 2012-13, according to the statistics of Trade Development Authority of Pakistan.

6. EU-Pakistan Relations :

EU-Pakistan Relations and GSP Plus:

Towards an End of Europe's 'Whitewashing'?

Dr. Siegfried O. Wolf

If one believes official statements, it seems that the EU accomplished an evolution in its relations with Pakistan. There is no doubt that the cooperation between Europe and Pakistan in terms of economic and development assistance has expanded over the last decades. Realizing the re-emergence of the EU as a major economic actor as well as its own tremendous need for development and industrialization (cf. Lieven, 2002), Pakistan started looking towards Europe as partner. A first agreement that was made to set up relations between Islamabad and Brussels was signed in 1962, which was followed by the first comprehensive agreement in 1976 to further intensify trade and economic ties. Currently, the legal and political basis for the relations between Brussels and Islamabad is the 2004 Cooperation Agreement. Additionally, within the framework of the Lisbon treaty of 2009, the EU-Pakistan 5-year Engagement Plan was launched which was supposed to further widen and deepen the cooperation between Europe and the South Asian state. At least on paper, the endorsed agreement was adding to trade, economic cooperation and development, and also addressed the issues of regional security, counter terrorism, narco-trafficking, and

organized crime. Another significant initial determinant of the 5-year plan was to strengthen the process of strengthening democratic institutions, civilian-administrative structures, and civil society. The signing of a memorandum of understanding on civilian capacity building for law enforcement in Pakistan in November 2010 has to be seen in this context. One of the outcomes of this document was the creation of the National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA) and the support for provincial police forces in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Punjab (cf. Sultana, 2013, 41). Furthermore, a Strategic Dialogue was envisaged to offer political guidance within the EU-Pakistan relations.

In addition to the various signed documents, the EU started also to build-up its physical presence in Pakistan in the form of an office by the European Commission in 1985. Already three years later, the office was upgraded to a fully fledged EU Delegation in order to monitor trade and development cooperation. In 1992, the Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department of the European Commission (ECHO) opened an office in Islamabad too. Besides the Delegation there is also the EU-Pakistan Joint Commission which is complemented by a Foreign and Security Policy Dialogue at senior official level to give more depth to the existing collaboration. On top of that several regular meetings at the expert level are held to discuss urgent matters regarding international affairs, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, and migration issues.

However, the shaping of the European strategy with respect to Pakistan is not devoid of limitations and weaknesses. Apart from the intention to get more involved on the political and strategic dimensions, the decision

makers did not go far beyond the economic paradigm which has traditionally defined the Pakistan-EU ties. Neither the Cold War nor the developments in the realm of security after “9/11” changed much in this respect. As a result, there is a clear ‘economization’ of the bilateralism between Islamabad and Brussels which was apparently at the expense of Europeans’ enthusiasm to take a closer, consequent look at Pakistan’s domestic affairs, especially when it comes to human rights, labour rights, environmental protection, women’s rights and the rights of religious minorities (cf. USDS, 2013a, 2013b). This process recently reached a new peak when Pakistan was granted the GSP Plus status by the EU. Under this programme the beneficiary state (a developing country, *in casu* Pakistan) is given special trade preferences, namely tariff reductions. The agreement is unilateral, meaning that the EU does not require or expect the beneficiary state to adopt similar measures reciprocally. Basically it provides for a flexible scheme of preferences according to the individual needs of the recognized states. There is no doubt that the GSP Plus status will give a boost to the country’s economy (cf. Dawn, 2013a), especially the textile and clothing sector would benefit from unrestricted access to the EU’s single market (cf. ITC 2013, 3-4). Pakistani analysts have calculated that GSP Plus is expected to help Islamabad earn an additional USD 550-700 million per year with an increase in exports of USD 2 billion (Mirza, 2013; Daily Times, 2013). It is estimated that 20 percent of the country’s exports would be allowed to enter the EU duty-free and 70 percent would benefit from preferential rates (Gishkori/Rana, 2013). Furthermore, Islamabad considers the

granting of GSP Plus a matter of prestige, for it hopes that it will improve the country's tattered international standing. Pakistan's reputation suffered significantly from its image of being one of the world's greatest hubs for international terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, and a source of all kinds of instability leading to the suppression of ethnic and religious minorities and tensed relations with its neighbours. Especially the persistently deteriorating human rights situation in the country (cf. USDS, 2013b, 1), enforced by religious fanaticism and certain state agencies acting with impunity, is a matter of severe concern that is shared by many Pakistan observers around the globe.

In order to achieve the GSP Plus Status, it is mandatory for Pakistan to ensure human rights protection and to ensure compliance with key human rights conventions. More concretely, Pakistan has to apply and prove the following: First, it must have ratified 27 key conventions. In order to get GSP Plus, which has to be understood as a "special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance" (EC, 2008), one has to sign and ratify 16 international conventions on human rights and labour rights, and 11 conventions on good governance and the environment. Second, Pakistan must not demonstrate serious problems with the implementation of these conventions (cf. Ali, 2013). Third, it may not have formulated any reservations to those conventions. Furthermore, Pakistan has to commit to a series of monitoring

requirements. Here, Pakistan must provide comprehensive information concerning the required legislation and measures taken to implement them consequently.¹

For the time being, it seems that Pakistan's diplomatic and lobby machinery was able to convince the most important decision-making circles within the EU of the following things: First, they have the political will and the capacities to deal with the prerequisites for getting the GSP Plus Status. Second, to improve the weak coordination and cooperation between its own institutional structures to be able to carry out the entire GSP Plus programme. Third, the respective authorities were able to convince the originally 'indifferent attitude' of the private sector towards GSP Plus conditions.

Fourth, it seems that the Pakistani government was also able to give an impression that the human rights situation in the country is improving. But as already indicated above, this does not reflect the realities on the ground. Religious and ethnic minority rights are often bluntly violated and the rights and interests of certain regions like Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan are treated with contempt. In brief, the human rights situation in Pakistan remains murky (Wolf, 2013d).

Having this in mind, it is important to be aware of the fact that there was also a significant degree of resistance against the granting of GSP Plus to Pakistan within the members of the EU. For example, the criticism found its expression on 5 November 2013 as the International Trade Committee of the European Parliament (INTA) had to make a decision regarding the granting the GSP Plus Status to Pakistan (and 9 other selected

countries). Besides the fact that INTA voted against a resolution opposing the grant of the GSP Plus Status (cf. Khan, 2013), 12 (out of 30 votes) were not in favour. This marks an interesting aspect of the whole GSP Plus process, which are worth looking at in detail. Here, one has to recognize that the result of this vote mainly comes from an intrinsic divide within the EU between the 'Northern States' and the 'Southern States'. The 'Northern bloc', mainly comprising the Scandinavian states (also known as the 'free traders'), Germany, and UK. Foremost, Berlin and London were already keen to grant Pakistan GSP Plus Status a couple of years before, especially after the traumatic experience of the 2010 flooding.

The 'Southern alliance', on the other hand, shares a common interest in protectionism. These member states are concerned that Pakistan's GSP Plus status would negatively impact their own economies by taking away jobs in their own clothing industries (cf. Sultana, 2013, 40). It is because of that that the EU for long preferred to provide humanitarian aid, as opposed to trade benefits. However, some Pakistan products received in the past duty free access but items perceived as a challenge for European products² were excluded from the list of favoured import items (cf. Siegmann, 2013).

Therefore, it is unfortunate but obvious that the decision pro- or against the GSP Status for Pakistan was rather made on the basis of economic interests of the individual member states, less on the evaluation of the human rights situation and the matching of the necessary requirements. Leaving aside the fact that several human and labour rights organizations

have raised their concerns about Pakistan's commitment to these requirements, it seems that the economic paradigm continues to dominate the EU-Pakistan relations.

Also on the level on the individual member states and their bilateral relations with Pakistan, it does not seem that there is any significant impetus to put pressure on the EU institutions to make Islamabad stick to its commitments. Instead, a 'strategic silence' can be observed in European foreign policy circles when it comes to getting strict in insisting on international standards and conventions, especially in the context of human rights, political and religious freedom. European ambivalence in vocally claiming and practically enforcing democratic values in the South Asian context is not only obvious when its own economic interests are at stake, but even more when it intersects the transatlantic relationship. In other words, Europe's approach towards Pakistan is still far from independent from US interests and interference. For example, there are no doubts that Germany will do anything which will turn out to be perceived as an unnecessary burden for its relations with Washington. Berlin's maneuver of sitting out the issue of granting Edward Snowden potential asylum, or the National Security Agency (NSA) affair of tapping Germans communication systems can be seen as clear indications thereof. The 'official indignation' of the German government in this context has to be seen rather as a distraction of Europe's public attention from certain political developments in Brussels (initiated by Germany) than a severe 'huff' about the US ignorance of the private sphere of German citizens.

In consequence, many of the European evaluations, which are announcing processes of democratic consolidation look rather as attempts of politically motivated 'whitewashing' than credible assessments of the real status quo in Pakistan.³ Therefore, Pakistan's establishment is enjoying a situation in which one can ignore the implementation of commitments without fearing significant consequences. In consequence, the enthusiastic reform measures regarding the improvement of the conditions of disadvantaged communities and regions, and especially their implementation, remains rather the exception than the norm.

To conclude, the EU has to make sure that Pakistan's political establishment and law enforcement agencies do more than merely paying lip service to democratic values and human rights. Furthermore, Europe needs to monitor the implementation of international commitments. It is important for the decision-makers in the EU to demonstrate the political will to implement the opportunities given by GSP Plus to them, and to show that withdrawal of the benefits in case of non compliance with the prerequisites remains a viable option. The case of Sri Lanka,⁴ which temporarily lost its GSP status after a series of violations of the conventions, should serve as a reminder for Pakistan's elite that the EU is willing and able to react according the recommendations of the strict monitoring mechanism of the implementation of GSP Plus requirements.⁵ Here, the EU must also take into account the likelihood that the 'non-economic motivation' of the new civilian government in intensifying cooperation is also to a certain extent an outcome of the growing anti-

American sentiments in Pakistan and less in the convictions of European values (Wolf, 2013d). In addition, Islamabad has to realize that the granting of concessions and aid come hand in hand with responsibilities. The arguments that have persistently been made over the last decades – that changes need time, and the security of the state must deserve the primary attention (which absorbs of course the bulk of the national resources) – cannot be used anymore as an excuse to not deliver the implementation of international commitments and domestic political-decision making. Therefore, the reiterated demands for more (unconditional) funds successfully addressed towards the international community by concurrent negligence of its own homework or performing basic duties (like paying taxes or energy bills), must come to an end. Otherwise, the establishment in Pakistan will interpret GSP Plus as just another ‘carte blanche’ for financial and economic benefits. However, in order to do so, Europe has to recall its democratic norms and values in its foreign policy decisions. In sum, whitewashing can’t be an alternative for a sustainable, constructive and relationship with Pakistan.

Notes :

1. See for more details: European Commission, Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP), http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/generalised-scheme-of-preferences/index_en.htm.
2. For example knit wear, bed linen, apparel, and home textile(cf. Siegmann, 2013; cf. Sultana, 2013).
3. For a critical assessment of Pakistan’s latest political development, see Wolf (2013a, 2013b, 2013c).
4. The EU suspended Sri Lanka’s GSP status after violations of the human rights conventions in the context of the armed confrontation with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leading to their military defeat.
5. See European Commission, 15.2.2010, <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=515>.

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7. Iran-Pakistan Relations :

Iran-Pakistan Relations: Cooperation Combined with Rivalry

Pir-Mohammad Mollazehi

(He is the guest researcher of Iran Review in the field of Sub-continent Issues. Before that He had worked with Iran's Radio and Television again as an analyst in this regard. He also writes articles and analyses for Tehran International Studies and Research Institute (TISRI))

Through a realistic approach, one may describe the existing relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and its eastern neighbor, Pakistan, as a combination of cooperation and rivalry. There are special reasons which can explain how Iran and Pakistan have managed to get along despite the existence of conflicting elements in their relations. However, if one wanted to put it straight, it would turn out to be a picture similar to the ancient Roman god, Janus, and his double faces. Through different junctures of human history, this deity has been taken as a symbol and manifestation of the coexistence of two conflicting elements along each.

Cooperation

The combination of rivalry and cooperation between Pakistan and Iran is a product of certain realities which can be categorized in four major areas: 1. Political area; 2. Cultural area; 3. Security area; and 4. Economic area.

As for the political area, it would suffice to consider that after the independence of Pakistan and its separation from the Indian Subcontinent in 1947, Iran was the first country in the world to recognize this newly established Muslim nation. It was in 1949 that then Pakistani prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, started his first foreign trip with a visit to the Iranian capital, Tehran. The Shah of Iran was the first head of state to travel to Pakistan following the independence of that country. In return, when the Islamic Revolution triumphed in Iran and the imperial rule was overthrown, Pakistan was the first country to recognize the Islamic Republic of Iran. The trip by then Iranian president, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, to Pakistan and the warm welcome accorded to the Iranian president by his Pakistani counterpart, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, marked a turning point in the development of relations between Iran and Pakistan following the victory of the Islamic

Revolution in Iran. The relative impartiality of Pakistan throughout eight years of war between Iran and Iraq helped to promote bilateral relations to an acceptable level. On the whole, despite many different ups and downs, the relations between Iran and Pakistan have been constantly on the rise.

In the cultural area, relations between Iran and Pakistan have had their roots in the depth of the historical relations that existed between Iran and the Indian Subcontinent. The present-day Pakistan has been, in fact, the closest center to Iran in terms of the assimilation of the Islamic and Iranian culture and civilization in all the Indian Subcontinent. It will suffice to consider the profound roots of Islamic and Iranian culture in the northern parts of the Greater India, which was centered on the city of Lahore, the capital city of the present-day Pakistan's Punjab Province. This is why the first national anthem of Pakistan following its independence from India, was written in Persian by the great Persian-speaking poet of the Indian Subcontinent, Muhammad Iqbal (commonly known as Iqbal Lahori). The name of Iqbal still stands out as the writer of Pakistan's national anthem, which is also a sign of cultural links between Iran and Pakistan. Muslim families have ruled various parts of the Indian Subcontinent throughout its history and most of them have been emotionally attached to the culture, language and the civilization of Iran and Islam. Through such a viewpoint, one may say that in historical terms, the present-day Pakistan came into being under the influence of competitive realities that characterize Islamic-Iranian civilization, on the one hand, and Hindu-Buddhist civilization, on the other hand. The country also became independent at a time that the international environment was ready for the peaceful coexistence of these two fields of civilization and religion. Just following the proclamation of its independence, Pakistan took steps to define its new Islamic identity within the framework of the Islamic world and in relation to the Islamic-Iranian civilization and culture. This was an important element in the positive approach taken by Muhammad Ali Jinnah (the founder of Pakistan) and Liaquat Ali Khan [toward Iran]. Both of them happened to be followers of the Shia denomination of Islam and, thus, had powerful ideological affiliation to the center of Shiism in the region, that is, Iran. Despite the secular nature of the regime of the former Iranian Shah, such a religious affiliation served to foster and facilitate a positive viewpoint between Iran and Pakistan.

As for the security area, the most important factor for the development of relations between Iran and Pakistan during the six decades, which have passed since the independence of Pakistan, is the existence of a long common border. The border between the two countries runs for 987 kilometers between two border points of Siah Kouh, in north, and Gwadar Bay, in south. Of course, political borders are manmade and drawn at a time that the UK was swaying its full colonial power in the region. However, security issues related to border areas come to the fore as the Baluch ethnic group accounts for the bulk of the Iranian and

Pakistani population on both sides of the border and Baluch people in Iran and Pakistan share the same language, culture and history. This is how the apparently dual policy of cooperation and rivalry between the two countries has come into being. This means that as ethnic tendencies started to grow in Pakistan's Baluchistan Province and separatist movements emerged there, security matters arising from this issue were taken more seriously by Iran. On the one hand, a common security issue brought Iran and Pakistan closer together. On the other hand, however, concerns about the spread of ethnic-centered ideas to Iran's Baluchestan region and subsequent overflow of insecurity from Pakistan's Baluchistan Province to Iran's Baluchestan, raised doubts among the Iranian officials about the ability of Pakistani government to control and appropriately handle such a delicate security matter.

A major transit route for illicit drugs runs along the common border between Iran and Pakistan and the costs incurred by Iran in its fight against drug trafficking, have further exacerbated those doubts. This situation came about despite the fact that Tehran and Islamabad have already signed security pacts and agreements for exerting joint control over the border areas. During recent years in which the political rivalry between Pakistan and India over the unresolved disputes in Kashmir region has heightened, the dominant notion in Pakistan has been that Baluch separatists are somehow supported by India. Proponents of this idea argue that by doing so, the Indian secret service, known as RAW (Research and Analysis Wing), is trying to retaliate the support that the Pakistani secret service, ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence), has been according to separatist guerillas in Indian-administered Kashmir. Of course, both Islamabad and New Delhi have denied that they are supporting separatist tendencies in the other country, but such a lame denial will not change the reality of rivalries between the two countries.

In the economic area, relations between Iran and Pakistan are relatively vast and the two countries enjoy potentially high capacities to meet each other's demands. The joint economic commission was set up by both countries in 1996 and the two countries are also engaged in effective economic cooperation within the framework of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). Nonetheless, the main issue related to bilateral economic cooperation, which dominates other aspects of economic exchanges between the two countries, is the issue of energy. The best symbol for the two countries' cooperation in the field of energy is the agreement which has been reached for the construction of the "Peace Pipeline" whose construction is currently under way. At first, the pipeline was supposed to take the Iranian gas from Assaluyeh region in south Iran to Gwadar port in south Pakistan from where it would have flown toward Mumbai in India. Due to intense rivalries between India and Pakistan and India's concern about the security of Pakistan route, the New Delhi was first willing for the pipeline to run under the sea. However, the huge cost of building an undersea pipeline combined with the need to the most advanced technology for the construction of an

undersea pipeline, which was demanded by India, finally caused New Delhi to temporarily withdraw from the project. As a result, discussions got underway between Tehran and Islamabad to replace China for India by implementing a strategic project which envisages connecting the Pakistani port of Gwadar to the Chinese city of Kashgar through Karakoram route. This project was also a focus of attention during a recent trip to Beijing by the new Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

Apart from the Peace Pipeline project, which can help to meet Pakistan's long-term need to energy, the export of electricity from Iran to Pakistan is another possibility which has been already started in border areas and can stand out as a major option for meeting Pakistan's energy needs in the future. This is especially true because despite pressures put on the government of Pakistan by the United States to change its mind about the construction of the Iranian gas pipeline, Islamabad has remained steadfast on pursuing the project to the end and has so far resisted Washington's calls to scrap the project. Such resistance would not have been possible in India due to a host of different reasons.

Rivalry

The existence of rivalries between Iran and Pakistan is a reality which cannot be denied. At the same time, it cannot be taken as a ground to totally disregard the existing cooperation which exists between the two countries on the basis of political exigencies and common interests. It is clear that following the 9/11 terror attacks in the United States and subsequent military invasion of Afghanistan by Washington and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), rivalries between Iran and Pakistan seem to have taken a new, and yet more complicated, turned compared to the past. To summarize various kinds of rivalries between Iran and Pakistan, they can be expressed as follows:

1. Ideological and religious rivalry;
2. Rivalry in handling sectarian issues and terrorism;
3. Rivalry fueled by the evolving Arab Spring developments;
4. Rivalry resulting from the United States policies; and
5. Rivalry related to such ethnic groups as Baluch, Pashtun, Tajik, and Hazara peoples.

Every one of these different areas of rivalry between Iran and Pakistan needs more in-depth discussion, which cannot be offered here. However, the important reality with respect to rival ties between the two countries is related to the ideological and religious challenge that has been facing the Islamic world since the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. After the victory of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, a new system of government based on the Shia philosophy has come into being which promotes a new form of Islamic governance and offers a new model of power in Islam based on the guardianship of the religious jurist (*Velayat-e Faqih*). As a result, the Sunni part of the Islamic world, including in Pakistan, which

is the second most populous Islamic country after Indonesia, has found itself faced with a kind of ideological and religious challenge. It should be noted that the majority of Pakistanis are followers of the Sunni faith and are also followers of Deobandi and Barelvi schools of thought whose main roots are in jurisprudential schools found in the Greater India. It should be noted that about 20-25 percent of the Pakistani population is made up of Shia Muslims, who are evidently under the influence of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. As a result, in order to put forth their religious demands, they have established their own political and religious organizations such as Tahrik-e Nefaz-e Fiqh-e Jafria (Movement for the Implementation of Jafari Fiqh), and Imamia Organization of Pakistan. Due to such efforts, the ideological and religious challenge between Sunnis and Shias has taken a destructive turn and has come to the surface in the form of sectarian conflicts and terrorist attacks. There are currently two kinds of radical Sunni groups in Pakistan. The first kind of radical groups opposes all kinds of Shia organizations as a result of which they are also opposed to the model of the Islamic power which is pioneered by Iran. Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, (LJ, or Army of Jhangvi) are the most notable examples of these groups. The second group of radical Sunnis in Pakistan has focused its efforts on countering the policies of the Indian government in Kashmir with Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen of Kashmir being outstanding examples of these groups. The emergence of such radical and sectarian groups in Pakistan has not only endangered the security of Pakistani citizens regardless of their religious beliefs, but has also played a destructive part in undermining the relations between Iran and Pakistan. As a consequence of such conflicts, the policy of concurrent cooperation and rivalry which has historically existed between Iran and Pakistan has been showing more of its Janus-faced nature.

In the meantime, the political developments in Afghanistan after terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States, have helped to keep up the political rivalry between Iran and Pakistan. Following the 9/11 attacks, the United States and its NATO allies launched a military invasion against Afghanistan and toppled the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which had been established by the Taliban group. The Taliban group was considered the closest political group in terms of ideology to the jihadist philosophy that was adhered and promoted by the Pakistani army. Of course, informed efforts have been, and still are, underway both in Tehran and Islamabad to cover up such destructive rivalries and to manage them at an acceptable level. Despite those efforts, the destructive impact of these rivalries reached its acme in the bitter incident, which took place at Iran's Consulate in the Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif, where Iranian diplomats were ruthlessly massacred by the Taliban after they forcefully ran over the city. In addition, the effects of the rise and fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan did not remain limited to the domestic developments inside that country, but led to new and more distinct demarcations which set apart various ethnic groups in Afghanistan. On the other hand, the different direction that Iran and

Pakistan took for supporting major ethnic groups that have strong claims to power in Afghanistan, inevitably caused Tehran and Islamabad to offer their support to different ethnic groups in the war-torn country. For example, the government of Pakistan chose to support two major ethnic groups that were closer to ethnic groups on its soil, that is, Pashtun and Baluch. On the contrary, Iran supported Tajik ethnic group as well as the Hazara people who are followers of Shia Islam. As a result, when it comes to ethnic rivalries in Afghanistan; Iran, India and Russia took sides with Tajiks and Hazara people while Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States supported Pashtuns, with the Taliban group being a prominent example of Pashtun people.

The covert rivalries between Iran and Pakistan do not stop at that point. Following the initiation of political developments in the Arab world, which are collectively known as the Arab Spring or the Islamic Awakening, Pakistan practically took sides with Saudi Arabia and other member states of the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council, thus posing a challenge to the growing regional power of Iran. The most prominent examples of such a confrontation can be seen in Syria and Bahrain. In Syria, Iran is supporting the ruling Alawite minority led by the country's incumbent President Bashar Assad. At the same time, Pakistan, along with Saudi Arabia and the Sunni Arab states of the region have been offering their support to the majority Sunni Syrians who are opposed to the Alawite government of Assad. In Bahrain, Iran is once more supporting the Shia majority of the country that has been asking for a bigger share in the political power. Here, Pakistan is again on the side of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which have dispatched military forces into Bahrain in order to suppress Shia protesters who they claim, are closed to Iran. Such different positions [taken toward regional developments by Iran and Pakistan] have, in practice, imparted a religious and ideological hue to the ongoing power struggles which are currently going on in Syria, Bahrain and Iraq and have their roots in political issues. It is an undeniable reality that such rivalries have been going on behind the scenes between Iran and Pakistan. Being aware of this reality, both countries have done their best to prevent their differences from coming to the surface and become known to public. At the same time, both countries are trying to prevent such rivalries from having a strong untoward effect on their economic, political and security cooperation, and if such an effect is unavoidable, at least, reduce it to the lowest possible degree.

It is, however, clear that the long-term impact of such negative rivalries [on the two countries' relations] cannot be easily ignored, especially when foreign elements are at work to multiply their effect. One of those factors is the policies adopted by the United States in the region, which are clearly at odds with the regional interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran. So far, the US policies have succeeded to make the Indian government change its mind about participation in the construction of the "peace gas pipeline," [which was supposed to take Iran's natural gas to India via

Pakistan]. Even in Pakistan, the government in Islamabad has been showing no hurry for the implementation of the project before the situation of relations between Iran and the United States becomes clear. Apparently, Pakistan is waiting to see how Iran and the United States settle their disputes before making a final decision on the pipeline project. This comes despite the fact that Pakistan's need to economical and long-term energy supply from Iran cannot be denied and the Pakistani officials, regardless of which party is in power in Islamabad, have owned up to this issue. The fact that the former Pakistani government, which was controlled by Pakistan People's Party, signed the contract for the transfer of the Iranian gas to Pakistan during the last months of its tenure and the new Pakistani government, which is run by Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz, has also indicated its commitment to the contract and has not given in to US pressures over this project, attests to this claim. It also proves that Pakistan has chosen a better way, compared to India, for the protection of its national interests when it comes to energy issues.

Conclusion

When seen from the viewpoint of the historical realities and common regional needs of the two countries, the relations between Iran and Pakistan are an amalgam of cooperation and rivalry. At certain junctures of their history, cooperation has been the dominant feature of bilateral relations. However, at other times, and usually due to different reasons which are not controlled by the two nations, rivalry has dominated and characterized the ties between Tehran and Islamabad. At any rate, the Islamic Republic of Iran has managed to maintain its strategic position, and it is still able to leave its mark on regional developments in order to establish a logical balance of strategic power in South Asia and the Indian Subcontinent regions. As a result, the Islamic Republic is able to play a positive mediatory role to reduce the tension in relations between India and Pakistan, especially with regard to the two countries' disputes in Kashmir.

However, the dominance of an ideological discourse over the political relations between the two countries can prove to be a stumbling block on the way of further development of political, security and cultural relations. If ideological rivalries give birth to sectarian strife and terrorist activities, they may even lead to a full-blown war between Shias and Sunnis. If such a war breaks out in reality, it would push Iran and Pakistan in different directions to take different positions on that situation. In that case, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia will form a unified front to counter Iran. The developments which have so far emanated from the Arab Spring in the Middle Eastern countries, especially in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Bahrain have already taken a clear turn toward religious sectarianism. As a result of this state of affairs, Iran has taken sides with Shias while Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have been supporting the Sunni Muslims. If a logical solution based on the interests of nations

and regardless of their beliefs is not sought for this situation, it will undoubtedly have a negative effect on relations between Iran and Pakistan. In that case, rivalries may overcome the cooperation and for a certain period of time, no matter how short, lack of trust may dominate the relations between Iran and Pakistan.

8. Kazakhstan-Pakistan Relations :

Kazakhstan- Pakistan relations

in the field of cultural cooperation and their role in enhancing security in the region

Dr. Malik Augan

Department of International Relations and World Economy
al-Farabi Kazakh National University

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is one of the largest Muslim countries and only nuclear power among them. Pakistani foreign policy towards Kazakhstan and the Central Asian region is based on common historical and cultural heritage, religious traditions and geographical proximity. While developing relations with the countries of the region, Pakistan has sought to strengthen its international position in the countries of the Central Asia, which Islamabad regards as part of the Muslim world.

Kazakhstan in relations with Pakistan primarily considered the role this country has played in Afghanistan, especially after 1996. In addition, Kazakhstan is interested in Pakistan because of its support of CICA and joint activities in international organizations such as the ECO and the OIC. However, Kazakhstan like other countries in the region has developed relationships with Pakistan considering its own interests in India.

Since the recognition of the independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan by Pakistan on 20 December 1991, meetings of the leaders of the two countries have become regular and active. The meeting of Prime Minister of Pakistan N.Sharif and President Nursultan Nazarbayev was held at Davos International Economic Forum in February 1992. At the end of February 1992 Nursultan Nazarbayev visited Pakistan on an official visit. An agreement on the establishment of diplomatic and consular relations between Kazakhstan and Pakistan was signed during the visit.

Visits to Kazakhstan of Foreign Minister of Pakistan S.A.Ahmad Ali (January 1994), the Pakistani parliamentary delegation (1994), Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (August 1995), President Franklin Leghari

(October 1996) and other Pakistani government officials further strengthened bilateral relations.

Documents signed during these visits laid the legal foundation for the development of bilateral relations. The most important among them are: the Declaration on Principles of Relations between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Agreement on the establishment of diplomatic and consular relations between the RK and the IRP, the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation, the Agreement on Cooperation in the field of culture, sport and tourism and others.

As a result, agreements were reached on expanding economic and technical cooperation between the two countries and the establishment of a joint ministerial commission on cooperation in the fields of economy, technology, culture and education. To expand business cooperation with Kazakhstan permanent intergovernmental commission on trade, economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation was created. The first meeting was held in January 1993 in Islamabad and the next one only in July 2001 in Astana. Later, these working sessions were periodically held in one of the capitals of the countries.

Pakistan's attempts to establish contacts with the countries of the Central Asia were built on historical ties with the region. Spiritual culture of the people of the Central Asia and Pakistan has common Persian, Muslim and Turkic roots. Pakistan was always interested in the religious needs of the region's population. For example, 5000 copies of the Koran were discreetly sent through Afghanistan's ethnic Uzbeks to Soviet Central Asia in 1984. Attempts to use Islam as a cultural and political factor were observed during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan as well.

Regular contact between the two sides was established only after 1991. The visit of the Pakistani delegation led by Foreign Minister Ali S.A.Ahmad to Almaty in late November 1991 was held and issues of cooperation in trade, economic, financial, cultural and humanitarian areas was discussed. Pakistan loaned 10-30 million dollars for purchases of essential commodities such as pharmaceuticals to each of the Central Asian countries including Kazakhstan.[1] During the visit the two sides signed a "Memorandum of Understanding" and the joint declaration on exchanges in the fields of culture, education and economy. The Joint Economic Commission (JEC) was the institutional framework of the agreement. Under a special technical assistance program (NTS) fully

funded by Islamabad in 1992-93 schools that assisted in the training of Kazakhstani specialists of English Language, Banking and Accounting were chosen.[2] Diplomatic Academy of Pakistan has developed a program for training of more than 60 diplomats from Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is among the countries that are granted quotas for study in various military educational institutions of Pakistan including the National Defense University.

In Islamabad International Islamic University, one of the largest and most influential members of the International League of Islamic Universities, several dozen Kazakh students have completed or have been studying Sharia law and theology courses. The main objectives of the International Islamic University are organization and coordination of the spread of Islamic influence in the Central Asian states, training and retraining of personnel for countries with Muslim populations, translation into various languages and publication of literature, theoretical research on the processes of Islamization and ways to strengthen current religion in political and ideological system of Muslim societies. As part of this program Ahmed Yassavi's works were translated into Urdu and Pashto. University is funded largely by governments of Egypt and Pakistan, religious nongovernmental organizations from Saudi Arabia, Pakistani religious parties, World Muslim League and individuals.[3]

Cooperation in the field of education is reciprocal. Currently several hundred young people from Pakistan are studying at universities of Kazakhstan, mainly in medical majors. During the visit of Nursultan Nazarbayev to Islamabad in December 2003 an agreement on the development of inter-university cooperation between Kazakhstani Abylay Khan International Relations and World Languages University and the National University of Modern Languages of Pakistan was reached. Mayors of the capitals of the two states, Astana and Islamabad, signed an agreement on the establishment of bilateral relations in the field of urban economics management. Presentation of Nursultan Nazarbayev's "Epicenter of Peace" that was written in 2001 and was translated into many languages of the world same year was held in Islamabad in presence of the two presidents.[4] During this official visit Kazakhstan's interest in cooperation with Pakistan in the field of bio and information technologies was reiterated. Agreement on cooperation in science was signed earlier during the visit of the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan F. Legari to Kazakhstan in October 1996. An agreement was reached on cooperation between the two countries in the sphere of high technologies, particularly in the development of gene biotechnology for

agriculture, development of modern technologies for production of composite materials, joint research in the field of pharmacology.

Opening of office of the Honorary Consul in Lahore during mr.Tokayev's visit to Islamabad in March 1999 and the opening of the Consulate of Kazakhstan in Peshawar on 14 March 2001 in North West Frontier Province of Baluchistan have improved humanitarian cooperation between Kazakhstan and Pakistan. An official opening was attended by the governor of the province, local officials and representatives of Pakistan Foreign Ministry, people of science and culture, businessmen, journalists, the U.S. and Iran diplomats accredited in Peshawar, the Honorary Consuls of Turkey and France, ethnic Kazakhs living in Pakistan.

Confirmation of the interests of Astana and Islamabad in further development of bilateral relations was the creation of website of the Embassy of Kazakhstan in Pakistan. Purpose of the website of the Embassy of Kazakhstan is to give a variety of information about our country that has practical significance for the Pakistani users, including ethnic Kazakhs, as well as to acquaint them with the rich culture, nature and traditions of Kazakh people.[5]

In 1990s the Pakistani and Kazakh sides discussed reduction of visa restrictions for citizens of Pakistan so that they can move freely between Pakistan and Kazakhstan and neighboring Central Asian countries. Although increase of interaction between people further strengthens international relations, security issues are a priority. Islamabad's expectations to use Islam as part of its policy in Central Asia came short. Pakistan in the struggle for leadership in the region relied on the fact that most Muslim people living in Central Asia are Sunnis and will naturally stick with Pakistan instead of Iran. Moreover, Central Asian countries started to doubt sincerity of the intentions of Pakistan after interference in the internal affairs of some countries, primarily Tajikistan and less Uzbekistan. Another obstacle of strengthening humanitarian cooperation between Kazakhstan and Pakistan is the lack of direct transportation links.

The Memorandum of Understanding on the principles of cooperation in the field of transport between the governments of Kazakhstan and Pakistan was signed in January 1993. On 9 March 1995 quadripartite agreement was signed between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, China and Pakistan that resulted in the beginning of the operations of the Karakoram Highway in May 2004.

Promising prospects of joint activities of Kazakhstan and Pakistan in humanitarian and cultural cooperation provided by multilateral relations. In 1992, the Economic Cooperation Organization which includes Iran, Turkey and Pakistan was joined by the post-Soviet countries of Central Asia and by an Afghanistan. Since the first years of its activity the organization aimed to expand cultural exchanges between the countries, emphasizing the historical, cultural and religious similarity of the people of the region and the need to preserve and restore the common spiritual heritage. To achieve these goals the ECO Cultural Institute (ECI) was created in 1995, its charter signed on 15 March 1995 in Islamabad. Culture Institute's charter was ratified by Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and Tajikistan. In cooperation with UNESCO international project for the translation of children's literature to the regional languages is being carried out. Joint projects in the field of media, art, philosophy, sports and education remain a priority. Training Educational Institute was opened in 1998, its charter was signed by all countries except Uzbekistan. The central office of this training center is located in Ankara, but the Institute has offices in all ten countries. At Izmir ECO summit educational programs were approved. However, institutes haven't begun training activities. The ECO Science Foundation work remains pro forma too.

Environment protection has become a new trend in the organization's activities recently. This region's extremely pressing issues have been paid much attention at the highest level meetings. In Almaty declaration it is noted that Members should "... consider the feasibility of development of joint rehabilitation projects with financial and technical assistance from donor states, regional and international financial institutions in areas affected by environmental disasters, including the Aral Sea, the Caspian Sea, Lake Sarez and others." [6]

As approved by the heads of all participating states in Kvetta Action Plan of 1993 and the Almaty master plan for the transport sector in the ECO member states following areas of cooperation were identified as promising: transport, communications, trade and energy. These documents had the following goals: to link the ECO members among themselves and with international markets through reliable road, rail, sea and air routes, as well as through a network of oil and gas pipelines. [6]

For most of the ECO members with no direct access to the sea the development of transport corridors is a priority for economic development of the member states and for their integration into the world market.

The idea of creation of "Great Silk Road" Transasian railway that will link the region of the Middle East with Europe, the Far East, India and the countries of Southeast Asia was revived. Work on this project was completed in 1997 and at the extraordinary summit in Ashgabat ECO approved action program in the field of transport and communications.

Efforts of the ECO transport cooperation were concentrated on the organization of transport route of Almaty - Tashkent - Turkmenabad - Tehran - Istanbul.

Pakistan actively supported the idea of convening the CICA and signed the Declaration on Principles for Relations of member countries. Declaration of Principles governing relations between CICA member states in the cultural sphere provided that Pakistan, Kazakhstan and other countries that have signed the document will recognize the diversity of national characteristics, traditions, cultures and values of Asian states that is a valuable factor in their mutually enriching relationships. Paragraph VII of the Declaration proclaimed that the Member States will expand economic, social and cultural cooperation based on mutual interests and that will make special efforts to promote better mutual understanding and enhance cultural exchanges and cooperation in the field of education and tourism.[7] CICA Catalogue also included the interaction of the Member States on a broad spectrum of military and political issues of trust, dealing with new threats, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the development of economic, humanitarian and cultural cooperation.[8]

In order to build relationships within the field of humanitarian and cultural cooperation between Kazakhstan and Pakistan several independent organizations were established by the decisions of the OIC conferences coordinated by the General Secretariat: Islamic news agency, the Islamic Commission for Economic and Cultural Affairs, the Islamic Centre for Vocational Education and research, Islamic Foundation of scientific and technological development research, Center of Islamic art and culture, organization of Islamic Capitals , Islamic Organization for Education , Science and Culture.

Nauryz as intangible cultural heritage of Turkic and Iranian people was nominated at UNESCO by the group of countries including Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan.

Unfortunately, substantial work with SCO observer countries not started. Kazakhstan and Pakistan are members of the Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) created in 2002. Thus, Pakistan is trying to use the format of bilateral and multilateral relations to strengthen its influence in the Central Asian states, claiming it to be the leader and pushing Islamic unity as an integration idea based on historical, cultural and religious similarity of the people of the Central Asia. Islamabad has to take into account the fact that by the time of independence the Central Asian countries enjoyed good human potential and high level of economic and social development.

Islamabad seeks to use the Western factor (especially the U.S.) to turn the region into a zone of its interests and resolve internal problems such as the development of the transport and energy sectors of its economy. In addition, it tries hard to involve the states of Central Asia into the orbit of its policy to get Muslim allies in the confrontation with India.

So far Pakistan is not able to get any concrete support from the Central Asian states in the implementation of its strategic objectives in relation to India as Kazakhstan and other countries in the region have built relationships with Pakistan without prejudice to its relations with India. On the contrary, since September 11 India has become significantly stronger in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Improvement in India -US relations also creates uncertainties of Pakistani politics in Central Asia.

An important factor in Pakistan's policy in Central Asia is a Sino-Pakistani cooperation in our region. Geopolitical necessity and complementarity of interests of China and Pakistan is manifested in their policies towards Central Asia. China provided unconditional support to Pakistan in getting observer status in the SCO.

When carrying out its policy towards Central Asia Pakistan have to take into account competition and cultural expansion of Turkey and Iranian the region, pursue of independent foreign policy by the leaders of the Central Asian states, Russia's interests in the region and the situation in Afghanistan.

Despite the presence of geopolitical issues in the region, there are opportunities for the development of fruitful cooperation between Kazakhstan and Pakistan, both in bilateral and multilateral terms.

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9. Kashmir Dispute :

THE KASHMIR ISSUE:

BONE OF CONTENTION IN INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

Dr. MANAS CHAKRABARTY

**Professor of Political Science, University of North Bengal,
Darjeeling, in West Bengal**

(Dr. Manas Chakrabarty, M.A. Ph.D., is currently Professor of Political Science, University of North Bengal, Darjeeling, in West Bengal.

Dr. Chakrabarty has carried out extensive research and he has to his credit two books, around 65 published articles in leading professional national and international journals including some chapters in different books.

Dr. Chakrabarty has by now completed three Major Research Projects, one on "Judicial Behaviour and Judicial Decision Making of the Indian Supreme Court " sponsored by the Indian Council of Social Science Research and the other two on "Women and Politics: A Study of Women Parliamentarians" and "Indian Railway Trade Unions", sponsored by the University Grants Commission..

His areas of interest are: Indian Government and Politics, Judicial Behaviour and Judicial Decision Making. Trade Unionism, International Politics and Comparative Politics.

He is also the Director of Centre for Nehru Studies and Gandhian Studies (sponsored by the UGC), Programme, Dy. Coordinator of SAP(DRS Phase-II) sponsored by the UGC. Programme Coordinator, National Service Scheme at the University, Chairperson in Political Science, Directorate of Distance Education, North Bengal University, and Chairman, Sports Board, North Bengal University.

Dr. Chakrabarty is a Life Member of the Indian Political Science Association, Indian Institute of Public Administration and the American Studies Research Center.)

INTRODUCTION

As no individual is self sufficient unto himself, he has to enter into social relationship for his growth and development. Man is social, not by choice but by necessity. ⁽¹⁾ Society provides the appropriate environment for the development of personality and the fulfillment of life. This basic postulate of all social sciences, as enunciated by Aristotle, ⁽²⁾ can be safely applied

to International Relations as well. ⁽³⁾ Therefore, it can be said that international relations is of prime importance in the world society.

Like human relations, international relations between and among countries become significant particularly when the world is being referred as a global village. The relationship of nations carries implications not only in the relationship status of two or more countries but also generates a situation in the region. If the relationship is friendly, the atmosphere of the region remains filled with good oxygen which produces peace but if it is reverse, the entire environment becomes smoky and poisonous. Therefore, inter-national relationship is significant from all dimensions.

As no individual can live alone in the society, so the nations in the world and hence it becomes significant to study, understand and analyse the relationship that exists between and among the states. Foreign policy or so to say, that of foreign relations is the systematic activities evolved by communities for changing the behavior of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the international environment.⁽⁴⁾ In fact, all states have some kind of relation with one another and in their behavior they have a particular manner of self pattern.⁽⁵⁾ . International Relations as a field of study covers the factors and processes that affect the interactions among states and non-state actors across national boundaries.

In international relations, the interest of the countries which may be called national interest, are not identical. All the countries try to fulfill their national interest first and whenever there is any obstruction in the way, they come into conflict with one another. Therefore, we should take into account that in international interest, the element of conflict or conflict of interest is present in a very distinct way. It has rightly been said that international politics is the study of conflicts and interactions among the states of the world community. To Prof. Morgenthau, international politics is the struggle for, and use of, power among nations. ⁽⁶⁾ It should be stated that power denotes the quantity of

influence which the nations exert on the minds and actions of the people of one another. ⁽⁷⁾ In the same spirit, Sprout and Sprout defined international politics as those aspects of the interactions and relations of independent political communities in which some element of opposition, resistance and conflict of purpose or interest is present. ⁽⁸⁾ Going a step further, Thompson clearly stated that international politics is the study of rivalry among nations and the conditions and institutions which ameliorate or exacerbate these relationships. ⁽⁹⁾ Further, international Relations refer to the study of relationships between and among countries. It also includes the roles of sovereign states, inter-governmental organizations (IGO), international non-governmental organizations (INGO), non-governmental organizations (NGO), and multinational corporations (MNC). International relations is an academic and a public policy field, it can therefore be positive and normative, because it analyzes and formulates the foreign policy of a given State. International Relations as a field of study covers the factors and processes that affect the interactions among states and non-state actors across national boundaries.

International relations are therefore very significant from all respects. It is more important when the matter is related with two neighbouring countries. Naturally, India and Pakistan being close neighbours, the various dimensions of Indo-Pak relationship is significant from that point of view and also because of the fact of eternal conflicting issue of Kashmir, the bone of contention between the two countries. In fact, among the major problems in the bilateral relation between India and Pakistan, the Kashmir dispute has had a long record of bitterness and rivalry. Since the time of partition, the Kashmir issue is the main source of conflict between the two countries, viz. India and Pakistan. In fact, perhaps all sources of conflict between the two countries, is the issue of Kashmir, which has rightly been referred to as 'perennial problem' in the sub continent. In fact, India-Pakistan relations have been witnessing many upheavals in the history of their political evolution since 1947 not

allowing the winds of change to enter the sub continent to solve their long standing disputes over many issues and putting both of them in Shakespearean dilemma. ⁽¹⁰⁾ The major factors that may be attributed to the fact is perhaps candidly, both India and Pakistan considered to be the two giants of South Asia, have acquired strategic depth in their unending rivalry. For India, Pakistan has been and is still a troublesome but geopolitically important neighbor. It is a historical fact that the Indo-Pak conflictual relations are ipso fact a part of the legacy of the British colonial rule, yet their mutual antagonistic perceptions have posed the real threat on sovereignty and integrity and have also left a trail of bitterness between the two. ⁽¹¹⁾ It has rightly been said that the story of Indo-Pakistan relations has been a long series of discord and conflict. ⁽¹²⁾

It is pertinent to point out to one of the most important historical facts that the explosive character of the issues in Indian States was never forgotten by the Indian leaders and there were repeated appeals by them to the British Government to settle the matter in the seventy five days time they had at their disposal. ⁽¹³⁾

A BRIEF HISTORICAL SURVEY OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR

The northern most state of India, Kashmir has had always a chequered history. ⁽¹⁴⁾ The serenity of its beautiful vales and the freshness of its glades and gardens have time and again borne the traumatic pains of strife. It has been a grim witness to bloody invasions, tyranny perpetuated by its rulers through the passage of recorded history. ⁽¹⁵⁾

The State of Jammu and Kashmir, as the official name is, goes back to its modern and complex form to the past century (1846), when a small Prince, Gulab Singh, from the hilly country around Jammu got possession through the Treaty of Amritsar of Kashmir, because he had assisted the British in their fight against the Sikhs. ⁽¹⁶⁾ Let us try to find the genesis of the conflicts between India and Pakistan over Kashmir issue. If we turn the pages of history, it can be seen that in 1947, when

British India was partitioned into India and Pakistan, Hari Singh, the Maharaja of Kashmir and Jammu, a predominantly Muslim state, resisted the pressure to join either Pakistan or India hoping to get independence or autonomy from both countries. The problem of Kashmir arose because Maharaja Hari Singh was unable to make up his mind as to which dominion of the State of Kashmir should accede to or whether it accedes at all. ⁽¹⁷⁾ It was his objective to purchase time and to accomplish this goal; he signed a standstill agreement with Pakistan on August 16, and tried to sign a similar agreement with India. However, following the declaration of independence, communal rioting erupted in Punjab between the Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims when the state was being divided between India and Pakistan. But due to compelling situation, Singh signed the accord with India on October 26, 1947. The Instrument of Accession was accepted by the Governor General of India on October 27, 1947. The decision had the fullest support of Sheikh Abdullah. ⁽¹⁸⁾ and on the same day Indian armed forces entered Kashmir to repel the raiders. The local Muslims, mostly members of the National Conference provided the logistical support for the Indian troops. It was the beginning of the tension and crisis between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir issue.

Records of history show that Kashmir valley is a part of the old princely state of the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh until 26th October 1947. To be precise, currently the state of J&K is divided up between three countries, India has 45 percent, Pakistan has 35 percent, and China has 20 percent. So far as statistics are available, the figure of population of the Indian part of Kashmir is roughly nine millions of which six millions are Muslims. Out of the remaining, it consists mainly Hindus and the Buddhists. Geographically, in the Indian part, there are three distinct valleys which exhibit differing religious features: (a) The Kashmir valley comprises almost 96 percent Muslim; (b) In the Jammu valley, there are 66 percent Hindu; and (c) the Ladakh valley comprises 54 percent Buddhists.

Another cause of the tension between India and Pakistan has been Pakistan's denial regarding the agreement between Hari Singh and India. Unfortunately, regarding the agreement between Hari Singh and India, Pakistan denies that there was any agreement by which the Maharaja has agreed to join India. Whatever is said by Pakistan, it is a fact that "the treaty of accession" is a legal document whose merit was accepted by the United Nations. India's petition made on 30th October 1947 to settle this matter was duly honoured by the world body viz. the UNO. Further, the legality of the accession was accepted by one of the great powers of the world i.e. USA. The control of India over Jammu and Kashmir may again be reiterated by the statement of Mr. Warren Austin, the U.S Permanent Representative in the U.N, who said, on 4 February 1948 to the Security Council, " The external Sovereignty of Kashmir is no longer under the control of the Maharajah. With the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India this foreign sovereignty went over to India and that is why India happens to be here (Security Council) as a petitioner."

As per expert comments, the South Asia happens to be one of the insecure geographic regions of the world. It is the abode of more than one and a quarter billion people, which has one fifth of the world's total population. The major feature of this region is Poverty and illiteracy. Right from 1947, that is the birth of India and Pakistan, a very deep-rooted mistrust and hostility have always been a major factor that have strained the relations between the two states. The necessary fuel to this explosive and contradictory situation was provided by the disputes which remained unsolved in the time of partition. ⁽¹⁹⁾ We can easily trace that the problem has its origin in the partition of the British Empire in India along the religious line in 1947 between Muslims and non-Muslims. However, the fundamental premise of that partition, to separate out two warring factions, is yet to be fulfilled. The so-called Kashmir problem is the result of that unfulfilled task of the partition of the British India and hence it is really difficult to find an amicable solution to the long standing problem.

This led to the deterioration of the relationship of the two countries and it slipped from one problem to another resulting in a serious crisis in the bilateral relation of India and Pakistan. Between 1947 to 1955, the relationship touched the lowest point with several issues of which Kashmir was the most important. There is no denying the fact that the Kashmir war of 1948 led to further aggravation of the tensions between the two countries. From the point of view of international relations, it had also upset the balance of power in South Asia which served only the interest of the super powers. There was a competition to keep Pakistan on the toe of the super powers and tried to make Pakistan a puppet in their hands. As a result, the situation that prevailed, led to ongoing tension, conflict and contradiction in the pursuit of power structure. To a student of Political Science and International Relations, it would reveal that the dispute between the two countries had three major dimensions: the withdrawal of the plebiscite offer by India on Kashmir in the year 1956, the intervention of the world body viz. the UN in the Kashmir issue on the request of Pakistan and last but not the least, the Kashmir dispute as a major battle ground of the cold war between the two ever rival countries, that is India and Pakistan. By this time they have fought three full-scale wars in 1947, 1965 and in 1999. Apart from these three there have been a substantive number of border disputes and rivalry resulting in tension and disruption between the two countries. It is very difficult to say whether the fourth one is in the pipe line or not. There are a good number of conflicting issues between India and Pakistan but of them all, the Kashmir is the core issue that has decisively led to the deterioration of their relationship. There is no denying the fact that the disputed Kashmir State has assumed much strategic importance for both countries and has led to arms race between them resulting in a situation of cold war. Over the last six decades, a number of series of direct and indirect talks have been held between India and Pakistan to normalise the relationship for seeking a just solution of Kashmir dispute but none of the attempts have yet been successful.

As we see that even in the post-cold war era that has marked a

paradigm shift in the field of international relations from conflict to cooperation, there is yet no hopeful sign for a change in Pakistan-India relations. Instead, Pakistan and India have appeared more and more entrenched in acrimonious relationship. As a result, all efforts for bringing them closer and creating conducive environment in the region so that peace may prevail, has not been successful.

If we turn the pages of political process in the sub continent, it becomes clear that so long several attempts have been undertaken by the leaders of both the countries right from the time of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India till date. For example, the Composite Dialogue Process between Pakistan and India was initiated by Prime Minister of India, Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee and General Pervez Musharraf, President of Pakistan in January 2004. Out of the several issues that need to be solved, Kashmir issue was one of them which received a special attention. There is no denying the fact that although the process moved at a snail's pace and failed to solve any of the issues, it was termed as irreversible and identified by both the countries as sine qua non for establishing peace in the sub continent. Again, in July 2009, Prime Minister of India Manmohan Singh and the Prime Minister of Pakistan Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani, in a joint statement at Sharm-el-Sheikh, agreed to a "way forward in India-Pakistan relations" and de-linking peace talks from action against terrorism, but no headway has been made. But allegations and counter allegation, more from Pakistan side has continued. Prime Minister of Pakistan, Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani, observed that India is "not sincere in resuming composite dialogue", and attempts to "normalize relations between the two countries were being stalled."⁽²⁰⁾

But as students of Political Science and International Relations, what we feel is that both countries should realize that it is in their mutual interest and in the interest of the region as a whole to fight jointly against terrorists operating in each country to a lesser or greater degree, avoid blame-game, and negotiate for resolving, and not simply managing,

disputes. There is no alternative to resolving all issues including Kashmir and river waters, for the overall peace and progress of the region. It is said and believed that the key to an amicable solution of Kashmir issue lies in getting the Kashmiri leadership from both sides to come to a common platform and display flexibility to achieve a durable solution.

It is said that Pakistan itself is a victim of terrorism more than any other country in the world. The country is facing Mumbai like attacks almost every other day. The terrorists are attacking all conceivable places: hotels, mosques, educational institutions, playgrounds, bazaars, graveyards, funeral processions, political dignitaries, security personnel and installations that to date include the Naval Headquarters in Islamabad and the General Headquarters of the Army in Rawalpindi. The economic cost of the war against terror during the last eight years comes to US\$ 35 billion and has caused several thousand casualties of civilians, and members of police and armed forces; more than 3000 persons. In India also we find several terrorist activities which greatly endangered civilian life and peace of the general people and has caused many casualties. Therefore, all of us should be well concerned about the common problems that are prevailing in both the countries and perhaps one of the major reasons is definitely the Kashmir issue. The Kashmir issue has always remained a special case with regard to India and Pakistan. It came to India in 1947 in special circumstances and with special protection of its autonomy, guaranteed under Art. 370 of the Indian Constitution. ⁽²¹⁾ Again, Kashmir is special also because it is the main reason; perhaps the only real one why India and Pakistan continue to be enemies for so many years after the sub continent was divided by partition. It is special to Pakistan because it symbolizes the unfairness of a division, based on Islam, which left a Muslim majority state contiguous to Pakistan in India. As such it represents to Pakistan what is often described as ‘the unfinished business of partition’. ⁽²²⁾

It has rightly been pointed out that Kashmir has perhaps been the most important single factor in India’s foreign relations. ⁽²³⁾ It

has perpetually bedeviled relations between India and Pakistan since 1947. It is the single most important factor which brought the cold war to the Indian sub continent. Until 1962, it was the single most international issue which forced us to spend increasingly large amounts on defence, and after 1962, it has continued to be a major factor in our defence effort. Since the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971, it has been the only major political issue in Indo-Pakistan relations. ⁽²⁴⁾ There is no denying the fact that Kashmir remains to be the most important single issue that has spearheaded the problem and has threatened the peace process in the entire South Asian region in general and Kashmir in particular. As a result of the rivalry and confrontation between India and Pakistan, the innocent people of the two countries have already suffered the effects of three destructive wars resulting in innocent killing, waste of national resources and above all peace in the sub continent.

One hard reality is this which has perhaps rightly been pointed out that the Kashmir issue has entered deep into the veins of Pakistani people and no government in Pakistan, not even the one popularly elected government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had the courage to publicly accept the status quo and declare the dispute closed. ⁽²⁵⁾ In fact, Bhutto had to declare a thousand years' war against India on this issue. For India too, Kashmir came to represent more than history, geography and the ancestral home of the Nehru Family. It was a symbol of the legality of the treaties because Jammu and Kashmir joined the Indian union by an act of Accession signed by the ruler. It was a symbol of the democratic process because the elected government in the State confirmed the accession. It was a symbol of secularism and equal rights in the multi religious state. ⁽²⁶⁾

The negotiation between the two countries that have been undertaken so far and those in the pipe line is perhaps the only way to solve the long standing issue. It may be said that if the concerned parties are keen enough with sincerity to solve the issue and continue with the process of

negotiation by mutual trust and continue the dialogue to one another with mutual respect and honour and with an attitude of flexibility, the problem may definitely be solved. The gesture must contain the element of honesty and objectivity and above all, all of us must carry a good will in this regard and only then it can be asserted with a fair amount of certainty that it will not remain a vexed problem anymore and there is no reason to believe that it will still remain an unsolved problem because there is nothing in the world that cannot be solved. If the dialogue process is creatively sustained for a couple of years, it would deepen the existing conducive environment that can serve as a basis for conflict resolution. Without dispute resolution, it is difficult to imagine a durable peace and stability in the region. ⁽²⁷⁾ Actually, the Indo Pakistan relations over the decades have been mired by mutual apprehensions, mistrust and deliberately nurtured misunderstandings. ⁽²⁸⁾

There is a claim from the side of Pakistan that it has shown its willingness to move beyond conflict management and towards conflict resolution. It remains the core issue between Pakistan and India. It's just resolution can change the destiny of over one billion people of our region. If we try to analyse the view of Pakistan we find that they have claimed an amicable solution to the lingering problem which would also significantly contribute to international peace and security. To their view, to deny the fundamental rights especially the right to self-determination to the Kashmiri people is not fair. It is our firm belief that final disposition of the Kashmir dispute will be in accordance with the wishes and aspirations of Kashmiri people. Prime Minister Soomro expressed the hope that the spirit and flexibility showed by Pakistan will be reciprocated by India, which will open new vistas of cooperation and development of the two peoples. Abdul Qayyum said that the four-point suggestion of President Pervez Musharraf would be the first step towards the resolution of the Kashmir issue and this will release an air of peace in the region

We should also refer to the UN intervention with the Kashmir problem. The U.N Resolution of 13 August 1948, clearly asked Pakistan to vacate the areas it had occupied in October 1947, so that India can arrange a referendum. Pakistan did not abide by the UN Resolution and so far

refused to withdraw its troops and infiltrators. As an international strategy, to win the Chinese support, Pakistan gifted away 4853 sq km of the Kashmiri territory in the Shaksgam Valley to China in 1963, thus disrupting the territorial integrity of the State of J&K to a very great extent. China has occupied about 19 percent of the territory in 1962 and has obtained from Pakistan another 1 percent in the year 1963. It should be referred that for these violations the UN could not impose any sanction on Pakistan, as the Resolution was not under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which is non-binding in character.

SUMMING UP

To the students of political Science, the history of Indo-Pakistan relations is like a great puzzle and riddle. Both the states are like north pole and south pole because it is really strange to trace that the relationship between the two countries are marked by differences and conflicts on almost every important issue. It is really difficult to trace a single issue where both the countries hold the same opinion and think in one line. India and Pakistan have invariably pursued paths which in essence were contradictory to each other and sometimes even ran counter to the dictates of logic and reality. ⁽²⁹⁾ It is a reality that India and Pakistan have failed to maintain a congenial and harmonious relationship. Rather, it is discernible that the relationship has steadily drifted towards a tragic exercise and a preparation for cold war and has led to the brink of violent outbreak of tension, rivalry and even wars. It is high time that we should concentrate on this phenomenon and make a closer study, analyse and try to find a real solution of the problem without allowing the problems to continue so that the ugly demon of war may not appear in between the two countries. Analysis has to be made in the context of historical background, size of the country, economic and human resource bases, actual power positions, broad national interests, the ideological differences. It may be said that so far all these factors have been either misread or ignored which has allowed indirectly increasing the tension

areas between the two countries. The mistrust between the two countries has added fuel to the fire of relationship and as a result, the relations between India and Pakistan have slipped from one crisis to another.

The history of Pak-India relations is a testimony to the fact that without resolving the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir, the confidence building measures (CBMs) and improvement of relations would prove to be fragile and even short-lived. An amicable solution to the lingering problem would also significantly contribute to international peace and security. It is perhaps a historical fact that history of conflict and strained relationship between India and Pakistan revolved round Jammu and Kashmir and there is no denying the fact that without resolving the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir, the confidence building measures (CBMs) and improvement of relations shall prove to be fragile and even short-lived. The peace process perhaps has to move beyond the CBMs, which are largely a means towards an end and certainly not an end.

What we have seen from the last sixty years with regard to Kashmir, there is lack of sincerity and will. Innocent killings, hartals, curfews have paralysed our life and there is no future and hope. In every conference, domestic and international, foreign ministers meet, in Prime Ministers meet, dining halls, scholars' hostels, school assemblies and even in shops, Kashmir issue is discussed and is swallowed like a banana and grapes and everyone is tasting it with his own taste but none cares and no one comes in front to resolve it. ⁽³⁰⁾ It is admitted by all that terrorism has disturbed the peace process in both the countries and the issue of terrorism should be handled with a firm hand otherwise, 'PEACE' will remain to be a golden mirage that can never be achieved.

It is also pertinent to note that the disturbance that continues to exist in the sub continent also has a major international dimension and this has an effect on the economic development of the region. Major

powers like the US, Japan, EU, China, Russia and Canada, who are eager to promote investment and trade relations with the countries of South Asia are held back due to the uncertain prospects of security in the region. It has greatly affected the rapid economic progress of the region without which the menace of terrorism cannot be eliminated. The most distinctive feature of a democratic government is that it is more responsive to the needs of the people. The prime requirement of the people of South Asia is peace, security, development and progress so that they are able to get rid from the jaws of grinding poverty. But due to continued disturbance, it has become really difficult to come out of the situation. The enormous costs of India-Pakistan tensions and conflict are apparent to all; the mounting defence budgets are only one tangible aspect of this cost which has often been cited. ⁽³¹⁾ It has catapulted one dimension that even if today both the countries are involved in conflict, the defence budget will continue to be heading to higher to higher and this will definitely leave a negative aspect on the development process of both the countries. Another important dimension is the cost of the tension which is rising each and every day. At this juncture, it will be gross underestimation of the wisdom of the national leaders of India and Pakistan to presume that they are not aware of these costs: if they still find it difficult to agree on Kashmir and other problems. It is obviously because according to their calculations, is easier and better to bear the costs of India-Pakistan tension than to have the problems resolved which are detrimental to their respective interests. ⁽³²⁾

The million dollar question at this point is: what could be the solution to resolve this conflict? Rajesh Basrur provided three alternatives: First, keep the conflict over Kashmir on the backburner and improve relations in other areas- similar to the India China relationship. Second, divide Kashmir. But better still would be third option: To begin with the first approach and then move gradually to the second. For all we know with the successful confidence building measures, the second option might turn out to be redundant. ⁽³³⁾

Pakistan demands for associating the Kashmiri's with the peace process to enable all sides to reach a mutually acceptable and sustainable solution. Despite the enormity and magnitude of the task involved, as Pakistan maintained, we are firmly committed to the peace process and would not be found lacking in our resolve for the resolution of all outstanding issues with India, including the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir.

It may be said that till date the peace process has achieved progress only on the CBMs front; but so far as the area of conflict resolution is concerned, with a view to achieve 'peace' in the sub continent, Pakistan and India have not been able to secure any tangible success. Neither of the two countries has even inked agreements on Siachen and Sir Creek, although, reportedly, major differences over these two issues have been removed. Again, from the practical point of view, there has been no forward movement on Kashmir, despite the fact that the two sides have exchanged a number of ideas and proposals on the settlement of the long standing issue of dispute. In spite of the Indian Prime Minister's observation that Kashmir has never been so intensively discussed between Pakistan and India as under the on-going Composite Dialogue Process notwithstanding, in practical terms, there is no change either in the on-ground situation in Kashmir or in the traditional Indian position on the issue. Therefore we can well understand the present scenario of this long standing problem.

It is needless to mention that since partition, India-Pakistan relations have highly been violent and conflict prone and an agent for the release of tensions. Besides three wars, nuclear explosions, Kargil crisis and other gruesome incidents such as shooting of Pakistan's Navy aircraft, demolishing of Babri Mosque, brutal killings of innocent Muslims in Indian Gujrat and constant killings in occupied Kashmir have added multiple dangerous dimensions to Pakistan-India relations. It has not only sparked fire but also has given the temperature to be felt on the body politic. It may therefore be noted that the CBMs are supposed to create trust between rival parties for the management and

resolution of conflicts but in case of India and Pakistan, the absence of trust is the basic hindrance for the successful implementation of CBMs. It is well nigh impossible to deny the fact that there exists basic mistrust and suspicion between India and Pakistan on historical, religious, cultural and political grounds. Keeping in view the past record, it appears that the CBM exercise cannot be very successful in South Asia, particularly between India and Pakistan. It is imperative that there is a consensus in both countries for having close and cooperative relations and a framework for enduring peace. It is well understood that the general people want **'peace'** and in order to achieve this, mutual approach to the common problem is sine qua non.

It should be referred that perhaps the Indian Foreign Policy has failed to convince many countries about Indian sovereignty on the entire J&K. Many countries even friendly to India maintain that the entire state of J&K is a disputed territory. Such an opinion is hold by the USA and many other countries of the world.

A reference may be made to the Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh: In a reaction to PPP co-chairman Asif Ali Zardari's interview to an Indian newspaper in which he reportedly called for a new approach to deal with the Kashmir issue and argued that the two countries cannot remain a hostage for another generation to that intractable conflict, Manmohan Singh has felt upbeat and hoped a new era in Indo-Pakistan relations was about to begin. Further, on September 13, 2010 the Cabinet Committee on Security chaired by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh accepted that 'trust deficit' and 'governance deficit' were among others, two biggest problems affecting J&K. Therefore, it is high time to take up all these dimensions to give adequate care to this burning problem.

The sentiments may however go a long way in seeking a qualitative change in approach held by the two sides on unresolved issues for the last six decades. It is important to note that there has definitely been a change of attitude of both the countries in the true sense of the term and

this change of attitude might work and bring a solution to the long standing problem between India and Pakistan and winds of 'peace' might blow and the people of both the countries may inhale problem free, tension free breath and this will find a solution to the vexed problem which will not only be a boon to the region but world politics at large.

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Pakistan and India locked in Kashmir dispute: What's the way out?

Maria Inayat

Research Fellow at Media Sniffers

Email: mariaainayat@gmail.com

*(I am an ambitious and hard working person. I am eager to learn and desirous of exploring new avenues. I am Islamabad based researcher. Along with these abilities I am continuously working over Kashmir issue with various organizations for the resolution of this issue. I am also writing in Pakistan based newspaper "The Frontier Post" my recently published article is "**Balochistan Achilles heel of Pakistan**".*

Qualification:

Bachelors of Computer Science (BSCS)

Sustainable Peace and Development Organization (SPADO)

Did internship at SPADO in Islamabad from July 2010 to December 2010

Media Sniffers:

Working at this organization as research fellow from almost two years i.e. 2011 to present.)

Abstract:

Pakistan and India are clearly seen locked in the Kashmir Dispute since Independence. It is an open secret that in the early years of Independence both India and Pakistan have played a cold game in solving this Issue but today the solution of this issue has become the matter of world peace. Many resolutions have been presented on this issue to the date not only by both the state leaders but also by the International community. But now we have to take new turn and adopt new strategies to resolve this issue. New models of strategies have been given in this paper by the adoption of these models it can be assumed that Kashmir issue could be resolved peacefully and during formulating the solutions it has been taken into consideration that either of the states don't remain at disadvantageous position.

Historical Background:

The history of Kashmir shouts out to 1849 when the beautiful Valley of Kashmir was sold out to the Hindu Dogra Ruler Ghulab Singh under the treaty of Amritsar. A century later in 1947 the emergence of India and Pakistan as free Independent states led Maharaja Hari Singh the Great

Grand Son of Ghulab Singh into Great Pressure and Hari Singh couldn't make a timely decision of joining the dominion of India or Pakistan.¹ The state lived Independent for almost two months unless Maharaja's design of separate rule over Kashmir was challenged by the Pathan tribe's of Pakistan with assistance from a young Kashmiri Mohammad Ibrahim Khan who laid the foundation for an Armed Liberation Movement against the Independency of Kashmir.² When the tribesmen from Pakistan's North West frontier invaded the state at this hour Maharaja immediately pledged to Indian for Government help which was provided to him on the terms of Kashmir over help. He then finally decided to join India under a Treaty of Accession a document which termed accessing Kashmir legally as a part of India, this decision was immediately contested by Pakistan on the basis of state's majority Muslim population^{xl}. Since then Kashmir has become the pivot point of an acute regional dispute between India and Pakistan. Kashmir has been fought on twice by these bitter rivals both on battle field and negotiating tables.³

Reasons of Disputes:

The Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan is no doubt the focal point around which the normalization of the relations of two countries can begin. When discussing the Kashmir dispute the Kargil Conflict cannot be left unattended.⁴ The Kargil Conflict lays its roots on the Kargil district of Kashmir between May to June 1999.⁵ India's territorial integrity has never been threatened as seriously by the 1971 military conflict as it has been threatened by Pakistan's Intrusions along the Line of Control into the Kargil District of Kashmir, This scenario had led the Indian. Military to launch "Operation Vijay" (Anti-Kargil) to regain the Pakistan occupied territory. We can clearly say that one of the main reasons of Pakistani Army's intrusion in Kargil was to re-capture a part of Siachen glacier.⁶

Siachen glacier lies between the Karakoram Range, beyond the Ladakh range Defining Siachen, despite the severe climate means "The Land of Wild Roses" .Siachen cover's a total of 10000 square kilometers uninhabited area.⁷ The glacier in height is said to be nearly 23000 feet. This area is claimed to be a part of India under the Karachi agreement of 1949 which states the cease fire line (NJ-9842) to Saltoro Ranges and beyond. This area reaches up to the Shaksgam Valley (Chinese territory) which was unilaterally handed over by Pakistan to China.NJ-9842 is the northern most demarcated point of India-Pakistan cease fire line beyond this point no military forces had ever been deployed there until Pakistan started sending mountaineering expeditions to the Siachen Glacier and

peaks around it meanwhile the Indian intelligence reports disclosed Pakistan's plan of Occupying the Siachen glacier by sending troops there.⁸ This thought was pre-empted by the Indian Army with the launch of there "Operation Mehgdoot" in 1984 and occupied the heights of Saltoro Range to which Pakistan answered in the form of "Operation Abadeel" resulting in converting the point NJ-9842 to Actual Ground Position Line of both the military forces. Siachen has never been an easy task for the troops apart from the cross battling the harsh weather leaves no stone unturned in testing the courage and patience of the troops.⁹

So far many lives have been lost and the solution could now also lead to a nuclear war unlike the wars of 1948, 1965 and 1971. This one could be lot more destructive and devastating for both the countries.¹⁰ The question that emerges after studying the above conflicts is should India or Pakistan again goes for a war over Kashmir? Seeing all the probabilities my answer would be "NO".¹¹ As war wouldn't be able to provide any kind of solution as if it could, it would have been proven effective in the previous three wars.¹² Today the Kashmir conflict is seeing entering its 65th year but the problem still remains rigid and it cannot be solved unless Kashmir is not stopped using as a political mileage by both sides.¹³

Possible ways by which issue can be resolved:

From the above mentioned discussion it is very obvious to observe that Kashmir has become a big puzzle for both the states. International community is also not showing its deep interest regarding this issue due to the knavish and immature behavior of both states. If both the states are really inclined towards the resolution of this issue then they should give importance to this issue before international community and should involve them regarding the resolution of this issue.

a) Dialogues or Negotiations:

After conducting the careful research of entire Kashmir dispute it can be deduced that both the states have been trapped in this area for a very long time. Both the states have been using their traditional means to resolve this issue but the results are bringing them nothing. It can be seen that in past both states tried to initiate dialogues but unfortunately they couldn't achieve their goals due to the interference of military leadership of both the states. Dialogues and negotiations are the only peaceful way for gaining positive results In this regard both the states are required to do dialogue without the involvement of military

leadership and keeping the Kashmir's as a priority with fair intentions.

b) Need Of a Bilateral Treaty:

It is open secret that significance of Kashmir is due to its resources like water etc. There is a vital need of bilateral treaty among both the states to enhance confidence in order to acquire the peace. Pakistan is passing through a very critical situation like terrorism issues, energy issues and lack of resources etc. Keeping in view situation of Pakistan it cannot be admitted that Pakistan will compromise on Kashmir issue without the presence of such kind of a treaty which will give confidence to Pakistan that will fulfill its need of water by the virtue of this treaty. This sort of treaty should be specific to the water resources which should have the capability to address the apprehensions of both states.

Independent Kashmir:

Thinking of Kashmir as an Independent state surely has a lot potential. This requires both India and Pakistan to give up the territory which does not sound keen to both the parties to which free and fair plebiscite can surely help. The acquirement of land from both the sides can create a smaller independent Kashmir leaving both India and Pakistan with their strategically important regions and Kashmir's with a land they can term as their own.

d) Kashmir for Kashmiri's:

It is of no doubt that the Kashmir Issue after 67 years demands a justifiable and peace promoting solution. Surveying the current condition of both the rivalry states India and Pakistan they require to place Kashmir as a priority in their solution and to think on promoting Kashmir for the Kashmir's thought as they deserve this land the most weather as its Inhabitants or as the trauma of war they have faced in the past so many years on their home land. The two state issues' can be worked out by the surrender game by both India and Pakistan leaving Kashmir for the Kashmir's to live.

e) Live and Let Live agenda:

It is by now open to all that the Kashmir conflict is not only contended to India or Pakistan it is a matter of world peace which

cannot be gained without the stability of Kashmir. Kashmir has been facing human rights violation since long which has not being noticed or acted upon by the International community and has been put on the back burner by them. This land has absorbed in it many tears of the brutal killings and violence in it hence It now requires justice in the form of peace. This will not weaken any of both the Nations but will also show its humanitarian aspects.

f) Eradication Of Military Hegemony:

If we consult the history of relationships of India and Pakistan then we come to know that military of both sides always had played very important role in relations between both the states. Because if we try to solve this issue by keeping in view the opinions of military leadership then we never would get fruitful results because military personals are designed to have aggression in their-selves. Keeping in view this notion we should eradicate completely military hegemony from the space of elite decision making this kind of thing could brought us at the logical political solution that would be proved better not only for both the states as well as for region and whole globe.

g) Factor of Trust Building:

The eradication of the Kashmir Conflict needs a solution which covers the previous mistrust issues of both the state's India and Pakistan. It weather be the effects of Kargil conflict or the Siachen issue both the states need to show confidence and act of maturity in their solution hunt which is totally impossible without both the states showing faith in one another.

h) Joint Rule over Kashmir:

The idea of Joint Rule of Kashmir has always been questioned in the International community because international community is of the view that this kind of proposal is impossible because it goes with the idealistic approach. But by the implementation of this proposal both states can fulfill their urge to rule over Kashmir allowing Kashmiri's to remain settled in their homeland.

i) Fair Divide:

Fairly dividing the Kashmir boundaries is not an easy thought but can result as an effective one. Kashmir can be worked on the

formula of divided by two for both India and Pakistan giving Pakistan an assurance of protection of its major source of water there and India the part of land it has fought so many years to have. This thought is above the India and Pakistan benefit but is also applicable to the justice of Kashmiri's as they would be given the choice to choose the land they accept to live in, A Muslim boundary or an Indian square. This would be quite justifiable solution to both the nations which have been striving for Kashmir as their land for years now.

Conclusion:

From all the above mentioned discussion it can be concluded that past initiatives of peace that would be started in order to make relations of both the states smooth had been destroyed. Now we should move for new solutions because with the passage of time problems also have become new. The above mentioned solutions are totally new solutions by adopting them the issue of Kashmir can be solved both the states can unknit this issue in order to adopt new given solutions. Both the states are just ruining their economy but due to the resolution of this issue both the states can prosper in positive direction, which will not only improve their economy but also bring stability and peace not only in between both the states but also at regional level as well as at global level.

These solutions can work as an effective and peaceful remedy to the harsh problem providing justice to both the states but the basic need is to solve the issue for both the states is to work maturely. Above given solutions can be implemented without paying injustice to the Kashmiris.

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10. Pakistan's Nuclear Policy :

Pakistan's Nuclear Policy and Its threat Perceptions

Dr Shalini Chawla

Senior Fellow

Centre for Air Power Studies

New Delhi

E-mail: shaluchawla@yahoo.com

(Dr Shalini Chawla is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS), New Delhi. She was a research scholar at IDSA, 1999-2002. She worked as a freelance defence analyst from 2003-2005 in Colombo, Sri Lanka. She joined CAPS in 2006 and focus of her studies is Pakistan, Afghanistan. Currently, she is the Project Director for the CAPS project – “Pakistan and Afghanistan: Present and Future”.

She is also a project head for an ICSSR project titled - Afghanistan: The US withdrawal and Beyond.

She has published widely in national and international journals relating to defence and security issues. Her publications have covered a wide range of issues including – Pakistan Army, Navy and the Air Force, Pakistan's defence spending and arms procurements, Pakistan's political, social and economic dynamics.

*She has authored two books titled - **Pakistan's Military and Its Strategy (2009) and Nuclear Pakistan (2012)***

*Her forthcoming book is titled – **Pakistan Military and the Counterinsurgency Strategy (2014)**.*

Pakistan's defence planners have essentially relied on the nuclear weapons for the security and ultimate survivability of the state. Nuclear weapons have been a shield for Pakistan which has facilitated it to conduct covert war against India without the fear of Indian retaliation, for more than two decades now. Nuclear weapons have been for war prevention (conventional) in case of Pakistan, which has deterred India from initiating any action in response acts of terror.

The basic assumption behind the nuclear weapons has been that it will not only guard Islamabad against the external aggression from the immediate, but, would also protect its ideological identity as the only Muslim nation possessing nuclear weapons. However, the most imperative rationale behind the build up of the nuclear weapons has been Pakistan's desire to at best match India's military superiority if not neutralise it strategically. Perceived threat from India has perpetually dominated defence planning in Pakistan. On the other hand, even with the deep sense of insecurity and perceptible Indian conventional superiority Pakistan launched three wars against India and its sense of insecurity deepened with experience of defeat in each of the wars.

The basic rationale for Pakistan acquiring nuclear weapons has been its expectations to neutralise India's perceived conventional military superiority and the way it was employed by it in the 1971 War. Former Foreign Minister Agha Shahi referred to it as the "Sword of Damocles" hanging over Pakistan's head, when stating the objectives of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, he said:

" to equalise, to compensate our military imbalance that hangs like a sword of Damocles over the head of the nation which cut our country into two in 1971".

G.Parthasarathy, former Indian ambassador to Pakistan holds a similar view:

"Pakistan decided to acquire nuclear weapons not because India had nuclear weapons, but because its ruling elite believed that after the dismemberment of the country during the Bangladesh conflict, it needed such weapons because of India's size and conventional superiority." ¹

In this respect Pakistan adopted a doctrine and strategy not very different from that pursued by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) against the USSR. Pakistan visualised nuclear weapons as the sole guarantor of its national pride and national survival, and thus

started to seek Chinese assistance for its nuclear weapon programme in the late 1960s in the aftermath of the US sanctions. Nuclear weapons for Pakistan were seen as a means to neutralise Indian conventional military superiority, and also a projection of its scientific and technological capabilities. In addition, it has perceived nuclear weapons capability as a “currency of power” which would enhance its strategic image in the international community in general and Muslim countries in particular.

Pakistan’s strategy includes its deep desire to emerge as a formidable country of the Muslim world and to be visualised as the *leader of the Islamic world*. Bhutto in his death cell testimony stressed:

“.....We were on the threshold of full nuclear capability when I left the government to come to this death cell. We know that Israel and South Africa have full nuclear capability. The Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilisations have this capability. The Communist powers also possess it. Only the Islamic civilisation was without it; but that position was about to change”.²

In its pursuit of nuclear power status Pakistan did have financial support from Saudi Arabia and Libya and eventually it did share nuclear data and expertise with Iran, Libya and Iraq. Pakistan believed that once it was able to achieve a nuclear weapons capability, demand for Pakistani skilled manpower and technology would go up in the oil-rich Muslim countries. In return, Pakistan would have easier access to the oil wealth of West Asian nations to fulfil its needs for technological development.³ Pakistan’s appeal for financial assistance for the acquisition of nuclear bomb for the ‘sake of Islam’ was a strong emotional appeal for the Muslim world. Pakistan started receiving significant financial support from the Arab world by mid 1970s. By mid 1976 five Arab countries and Iran had provided grants and loans worth nearly \$ 1,000. million. In a matter of three years (between 1973-74 and 1976-77), the Muslim countries ranked first in the list of aid donors to

Pakistan. ⁴ This fact holds significance in the present context when Saudi Arabia claims to acquire nuclear weapons from Pakistan. ⁵

For over more than six decades Pakistan's foreign and security policies have revolved around how to balance and counter the Indian "threat". The managers of Pakistan's security policy have addressed this dilemma by adopting two classical approaches:

- (i) Alliance with major powers to acquire high technology defence capability and (ii) since the 1960s, nuclear deterrence to offset India's conventional superiority. ⁶

Lt Gen Sardar F. S Lodhi, clearly stated the need for the nuclear weapons in the wake of Pakistan's weak conventional build up as compared to India: ⁷

"During any future Indo-Pak armed conflict India's numerical superiority in men and conventional arms is likely to exert pressure beyond endurance. In a deteriorating military situation when an Indian conventional attack is likely to break through our defences or has already breached the main defence line causing a major set-back to the defences, which cannot be restored by conventional means at our disposal, the government would be left with no other option except to use Nuclear Weapons to stabilize the situation. India's superiority in conventional arms and manpower would have to be offset by nuclear weapons. The political will to use nuclear weapons is essential to prevent a conventional armed conflict, which would later on escalate into a nuclear war."

Pakistan's perception of threat which formed the basis of its nuclear will undoubtedly continue to dominate its nuclear strategy and force build-up. In the aftermath of the nuclear tests in 1998 Pakistan's primary concern, to maintain a *credible minimum nuclear deterrence* against India's conventional and nuclear threat is unlikely to change in future.

Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine

In the pre-nuclear test period Pakistan's doctrine was that of ambiguity. Although,

Pakistan even today does not have an officially announced doctrine, statements made by responsible policy makers in Pakistan have clearly outlined basic elements in its nuclear doctrine. There is an unofficial code adopted by the Pakistani leadership, based on *Indo-centricity*, *credible minimum deterrence*, *strategic restraint* and *first use*. Very interestingly and rather ironically, the code asserts on the principles of peaceful programme revolving more around maintaining a balance against the Indian force build up, but it includes making a first strike in response to not only a conventional attack by India but also a posed threat from India.

Indo-centric

Pakistan has build up its defence capability highlighting the perception of threat from India. Threat perceptions in Pakistan forming the core of the defence policies, and the military strategy have remained India-centric. India remained a primary factor on the military's national security agenda and this has made the military more important than any other player in Pakistan. Pakistan's nuclear doctrine and strategy has been formulated solely around the assumed Indian threat of conventional war and its nuclear use doctrine is India specific.

Minimum Nuclear Deterrence

This is one of the basic tenets of Pakistan's nuclear doctrine. The concept of credible minimum deterrence is not based specifically on the numbers but it is the weapon arsenal including the nuclear weapons, delivery systems, command and control and the doctrine and strategy, based on the perceived threat perception from India. Credible minimum deterrent

force intends to build a minimum force capable of inflicting nuclear destruction on India.

The term 'minimum' begs definition and can be interpreted differently by the states. It is unclear that Pakistan has actually quantified deterrence and minimum for Pakistan would be based on the calculation of threat owing to the numbers of the nuclear weapons and missile systems with India.

First Use Doctrine

Pakistan has long held the belief that being the weaker state it can compensate that weakness by taking a bold initiative, preferably with strategic surprise, to attack Indian military capability and thus reduce the adverse margin of capabilities. This was its military strategy it practiced in all the wars it waged against India including the last one which was a regular war in Kargil in 1999 and more important the war through terrorism across the border for quarter century. The specific concentration of terrorism in the border districts in Punjab west of River Beas were clearly aimed at similar goals. Seen in context of this strategic mind set, it is not surprising it has adopted a nuclear doctrine of "First Use". In fact, it has often claimed that it would/could use nuclear weapon at the very beginning of the war with India if the Indian military even crossed the international border.

The need for Pakistan to maintain this position of first use is further exacerbated with India's assertion that the possibility of the conventional confrontation is not ruled out even in the nuclear environment. This obviously creates disturbances within Pakistan because it stands in contrast to Pakistan's rationale for the nuclear weapons which is to deter India from using conventional force against them.⁸ To deter India from using conventional force, Pakistan holds the position of first use, in case, it "feels" the need.

Possibility of Pre-emption

Pakistan's obsessive reliance on the doctrine of first use policy seems to be emerging from two factors. First, Pakistan wants to keep an option open for "Pre-emptive nuclear strikes" against India and it is convinced that its pre-emptive strikes would lead to the destruction of India's retaliatory capabilities and/or paralyse the Indian political decision-making. Secondly, Pakistan has failed to consider the consequences of the Indian retaliation. Pakistan seems to assume that India would not use nuclear weapons against it even after getting hit. Assumption related to India's strategic culture could be one of the pressing reasons for Pakistani assumption which seems to be intensified with India's non-reactive approach (with the conventional means) towards the Pakistan sponsored terrorist attacks.

The scenarios in which Pakistan would opt for nuclear weapons have been spelled out by Pakistani elites and cultivated the posture of irrational rationality to try and enhance the effect of this posture. Lt Gen. Khalid Kidwai, the head of the Strategic Planning Division in Pakistan's Nuclear Command and Control system, in 2002, in an interview to the Italian journalists, claimed that "nuclear weapons would be used only "if the very existence of Pakistan as a state is at stake". But he went on to state that Pakistan would definitely use nuclear weapons in case the deterrence fails and:

1. If India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory (space threshold);
2. If India destroys a large part either of Pakistan's land or air forces (military threshold);
3. If India proceeds to the economic strangling of Pakistan (economic strangling);
4. If India pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or creates large-scale internal subversion in Pakistan (domestic destabilization).⁹

The last two elements based on economic strangulation and domestic destabilization, cannot be seen in isolation and it would not be incorrect to say that these vaguely draw vast parameters which can potentially include various steps taken up by the Indian government in the wake of acute tension or conventional confrontation. Peter Lavoy said that these two elements are “offshoots or preludes to a conventional war that India might undertake”.¹⁰

Kidwai’s outlined scenarios create ample amount of uncertainty by covering a wide range of situations and potential actions by India during crisis. It is basically to deter India from any action, military, economic or diplomatic, which could hurt Pakistan in any form.

Objective of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons is to deter any form of Indian military response and thus Pakistan has deliberately adopted a posture of irrationality. Pakistani leadership is convinced that they have managed to deter India with their posture of irrationality and uncertainty, more than once. This interpretation obviously came out very clearly in President’s Musharraf’s December 2002 statement. Although Musharraf did not specify the nuclear threat in his speech to the army corps union in Karachi, but he said that he was ready to take a decision and act during the 2002 crisis:

“In my meetings with various world leaders, I conveyed my personal message to Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee that the moment Indian forces cross the Line of Control and the international border, then they should not expect a conventional war from Pakistan. I believe my message was effectively conveyed to Mr. Vajpayee.”¹¹

Weapon of last resort

Most of the Pakistani writings pre 1998 pointed towards build up of the nuclear capability against the Indian conventional forces and thus, implied its first use. But there seems to be a shift in the Pakistani thinking regarding the use of nuclear weapons and adoption of a

relatively moderate stand by claiming nuclear weapons as the “weapon of last resort”.

President Pervez Musharraf in May, 2002, said that if it came to war between the nuclear-armed rivals, he would "respond with full might." These statements were interpreted to mean that if pressed by an overwhelming conventional attack from India, which has superior conventional forces, Pakistan might use its nuclear weapons. Similar interpretation can be drawn from Pakistan's defence Minister Rao Sikander's statement when he said : “The country's ultimate security lies in the use of atom bomb; it is not a mere show piece”

Pakistan perceives nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantee of its security and national survival but has not been very clear in defining the red lines and the scenarios which could lead to its first use. Abdul Sattar (former Pakistan Foreign Minister), Agha Shahi and Zulfiqar Ali Khan jointly authored an article in *The News* on October 5, 1999, which stated:¹²

“the exigency under which Pakistan army may use nuclear weapons is spelt out as :‘Although the precise contingencies in which Pakistan may use nuclear weapons have not been articulated or even defined by the government, the assumption has been that if the enemy launches a war and undertakes a piercing attack to occupy large territories or communications junctions, the *weapon of last resort* would have to be invoked.”

In April 2002, in an interview published in the German magazine, *Der Spiegel*, Musharraf said :

“ If the pressure on Pakistan becomes too great then as a last resort, the [use of] atom bomb is also possible,”¹³

Musharraf's statement of last resort was made in 2002 and in the same period in his address to army Corps Union in Karachi, he said

that war with India was averted due to his repeated warnings for using nuclear weapons in case of India breaching the red lines. There is contradiction in Pakistan's stance where on one side it claims to use its nuclear weapons as a last resort and on the other side is convinced that the threat of nuclear weapons was successful in deterring Indian military posture.

Weapon of last resort can be logically interpreted towards the scenario where no other means are left with the nation to defend itself. In case of a conventional war between India and Pakistan, if Pakistan's military reserves are destroyed than it may not have the capacity to defend itself and rather than loosing war it would opt to use nuclear weapons against India. Pakistan's use of nuclear weapon even if it is as last resort would face Indian retaliation which talks about "unacceptable damage". Although, the weapon of last resort option stands in contradiction of Pakistan's earlier statements and appear moderate, but on the other hand, it also projects a mind set for self destruction, where complete destruction of the nation is preferred over all other possible options.

Nuclear Policy based on Restraint and Responsibility

In the last few years, Pakistan's endeavour has been to project itself as a *responsible* nuclear power. The need to do so was exacerbated with India and the US signing the nuclear deal. Pakistan has been keen for a similar nuclear agreement with the US and thus, projection of a responsible nuclear posture became inevitable. In 2006, Lt Gen. Khalid Kidwai in his address to the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey said that Pakistan has dealt with formidable challenges by developing a nuclear policy based on 'restraint and responsibility' with four silent features:

“(1) deterrence of all forms of external aggression; (2) ability to deter a counterstrike against strategic assets; (3) stabalization of strategic

deterrence in South Asia; and (4) conventional and strategic deterrence methods.”

Looking into Pakistan’s stance on nuclear weapons numerous contradictions can be seen. It talks about use of nuclear weapons as last resort, with restraint and responsibility. Obviously, last resort has not been defined by Pakistan and thus creates uncertainty, which enhances deterrence and thus serves Pakistani objectives. It would not be incorrect to state that ***Pakistan has very rationally adopted the posture of irrationality.***

Conclusion

The central strategic assumption of the Pakistan nuclear strategy has been that India cannot impose a conventional war against Pakistan leave alone achieve a decisive victory without the risk of catastrophic consequence of Pakistan’s nuclear attack. Pakistani leadership believes that Pakistan’s possession of the nuclear arsenal and the

first use policy would be sufficient to deter war. This logic in Pakistan has been reinforced by the common Pakistani perception that it was able to deter Indian military action on various occasions after highly provocative terrorist attacks, including the most recent one in 2008. Despite the fact that war was narrowly averted in 2002 Pakistani leadership seems to be very confident of its strategy against India.

This element in Pakistan’s grand strategy has encouraged Pakistan to enhance its capability to wage and escalate the covert war in Kashmir, as nuclear weapons were believed to deter India from responding with conventional military retaliation. Policy-makers in Pakistan seem to be convinced that they will be able to carry on, or rather accelerate, their activities in Kashmir and the rest of India (like the terrorist strike at Mumbai on 26/11) with the threat of use of nuclear weapons if required and this would control India’s strategic moves in the Valley. This process seems to have grown with Pakistan’s “first use policy”.

Pakistan has built up long-range nuclear missile capability in order to pose a political-psychological threat to India as part of its nuclear doctrine and strategy. The Cold Start doctrine and deployments and the concept of limited war raised serious doubts about the viability of Pakistan's cherished strategy of covert war and nuclear strike. Pakistan tested Hatf-9 (NASR) , short range surface-to-surface multi-tube missile in 2011. According to Pakistani policy makers, Hatf-9, which belongs to the category of Tactical Nuclear Weapons, is their counter to India's Cold Start doctrine which envisions limited conventional response from the Indian side in response to a sub-conventional attack on India originating from the Pakistani territory.

In the recent times, there have been signs that the Pakistani elites are increasingly conscious of the major limitations of the doctrine and strategy that Pakistan has assumed, since Indian strategic experts are talking of being able to exploit the strategic space above terrorism but below the nuclear threshold to enable punitive force being applied to change the covert war strategies and policy in Islamabad which would make its nuclear weapons capability unusable without horrendous costs to itself.

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Pakistan's Nuclear Policy and its Threat Perception

Ali Raza

Email ID: razaali566@gmail.com

*(Currently lecturer at **AIR University**, Islamabad. Also writes on regular basis for **The Frontier Post**, a leading newspaper of Pakistan. His researched articles have also been published in **Eurasia Review**. He has also worked as researcher for **Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate (ACDA), Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Pakistan**. Also works for various Islamabad based think tanks.*

ACADEMIC QUALIFICATION

M.Sc. in Strategic and Nuclear Studies (National Defense University, Islamabad)

Studied Scenario Building; Non-Proliferation Regimes; Economics of Defence; Traditional & Non-traditional Security Paradigms; Peace Movement; Global Terrorism; Strategic Stability; Indo-Pak Relations; Introduction to warfare; Introduction to Nuclear Technology; Arms Control & Disarmament; Theories of IR, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy; Nuclear Weapons in Contemporary International System; Crisis Management & Disaster Management; International Law & WMD; Strategic Stability; WMD Terrorism; Seminar Course on Energy, Resources, Wars & Conflicts; Nuclear Command & Control; Role of IAEA; Research Methodology and Writing and communication Skills,

WORK PROFILE

*Worked at **ACDA, Strategic Plans Division (SPD)** of Pakistan.*

*Lecturer at **AIR University**, Islamabad.*

Research Associate at various Islamabad based think tanks.

Published Articles

"NPT unable to prevent the development of N-weapons" The Frontier Post

"India's quest to test the deterrence credibility of Pakistan" The Frontier Post

"Global Feudalism and Arms Trade Treaty tool" The Frontier Post

WORKSHOP *Participated in workshop organized by Cranfield University (UK) in National Defence University of Pakistan and also was awarded with a certificate of **Defense Diplomacy Scholar**.)*

Abstract:

It has been precisely discussed in this paper that what kind of policy regarding its nuclear weapons Pakistan is enjoying. Also has been discussed with logical reasoning that why Pakistan is doing its journey with the policy of nuclear opacity. By the help of some facts and logics it has been safely concluded in this paper that this policy is not only serving effectively Pakistan but also India as well as entire region. Pakistan's nuclear policy of opacity is preventing both the states for initiating nuclear war with each other.

It has also been discussed in this paper that what kind of threat perceptions Pakistan is having with regards to its nuclear arsenals. In the presence of these perceptions what kind of steps Pakistan is taking in order to curb these issues.

Introduction:

When a state possesses a nuclear weapon, it has to address the two issues to efficiently employ and manage its nuclear weapons. Firstly, it needs to develop a doctrine that plans how, under what circumstances and for what purposes such weapons will be used. Secondly, there is a need of command and control system which ensures that nuclear weapons will be used in accordance with nuclear doctrine and not in other circumstances.

Historical Background:

Pakistan asserts the origin of its nuclear weapons program lies in its adversarial relationship with [India](#); the two countries have engaged in several conflicts, centered mainly on the state of Jammu and Kashmir.¹ Initial steps toward the development of Pakistan's nuclear program date to the late 1950s, including with the establishment of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) in 1956.² President Z.A. Bhutto

forcefully advocated the nuclear option and famously said in 1965 that "if India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own."³ After the December 1971 defeat in the conflict with India, Bhutto issued a directive instructing the country's nuclear establishment to build a nuclear device within three years. India's detonation of a nuclear device in May 1974 further pushed Islamabad to accelerate its nuclear weapons program, although the PAEC had already constituted a group in March of that year to manufacture a nuclear weapon.⁴

The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, headed by Munir Ahmad Khan, focused on the plutonium route to nuclear weapons development using material from the safeguarded [Karachi Nuclear Power Plant \(KANUPP\)](#), but its progress was inefficient due to the constraints imposed by the nuclear [export controls](#) applied in the wake of India's nuclear test.⁵ Around 1975 A.Q. Khan, a metallurgist working at a subsidiary of the URENCO enrichment corporation in the Netherlands, returned to Pakistan to help his country develop a [uranium enrichment](#) program. Having brought centrifuge designs and business contacts back with him to Pakistan, Khan used various tactics, such as buying individual components rather than complete units, to evade export controls and acquire the necessary equipment.⁶ By the early 1980s, Pakistan had a clandestine uranium enrichment facility, and A.Q. Khan would later assert that the country had acquired the capability to assemble a first-generation nuclear device as early as 1984. Pakistan also received assistance from states, especially [China](#). Beginning in the late 1970s Beijing provided Islamabad with various levels of nuclear and missile-related assistance, including centrifuge equipment, warhead designs, HEU, components of various missile systems, and technical expertise.⁷ Eventually, from the 1980s onwards, the Khan network diversified its activities and illicitly transferred nuclear technology and expertise to [Iran](#), [North Korea](#), and [Libya](#).⁸ The Khan

network was officially [dismantled](#) in 2004, although questions still remain concerning the extent of the Pakistani political and military establishment's involvement in the network's activities.⁹

On 11 and 13 May 1998, India conducted a total of five nuclear explosions, which Pakistan felt pressured to respond to in kind.¹⁰ Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif decided to test, and Pakistan detonated five explosions on 28 May and a sixth on 30 May 1998.¹¹ In a post-test announcement Sharif stressed that the test was a necessary response to India, and that Pakistan's nuclear weapons were only "in the interest of national self-defense...to deter aggression, whether nuclear or conventional."¹²

With these tests Pakistan abandoned its nuclear ambiguity, stating that it would maintain a "credible minimum deterrent" against India. In 1998, Pakistan commissioned its first plutonium production reactor at Khushab, which is capable of yielding approximately 11 kg of weapons-grade plutonium annually.¹³ Based on analysis of the cooling system of the heavy water reactors at Khushab, Tamara Patton estimates the thermal capacity and thus the plutonium production capacity of Khushab II and Khushab III to be ~15 kg and ~19 kg per annum respectively.¹⁴ Construction of a fourth plutonium production reactor at Khushab is ongoing and is estimated to be more than 50% complete based on satellite imagery analysis.¹⁵ Patton estimates that "if Khushab IV has at least an equivalent thermal capacity as Khushab III, the entire complex could be capable of producing 64 kg of plutonium per year or enough fissile material for anywhere from 8–21 new warheads per year depending on their design."¹⁶ Associated facilities and their associated security perimeters are also being expanded, including the plutonium separation facilities at New Labs, Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology, to reprocess spent fuel from the new reactors at Khushab.¹⁷ Islamabad has yet to formally declare a nuclear doctrine, so it remains unclear under what conditions Pakistan might use nuclear weapons.¹⁸ In

2002 then- President Pervez Musharraf stated that, "nuclear weapons are aimed solely at India," and would only be used if "the very existence of Pakistan as a state" was at stake. General Khalid Kidwai further elaborated that this could include Indian conquest of Pakistan's territory or military, "economic strangling," or "domestic destabilization."¹⁹ Because of India's conventional military superiority, Pakistan maintains the ability to quickly escalate to the use of nuclear weapons in case of a conventional Indian military attack.²⁰

Pakistan's Nuclear Policy:

Since the successful nuclear tests Pakistan has maintained ambiguity about its nuclear weapon employment policy and its nuclear doctrine. International community and especially India were also against this policy of Pakistan. The international community as well as India is also very ambitious that Pakistan should disclose its policy regarding use of nuclear weapons. Beside all these facts Pakistan has also faced sarcastic and knavish behavior from international community and India.

Keeping in view the horrible consequences and devastation of nuclear weapons, Why Pakistan has adopted the policy of opacity? The answer to this question is quite simple that Pakistan is having the option to opt the policy of "First use" or even "No First Use" it could be interpreted as that Pakistan doesn't want to go for "First Use" or even "No First Use" in fact Pakistan wants to prevent itself regards use or no use of nuclear arsenals, that's why Pakistan is going with the policy of opacity. This policy of opacity depicts that how much Pakistan is mature and concerned about deterrence stability. It is clear from above lines that nuclear weapon is not a military tool but a political tool and Pakistan in real terms is following its essence.

India is a state, which is stronger as compared to Pakistan in conventional means and both Pakistan and India has already fought almost four wars with each other. But after the acquisition of nuclear

weapons by Pakistan, there is some sort of material peace among both of these states. It is clear that nuclear weapons are playing significant role in terms of prevention of war among both states.

Pakistan's concept of nuclear deterrence is India specific. It was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who developed the concept of nuclear deterrence in order to strengthen the Pakistan. He in Ayub Khan's era repeatedly warned that India's ultimate intentions are to build an atomic bomb. By the effort of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto a National Command Authority (NCA) was established that assumed the responsibility of developing a nuclear weapon.

Essential Features of Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine

Pakistan is still passing through the phase of constructing nuclear doctrinal concepts and testing them. However from statements of political & military leaders, we can deduce the Pakistan's doctrine regarding use of weapons. Following are the key features of Pakistan's nuclear doctrine.

a) Indo-centric Credible Minimum Nuclear Deterrence:

Since the establishment of nuclear weapons project, it can be observed that Pakistan objective of development of nuclear weapon was to protect it from the large scale conventional or nuclear attack from India. So one can easily deduce that Pakistan's nuclear program is India specific, and it is designed to prevent Indian's from launching nuclear or large-scale conventional attacks on Pakistan.

b) Credible Minimum Deterrence:

It is said that credible minimum nuclear deterrence is one of the feature of Pakistan's nuclear doctrine. The statements of Pakistani military & political leaders reflect that Pakistan aims to

build a small but credible nuclear force to deter Indian aggression.

c) Principle of Massive Retaliation:

It is indicated from the statements of officials of Pakistani that Pakistan has adopted a policy of massive retaliation. In 1998, against the backdrop of rumors of an Indian preemptive attack, Pakistan warned India that an Indian strike would be reciprocated with massive retaliation with unforeseen consequences. In 2001-2002, General Pervaiz Musharaf warned India in the words,

“We don’t want war. But if war thrust upon us, we would respond with full might, and give a befitting reply”

d) Policy of Nuclear First Use:

In contrast to India, policy of Nuclear First Use is the key feature of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine. Pakistan has also rejected India’s offer to sign an agreement banning the first use. There are two reasons which compelled Pakistan to adopt this policy (i) First nuclear strike affordable financially and less complex to build. (ii) India’s conventional military power far outweighs Pakistan military.

e) Counter-Value Targeting:

If the target of nuclear weapons is some big cities, it is known as counter value targeting. Pakistan has not yet disclosed its targeting policy. Moreover it appears that Pakistan would focus on counter-value nuclear targeting.

f) Nuclear Command & Control system:

Pakistan has declared setting up of a National Command Authority (NCA) in 2000 and delegated employment and deployment control over all strategic forces and organizations to this body. However, it is not yet clear that what control mechanism Pakistan has adopted or will prefer to adopt.

Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is rough and its details are yet to emerge. Pakistan is still passing through the phase of formation of an appropriate nuclear doctrine.

Pakistan's threat perception:

After successfully getting the status of nuclear weapon state Pakistan has to address diverse kind of threats which almost every nuclear weapon state has to face. But situation of Pakistan is entirely different in comparison to any other state. Terrorism in Pakistan is at its zenith sectarian violence is almost at its height and all government organizations of Pakistan whether these are military organizations or civil organizations consists upon the people who belongs to different sects or probably most of them or influenced by the Islamic ideology. Keeping in view Pakistan perceived that there are high chances of nuclear terrorism in Pakistan that's why Pakistan adopts the nuclear policy of opacity. By adoption of this policy Pakistan feels that its population will remain with ambiguity and will not get justification to disrupt into nuclear policies of the state that would ultimately be in the favor of not only Pakistan and its neighbor countries but also for the whole region as well as for the entire globe.

a) Military options of adversary state:

It is an open secret that Pakistani nuclear arsenals are indo centric and the main objective of Pakistan's nuclear arsenals is to deter India. Keeping in view military options of India that India can opt against Pakistan, Pakistan has not clearly exposed its nuclear policy that in which condition Pakistan

will launch its nuclear arsenals the major reason to maintain ambiguity in its policy is that Pakistan has a competition with India and nuclear establishment of Pakistan believes that only policy to deter India is the policy of opacity by which Pakistan can successfully deter India and can prevent India from taking any hostile action against Pakistan.

b) Risk of Nuclear terrorism:

As Pakistan is sharing its borders with Afghanistan, India and Iran and it is assumed that non-state actors of all these three states are actively participating in terrorist activities in Pakistan. On the other side Pakistan is also facing criticism regarding its nuclear program from western states and after the assassination of Ex- Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto this notion got hype that where prime minister of a state is not safe so how nuclear facilities could remain safe and secure. Terrorist groups like **Taliban (TTP)** and various other groups are continuously giving threats that they will attack nuclear facilities of Pakistan. Keeping in view hostilities of **War on Terror** and abilities of these groups Pakistan is passing through a crucial situation and is also developing effective mechanisms to cope up with these issues.

c) Accidental Launch:

Pakistan has already developed effective command and control system regarding its nuclear weapons. But it is an open secret that nuclear command and control is highly sensitive business. The threats of accidental launch of nuclear weapon not only prevailing in context of Pakistan nuclear weapon program but also all nuclear weapon states are facing this issue. But matter of concern is Pakistan is taking this dilemma very seriously and continuously pursuing to adopt effective measures to eradicate this threat completely which is in other words an idealistic approach.

d) Unauthorized use of N- Weapon:

Almost all the nuclear weapon states are facing the issue of unauthorized use of nuclear weapon in this regard states usually develop a nuclear command authority and assign the powers to a designated authority who will use nuclear weapon in hour of need. Like many other nuclear states Pakistan is also considering this issue as a threat perception for itself and in order to cope up with this issue Pakistan has already taken effective measures to absolutely eradicate the chances of unauthorized use of nuclear weapon.

Conclusion:

It can be safely conclude from the all above mentioned discussion that Pakistan has adopted nuclear policy of opacity by keeping in view its military, geographical and strategic strengths and weaknesses. It is only option which serves Pakistan effectively. It also be concluded Pakistan is not in favor of any kind of hostility with India because such kind of hostility will ultimately lead both the states at the verge of nuclear war which would not be in the favor of both the states but also will bring instability in whole the region. It is also clear that Pakistan believes and will admit India as regional leader. This reality also cannot be over ruled that India has also played mature role and gave time to Pakistan to be stable in order to resolve its internal matters.

Both India and Pakistan are seen as role model in entire globe as both states having nuclear arsenal and also having tense relations history but due to the mature behavior of both states region is enjoying peace and stability. Both the states have proved by the virtue of their behavior that nuclear weapons are political tools not military tools and are responsible for the positive aftermaths for both the states.

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11. Internal Dynamics Impacting Pakistan's Regional Policies :

Internal Dynamics Impacting Pakistan's Regional Policies

Amb.Karamatullah K. Ghori

(Ambassador Karamatullah K. Ghori is a former Pakistani career diplomat and ambassador. He served his country's Foreign Service with distinction in various parts of the world—and in a variety of diplomatic assignments—in a career spanning 36 years. Before taking up the diplomatic career, Ambassador Ghori had lectured at Karachi University and worked as a researcher at Pakistan's premier 'think tank', the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs (PIIA).

Since his retirement from service, in early 2002, he has been a free lance columnist, commentator and speaker on politics and international affairs. He is a regular contributor to Pakistan's DAWN newspaper, and to the New Indian Express, and the Milli Gazette of India. His research papers have also been appearing regularly in FPRC Journal, Delhi, and PIIA's Journal, Pakistan Horizon. Ambassador Ghori is also a poet and writer of renown in his native Urdu language. His latest book—pen profiles of Pakistan's prime leaders and national luminaries—is due to come off the press, in India.)

Pakistan was born as a geographical anomaly, with its eastern and western wings separated from each other and a behemoth India wedged in between.

Even the founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah—who had waged a long and bitter legal battle for the right of the Muslims of India to have their own, separate and sovereign, homeland—recognised the weirdness of his new state, even before it was carved out of India. Voicing his utter disgust and concern on the plans to divide the two Muslim majority provinces of Bengal and the Punjab, Jinnah remonstrated—more in frustration than anything else—that “the Muslims will get a truncated or mutilated moth-eaten Pakistan. “ (1)

However, this bizarre sovereign entity—a veritable geographical monstrosity—was not supposed to come unstuck, at least in the mind of its principal founder. Ever an astute pragmatist, Jinnah fully understood the inherent weakness of his new state and even before it came into being he set about defining how the state should be raised and constructed on the basis of his ideological and idealistic conception.

Jinnah's inaugural speech in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on August 11, 1947—a full three days before Pakistan was proclaimed to the world as an independent state—laid down the outline of exactly how he wanted his child to be nurtured. He wanted Pakistan to be developed as a virtually secular state in which every citizen's rights and faith would be guaranteed without the state imposing any religion or faith on them. You would be free to go to your temples, your mosques, your churches freely and without fear (2).

In other words, Jinnah wanted land-based and grass-rooted nationalism to become the core creed of the country and not the faith on the basis of which he had fought the battle of Pakistan. He was, to any observer of his long political career, advocating something that went against the grain of his political strategy as the advocate of a Pakistan heaved out of India on the strength of its Muslim populace's faith. But Jinnah, the canny pragmatist and keen strategist, knew that adherence to Islam alone would be insufficient to keep the two wings of the country united and cohesive. It had served its purpose as a rallying force to gather them under his banner and on his platform but it could not be the glue to hold a culturally and linguistically disparate people together for long.

Jinnah feared, rightly, in his heart, that the inherent disparities in the ethnic ethos and histories of the lands that became Pakistan would be too powerful against the slogan of Islam as an over-arching and vaulted creed and guiding force of the country. He wanted a secular democracy firmly tethered to the economic well-being of its people to become the cement in the foundations of the new state.

However, with Jinnah dead, after just one year of his Pakistan's birth, his faith in the resilience of secularism to bond his polyglot people into a united nation was also buried with him; those who took up the challenge of welding the Pakistani nation together, after him, showed scant regard for his secular ideals. Instead, they quickly settled down to imparting Jinnah's Pakistan a religious complexion that he had shown little taste for.

The passage of the Objectives Resolution, within two years of Jinnah's demise, was a loud and unequivocal affirmation that Pakistan would be anchored on religious moorings. The Objectives Resolution was enshrined in the preamble of the first Constitution of Pakistan—adopted in 1956—and there it has remained firmly embedded in the preface to every constitution that followed, including the present constitution adopted in 1973. The Preamble proclaimed that it was the “will of the people of Pakistan to establish an order...wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah.” (3).

Leaving absolutely no doubt about the fundamental font of all law-making in Pakistan, Part IX of the Constitution, titled ‘Islamic Provisions’ stipulates: “All existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah...and no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such Injunctions.” (4)

Ironically, Pakistan veering in favour of a religious anchor was a move piloted by those orthodox religious forces that had opposed the Pakistan Movement tooth-and-nail. But once Jinnah departed from the scene, they moved in with vengeance to become custodians of Pakistan's ideology—an ideology defined by them. Whereas Jinnah had unfurled the banner of a common faith as a shibboleth for his movement out of sheer necessity, the religious zealots seizing the mantle after him sought to morph Pakistan into a laboratory for the application of their inverted agenda.

In reality, the assault on Jinnah's secular Pakistan was led by the well-entrenched plutocrats and aristocratic feudals who had opposed and worked against the idea of Pakistan but seized its political reins in order to safeguard their vested interests. Faith-based politics was deemed a perfect and convenient façade to sheathe their naked ambitions for raw power. In doing so they trampled, roughshod, on cultural and ethnic sensitivities of the people, especially of the majority populace of Pakistan inhabiting its eastern wing.

Jinnah himself had, inadvertently, erred on the ethnic and linguistic front when—showing little or no sensitivity to the Bengali tongue and identity of the people of East Pakistan—he had proclaimed at a public rally in Dhaka that Urdu would be the sole national tongue of Pakistan. He may not have realised it, but his disregard of Bengali linguistic and

cultural sensibilities became the first building-block for the purveyors of Bengali parochialism—which culminated in the truncation of Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh some years hence, in 1971.

The symbiotic feudal-mullah combine also quickly attracted camaraderie with the military. The alliance fitted neatly into the concept of a faith-based army defending not only the physical frontiers of the state but also guarding its frontiers of faith. That explains why the succession of Bonapartes on the national political horizons of Pakistan was so regular and unopposed, and why soldiers of fortune and bounty hunters prospered in Pakistan.

An arguably natural corollary to a faith-based Pakistan was that it must hitch its wagon—in the realm of its foreign relations—with the Western camp in the then nascent Cold War. The first Pakistani Prime Minister, Liaqat Ali Khan’s decision to shun the advances from the then Soviet Union—locked in an ideological tussle with the Western camp led by U.S.—and, instead, put all of Pakistan’s eggs in Washington’s basket was justified, ostensibly, as a move dictated by bread-and-butter issues. Soviet Union was, itself, convulsed in a post-WWII economic squeeze and couldn’t be thought of as an aid-giver to Pakistan. On the other hand, U.S. had ample resources to husband Pakistan’s needs in both economic and military sectors.

It was true that U.S. measured up copiously to Pakistan’s urgent needs for economic and military succour—and Washington, on its part, saw great promise and potential in Pakistan becoming a useful cog in its anti-communist juggernaut. The then Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, was deeply impressed with the discipline and professional calibre of the Pakistani armed forces and saw no reason why Pakistan shouldn’t be roped into the chain of military alliances he was building up, around the world, to combat what to him was the communist menace. Pakistan duly obliged by tying the knot in both SEATO (South East Asian Treaty Organisation) and CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation) fostered as bulwarks against communism’s perceived danger.

But faith was as powerful an incentive—if not more—as pecuniary advantage behind Pakistan’s decision to climb on board the American band wagon. The West was seen in Pakistan as a collection of God-fearing nations, whereas the Soviet bloc was all about countries that had no place for God in their system. It was a straight choice between believers and non-believers. Except that when Pakistan consorted with

China, faith was left at the door. Cultivating a strategic relationship with Communist China was deemed pragmatic and quint-essential, because of its counter-weight to arch-rival India.

The loss of its eastern wing—within a quarter-century of independence—should have induced sober introspection and soul-searching as to what had triggered the great upheaval. By the same logic, it should also have dampened insouciant infatuation with religion as the main cementing force of the nation. The irrelevance of faith as the foundation for an ethnically diverse and culturally divided people was an obvious lesson to draw for the people and policy pundits of Pakistan. But that lesson was never drawn. It was never even remotely accepted that the majority populace of the country, living in East Pakistan, had been driven into doing what it eventually did because of scant respect from the western wing, and its ruling elite, for the majority's language, culture and socio-economic hopes and dreams.

Instead, even a so-called populist and self-styled socialist, like Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, had no compunction in pandering to religious dogmatists' fervour to cast what was left of Jinnah's Pakistan even further into their own intolerant and centrifugal version of Islam.

Soon after becoming PM of a truncated and shriveled Pakistan, ZAB saw it expedient to cater to the whims of religious orthodoxy and at the expense of the Qadiyani minority sect within the ranks of Muslims of Pakistan. He prevailed on the parliament—where his party commanded a comfortable majority—to declare the Qadiyanis non-Muslims and amended the constitution, accordingly. Bhutto may have been successful—with that Machiavellian move—in pre-empting any clerical backlash against his government and getting the religious dogmatists and orthodox clergy firmly towed behind him, but the religious fault lines bedeviling Pakistan were also clearly exposed to the world because of that legislative coup.

The military coup d'état of July 5, 1977, that toppled ZAB and brought General ZiaulHaq to power lent another hefty boost to religious dogma dictating state policies. General Zia, with his conservative religious leanings, generously lent patronage to the clergy tightening its grip over the directions of the country's internal agenda and foreign relations.

The Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, in December 1979, was a boon to the right-wing religious orthodoxy to further consolidate their hold over Pakistan's direction.

The Soviet thrust into Afghanistan posed, no doubt, a threat to Pakistan. The super power had been unnerved by the Iranian revolution and wanted to pre-empt its fallout on Afghanistan. But the Islamists saw the Soviet move in a larger perspective. The Russians had been, historically, inimical to the realm of Islam. They had gobbled up the Turkic states of Central Asia, one by one and crafted policies that were calculated to snuff out of the peoples of those states their Islamic identity. The latest Russian incursion into Afghanistan couldn't be interpreted differently than to subdue the Afghans and undermine their Islamic moorings. The communist and left-wing intelligentsia of Afghanistan had long been Soviet votaries and had worked as the Trojan horse to let them into Afghanistan through the back door at the expense of its fiercely Islamic people.

The Americans jumped into the fray to draw blood from the Russians. Their motive was entirely self-centred and geared to the decades-old Cold War rivalry. However, with an Islamist General ZiaulHaq at the helm of Pakistan it became so much easier for the Americans to rope Pakistan into their war to finish off the Russian power and beat them at their own game in Afghanistan. Zia didn't have to be convinced that the Russians were threatening to take Pakistan, too, into their stride to reach the warm waters of the Arabian Sea.

Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Scourge of Terrorism:

General ZiaulHaq had his Islamic affinity with the Afghan victims of the Russian invasion underpinning his policy decision to let Pakistan become the pivot of the American-sponsored, provisioned and funded resistance campaign to throw out the Russian invaders. Pakistan readily allowed the Americans to make fullest use of its contiguity with Afghanistan and transform the tribal areas of Pakistan, sharing a long and prickly border with Afghanistan, into the launching pad for Afghan resistance against the invaders of their land.

It is a familiar and long-known story how Pakistan served the American interests in its capacity as the principal conduit of U.S. and Saudi aid to the Afghan *Mujahideen*, whose training was done in camps in Pakistan. The story need not be repeated here. However, there can be no two opinions that without Pakistan's pivotal role in the Afghan war against the Russians neither the invaders could have been forced to flee nor could the Americans have cut the feet of their rival giant and trigger its

demise. The valiant Afghan freedom fighters were the ones to prove that the Russian colossus had, in fact, the feet of clay.

Pakistan paid an enormous price—in terms of the sacrifice of its limited resources—in playing the role of the principal facilitator of the Afghan resistance against the Russians. The world recognised—but mostly grudgingly—the heavy toll on Pakistan of playing host to nearly 4 million Afghan refugees, not only during the decade-long struggle to evict the Russians but also in the years of turmoil, chaos and virtual civil war that followed the Russian withdrawal and the precipitate exit of the Americans from the Afghan theatre. This is not to mention the influx in Pakistan of the Afghan culture of drugs and dangerous arms. The total effect of this Himalayan undertaking by Pakistan was that it ceased to be the country it was before its doors were opened to welcome Afghan refugees, as well as the overseas ‘friends’ of the Afghans.

However, Pakistan on General ZiaulHaq’s watch ungrudgingly paid that horrendous price because the sacrifice was regarded worth Pakistan’s Islamic character. Religious scholars and an increasingly influential and powerful clergy intoned, in unison, that it was Pakistan’s bounden duty to rise to the aid of its Afghan ‘brethren’ because that’s how God in His Holy Book, the Quran, enjoined upon all believers to help their brothers-in-faith in need. The verdict blended well with Zia’s Islamic fervour as well as with his military sense: Afghanistan was a strategic asset to Pakistan and having it in its corner was more an investment than a price.

Fast-forward that to the present times, and Pakistan continues to pay an exorbitant price for its investment or involvement in Afghanistan. But the nature of the price has changed. The price now being exacted from Pakistan is not of its natural or material assets but of the lives of its people.

Why the nature of the price has changed is because of the sea-change in Pakistan’s role and place in the overall scheme of things related to Afghanistan. Back then, in the context of the Afghan *jihad* to roll back the Russian invasion, Pakistan was seen as the lynchpin of the resistance against an alien, though neighbour of Afghanistan, invader. The perception of Pakistan in the eyes of the outside world—a perception largely fashioned by U.S.—was that Pakistan was a chaperon and mentor of freedom fighters who had risen against foreign tyranny. President Ronald Reagan, the man who so fervently sought to dismantle the ‘evil’

Russian Empire, had no hesitation in comparing the Afghan *mujahideenas* the 20th century incarnation of the founding fathers of U.S.

But in the 21st century the U.S. perception of Pakistan has gone full circle. Back in the the 20th century, Pakistan was valued as the sponsor of Afghan mujahideen, but is now seen as a sponsor of *terrorists*, because the mujahideen of yesterday have since been routinely labelled as terrorists of today. Moreover, their erstwhile chaperon and mentor, Pakistan—then hailed as an equal partner in a holy war against rapacious invaders—is now decried and lambasted as the sponsor of marauding *Taliban*—which, themselves, are now denounced as the corrupted version of the then lionised mujahideen.

General ZiaulHaq had been beseeched by the Americans to don the mantle of sponsor of the Afghan mujahideen, and he had obliged them after settling the terms of Pakistan's engagement in a war that was not of Pakistan's.

Zia's successor Bonaparte, General Pervez Musharraf—a soldier of fortune like him—has never been accused of being a 'fundamentalist' like Zia, or imbued with his idealism of a soldier of Allah. Quite the contrary, Musharraf was readily granted the title of a 'moderate' Muslim unlike Zia. But whereas Zia had joined forces with the Americans—despite so much day-light between their disparate agendas---out of his Islamic fervour and enthusiasm, Musharraf hitched his wagon with the Americans out of personal necessity. He was a pariah in the west, particularly to the Americans, for having usurped power in Pakistan after overthrowing an elected government on spurious grounds. He was shunned as such by the Americans, so much so that President Bill Clinton, in a whistle-stopsojourn of just 4-hours in Islamabad, had refused to be photographed with the upstart military dictator. The cataclysm of 9/11 changed the scenario, dramatically, and over-night Musharraf, the pariah, was courted to agree to be in the trenches in Afghanistan with the Americans.

The role reversal for Pakistan, vis-à-vis the next-door neighbour Afghanistan, couldn't be more grotesque or telling.

ZiaulHaq had entered another people's war out of his strong conviction of Pan-Islamism and camaraderie with oppressed fellow-Muslims. Musharraf couldn't care less about Muslim collectivity or Islamic identity. There was no sense of conviction behind his leap into the American camp: it was out of sheer personal necessity. He had been

seeking legitimacy from the outside world—particularly from U.S. with its common-man reputation of a persistent king-maker in the Pakistani charade of power—and saw George W. Bush’s demand of him to become a part-and-parcel in his war against terror as a god-send. Unlike Zia, Musharraf would neither seek terms of engagement nor haggle over a price for taking Pakistan into the blind alley that Afghanistan has proved to be to its Western invaders.

But whereas Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan in the Zia era was, in the American eyes, that of a facilitator of ‘freedom fighters’ sponsored and favoured by them—a truly heroic role as such—Pakistan is today equated with sponsors of terrorist Taliban, and thus reduced to the unenvied role of a villain. Pakistan, then, was a friend of friends of America. Today, Pakistan is suspect as a friend of enemies of U.S.

To an overwhelming majority of Pakistanis, their country has been taken by Musharraf into a war that’s not of Pakistan’s just as Zia had taken them into another people’s war. However, Pakistan was, then, eulogised for its heroic services—and duly rewarded for them—in the cause of freedom, it is, today, being routinely castigated and targeted for its alleged villainy of hunting-with-the-hounds-and-running -with-the-hare.

And the price exacted from Pakistan for this other people’s war has kept on climbing. The exact figures of the economic toll paid by Pakistan over more than a decade of its being a cog in the American juggernaut against Afghanistan vary considerably from one to another. However, Pakistan’s own conservative sense is that it has lost—in productivity and exports—more than 70 billion dollars in this period.

The Pakistanis may not have minded this colossal toll—just as they happily shouldered the burden of feeding and sheltering millions of Afghan refugees—but the human toll being exacted by American drone strikes is proving to be beyond their capacity to bear.

Drones: a weapon of Human destruction.

Drones are a scourge for the innocent victims of their indiscriminate strikes in the tribal areas of Pakistan adjacent to the border with Afghanistan. The figures of casualties of drone strikes in Pakistan vary from a few hundred to several thousands, depending on who has been compiling them.

However, to U.S. drones are indispensable as a weapon of choice in the ongoing war on terror. President Obama—on whose watch drone strikes have increased, exponentially as compared to the era of George W. Bush—thinks it is a weapon that is not only cost-effective but also a result-oriented in the unending hunt for those suspected of targeting U.S. interests. To Obama the drones may have their utilitarian value that he is not inclined to dispense with just because it has been killing non-combatants, indiscriminately. To the American policy makers—be they of this present administration or of those preceding them—civilian casualties are unavoidable ‘collateral damage,’ a phrase infamously coined by Madeleine Albright when she was Secretary of State under President Clinton.

To independent and unbiased observers, however, drones and their frequent use is symbolic of America’s arrogance of power. As the New York Times’ celebrated columnist, Maureen Dowd noted, “they (the drones) are redolent of President Obama’s unhealthy attachment to lethal drones, which are killing too many innocents in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” (5)

Drone strikes inside the territorial limits of a sovereign state are also a clear and categorical violation of international law and convention. In his latest report on the subject submitted to UN General Assembly in October 2013 for debate, UN Rapporteur, Christof Heyns, a South African law professor, argued that deploying drone strikes as a “form of global policing undermines international security and will encourage more states and terrorist groups to acquire unmanned weapons.” (6)

The Rapporteur, also arguing that international laws be respected rather than ignored, said: “Drones come from the sky but leave the heavy footprint of war on the communities they target.” (7)

Drones complicate things, internally, for Pakistan and drag its relations with U.S. in a direction that the democratic government of Pakistan would, otherwise, prefer to avoid. Because drones kill civilians, and kill them indiscriminately, it has become an issue that has constantly been outraging the people of Pakistan. They hate this weapon of terror and hate those responsible for it. Surveys after surveys and public opinion polls aplenty have recorded an ever-increasing number of Pakistanis not being shy of citing U.S. as a power threatening Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. That puts the government on the back foot in its policy options, vis-à-vis U.S. The incumbent PM, Nawaz Sharif, cut a

sorry figure before his people on the issue recently. Returning home from his meeting with President Obama in the Oval Office, on October 23, Nawaz Sharif feigned to assuage his people's sense of hurt by telling them that drone strikes would soon stop. But within days of his vague assurance, Washington resumed drone strikes, with impunity as before, drawing more Pakistani blood and enraging its people even further about U.S. duplicity.

The wanton havoc wrought by these drones is a tale of suffering and misery for the people of Pakistan; and that's a powerful element in how Pakistan, under the circumstances, is being pushed into an inimical relationship with U.S., because that's what best reflects the sense of outrage of the people of Pakistan.

The exact toll that Pakistan may have already been forced to bear, in terms of lives lost, may never be known. Different agencies—both national as well as international—have different methods of collecting and compiling the casualty figures of the victims of American drone strikes in the tribal area of Pakistan. However, the figures compiled by FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Area) Secretariat should be accepted as closest to reality because this arm of the Pakistani administration works closer to the grass-roots in the areas savaged and singed by drone strikes.

FATA Secretariat has counted 352 drone strikes in the area administered by it, since the first drone attack, in June 2004. The official tally of casualties in more than 8 years is 2,293, of which 1,730 were natives, or "locals" and 563 were "foreigners", i.e. the Al Qaeda recruits from a clutch of Muslim countries—ME, Africa, Central Asia and Russian territories such as Chechnya (8). It is interesting to note that these official figures of Pakistan seem on the conservative side compared to the London-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism's tally at between 2,500 and 3,700.

Much as the U.S. might think it has a 'legitimate' right to use drones, indiscriminately, as a cost-effective weapon in its ongoing and unending war on terror—since re-christened by President Obama as 'the long war'—it is on a very weak wicket, as far as international law and consensus of the international comity of nations is concerned. That the U.S. logic on drones is untenable has been given a big boost by the latest UN GA resolution, adopted by an overwhelming strength of 193 member states in an Assembly of 198, on December 18 in New York. The

resolution deplored the human rights and international law violations endemic in drone strikes. The move was piloted by Pakistan in the GA (9)

Interestingly, the same day the UNGA—by the same margin—also adopted a resolution condemning spying on international leaders—an unmistakable reference to the leaks emanating from the American whistle-blower, Edward Snowden. The draft in this regard was piloted by Brazil and Germany whose leaders have been spied upon by U.S. eavesdropping. (10)

Inextricably linked with drones is the whole spectrum of Pakistan's relations with the Afghan regime in Kabul, as well as its mentor, U.S. The question upper most on the Pakistani list of priorities is what kind of a future Afghanistan will have—and what will Pakistan have to face or live with—once U.S. and its NATO allies withdraw from that country at the end of their 13 year of occupation?

But before that phase, the immediate concern for Pakistan is the process of U.S. and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan, beginning next year. It was Pakistan's territory that was used for the influx of western forces into Afghanistan. Pakistan has been the conduit for the supply of logistics for NATO and U.S. troops. The western allies will prefer to take their heavy equipment out of Afghanistan through Pakistan, which provides them the shortest and most economical route for this purpose.

For the moment, however, NATO supplies through the northern route, i.e. the one that goes via the historic Khyber Pass in Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa province (KP) are being blocked by the provincial government—led by the maverick cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan's Justice Party—as a mark of protest against the continued drone attacks in Pakistan. Imran Khan wouldn't call off the protest—and the blockade of NATO supplies into Afghanistan—as long as drones continue to hit Pakistani targets and punish its innocent people.

The impasse over the NATO supplies is a headache for the federal government in Islamabad. It puts it in a bind, vis-à-vis U.S.—on which it is dependent for military assistance and loans from international lenders, such as IMF and the World Bank—as well as in a fix, vis-à-vis the irate Pakistani people who are no longer prepared to tolerate brazen U.S. violations of their national sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction.

Of equal and not so distant concern for Pakistan is what kind of Afghan set-up it will have to contend with once NATO withdraws from

Afghanistan. And what about the continued U.S. military presence in Afghanistan for which Washington has—as per its claim—conclude with Hamid Karzai, a protocol, although Karzai, playing poker with his mentors, wouldn't sign the agreement governing the status of American troops, until next year.

What is certain is that U.S. would like to retain a sizeable military presence in Afghanistan even after withdrawing—for the sake of record in not in order to pull wool on the eyes of the world—the bulk of its forces from the Afghan soil by the end of 2014. Karzai has mentioned a figure of between 10,000 and 15,000 American troops Obama would like to have in a post-2014 Afghanistan. A NY Times editorial, however, claimed on the basis of U.S. officials, a figure of 8,000 to 12,000 (11).

But as far as Pakistan is concerned, it does not matter—it's immaterial, in fact—how many American boots, or how much American arsenal, are still deployed in Afghanistan, within its hailing distance. What matters to Islamabad is how the mix of continued American boots in Afghanistan and an Afghan government friendly with Pakistan's arch rival and adversary for regional influence, India, plays out and impacts its own security concerns?

Hamid Karzai is friendly to India—too friendly for Pakistan's comfort. He may not be there—in the hot seat of power in Kabul—calling the shots as such, after the next presidential election in Afghanistan in 2014. But Karzai has already ensured that Afghanistan's ties with his friendly India—where he was educated as a student—would survive him. There is a defence co-operation agreement between India and Afghanistan and Karzai is keen that India should train his military officers and equip the Afghan military with Indian-made weapons.

In ordinary circumstances, such a move by Afghanistan, i.e. to bring India closely into the equation, would be anathema to Pakistan, which had made it a corner stone of its policy, vis-à-vis, Afghanistan, to not let India court Afghanistan at its expense. However, Pakistan is conscious of the changed, or changing, regional dynamics, in which U.S. too has long been trying to get India actively engaged in Afghanistan. Over the years since the Americans husbanded the incumbent power structure in Afghanistan, India has expanded its presence in Afghanistan by setting up a number of its Consulates in Afghan cities abutting on the border with Pakistan. U.S. may deem it as an essential prop in its long term strategy for Afghanistan to use Indian activism there as a pressure point

against Pakistan with the obvious intent of keeping it aligned to American agenda. So, the Foreign Policy Adviser of Pakistan, Sartaj Aziz, grudgingly conceded—while addressing a policy seminar in Islamabad, that Afghanistan has the right to cultivate its relations with whatever country (a vague reference to India) but it should not be at the expense of Pakistan (12).

India, Afghanistan and the End-Game:

Pakistan's dilemma in regard to Afghanistan is that the fallout from failure of U.S. military strategy—particularly of the dismal results from the Obama-ordered 'surge' that had further inducted 30,000 American troops into Afghanistan's theatre of war---would create a nightmare situation for it. The battle-field 'surge' has failed to subdue the Taliban it was intended to decimate or render ineffective , and that only adds to Pakistan's concern of history repeating itself in its war-ravaged neighbour; only that, this time around, it would spawn a much worse scenario.

The Pakistani military establishment has been at the centre of Pakistan's Afghan policy—both at the level of formulation and execution. The military leadership of Pakistan had forebodings of the failure of American surge and dreaded its ramifications for Pakistan. The then Chief of the Pakistan Army, General AshfaqParvezKayani, had presented Obama with a 13-page White Paper at their White House meeting in October 2010 when the 'surge' was close to completing a year and showing deep cracks to a military strategist like Kayani. The paper warned Obama: "You are not going to win the war, and you are not going to transform Afghanistan. This place has devoured empires before you; it will defy you as well. Stop your grandiose plans and let's get practical, sit down, and discuss how you will leave and what is an end- state we can both live with." (13).

General Kayani may have departed from the scene, upon his retirement, but the stakes for Pakistan in the end-game of Afghanistan have lost none of their immediacy or relevance. If anything Pakistan's concern on the confusion spawned by Washington's diffident moves on Afghanistan has heightened for two reasons: U.S. wants to retain a significant military presence in Afghanistan even after 2014 and, two, its post-2014 agenda seems, clearly to suggest, that it would like to put Pakistan under pressure by getting Indian overly involved in Afghanistan. The Indian

angle, in particular, is far more disturbing than continued U.S. boots on the Afghan soil.

However, unlike the past when Pakistan's sensitivity on the Afghan issue could have easily exacerbated tension with India, both the military and civilian leaderships of Pakistan clearly do not seem to seek confrontation with India or make the latter's increasingly robust activism in Afghanistan a *casus belli*.

There is hardly a doubt that domestic dynamics and compulsions are writing the changed script and dictating the course of relations with India. Terrorism and its mounting toll—with those killed in suicide bombings and related acts of terror numbering into tens of thousands—has precipitated a situation where traditional hostility or confrontation with India would be akin to opening a second front, a scenario that the Pakistani establishment would best prefer to avoid.

General Kayani set the tone for this sea-change in relation to India when, delivering his key-note address at the annual Pakistan Independence Day parade at the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) Kakul, on August 13, 2012—a year after Osama bin Laden had been liquidated by the Americans within hailing distance of PMA precincts—he reminded the nation that the enemy was within and terrorism had become the new frontier for Pakistan's defence establishment to scale and overcome. In his words, “No state can afford a parallel system or a militant force” (14).

General Kayani's forthright acceptance of the menace of terrorism having acquired a snowballing intensity and quickly becoming Pakistan's enemy no.1 was a marked departure from the erstwhile standard policy pillar of Indian being enemy no.1 and principal challenge for Pakistan to surmount. And, further, in order to make sure that his own people, or the outside world, shouldn't think that his allusion to terrorism being Pakistan's principal threat, Kayani repeated the theme in his last address as Pakistan's military chief, from the same podium and venue, at the *Azadi*(Independence) Parade of August 14, 2013. Once again he minced no words in telling his people and through them the world, in so many words: “Today we face a number of internal and external challenges. Internal challenges need our special attention; they are a threat to Pakistan's sanctity and to every Pakistani's life and property.” (15)

General Kayani's shifting of threat focus and perception of Pakistan—from India to home-grown terrorism—paved the way for the civilian

democratic government to turn a new leaf in relations with India. Nawaz Sharif—who earned the right to lead Pakistan a third time as a consequence of the May 11, 2013 general elections—seized on the new vista opened for the country, vis-à-vis India. A businessman with a keen sense of profit and loss, he had made the normalisation and betterment of relations with India a major plank in his election campaign, and articulated the same theme in his first policy pronouncement as Prime Minister. In response, PM Manmohan Singh did not disappoint him when he despatched his Special Assistant to Lahore, within days of Nawaz’ victory, to deliver his message of congratulations and also reciprocating the desire for a new phase of co-operation—not confrontation—between the two estranged neighbours.

In the six months of his latest stint in power, Nawaz Sharif has tapped myriad methods of diplomacy—both conventional and unconventional—to edge closer to India and bring down the barriers that have kept the two apart. His own meeting with PM Manmohan Singh—on the sidelines of the UNGA in New York—in end September was the first formal contact between the two leaders. Nawaz Sharif has since used special emissaries to confab with their Indian opposite numbers and seek removal of the cob webs that have psychologically been a barrier in their march to full normalisation of relations.

The latest ploy deployed by Nawaz Sharif was to send his go-getter younger brother, the Chief Minister of Punjab, Shehbaz Sharif as his special emissary bearing his invitation to Manmohan to visit Pakistan—a visit that may never come through because of paucity of time at Manmohan’s disposal; the impending general elections in India could well spell Manmohan’s eclipse from the Indian leadership scene. But Nawaz’ sibling diplomacy is a novel, out-of-the-box gambit. He wants the Indians to believe his keenness to lend a hefty tug to relations in South Asia. He has almost made it a family business.

But Shehbaz Sharif—a peripatetic man at that—endeared himself to the leaders of Indian Punjab with his cultural diplomacy, which included a *Kabbadi* (Indian-style wrestling) match between India and Pakistan at Ludhiana (16).

Shehbaz and his opposite number, Chief Minister Badal, apparently struck a camaraderie of cultural dimensions, with both agreeing to work on enhancing and highlighting in the relations of the two Punjabs, the

versatile cultural legacy of Punjab and the Punjabi language—a great, untapped, reservoir, when one might come to think of it. (17)

It's a good omen for turning a new page in their bilateral relations that have remained hostage to old grudges and mental reservations no longer relevant to the dictates and challenges of the times. Their leaderships also seem getting belatedly attuned to the horrors that could be unleashed in the region—and the world—by another war between them. This would, presumably, be a nuclear confrontation whose implications are far too horrific to conceptualise fully.

In its latest report—of December 9, 2013—the Nobel-Peace Prize-winning *International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and Physicians for Social Responsibility*—an NGO of global renown and respect—has surmised that a nuclear war in South Asia could trigger the end of civilisation, through regional famine and its catastrophic effects on the rest of the world. The report's author, Ira Helfand, gloomily concludes: "A billion people dead in the developing world is obviously a catastrophe unparalleled in human history. But then if you add to that the possibility of another 1.3 billion people in China being at risk, we are entering something that is clearly the end of civilization." (18).

It's not only the ruling elite of Pakistan that's so keen to turn the moribund relations with India around; the Pakistani opposition, too, shares this enthusiasm.

What could only be said to belong to prescient, the maverick cricketer-cum-political leader, Imran Khan, floated a brilliantly novel idea of Indo-Pakistan co-operation, on his return to Lahore at the end of a two-day visit to Delhi on December 9. Imran said the time had come for India and Pakistan to set up joint research centres, closer to their border, for peaceful harnessing of nuclear power and its civil technology. Hare-brained as some cynics might denounce Imran's initiative, it has so much novelty and room for innovation that not giving it the serious attention it deserves would be a crime.

It is not only political leaders of various stripes and affiliations, hues and colours, in Pakistan that seem so keenly inclined to inject fresh impetus in exploring new approaches to India. NGOs with their societal reach covering a broad spectrum of Pakistan are also getting into the act to chip in, at their level, to the arduous task of bridge building with India. On December 6, 2013, a highly ambitious, but promising, programme called *Exchange for Change 2013-2015* was launched in Karachi at a

colourful ceremony under the aegis of a Pakistani NGO—the Citizens Archive of Pakistan (CAP)—and an Indian NGO, Routes 2 Roots (R2R).

Exchange for Change aims at building trust between the younger generations of India and Pakistan—the youths still in school but highly conscious of the world around them. 5,000 school children, between the ages of 10 & 14 will take part in what could only be summed up as intellectual and academic brainstorming. Schools from three principal cities of Pakistan—Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi—and three major cities of India—Delhi, Dehradun and Mumbai—will interact with each other, during the life of the project, in sustained intellectual exchanges in oral, visual and written histories of South Asia. The idea is that not only they should get to know each other’s histories—comprehensively—but also each other, and try to build on these foundations a sustained edifice of mutual recognition and respect (19).

Why are the people of Pakistan eager to cultivate their peers across the Indo-Pakistan divide is easier to understand in the perspective of the ruin stalking their land—from one end to the other—under the scourge of terrorism. The sense is gaining ground and settling down in the subconscious of the people that together with India they may be able to tackle the monster more effectively. This is one reason that intellectual circles of Pakistan seem to believe their country should co-operate more closely with India in regard to calamities such as the November 26, 2008 mayhem in Mumbai perpetrated by rogue terrorists from Pakistan despatched to India’s most cosmopolitan city to sow terror.

On the other hand, for the putative civilian leadership of Pakistan whose biggest relevance to legitimacy is the mandate given to them by the people of Pakistan, a friendly India would be the means to contain the Bonapartist ambitions of its generals, like Pervez Musharraf, entertaining dreams of ruling over Pakistan. A friendly India would add to the democratic strength of Pakistan and work as an anti-dote against the political ambitions of the generals.

The only caveat, heard from many a quarter in Pakistan, against rushing into a pro-active phase of relations with India is that there is little evidence on the Indian side of the enthusiasm animating the Pakistani discourse on better relations with their most important neighbour. The tepid, if not disappointing, results of the years-old campaign of India-Pakistan camaraderie, launched under the enchanting title of *Amn Ki*

Aasha(Hope for Peace) is cited as proof of India's discouraging, if not cold, response to the Pakistani initiatives.

The cynic might say, in regard to India's perceived cold shoulder to Pakistani overtures, that it's typical of India's Big-Brother syndrome. It doesn't attach the same significance as Pakistan to the challenge of moving on to higher grounds in their bilateral relations. India doesn't feel the urge, or compulsion, to respond to Pakistan with matching vigour and enthusiasm because it has the upper hand, holds all the aces, and doesn't want to disclose its hand until its wisdom tells it to do so.

The realist and pragmatist, in contrast to the cynic, would argue differently and pontificate that India is not ready to play ball—at least not yet—because of two reasons.

One is its heavy betting on the Mumbai massacre and its unwillingness to make any concession to Pakistan, or give it any quarter. India will simply take no major stride until Pakistan moves as India would like it to.

The second impediment to a 'new-look, feel-good' bilateral equation that Pakistan is so keen to have with India comes from India being totally engrossed, for the moment, in what the next general elections—due in spring, 2014—might spawn. In other words, everything—at least on the front of ties with Pakistan—is on hold and will have to await the election result. That, in its permutations, doesn't offer much food for optimism to India-watchers in Pakistan. In fact, the anticipated rise of a man as controversial as Narendra Modi, the BJP stalwart hoping to succeed Manmohan Singh, gives fright to them. Modi's extremist views and his hawkish pronouncements are of little comfort to those in Pakistan anxious to make positive moves on the Indo-Pakistan political chess-board.

Conclusions:

Pakistan's strategic planners and policy gurus—be they in uniform or mufti—have traditionally strived, and strived hard, to avoid facing a two-front scenario—in terms of war or conflict—in the South Asian sub-continent. The Pakistani military establishment's antipathy to India was anchored in its threat perception of India at the core of it. However, nuclear parity with India—and the balance of terror spawned as a consequence of it—has done a lot to diminish the psychological unease of the past in Pakistan. More than that, the manic expansion of the home-

grown terror threat has made terrorism the main focus of attention—as outlined above—and taken the spot light away from India.

However, because of Afghanistan and its likely uncertain future—especially one that forces from outside the region have been trying to fashion—Pakistan now, ironically, finds itself facing a situation that could well be summed up as a classical two-front scenario. That in itself may not be anything new, but its complexion has undergone a sea-change in the years since U.S. invaded Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11.

In the past, India was the primary concern in the two-front dilemma, and Afghanistan only secondary. Still, Pakistan had learned to live with Afghanistan’s low-intensity hostility—a factor Pakistan got used to taking in its stride since its birth. Afghanistan was the only member state of UN to cast a vote against Pakistan’s admission to the world body in 1947 as a sovereign state. The U.S. and NATO presence in Afghanistan—and their bids to fashion an Afghanistan to suit their likings—have changed the old order of two-front dilemma. India has since been relegated to a lower position while Afghanistan under the foreign heels is now deemed the top concern for Pakistan’s strategic planning and projections.

Afghanistan—as most Pakistanis believe—is the root of the new culture of terror that hobbles Pakistan and its people. Pakistan’s involvement in the unending war on terror—with its main focus on Afghanistan—has spawned terrorism of a kind that had absolutely no place in Pakistan before the American forces marched into Afghanistan on the heels of 9/11.

The violence, the blood-shed, the mayhem, Pakistanis by and large believe is not going to go away as long as American and other western boots are on the Afghan soil. Adding to Pakistan’s concern is the growing evidence that U.S. is going to be actively engaged, militarily, in Afghanistan beyond 2014. As the New York Times wrote in its December 1 editorial, under the caption of *Lingering in Kabul*, “the Obama administration has announced an agreement with Afghanistan on a long-term bilateral security arrangement that, officials say, would allow up to 12,000 mostly American troops to be in that country until 2024 and perhaps beyond...” (20)

Pakistan has the apprehension—not entirely baseless—that continued American presence on Pakistan’s northern door would be tantamount to showing the red flag to already enraged and ferociously blood-thirsty

Taliban and their likes in Pakistan who simply loathe the idea of an imperialist power digging itself into Afghanistan.

U.S. policy in the context heightens the Pakistani suspicions that its central goal is to keep Pakistan in ferment and crisis, and not allow peace and normalcy—which has deluded Pakistan since the American onslaught of 2001—to return to the country. The targeted elimination of the Pakistani Taliban Chief, Hakimullah Mehsud, in a drone attack on November 1—barely hours before he was to enter into a peace process with Pakistan—was seen by the people of Pakistan as categorical evidence of U.S. purposely working to sabotage peace in their country. Mehsud's murder was deemed a blatant act of provocation to the terrorists engaged in a saga of rampant blood-letting and encouraging them to go on exacting more blood from the people of Pakistan.

The people's outrage at this calculated sabotage was so spontaneous that it forced the government to chime in, too, in condemning the killing as—in the words of Interior Minister, Chaudhry Nisar, “a drone attack on the peace process.” (21) Even independent and outside observers were compelled to remonstrate as such: “Whereas Washington may have been on the same page as Rawalpindi, where the army is headquartered, it now appears out step (sic) with the civilian government in Islamabad...the optics are not pretty for either side.” (22)

The visibly poor optics seem nowhere poorer than in the crude arm-twisting by Washington of Islamabad's desperate effort to import natural gas from Iran for its starved industries and consumers. Pakistan's domestic production of natural gas is 4.2 billion cubic feet, while its minimum consumption demand is at least a billion cubic feet more. Iran has abundance of natural gas, virtually on Pakistan's door-step. It is ready to help and has already completed a 550 km long pipeline on its side. Pakistan needs 2 billion dollars to build a 500 km long pipeline on its side. Its industry and people are crying out loud for Iranian gas to relieve their misery. But U.S. would have none of it. It has been squeezing Pakistan and threatening it with sanctions if it goes ahead with the building of its gas pipeline from Iran. This is not what Pakistan and its people would expect from a 'friend', which Washington claims it is of Pakistan. Friends don't stab friends in the back especially when friends may be starving.

The challenge for Pakistan is not only to live with bad optics but also to parry the inimical jabs into its security space of a super power gone

berserk. Why is Washington so intent on pursuing a policy running counter to Pakistan's security and economic interests is not rocket science to require expert knowledge and insight. U.S. policy is calculated to keep Pakistan begging at its door for economic largesse. A begging-bowl bearing Pakistan would be expected to work as a cog in U.S. policy for Afghanistan and its neighbours including, foremost, Iran.

Another facet of this American policy is anchored in keeping Pakistan engrossed in its internal security compulsions as long as U.S. is occupied with firming up its long term plans for Afghanistan. A Pakistan plagued with a security challenge from its own Taliban will not be expected to throw spanners in the American works. That accomplished, Washington would then face Pakistan with a *fait accompli* and hope that it has no choice other than lumping it.

That Washington under its patronage and system of spoils has managed to spawn in its occupied Afghanistan a cadre of loyal and supine political leaders who will be doing its biddings and signing on the dotted lines, even after Karzai is gone in 2014, is not lost on the leaders of Pakistan. The new breed of Afghan leaders is convinced that Pakistan is hostile and inimical to Afghan interests, a theme once again articulated by FawziaKoofi—an 'enlightened' partisan of western influence and control over Afghanistan occupying space in the Afghan parliament. Claiming to speak on behalf of the Afghan people she said: "They (the people) said our neighbouring countries—namely Pakistan and Iran—cannot be trusted. Pakistan and Iran are not our enemies. But they don't want what is best for Afghans, and therefore cannot help bring peace to Afghanistan..." (23)

Reading between the lines of what Koofi said, the only inference to draw is that only the western powers are true friends of the Afghans and only they can help usher in peace in the war-torn country. No reference, of course, to the plight of the Afghans as a result of twelve year-long occupation and trashing of their country by the western military powers.

That leaves Pakistan with little choice other than seeking, and working for, a rapprochement with India. That initiative comes loaded with vital stakes to ensure that Pakistan is not bedeviled by its perennial fear of encirclement and division of its focus on two fronts. It may be a tall order but is worth giving a serious try.

Foot notes:

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How does Pakistan's domestic strife influence its foreign policy, and vice versa

Dr.Sanchita Bhattacharya

Research Associate,

Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi

(Dr. Sanchita Bhattacharya is working as Research Associate, in Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi. She has done Ph.D. in “Madarsa Education in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh: A Comparative Study” from School of International Studies (SIS), JNU. She writes frequently on the subject of Political Islam, and her articles have been published in East Asia Forum, Outlook India, New Age Islam etc. She can be reached at sanchita.bhat83@gmail.com)

Over a considerable period of time, or for decades, Pakistan’s domestic problems and skirmishes have influenced its foreign policy, and at the same time, the external aspirations of the country have controlled domestic scenario. Though, the domestic crises in Pakistan are mainly the result of the failure of state institutions, yet cross cultural relationships among nation-states are being used maliciously to destabilize the other country or countries sometimes politically and sometimes economically. Pakistan’s domestic politics remains intimately linked to political relations with Pakistan’s neighbours. Any analysis of threats to Pakistan’s security must emphasis on this overlapping phenomenon between external and internal problem.¹

One can very well state that, post 9/11 Pakistan’s engagement in War on Terror in combating Al Qaeda and Taliban was motivated by it’s domestic security consideration. The then Pakistani President Musharraf was prompt in extending full support to America in the ensuing war. The most probable reason for his forthright response was his recognition that America and Pakistan could join in quelling the radical religious and terrorist elements growing within the region.² Moreover, Musharraf was also interested to neutralized the sectarian terror elements in Pakistan. These groups like : Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM); Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP); Tehreek Nifaz Fiqah-e-Jafria (TNFJ); Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) etc have been very critical to domestic stability of Pakistan and take refuge in sectarian biases to inflict terror. Confronting the sectarian challenges, to the writ of the

state, Musharraf was content to exploit the opportunities offered by the War on terror, to crackdown on these groups and suppress them once and for all.³

One of the important components of Pakistan's domestic strife is the non-state terror actors. The existence of non-state actors (Islamic extremists) associated with Pakistan or working on Pakistan's land with impunity is considered a threat to the peace of the world.⁴ In somewhat covert manner, the state has supported such elements to fulfill the unwanted aspirations. The decadent approach has given unlimited power and mobility to terror groups to publicly pronounce their demands exemplifying the 'actual' foreign policy of Pakistan. In the month of January, 2013 top Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) leader Wali Ur Rehman, in a rare video appearance, pledged to send fighters to Kashmir and wage a struggle for the implementation of Sharia rule in India. "The practical struggle for a Sharia system that we are carrying out in Pakistan, the same way we will continue it in Kashmir, and the same way we will implement the Sharia system in India too. And this is the only solution for people's problems," said Rehman.⁵

On the other hand, in order to appease and legitimise its non-state actors, the government is shelling out its own resources, which in turn will be used against it. The appeasement, therefore, is counterproductive, but Pakistan has a long legacy of consecutive governments that have willingly or unwillingly appeased terrorists in order to survive in the short term.⁶

Pakistan is a weak state, and government policies are making it weaker still. Its disastrous economy, exacerbated by a series of corrupt leaders, is at the root of many of its problems.⁷ The critical economic condition of Pakistan does influence the aspect of foreign policy, as it becomes difficult for the country to be an equal partner in international dealings and partnerships. Pakistan lacks economic development and political stability, which keeps on making Pakistan dependent on international players and financial institutions.⁸ The imbalance in the Civil-Military aspect of the country is well reflected in economic sphere. The Army in Pakistan is itself an economic enterprise, along with the corrupt "Families"⁹ of Pakistan, who control more than 70 per cent of economy.

Due to dilapidated economic growth, the country has to deal with the hovering presence of American donations and the greater risk of its 'own' interest in Central and South Asia. The flow of money has therefore,

become a measurement of success, when it comes to US-Pakistan relations. Recent conspicuous news thus shows that US made decision to release more than USD 1.6 billion in military and economic aid to Pakistan that was suspended when relations between the two countries disintegrated over the covert raid that killed Osama bin Laden and deadly US air strikes against Pakistani soldiers.¹⁰ Officials and congressional aides said ties have improved enough to allow the money to flow again. It also becomes easier for the donor to entice Pakistan for its own benefit, in terms of financial gains. The crippled domestic economy, thus, leads to a fractured foreign policy.

Balochistan issue is a one of the major irritant in the domestic sphere of Pakistan, having over-bearing on the Foreign Policy aspect as well. It is the largest of among four provinces, with an area of 347,190 km. The province has rich natural resources, especially energy resources, including an estimated 19 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 6 trillion barrels of oil reserves.¹¹ Balochistan also holds extensive deposits of gold and copper at Reko Diq in the district of Chagai. The strategic importance of nearing the Arabian Sea with a coastline of 760 km, has created further problem. The Gwadar port (Pakistan-Iran border) and the NATO supply lines have redefined its importance in terms of Pakistan's policies with US and China.

Crucially, the ethnic imbroglio of Balochistan has been infamous for 'kill-and-dump' operations. The tension emanated from the course of events during the independence of Pakistan. The forces of nationalism in Balochistan are threats to national integration and federation of Pakistan.¹² Groups like Baloch Liberation Army, Baloch Republican Army, Baloch Liberation Front etc are continuously challenging the establishment. Moreover, since 2009 Balochistan has come under increased scrutiny, with the Americans alleging that Quetta and its environs are a safe haven for the Taliban leadership, including Mullah Omar. The Americans are also keeping a close tab on the Quetta Shura.¹³ Other militant groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Taliban, Jundullah also known as the Iranian People's Resistance Movement, are also active in Balochistan. Interestingly, on February 9, 2012, the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the United States House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs convened a hearing on Balochistan, chaired by Congressman Dana Rohrabacher. The fact that the Balochistan issue has made it to the legislature of the world's most powerful country is no mean development.¹⁴

In terms of Indo-Pakistan relations, the latter has always 'blamed' India for covertly supporting the Baloch insurgents. Accordingly, the Kashmir question from India side is often countered by the Baloch ethnic problem. And at the same time, India has her own stakes in the region due to proposed gas pipelines of: Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI).

The foreign policy compulsions or reliance of Pakistan on external nations have deep impact on the domestic situation. The interplay of both these factors no doubt creates tension and turmoil in the country.

US factor and the War on Terror fought over a decade caused overall strain and mass resentment and an easy pretext for terror groups with global Islamic agenda to validate their claims. Islamic extremist forces, which were well entrenched in Pakistani society, posed a great challenge to the Pakistani state. Anti-Americanism has emerged as a dominant trend in Pakistani society. It has been explained under the following three models: Firstly, the Friendship-Betrayal Model based on the historical experiences of engagement and estrangement in Pak-U.S relations, secondly, Anti-Imperialism which reflects the capitalist, resource oriented U.S policies in the developing countries, thirdly, Anti-Islamism based on the pro-Israeli and pro-Indian U.S policies in the world.¹⁵

The international war against terrorism has caused more agony, deaths and destruction to the people of Pakistan than any other country of this world.¹⁶ Pakistan has paid a heavy price in its war on terror, its High Commissioner to Australia, Abdul Malik Abdullah said in June, 2012. "We are talking about 43,000 Pakistani people who have lost their lives, and that's not including the number of those who have been maimed, crippled, incapacitated," he said.¹⁷

Pakistan's decision to be part of War is crippling the country from within, reflecting in the education field. The two regions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) are worst effected due to insurgency and the Afghan spill-over. On 21 February 2013, then education minister of the terror-afflicted state of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sardar Hussain Babak, disclosed that militants have destroyed or damaged more than 3,000 schools in the province. The gruesome assessment of yet another terrorised and insurgency-affected zone — the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) — reveals that Taliban attacks have damaged more than 460 schools throughout FATA's seven

agencies, including 110 in Mohmand, 103 in Bajaur, 70 in Khyber, 55 in Kurram, 65 in Orakzai, 44 in North Waziristan and 16 in South Waziristan (though no time period was specified).¹⁸

Pakistan always considered Afghanistan to be strategically important and in order to access Central Asia, Afghanistan is high in the priority list. However, as a matter of fact as long as Pakistan sees a stable Afghanistan as suspiciously synonymous with an encircling Indian-Afghan alliance, then Pakistan will oppose stability in Afghanistan.¹⁹ So, the situation is not at all comfortable for Pakistan and it cannot keep on justifying the existence of such elements only in the name of Islam.

Afghan policy of Pakistan has deep-rooted repercussions on the already existing tumultuous domestic situations. As was experienced during the 'Mujahideen Experience', the free flow of Kalashnikovs along with drugs, organized criminal activities and disgruntled Talibans-Pashtuns amalgamated into the domestic milieu of Pakistan. Post 9/11 the situation has worsened due to double-edged Pakistan policy on Afghanistan. At a point the leadership of Musharraf was very upright in helping US against Al Qaeda and Taliban, but in reality, huge population of Pashtun refugees with a 'certain bent of mind' are the reality of Pakistan. They are generally found in KP, FATA, Quetta, Capital of Balochistan, Lahore, Rawalpindi etc. A substantial amount of them are also active participants in Karachi quagmire.

Moreover, Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan also brought the havoc of US Drone attacks. The American establishment is determined to kill terrorists, but in the process common people are brutally injured and killed. Since 2004, Drone attacks by US on Pakistani civilians have created destruction in the Pashtun areas. According to *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, since 2005, about 2590 people have been killed in Drone strikes in Pakistan.²⁰ The attacks and rampant killings have increased anti-American sentiments of common Pakistani people. According to a poll of Pakistani public opinion carried out by the Pew Global Attitudes Project in 2009, it was found that only 16 percent of Pakistanis have a favorable view of the United States.²¹

Kashmir policy cause further domestic strife and tension in terms of exploitation of Jihadi sentiments and show-off of 'Islam pasand policy' by Pakistan. The policy of amalgamating the entire Kashmir within Pakistan, does not have a direct impact on the internal problems. But, it does entertain a hate culture and militant outfits do exploit the mind-set

and somewhat become preacher of the state policy. Terrorist groups use a range of instrumentalities to raise finances worse, state institutions are deeply complicit in a wide range of terror finance operations.

Huge amount of donation has been accrued by them in name of Kashmir and Jihad. Militant groups like Jaish-e-Moahmmmed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) infamous for their 'state-sponsored' terror activities in Kashmir, are active players in terror-funding. One notorious trust, Al Akhtar, an offshoot of JeM, for instance, has been designated by the U.S. Treasury Department as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) since 2003 and by the UN since 2005. Saud Memon, a financier of Al Akhtar Trust, was found to be involved in the kidnapping and murder of Wall Street Journal's reporter Daniel Pearl. Al Rashid Trust (ART) also deserves mention in this context; it was listed by the U.S. Department of Treasury on September 23, 2001 and by UN on October 6, 2001. ART was known to have been supporting jihadi activities in Kashmir along with Chechnya, Kosovo, Afghanistan under the leadership of Mufti Mohammad Rashid. ART was linked to Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), JeM, Al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), among others.²²

The hosts of common factors like Afghanistan, Kashmir issue, War on Terror, militant groups, internal strife etc are very dominant in defying the foreign policy and domestic strife of Pakistan. These are inter-related and inter-connected sources of discord and agony for common people of Pakistan and at the same time, in order to fulfill the foreign policy objective, Pakistan use these to exercise active role in the region in the name of Islamic brotherhood, regional cooperation, and peaceful co-existence.

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12. Pakistan's Geopolitical Environment and Terrorism :

Pakistan's Geopolitical Environment and Terrorism

Ambassador Fauzia Nasreen

Senior Adviser, Centre for Policy Studies,
COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, Islamabad

Qualifications

- Masters in English Literature
- Masters in Defence and Strategic Studies
- Attended Visiting Fellowship Programme at Oxford University
- Attended ND Course at National Defence University, Islamabad

Professional Background

- Joined Foreign Service of Pakistan in December 1973
- Served in various capacities in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Served in Pakistan missions in Tehran, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Rome
- Served as Pakistan's Ambassador/High Commissioner to Nepal, Poland and Australia
- Retired from service in December 2010
- Since 2011 have taught as visiting faculty member at National University of Modern Languages, Fatima Jinnah Women University and Centre for Contemporary Studies, NDU
- Since early 2013 working as senior adviser in the Centre for Policy Studies, COMSATS Institute of Information Technology.
- Have chaired national and international conferences on issues related to public policy and national security.
- Have been resource person for Gender related workshops organized by Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) and USAID.

Any analysis even though cursory, of the geopolitical environment of Pakistan and terrorism in general requires an understanding of the changes that have taken place in the global and regional system in the last few decades. The end of the Cold War between the two superpowers in itself was an epoch development which radically altered the dynamics determined by the polarization of the world into two camps. The ideological confrontation characterized by communism and capitalism dwindled with the dismantling of the socialist world and collapse of

Soviet Union. The profound changes in the European context gave credence to The End of History and triumph of democracy. Others believed that the world was at the cusp of Clash of Civilizations which meant a bitterly fragmented world with multiple civilization poles. As the contours of the new world order were being crafted, the festering conflicts subsumed by the superpower rivalry, began challenging international peace and security. The conflict complexes that erupted with engulfing dangers had deep undercurrents of historical, ethnic, religious, cultural, nationalistic and ideological moorings.

The transformational changes underscored that the mechanisms of the Cold War developed in the backdrop of World War II were inadequate. The challenges posed were enormous, multidimensional and complex. They varied from security questions to poverty, hunger and disease. The emergent democracies, nevertheless, embarked on a transition process assisted by the safety nets of the wider Cold War structures such as the European Community and NATO. However the “rest” of the world had to deal with the remnants of the major Cold War issues in “localized” terms. The political transition of the world under the uni-polar global dispensation had since been punctuated by various doctrinal experiments. These ranged from pre-emptive strikes to rapid deployment and humanitarian intervention with the over-arching advancement in technology particularly UAV (commonly known as drones) and cyber-weapons.

Within this milieu, terrorism acquired a new dimension incorporating elements of various forms of war-fare. Not only did the geographical reach of terrorists expanded, their political outreach was nourished through indoctrinated networks operating with no legal, geographical or political boundaries. The state sovereignty was thus challenged by the outside state actors and non-state actors alike. In most cases these states had already been under stress for various reasons. This further compounded internal pressures on states like Pakistan that played a central role during the period of super power confrontation. Following the defining events of the 1990s in the Middle East centering on Iraq to East and North Africa and Afghanistan the chain of disgruntlement and disaffection was exploited by the extremists to fuel anti-western sentiments and propagate a world-wide message of their political ideology. The means adopted were violent with attacks on civilian populations and funneling of funds and weapons through fraudulent and illicit channels.

The 9/11 attacks on the US reflected the gravity of and the proportion which this menacing phenomenon had acquired. Charles W. Kelley (World Politics: Trends and Transformations, Tenth Edition) in relation to the armed conflict, specifically terrorist attacks in the 21st century has noted “Was this a new type of warfare_ non-territorial networks of terrorists fighting against established territorial states _ or was it a throwback to earlier millennia when that kind of war between states was frequent?” Terrorism as he says was one of the three different ways that armed conflict most often occurred. The other two being wars between states and civil wars within states (or intra-state wars). In his view “The opposing forces of integration and disintegration point toward a transformation in world politics as extensive and important as the system-disrupting convulsions following World War I and World War II and Cold War....”

Three dimensions of the political developments in the post-Cold War environment have had far reaching impact on the world order: the unchallenged power of the US as the sole super power; Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in total disregard of the UN Charter; and the 9/11 attacks on the US by al-Qaeda. The 1990s witnessed the unfolding of al-Qaeda’s grand strategy with a distinct anti-US thrust. Utilizing its roots in Afghanistan and links with the Jihadi elements from the days of the Soviet occupation of that country, its leadership established its abode and base in Afghanistan. The Arch of Terrorism replaced the Arch of Crisis of the Cold War which was characterized by Soviet incursions of the 1970s, starting from Afghanistan to the Horn of Africa. The bombings of the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya underscored that the terrorists were well trained in carrying out terrorist attacks and were well conversant with the kind of warfare they were to undertake at the global level.

Consequently international concern grew about the illicit funding and terrorist activities of such groups as al Qaeda with an overriding fear of their access to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The nexus between terror groups and criminal activities was established through successive UN Security Council Resolutions adopted from 1997 onwards. These Resolutions dealt with the issues of non-state actors, state’s control over its territories, money laundering, proliferation of WMD and the role and responsibility of the international community in these matters. The critical focus had been on terrorism and measures to deal with this menace through unanimous undertaking within the UN system. The vital theme that emerged was the role and responsibility of the state, particularly relevant in view of the challenges posed by globalization. The

access and reach afforded by globalization to the illicit non-state actors had to be checked and monitored.

The 9/11 attacks brought renewed and intense focuses on Afghanistan and Pakistan. The initial thrust on hunting down al-Qaeda coupled with rebuilding of Afghan nation and institutions, was narrowed down to counter-insurgency. President Obama's goals as enunciated in his December 2009 pronouncement were dismantling, disrupting and destroying al-Qaeda and its networks. The geographical arena of operations and concerted action was converted into AfPak first which then gradually shifted to Pakistan with incursions like Abbotabad, Salala and intensification of drone strikes. With the NATO troops' drawdown deadline of December 2014, the regional environment could be witnessing another wave of change. In this game of chess Pakistan is at the cross roads and a critical juncture. The external dynamics are as crucial for Pakistan as the internal security challenges. Untangling the web of terrorism, extremism and separatism (the Three Evils) and engaging with elements threatening internal peace and law and order has become an imperative for Pakistan that has assumed top-most priority.

The elections in Pakistan of May 2013 have created a new political environment. Although PML (N) has won an overwhelming mandate in the Centre and Punjab, PTI enjoys strength in KPK where it has formed the government. PPP has stood its ground in Sindh and PML (N)-supported government rules in Baluchistan. With varying political agendas of the three parties, it can be argued that the public support essentially rest on different aspirations; end to drone strikes in KPK; revival of economy and trade considerations in Punjab; compassionate handling of insurgency in Baluchistan and purging of disruptive elements in Sindh. This has posed some foreign policy challenges for the government as well. PML (N)'s domestic priorities are predicated on reviving the economy and stabilizing energy situation in the country. For this Prime Minister Nawaz's aim is to work towards peace and stability in the neighborhood by i) stabilizing Afghanistan; ii) pursuing peace with India; iii) leveraging US relations for meeting domestic and external challenges; and iii) developing trade and energy corridors with China, Iran and Central Asia. In all these objectives, the common denominator is the Taliban question (both the TTP and the Afghan Taliban). Hence the government's emphasis is on dialogue with TTP but not ruling out use of force if necessary.

The question of Afghanistan and stabilizing efforts there is a complex task particularly so for Pakistan. Given the prevailing uncertainties about the overall transition in Afghanistan, the fate of peace and reconciliation process and integration if at all of the Taliban, is unpredictable. Coupled with this, is the issue of the final conclusion of the Bilateral Security Agreement between Kabul and Washington which will determine the future security dynamics broadly of the region and more specifically of Afghanistan. President Karzai could be holding the cards close to his chest in so far as the April election maneuvers are concerned. It appears that he sees stakes in the future of Afghanistan too high to leave the political developments in the country to chance. His attempts to retain power within his own circle could spin developments into turbulence. The passing of the torch to the next leadership as elected by the people in a transparent manner could be linked with the tricky question of the Afghan Taliban and their acceptability in the new dispensation.

Under these circumstances Pakistan's primary attention is on domestic issues and assuring people of the government's commitment to fulfilling their expectations. A collective response to the challenges by all the institutions and political leaderships is quintessential to any contemplated strategy. The government of the day is determined to demonstrate wisdom in playing the central role and in using the state authority in the best interest of the country in an effective, transparent and accountable manner. The All Parties Conference (APC) held in September 2013 under the patronage of the PML-N government has resolved to undertake dialogue with the Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan, the umbrella group of various networks operating in Pakistan. Presently the talks appear to be in a nebulous stage. The leadership change in TTP after the killing of Hakeemullah Mehsud seems to have dealt a blow to the talks. TTP now appears to be less inclined to enter into dialogue. They could very well be pre-occupied with internal consolidation and consultations on their future objectives and strategy.

Resumption of leadership by Fazalullah the radio mullah of Swat has further complicated matters. He has direct experience of running TTP's campaign in Swat and has his roots in the settled areas of KPK. Along with this development the precarious expansion of theatre of drone operations outside FATA as demonstrated by the Hangu strike, has outraged sentiment in KPK where public anger has led to the halting of NATO's transit movement from Karachi to Torkhum. The attack underscores US resolve to hit the "high value" targets well beyond the

tribal areas. This is a source of grave concern for the government and the people of Pakistan. In order to defuse the existing situation, it would be desirable for the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan to hold consultations and arrive at some common understanding of the issues complicating the overall environment. Both in Afghanistan and Pakistan the governments are facing severe criticism for their inability to protect their people from attacks of an outside power. If democracy is to thrive in both these countries public perceptions and sentiments cannot be overlooked by the political parties. It is broadly in the interest of the region if the governments in the two countries are not pushed to the wall. Overtures of friendship and peace must see reciprocal gestures and good intentions.

The potential of the region is enormous. Peoples of this region deserve a better, stable and prosperous future. The young population needs hope, opportunities and conditions that would allow them to realize their full potential. Fulfillment of these aspirations is a certain path to security, peace and development. While the governments of the region are bound by their policy options, the people and private sector should generate momentum for softening of hard positions that are status quo oriented. Optimism should prevail as the capacity is there to overcome challenges no matter how difficult.

13. Religious and Ethnic Intolerance in Pakistan :

Tackling religious & ethnic intolerance in Pakistan

Group Captain S. M. Hali

(Group Captain Sultan M Hali is a veteran of the Pakistan Air Force, where he flew 4,500 hours, has commanded various operational and training units and also served as Air & Naval Attaché at Riyadh. After retiring from the service, he took up media as a profession and completed his Masters and M Phil in Mass Communication along with broadcast journalism from USA. He has been a pioneer in the electronic media, establishing Indus Vision TV Channel, Private Radio FM Channels and Associated Press of Pakistan (APP)'s Video News Service. He regularly contributes to the print media through articles in The Nation, Nawa-i-Waqt and different national and a number of international journals, besides participating in International and National seminars on security issues.

He has been hosting a bi-weekly English language talk show, "Defence & Diplomacy" on PTV News since March 2009 and now on PTV World since January 2013.

He has authored three books, which are a compilation of his articles:

Pakistan Air Force: Second to None

Nairang-e-Zamana

Defence & Diplomacy

For his meritorious service, Government of Pakistan has conferred upon him Sitara-e-Imtiaz (M.)

Pakistan is suffering from a serious malaise, which stems from a combination of terrorism, extremism and intolerance. Each one of these merits detailed study although they are inter-related. Their cumulative action, which is gnawing at the roots of Pakistan, has become akin to the mythical ten headed Hydra. In Greek mythology, the Lernaean Hydra was an ancient nameless serpent like chthonic water beast (as its name evinces) that possessed many heads—and for each head cut off it grew two more—and poisonous breath so virulent even her tracks were deadly. This monster was so poisonous that she killed men with her breath, and if anyone passed by when she was sleeping, he breathed her tracks and died in the greatest torment. According to legend, the Hydra of Lerna was killed by Heracles as the second of his Twelve Labours. Its lair was the lake of Lerna in the Argolid, though archaeology has borne out the myth that the sacred site was older even than the Mycenaean city

of Argos since Lerna was the site of the myth of the Danaids. Beneath the waters was an entrance to the Underworld, and the Hydra was its guardian.¹

The many forms of intolerance

In Pakistan, intolerance has taken various forms. Sometimes it strikes in the shape of attacks by terror mongers, who are prepared to hit a target of their choice at will. Besides military and security installations, schools, hospitals, markets and places of worship have become their favourite objectives. Pakistan's law enforcement agencies (LEAs) have borne the brunt of the terror attacks. The LEAs attempt to thwart the nefarious designs of terrorists, but they foil one attack or capture miscreants, only to find that many more have taken their place just like the ten headed Hydra. The terrorists have demonstrated the highest degree of barbarism and brutality by targeting innocent civilians. At other instances, these harbingers of hate and revulsion take the shield of the controversial blasphemy law prevalent in Pakistan to strike at personalities and misuse the law to seek personal vendetta.

Intolerance is a form of **Extremism**, which is a term, used to describe the actions or ideologies of individuals or groups outside the perceived political center of a society² or otherwise claimed to violate common standards of *ethics and reciprocity*. It is usually considered by those to whom it is applied to be a pejorative term. It is typically used in reference to political and social ideologies seen as *irrational, counterproductive, unjustifiable*, or otherwise *unacceptable* to a civil society. The term connotes the *illegitimacy* of certain ideas or methods.

In Pakistan, intolerance takes many forms:

- Religious
- Sectarian
- Ethnic
- Fanaticism (Intolerance of people less religious than themselves)
- Vigilantism (Taking the law into one's own hands)

Religious Intolerance

This is the basic form of intolerance, which had raised its ugly head at the time of partition, when both Hindus and Sikhs were being massacred by Muslims, while they were trying to flee to India because the Sikhs and Hindus had earlier, reportedly attacked Muslims in their plight to cross over to independent Pakistan. Since then, sporadic cases of targeting either Hindu or Christian minorities in Pakistan have occurred but not at a large scale till recently.

The legislature of Islam and Pakistan's Constitution:

The Muslim poet-philosopher Sir Allama Muhammad Iqbal first proposed the idea of a Muslim state in northwestern South Asia in his address to the Muslim League at Allahabad in 1930. Islam was thus the basis for the creation and the unification of a separate state. Allama Muhammad Iqbal in 1937, in a letter to Jinnah wrote, "After a long and careful study of Islamic Law I have come to the conclusion that if this system of Law is properly understood and applied, at last the right to subsistence is secured to everybody. But the enforcement and development of the Shariat of Islam is impossible in this country without a free Muslim state or states. This has been my honest conviction for many years and I still believe this to be the only way to solve the problem of bread for Muslims as well as to secure a peaceful India"³.

Despite the call given by Iqbal, Jinnah outlined his vision of Pakistan in an address to the Constituent Assembly, delivered on August 11, 1947. He spoke of an inclusive and impartial government, religious freedom, rule of law and equality for all. He said, "You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the State...We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State...I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in the course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State."⁴

Unfortunately, Mr. Jinnah, who was already terminally sick, after the Independence of Pakistan, was unable to run the affairs of the state and later leaders ignored his inaugural address and its clear cut message of secularism and imposed religion on the Republic instead.

After Jinnah passed away in 1948, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan's efforts were focused on the formulation of a constitution for Pakistan. On 12 March 1949, the State Parliament passed and promulgated the Objectives Resolution, which ultimately declared Islam as state religion of the country. The main objective of the resolution was the "declaration of State's submitting to the democratic faith of Islam and to the sovereignty of God". The resolution was met with great resistance in the state parliament when Law Minister J.N. Mandal resigned from his ministry and criticized the promulgation of the Objectives Resolution. Politicization of Islam in the country further tightened its support when ultra-conservative Clerics passed a "demand draft", called 22 points which called for the preparation of constitution according to Objectives Resolution, in 1950.⁵

In 1973, in a bid to prop his failing government and score brownie points with the religious right, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto compiled and promulgated a new constitution, which was approved by all political parties and the clerics; it had the Objectives Resolution as an integral part of it by virtue of Article 2A of the Constitution⁶. Bhutto further took the extreme steps of declaring the Ahmadis to be placed outside the fold of Islam⁷, outlawed alcohol and drugs and changed the weekend from Sunday to Friday, but no substantive Islamic reform program was implemented and these steps further deepened the chasm and caused greater religious intolerance.

Bhutto's government was toppled by another military dictator, General Zia-ul-Haq, whose Islamization program caused serious umbrage to secularism and the moderates of Pakistan and for the first time provided legislature to the extremists to whip their brand of Islam. He announced the government would enforce *Nizam-e-Mustafa* (Islamic System), a 180 degree turn from Pakistan's predominantly British style secular law, as a preliminary measure to counter what he saw as a lack of true Islam in Pakistan⁸. Starting in February 1979, new penal measures based on Islamic principles of justice went into effect. These carried considerably greater implications for women than for men. A welfare and taxation system based on Zakat and a profit-and-loss banking system were also established in accordance with Islamic prohibitions against usury but were inadequate.

Blasphemy Law

Pakistan's Penal Code Section dates back to pre-partition India when it was introduced in 1860. Section 295, better known as the Blasphemy Law, deals with religious offences and was meant to prevent religious violence. In 1986, Zia-ul-Haq enforced it with full fury and vigour⁹.

The implementation of Islamic laws of Apostasy and Blasphemy in Islamic Republic of Pakistan was an end to religious freedom and harmony among different religious communities. The Muslim majority used blasphemy law against Christians on business rivalry and personal grudges. The victimization of Christians suddenly turned in social crisis when capital punishment was legislated on blasphemy laws. This also further aggravated religious intolerance.

The assassination of Salman Taseer, Governor of Punjab on 4 January 2011, purportedly at the hands of his own security guard confessedly because of the gubernatorial comments against the blasphemy laws is a sad state of affairs. The irony is that the blasphemy law is not divinely ordained; it was manmade and gave human beings the right to consider amending it or repealing it. If anyone had a difference of opinion, both the religion and the Constitution of Pakistan provide a methodology to resolve the issue. The kind of vigilante action resorted to by the

gubernatorial Elite Force guard was totally unconstitutional. It is very unfortunate that on the Friday, preceding Salman Taseer's murder, many of the mosques in Pakistan during the Friday prayers' sermon, were openly condemning Governor Salman Taseer for expressing solidarity with Ms. Asiya, the alleged blasphemous Christian, sentenced to death; a day before the murder, SMS were being texted to cell phones all over the country by unknown persons, urging action against people considering the repeal or amendment of the blasphemy law. Some individuals had gone to the extent of announcing head money for anyone who would eliminate the Punjab Governor. This should have been taken cognizance of by both the judiciary and the religious leadership. Unfortunately, a number of religious leaders who appeared on various TV Channels after the assassination of Salman Taseer refused to condemn the heinous act and thought that the vigilante elite guard, who killed the Punjab Governor, was justified in his act and should be set free. What is even more ironical is the fact that when Mr. Qadri, the Governor's security guard, who had gunned him down, was showered with rose petals¹⁰, when he was brought to Islamabad Court for a remand.

Fallout of Afghan Jihad

Religious intolerance in Pakistan has been further nurtured by the jihadists in Afghanistan and the fallout of their extremism in Pakistan, which has permeated into the Pakistani milieu. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the over five million Afghans who sought refuge in Pakistan, were carefully recruited and trained by a combination of CIA and ISI to conduct jihad against the Soviet "invaders". Muslims from various countries around the globe responded to the clarion call given for participating in the "holy war" to route the "infidel" Soviets from the oppressed Islamic State of Afghanistan. The CIA had its own agenda to stop USSR in its tracks. This was the first time in the Cold War era that the US had the upper hand and the means to destabilize Soviet Union. Pakistan had its own reasons for becoming an ally of the Occident because in realization of Peter The Great's dream, the Soviets would not have stopped in Afghanistan but were likely to push onwards through Pakistan, to reach the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. Pakistan was thus fighting the battle for its own survival.

Arabs of different ilk, Chechens, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Muslims from Australia, Britain, China, Indonesia, Philippines, the US and a number of countries joined the jihad to liberate Afghanistan. That was the beginning of Al-Qaida, which ironically was nurtured by the CIA, who pumped in funds from its own sources as well from oil rich Arab states, supplied weapons, logistics and even jihadi literature to motivate the Islamic warriors to fight the "just" war.¹¹

Unfortunately, when the Soviets ultimately retreated from Afghanistan, some of the holy warriors returned to their homeland but the Uzbeks,

Chechens and numerous others, who had burnt their boats, chose to stay back. Thousands of Pakistanis had joined this Jihad and battle-hardened, they returned to their homeland but quite a few stayed back. Armed to the teeth and trained in the art of guerrilla warfare, these holy warriors were never de-indoctrinated and became virtual Frankenstein, as they were spoiling for combat. The Soviet retreat and US hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan left a power vacuum and internecine wars between the tribal warlords, each vying for control, wreaked more havoc in Afghanistan. Taking advantage of the chaos and strife, a group of young students called the “Taliban”, who had been trained in various seminaries of Pakistan, wrested control from the warlords and became the new rulers¹². This group was not only rigidly orthodox but revived the extreme punishments under Islamic law and because of their severity and fundamentalism, infuriated the rest of the world. The Taliban also provided sanctuary to the Al-Qaeda and its hardliner leader Osama bin Laden and his equally severe deputy Aiman Al-Zawahiri.

9/11 occurred and the Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the heinous attack. The US insisted on the Taliban to handover Osama bin Laden to them for trial. Pakistan too urged its erstwhile allies the Taliban to do the rightful thing but Mullah Omar, the Taliban Amir, refused. US, NATO and their allies launched a massive attack on Afghanistan and occupied it, toppling the Taliban, who opting for discretion to be a better part of valour, retreated to the mountains bordering Afghanistan and Pakistan. The US bombed the territory but failed to subdue the Al-Qaeda or the Taliban, who sought safe haven in the treacherous terrain, where they regrouped and wreaked havoc in both Pakistan and Afghanistan through terror attacks. In Afghanistan, their major targets were the allied forces while in Pakistan; their local counterparts, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) assailed the armed forces which were perceived to be US allies¹³. Ordinary civilians also became cannon fodder. The renewed wave of religious intolerance received fresh impetus and the harbingers of sectarian intolerance had a field day, looking for soft targets in the shape of Shias, while Christians and even Hindus were not spared. Pakistan is still grappling with this menace, which refuses to die down.

Sectarian Intolerance

Violence amongst sects is once again raising its ugly head in various parts of Pakistan. It is a misfortune for Muslims that this demon is also used by enemies of Islam to destabilize them by creating rifts between the Shias and Sunnis in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and other parts of the Islamic world. The feuding reaches such a bloody frenzy that it is nothing short of carnage resembling communal violence. The hatred stoked by vested interests, forces brothers to turn on brothers only on the basis of their sect. At times the enemies of Islam perpetrate the crime

against one sect and lay the blame on the other, fanning retaliation and hatred.

Pakistan is a country where different faiths dwelled in harmony and were free to practice and preach their religious beliefs but the last two decades have witnessed a frightening upsurge in the Shia-Sunni sectarian violence, both in terms of scope and intensity. It is still not clear whether the seeds of dissension were sown in the Zia era, where a religious upheaval by the Sunnis erupted or are the fallout of the Afghan jihad, which spilled over across the Durand Line into Pakistan or the divide was artificially created by external protagonists to destabilize Pakistan or a proxy war is being launched between two international forces, Iran is reportedly aiding and abetting the Shia sect, while the Saudis are providing the motivation, monetary support and agenda to target the Shias.

President Zia-ul-Haq himself, who favoured a return to Islamic orthodoxy, reportedly became a target of the sectarian divide. Various Islamic laws were promulgated in Pakistan during his regime but since most were only cosmetic changes or harsh extremist punitive measures like public flogging, chopping of limbs of thieves and stoning to death of those guilty of moral turpitude; they only deepened the abyss of differences rather than bridge them. The broad daylight assassination of Shia scholar and respected cleric Allama Arif ul Al Hussaini, purportedly led to a vindictive plot to eliminate Zia-ul-Haq. Pakistan-One, the Presidential C-130 carrying 39 other senior officers of the armed forces and the US Ambassador and Defence Attaché accredited to Pakistan was brought down through sabotage and incapacitated by deliberate targeting, killing all on board¹⁴.

The resultant religious bedlam has plagued the Pakistani milieu, which has been exploited by vested interests. There appears to be a method in the madness. Rallies, congregations and places of worship of both Shias and Sunnis may have been assailed by a third party, with each side blaming the other and retaliating with counterattacks, creating more chaos.

Frequent clashes between the two sects have left hundreds dead and thousands injured, including Iranian diplomats, senior state functionaries and important religious leaders on both sides. The recent sectarian strife has engulfed even those areas, which were previously unaffected, largely because of the interference of hostile agencies and emergence of organized terrorists group along sectarian lines. Besides target killings, these groups now hit even ordinary members of each other sects, whenever and wherever they find it operationally convenient. The multitude of attacks launched this holy month of Moharram, leaving a trail of death and destruction are not limited to isolated localities

rather it has now become a national concern with serious implications for the state and society¹⁵.

Ethnic Intolerance

This form involves the intolerance of people of other castes or origin; for example, Sindhis and Mohajirs fighting in Sindh or the Hazaras and Balochis targeting each other in Balochistan and so on. The ethnic divide in Sindh has been further widened with the addition of Pathan settlers. Resultantly, the killing fields of Karachi, the capital of Sindh province and the commercial hub of Pakistan have become a turf war with each ethnic group vying for ultimate control.¹⁶

Ethnic intolerance stems from the original Arab society, when the Arabs considered themselves to be superior of the other races, labeling the rest as *Ajmis* or mutes¹⁷. Although a majority of the Muslims in the Indo-Pak sub-continent do not originate from the Arabs but are converts from Hinduism or other religions, yet they have maintained that false sense of superiority.

With the independence of Pakistan, the West Pakistanis used to consider themselves superior to the Bengalis of East Pakistan and suffered its breakaway in 1971. Narrow nationalism, callous disregard and extreme prejudice drove the Bengalis away from the federation although they were in the forefront of the Pakistan Movement. One of Pakistan's pioneering and brilliant bureaucrats Qudratullah Shahab, in his memoirs *Shahabnama*¹⁸, writes when he was serving as undersecretary with Pakistan's first Minister for Economic Affairs, Labour, Works & Rehabilitation, I.I. Chundrigar, during a meeting being held in the office of the Commerce Minister, Ghulam Muhammad, the agenda was to discuss the import of sanitary fittings for the official buildings under construction. There were four Ministers present, including Maulana Fazal-ur Rahman, the lone cabinet member from East Pakistan and a number of high officials attending the meeting. After prolonged discussions, the quantity, quality and quota of the sanitary fittings was decided. Maulana Fazal-ur-Rahman, who was the Minister for Information, Interior and Education, proposed that some quota for sanitary fittings for East Pakistan or at least the provincial capital Dhaka should also be allocated. The other participants at the meeting, who were all from West Pakistan, burst into laughter and one Minister coldheartedly remarked that "you Bengalis relieve yourselves in fields and behind banana trees, why do you need sanitary systems?" Qudratullah Shahab sadly comments that perhaps the foundations of Bangladesh were laid that day.¹⁹

The wanton targeting of the Hazaras in Balochistan is both a case of ethnic as well as religious intolerance. Baloch origin inhabitants of the province look down upon the Hazaras, who are a hard working race but

belong to the Shia sect. In the near past, they have also been targeted by the rabid anti-Shia militant group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, which owes allegiance to the Al-Qaeda and there appears to be no respite.

Fanaticism

This phenomenon leads to people adopting airs if they themselves follow the tenets of Islam religiously but tend to look down upon those who are less religious than them. The seeds for this dangerous tendency were also sown during the reign of General Zia ul Haq, who encouraged the outwardly show of religiosity and looked down upon those who did not participate in this wanton exhibitionism of piety. The credit for turning our unbiased, evenhanded and peaceful society into a hub of fanaticism and planting seeds of radicalism goes to none other than General Zia ul Haq. Prior to his nefarious rule, Shia, Sunni, Barelvi, Deobandi and people of all other schools of thought had been living with dignity, mutual love and respect. They did have religious and sectarian differences but were not engaged in physical or verbal clashes. Despite annoyances, they were not thirsty for each other's blood. Just one person — Zia ul Haq — was responsible for staining our streets with blood and our prolific brains with the destructive germs of extremism.²⁰

Zia ul Haq promoted the outward demonstration of virtue and those who wanted to curry favours with him joined the bandwagon. Fanatics had a field day looking down upon others deemed to be less religious and settled scores with their rivals by painting them as “disbelievers” and reporting them to the religious police, who meted the harsh punishments promulgated by Zia ul Haq. The result is the badly misled and divided society in Pakistan, which remains fractured and confused.

The Taliban exploited the situation, when they overran Swat, Mingora and Waziristan. They imposed their brand of *Sharia* laws, re-imposing the harsh and brutal laws of public flogging, chopping of arms and stoning to death. The sad part is that a number of people in Pakistan identify with them and hail them as heroes. The successful targeting by a US drone strike of one of the most brutal mass murderers, the erstwhile leader of TTP, Hakimullah Mehsud is a case in point. The marauder and heartless assassin of innocent women, children and law enforcing personnel has been declared a “Martyr” by the religious parties²¹ only because it was the US that exterminated him, thus adding to the chaos, confusion and mayhem, and also exposing the duplicity of the so called religious leaders. To rub salt in the wound, another politico-religious leader in Pakistan, Maulana Fazalur Rahman decreed that “even a dog killed by the US will be deemed as a martyr”.²²

Vigilantism

It is defined as some individuals or groups taking the law into their own hands. A recent example is the students of Jamia Hafsa, who in 2007

had decided to raid brothels and punish its inmates and destroy CD and Video shops.²³ Emboldened by the government's initial lack of action, their spate of vigilantism erupted in the carnage of Lal Masjid.

Another form of vigilantism, which the Pakistani milieu is suffering from, is that being executed by the media. Owing to successive military regimes in Pakistan, the media remained oppressed. After the demise of General Zia ul Haq, Benazir Bhutto liberated the Press. Pakistan's last military dictator General Pervez Musharraf tried to take media freedom to another level by issuing licenses to private FM radio and TV channels. This new found freedom was too much and too soon since effective regulatory legislation was not in place. Resultantly, some elements of the electronic media, among other malpractices, adopted the disturbing practice of "vigilante journalism" aimed at exposing people — often ordinary members of the public — they claim are breaching social morals²⁴. Many TV anchors on private TV Channels raise issues and then indulge in vigilantism; adopting the role of judge, jury and executioner themselves.

There is the extreme case of a televangelist Dr. Aamer Liaquat Khan, who has been hosting religious programmes on ARY TV and Geo TV of Pakistan, where he has been preaching Islam. On 7 September 2008 Hussain dedicated an entire show to Ahmadis²⁵. Liaquat was adamant in exploring the beliefs of the Ahmadis, a heterodox sect which has been declared as "un-Islamic" by much of the orthodox Muslims. In it, two scholars said that anyone who associated with false prophets was "worthy of murder". Within two days, two prominent Ahmadis were killed, one of them being a physician and another being a community leader. The televangelist was sacked from the TV Channel but has returned again to spew venom.

In another case, in January 2012, TV anchor Maya Khan caused a storm of protest with her show "Raid in the Morning", in which she and a group of veiled women chased couples in a park accusing them of behaving immorally. Many fled, but Khan pounced on one couple and badgered them with questions, tricking them into answering by telling them the camera was not running. The show provoked furious criticism on social networking websites Facebook and Twitter, and eventually a 5,000-name petition forced bosses at **Samaa** TV station to sack her.²⁶ Despite this stern action, some elements of the media continue practicing their brand of vigilantism and abusing their new found freedom.

Tackling religious and ethnic intolerance in Pakistan

To stem the rot that has set in, a Herculean effort will be required to slay the dragon of religious and ethnic intolerance in Pakistan. There is neither a quick fix nor any easy solution. So far successive regimes have

been applying superficial measures, which have failed because like the mythical ten headed Hydra, they only tried chopping off the head, which resulted in two more growing in its place. Like Heracles, we have to destroy the body of the Hydra in order to slay it. General Pervez Musharraf tried his scheme of introducing “enlightened moderation”²⁷ but since he was keen to take the society to the other extreme of permissiveness and moral depravity, it only emboldened the extremists.

Religious intolerance and bigotry has permeated in the Pakistani society to such an extent that disagreement of views is construed as a terrible crime and dissent leads to murder and elimination. This heinous practice is in direct contravention to the tenets of Islam, which preaches tolerance. The Holy Prophet (pbuh) himself forgave his opponents and was kind and magnanimous towards those who chose to differ with him. How can those who bear the torch of love for the Holy Prophet (pbuh), kill and maim their fellow beings for mere difference of opinion. The masses being devoid of in-depth knowledge of Islam; get carried away by the emotional appeal to their so called reverence of Islam and The Holy Prophet (pbuh). It is imperative that the record is set straight in light of teachings of the Holy Qurān, the practice (Sunnah) and Hadith attributed to the Holy Prophet (pbuh) and research and studies of erudite scholars.

Even a cursory glance of the teachings show Islam to be a religion of mercy to all people, both Muslims and non-Muslims. There is no place for religious intolerance in Islam, but unfortunately it has pervaded the Pakistani society to such an extent that bigoted pseudo religious leaders have distorted the tenets of Islam and are preaching violence against perceived offenders against Islam. The Holy Prophet (pbuh) was described as being a mercy in the Qurān due to the message he brought for humanity:

“We sent thee not, but as a mercy for all creatures.”
(Qurān 21:107)²⁸

When a person analyzes the legislations of Islam with an open mind, the Mercy mentioned in the above quoted verse will definitely become apparent. One of the aspects constituting an epitome of this Mercy is the way the legislations of Islam deal with people of other faiths. The tolerant attitude of Islam towards non-Muslims, whether they are those residing in their own countries or within the Muslim lands, can be clearly seen through a study of history.

Treaty with Christians of Najran

A delegation of 60 Christians living in the community of Najran, some 600 km south of Medina, the city where the Prophet Mohammed (pbuh) resided, went at his place as a delegation in year 631. The talks between the representatives of a community monotheist with the founder of

another lasted three days. They made it possible to once and for all clarify the model of Muslim ethics with respect to other religions. The text of the treaty, the original of which is available at the St. Catherine's Monastery at Sinai, with the seal of the Holy Prophet (pbuh), bears testimony that the meeting with the Christians of Najran evoked above was not, far from there, an event isolated in the life from the Prophet, who testifies constantly to the permanence of his interreligious relations. A pact presents proof thereof:

"In the name of lenient and miséricordieux God."
"Charter of protection given by God and his Apostle to those which received the Book, with the Christians who belong to the religion of Najran or any other sect Christian. It was written to them by Mohammad, envoy of God close to all the men, in pledge of protection on behalf of God and his Apostle, and so that this is for the Moslems who will come after him a pact which will engage them, that they will have to admit, to recognize for authentic and to observe in their favor. It is defended with any man, was it governor or holder of authority, the enfrendre or to modify it. The Believers will not have to be the responsibility of the Christians, in their imposing of other conditions that those which are carried in this writing. That which will preserve it, which will respect it, which will conform to what is contained there, will discharge its duties and will observe the pact of the Apostle of God. That which, on the contrary, will violate it, which will be opposed to it, which will change it, will relate its crime to its head; because it will have betrayed the pact of God, will have violated his faith, will have resisted its authority and contravened the will of its Apostle: he will be thus impostor with the eyes of God. Because the religion that God imposed, and the pact whom it made, make protection obligatory. That which will not observe this pact, will violate its sacred duties, and that which violates its sacred duties does not have fidelity and will be disavowed by God and all the sincere Believers. The reason for which the Christians deserved to obtain this pact of protection of God, his Envoy and the Believers, is a right which they were acquired, and which engages whoever is Moslem, to obtain this charter established in their favor by the men of this Religion and which forces any Moslem to have regard there, to lend to him hand-strong, to preserve it, keep it perpetually and to respect it accurately. "

The protection of God and the guarantee of the Prophet Muhammad, extend on Najran and neighborhood, that is to say on their goods, their people, the practice of their worship, their absent and present, their families and their sanctuaries, and all that large and small, is in their possession.

"This is a message from Muhammad ibn Abdullah, as a covenant to those who adopt Christianity, near and far, we are with them.

Verily I, the servants, the helpers, and my followers defend them, because Christians are my citizens; and by Allah! I hold out against anything that displeases them.

No compulsion is to be on them. Neither are their judges to be removed from their jobs nor their monks from their monasteries. No one is to destroy a house of their religion, to damage it, or to carry anything from it to the Muslims' houses. Should anyone take any of these, he would spoil God's covenant and disobey His Prophet. Verily, they are my allies and have my secure charter against all that they hate.

No one is to force them to travel or to oblige them to fight. The Muslims are to fight for them.

If a female Christian is married to a Muslim, it is not to take place without her approval. She is not to be prevented from visiting her church to pray. "29

The powers that be at Islamabad need to get their act together, if they are serious about eradicating the society of the scourge of religious and ethnic intolerance, they require to put in place a concerted effort, which should be based on a well thought out strategy. The need of the hour is to muster the support of credible opinion builders, which includes members of the clergy, media, academia as well as the judiciary. One of the first steps would be to re-examine the harsh and stringent laws which have empowered the extremists and provide them a whiplash to attack the hapless victims in the garb of purging the society of evildoers. An important measure would be to revise the syllabus being taught to Muslim students under the subject of Islamiyat both in the Federal Board system, in private schools and at the religious seminaries, the madrassas. Firstly, the curriculum must contain in-depth knowledge of Islam, so that the young minds can discern the true message from that being propagated by the hate mongers; secondly, any syllabi, which inculcate messages of hate and revulsion, must be removed.

Revisiting the Blasphemy Law

Islam is a religion of peace and does not justify slaying people unless they have taken up arms against Islam or the state. The decision for action rests with the state and not clerics. The religion professes armed action only as a last resort; first they should be asked to stop their aggression, next they should be told categorically that if they do not lay down arms, their aggression will be met with force, and if they persist, then the use of force is authorized, only by the state. Difference of opinion should be resolved with dialogue and not the use of brute force³⁰.

Let us examine the case of slaying Salman Taseer. In this case, it was being professed that Salman Taseer's comments of calling the Blasphemy Law as a "Black Law" hurt the feelings of devout Muslims and thus he

was eliminated. The Blasphemy Law is unfortunately one-sided; it prescribes punishment for the blasphemer but the accuser, especially if he misuses the law, goes scot free even if he levies charges, which are false or guided by personal grudges against the accused. It was this aspect that Salman Taseer wanted revisited.

Pakistanis must be reminded that the Holy Prophet (pbuh) was himself the most tolerant of humans. The case of the infidel old woman, in the days of early Islam should be recounted as an example. She would throw garbage upon the person of the Holy Prophet (pbuh), whenever he would pass her street on his way to the prayers, forcing him to go back home and change his clothes. When she did not appear one day to conduct her abhorrent deed, the Holy Prophet (pbuh) went to her home to inquire upon her welfare. He discovered that she was lying sick with no one to attend her. The Holy Prophet (pbuh) looked after her, and when she regained health, she was so impressed by the Holy Prophet's (pbuh) conduct that she converted to Islam. We may also recall the occasion, when during a battle, Hazrat Ali (rau) floored an infidel warrior and was about to behead him when he spat on the face of Hazrat Ali (rau), who spared his life stating that "I was going to kill you since you were an enemy of Allah, but when you spat on my face, you became my personal enemy and I would not like to take a life on personal enmity".³¹

A dissenting view but whiff of fresh air

It is sad to note that not a single religious leader in Pakistan condemned the assassination of Salman Taseer. It would not be out of place here to quote a statement from New Delhi-based Maulana Wahiduddin Khan's response to the assassination of Salman Taseer in an article published in the *Times of India*, insisting that the punishment of death for blasphemy, as prescribed in Pakistan's blasphemy law, had no sanction in Islam at all.

The Maulana's notation is like a whiff of fresh air since his views on the appropriate Islamic punishment for blasphemy, particularly for defaming the Holy Prophet (pbuh), are diametrically opposed to those of the mullahs and doctrinaire Islamists, who detest him. The Maulana does not condone blasphemy, even in the name of free speech, of course, but nor does he agree with those Muslims who insist that Islam prescribes the death penalty for those guilty of it. He first articulated his position on the subject in a book titled *Shatim-e-Rasul Ka Masala: Quran wa Hadith aur Fiqh wa Tarikh ki Raushni Mai* (Defaming the Prophet (pbuh): In the light of the Qurān, Hadith, Fiqh and History). The book, comprising a number of articles penned in the wake of the massive controversy that shook the world over the publication of Salman Rushdie's infamous *Satanic Verses*, was published in 1997. It is a powerful critique, using Islamic arguments, of the strident anti-Rushdie

agitation and of the argument that the Islamic punishment for blasphemy is death. Although Khan condemned the **Satanic Verses** as blasphemous, he argued that stirring up Muslim passions and baying for Rushdie's blood was neither the rational nor the properly Islamic way of countering the book and its author. Death for blasphemy, he contended, using references from the Qurān and the corpus of Hadith to back his stance, was not prescribed in Islam, in contrast to what Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini, and, echoing him, millions of Muslims worldwide, ardently believed.

Khan was possibly one of the only Islamic scholars to forcefully condemn the death sentence on Rushdie that Khomeini had announced and that vast numbers of Muslims, Shias and Sunnis, imagined was their religious duty to fulfill. Although his book deals specifically with the issue of blaspheming the Holy Prophet (pbuh) in the context of the anti-Rushdie agitation, it is of immediate relevance to the ongoing debate about the blasphemy laws and the violence it engenders in Pakistan today. What is particularly fascinating about the book is that it uses Islamic arguments to counter the widespread belief among Muslims that death is the punishment laid down in Islam for blasphemy as well as for those who, like the late Salman Taseer, oppose such punishment. Addressing the issue from within an Islamic paradigm, with the help of copious quotes from the Qurān and Hadith, Khan's case against death for blasphemers would, one supposes, appear more convincing to Muslims than secular human rights arguments against Pakistan's deadly blasphemy law that has unleashed such havoc in the country.³²

In order to attempt to bridge the divide, it will be relevant to present a case of what Islam has to say on religious tolerance. The just relations between Muslims and people of other faiths were not due to mere politics played by Muslim rulers, but rather they were a direct result of the teachings of the religion of Islam, one which preaches that people of other religions be free to practice their own faith, only accepting the guidance offered by Islam by their own choice. Allah ordains in the Qurān:

“Let there be no compulsion in religion...” (Qurān 2:256)³³

Not only does Islam demand their freedom to practice religion, but also that they be treated justly as any other fellow human. Warning against any abuse of non-Muslims in an Islamic society, the Prophet (pbuh) stated:

“Beware! Whoever is cruel and hard on a non-Muslim minority, curtails their rights, burdens them with more than they can bear, or takes anything from them against their free will; I (Prophet

Muhammad) will complain against the person on the Day of Judgment.” (Abu Dawud)³⁴

How far is this mannerism than the majority of nations, to this day, which not only suppress the rights of foreign religions, but also foreign peoples and races! In a time when Muslims were being tortured to death in then pagan Makah, Jews were being persecuted in Christian Europe and various peoples were being subjugated due to their particular race or caste, Islam called to the just treatment of all peoples and religions, due to its merciful tenets which gave humanity the right to their humanness:

“The punishment of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger, and strive with might and main for mischief through the land is: execution, or crucifixion, or the cutting off of hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile from the land: that is their disgrace in this world, and a heavy punishment is theirs in the Hereafter [Qurān 5:33]³⁵

In Islam, a person who has committed blasphemy can either be killed or crucified, or his opposite hands and feet can be cut off, or he can be exiled from that land. On the other hand, in other religions there is no other option except capital punishment. Islam at least has four options of punishment for an act of blasphemy.

Islam protects humanity

Islam abhors needless killing and exhorts the protection of the lives of the entire humanity. The Qurān is emphatic:

“If you kill an innocent human, it is as though you have killed the entire humanity.”

(Qurān 5:32)³⁶

The beauty of this verse is that Allah pointedly decries the slaying of all humanity and not Muslims alone. Many mistakenly believe that Islam does not tolerate the existence of other religions present in the world. The lives of the practitioners of other religions in the Muslim society are also given protective status. In addition to the Qurānic teachings, the Holy Prophet (pbuh) exhorted:

“Whoever kills a person who has a truce with the Muslims will never smell the fragrance of Paradise.”

(Hadith: *Saheeh Muslim*)³⁷

In the Madinan society since the upper hand was with the Muslims, the Holy Prophet (pbuh) strictly warned against any maltreatment of people of other faiths:

“Beware! Whoever is cruel and hard on a non-Muslim minority, or curtails their rights, or burdens them with more than they can bear, or takes anything from them against their free will; I (Prophet Muhammad) will complain against the person on the Day of Judgment.” (Hadith: *Abu Dawud*)³⁸

The Arabian Peninsula during the time of the Prophet (pbuh) was a region in which various faiths were present. There were Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, polytheists, and others not affiliated with any religion. When one looks into the life of the Prophet (pbuh), one may draw on many examples to portray the high level of tolerance shown to people of other faiths.

In order to understand and judge this tolerance, one must look into the period in which Islam was a formal state, with the specific laws laid down by the Prophet (pbuh) in accordance with the tenets of religion. Even though one can observe many examples of tolerance shown by the Prophet (pbuh) in the thirteen years of his stay in Mecca, one may incorrectly think that it was only due to seeking to raise the profile of the Muslims and the social status of Islam and in general. For this reason, the discussion will be limited to the period which commenced with the migration of the Prophet (pbuh) to Medina, and specifically once the constitution was set.

The Saheefah

The best example of the tolerance shown by the Prophet (pbuh) to other religions may be the constitution itself, called the ***Saheefah*** by early historians.³⁹ When the Prophet (pbuh) migrated to Medina, his role as a mere religious leader ended; he was now the political leader of a state, governed by the precepts of Islam, which demanded that clear laws of governance be laid out to ensure harmony and stability in a society which once had been distraught by decades of war, one which must ensure the peaceful coexistence of Muslims, Jews, Christians and polytheists. Due to this, the Prophet (pbuh) laid down a ‘constitution’ which detailed the responsibilities of all parties which resided in Medina, their obligations towards each other, and certain restrictions which were placed on each. All parties were to obey what was mentioned therein, and any breach of its articles was regarded as an act of treachery.

One Nation

The first article of the constitution was that all the inhabitants of Medina, the Muslims as well as those who had entered the pact from the Jews, Christian, and idolaters, were **“one nation to the exclusion of all others.”** All were considered members and citizens of Medina society regardless of religion, race, or ancestry. People of other faiths were

protected from harm as much as the Muslims, as is stated in another article, **“To the Jews who follow us belong help and equity. He shall not be harmed nor his enemies be aided.”**⁴⁰ Previously, each tribe had their alliances and enemies within and without Medina. The Prophet (pbuh) gathered these different tribes under one system of governance which upheld pacts of alliances previously in existence between those individual tribes. All tribes had to act as a whole with disregard to individual alliances. Any attack on other religion or tribe was considered an attack on the state and upon the Muslims as well.

The tolerance of the Holy Prophet (pbuh) towards other religions

The Holy Prophet (pbuh) was conscious of the responsibility Muslim leadership had towards respecting and tolerating other religions. He made it clear that anything other than tolerance would not be tolerated, and that, although all were members of a society, each had their separate religion which could not be violated. Each was allowed to practice their beliefs freely without any hindrances, and no acts of provocation would be tolerated.

There are many other articles of this constitution which may be discussed, but emphasis will be placed on an article which states, “If any dispute or controversy likely to cause trouble should arise, it must be referred to God and His Messenger.” This clause maintained that all inhabitants of the state must recognize a higher level of authority, and in those matters which involved various tribes and religions, justice could not be meted out by individual leaders; rather it must be adjudicated by the leader of the state himself or his designated representatives. It was allowed, however, for individual tribes who were not Muslims, to refer to their own religious scriptures and their learned men in regards to their own personal affairs. They could though, if they opted, ask the Prophet to judge between them in their matters. God says in the Qurān:

“...If they do come to thee, either judge between them or decline to interfere...”
(Qurān 5:42)⁴¹

Here we see that Prophet (pbuh) allowed each religion to judge in their own matters according to their own scriptures, as long as it did not stand in opposition to articles of the constitution, a pact which took into account the greater benefit of the peaceful co-existence of the society.⁴²

Here we find such outstanding examples from the life and practice of the Holy Prophet (pbuh) and his companions that there is no room for misinterpretation of Islam. Unfortunately, owing to vested interests, myopic vision and misplaced loyalties, we see religious and ethnic intolerance on the rise. A relevant example to this effect is quoted below.

Misplaced loyalties

On 27 May, 2005, a suicide bomber in the capital, Islamabad, killed 19 people and wounded nearly 100 in an attack on a shrine where hundreds of Shias had gathered. That same day, religious parties had organized a rally after the Friday prayers to protest the desecration of the Holy Qurān in Guantanamo Bay prison camp. The casualties of the Bari Imam shrine were being rushed to various hospitals of Islamabad. A state of emergency had been declared in the hospitals to meet the crisis situation. The wounded and the injured required immediate medical attention and blood. Students of various institutions and other volunteers rushed to do their civic duty. Islamic parties missed a grand opportunity to divert their protest rally to help the casualties and ease the suffering of the blast victims and aid the hapless relatives who were going from pillar to post to locate their loved and dear ones. The street power that the religious parties had rallied, could have been immediately mobilized, firstly to aid the victims, secondly task forces could have been organized to assist the transportation of the casualties, the evacuation of the affectees and help the relatives have access to the casualty lists and soothe their grief and mental agony. Edhi ambulances could be seen rushing to and fro plying between the blast site and various hospitals and emergency set ups.

The religious parties considered the protest rally to be of paramount importance. One is reminded of the year 570 of the Christian era that blissfully happened to be the year of the birth our Master (Mohammed)—May peace of the Allah and Blessing be upon him and his progeny—Abraha, the Abyssinian potentate of the Yemen invaded Makah. The invading horde plundered the herd of camels belonging to ‘Abd’ l-Muttalib the Makkan Chief, who confronted Abraha for their return. The pompous Abyssinian invader Abraha showed surprise at ‘Abd’ l-Muttalib’s demand and remarked that I thought you would ask for your Kaaba to be spared but instead you demand the return of your camels only. The astute, ‘Abd’ l-Muttalib replied that the protector of Kaaba would take care of it; I am responsible for my camels and demand them back. He indeed got them back from Abraha; while Allah verily dealt with the invaders of Makah; in such a manner that it has become a lesson for would be plunderers of the holy Kaaba.

The Qurān would have been in no immediate danger if the religious parties had deferred their protest rally to serve humanity in its moment of grief and pain. The political mileage they would have received from their gesture of serving mankind in its moment of distress would have transcended them to a much higher elevation of public respect. Alas they missed a great opportunity.⁴³

How to stem the rot?

This scribe proposes that to create religious tolerance among Pakistanis, opinion builders of all shades of life must come forward to play a positive role. Community leaders, intellectuals, politicians, the media, school, college and university teachers all can contribute. Unfortunately, in our society, the religious teacher and the Imam of the mosque are very powerful as they can mould opinions from their pulpit. They need to realize that the people should be led with the teachings of Islam which propagates tolerance and not intolerance. So far some of them had used their power of the gab to mould public opinion in the style of demagoguery and instigating their followers on the hate trail. We have our work cut out to bring the people back to the credibility of tolerance if we want to secure the future of our successive generations otherwise they will be doomed to repeat the same mistakes and perish in ignominy, unsung, unheralded.

Short-term measures to check extremism included ban on militant organizations, action against publications spreading hate and check on the misuse of loudspeakers at worship places, while long-term measures include Madrassa reforms and improvement in religious syllabi.

Whereas some of the efforts of the government have borne fruit in reducing the vice of sectarianism and religious violence to some extent, however, it requires the wholehearted efforts of every law abiding and peace loving citizen of Pakistan to join hands to completely eradicate this malice.

A major step necessitates creation of the spirit of tolerance of each other's views, however diverse they may be from one's own; simultaneously, impressing upon the consideration of curbing the urge of expressing opinions critical of other religions, sects, and creed or insulting sanctities, beliefs and faith in the name of freedom of speech.

Violence only begets more violence; difference of opinion can be best resolved through dialogue and discussion. If we have to progress as a nation and evolve as a harmonious and peace loving society, we have to accept each other's point of view and not play in the hands of the enemy within and without, which would jump at the opportunity to exploit any weakness to implant seditious thoughts, create friction and discord to subvert Pakistan.

Extremism is repugnant to the spirit of Islam, which is the religion of peace. There is no place for radicalism, bigotry and prejudice in our religious conviction. Whereas the government is primarily responsible for the maintenance of law and order, it is the conscientiousness of the religious leaders, academics and opinion builders including the media to

instill the message of hope, trust and building harmonious relations among the diverse citizens and help to mould them into a unified society. It needs to be infused in the minds of the common folk that those who attack shrines of saints, mosques, schools and Madrassas, are no friends of Islam. Attacking Tombs of Khushal Khan Khattak in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or Hazrat Data Ganj Bakhsh Rahmatullah Ilaih situated in the heart of Lahore are an abominable deed and amount to desecration of the holy places. Take the case of the Data Durbar, which has become not only an attraction for the devout from all over the country but culturally people living close to the shrine have become emotionally and economically dependent on the shrine. Food stalls, flower sellers and numerous beggars are dependent on Shrine visitors. On special occasions, the shrine is lit up with lights; dinner is prepared for hundreds of people and Fakirs dance around and musicians play music for hours. In the boundary of the shrine, the faithful recite the Qurān incessantly and pay tributes to the Holy Prophet (pbuh). The heinous attack took place, deliberately on a Thursday, when a maximum number of visitors congregate to pay homage to the Saint, taking a deadly toll of 40 lives and hundreds of wounded.

Religious intolerance takes various shapes. Friday May 28, 2010, while being observed as *Youm-e-Takbeer* to commemorate the twelfth anniversary of Pakistan's nuclear tests elsewhere, will go down in the history of Lahore as the deadliest in recent times. Religious intolerance struck two places of worship of Ahmadis in Lahore with full fury, taking a massive toll of more than 80 dead and more than 100 injured. Armed militants, some of them wearing explosives, stormed the twin places of worship in Model Town and Garhi Shahu areas, hurling hand grenades and firing at hundreds of people gathered for Friday prayers. A militant group associated with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attacks in a message sent to media outlets after the incident⁴⁴.

The message brings a macabre twist to the erstwhile reign of terror by the fear mongers. The twin attacks in Lahore on the minority group is a chilling reminder that the grim reapers of death and destruction, targeted them with the perverse aim of garnering support by preaching hate for the targeted group. 'We accept the responsibility of today's sacred attacks at the Ahmadis, who do not accept Prophet Mohammad as last prophet, indulge in conspiracies against Mujahedeen (holy warriors), and also cooperated with the Jews for the sacrilegious sketches of the Prophet on YouTube and Face book,' the militants said. 'We give the Ahmadis a last warning through the attacks to either quit Pakistan or get ready to die at the hands of the lovers of the prophet.' Lahore has witnessed a number of bloody militant attacks in recent months, including on the military officials and cultural sites. But it was the first major Taliban attack on Ahmadis, who were declared non-Muslims in Pakistan in 1974. Roughly four million Ahmadis hold the

belief that the founder of their sect, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, is also a prophet, a claim that stands in conflict with the faith of the majority Muslims who believe that Mohammad (pbuh) was the last among all the prophets. Irrespective of their views, they do not merit maltreatment or worse, death for their beliefs.

The shocking aspect is that the custodians of Islam, who allegedly gunned down Bhatti for asking the Blasphemy Law to be revisited, after murdering the Minorities Minister, had strewn the street with pamphlets condemning those to want changes in the Blasphemy Law. Their heartlessness and total disregard for the sanctity of Islam and respect for the Holy Prophet (pbuh) is evident from the fact that they desecrated the Holy Prophet (pbuh) and Islam by throwing the pamphlets containing the name of the Holy Prophet (pbuh) and Qurānic verses on the streets. Under the same blasphemy law these assassins have blasphemed and are liable to be put to death for their dastardly act. Bhatti was a devout Christian and would have asked Christians to follow the teachings of Christ and forgive these people. Christ has spoken of persecution so he would have recommended that let God deal with these people and remember He is a JUST God. Love should be your message of strength not revenge. Pray for those who are against you and pray for those who don't stand by you. The Holy Bible says that God is LOVE. Jesus Christ said in Matt 5:44 to LOVE your enemies⁴⁵. This is why Jesus willingly went to the cross and shed His perfect blood that paid for the sins of the world (and He rose from the dead) and thus, He reconciled us back to God so those that believe in Him will have eternal life in heaven. This salvation is available for every person in every nation. All countries should have freedom of religion. This persecution has got to stop. John 14:6, John 3:16⁴⁶

Sowing seeds of hatred and intolerance is contrary to the mission statement of Pakistan as well as the tenets of Islam

The esprit de corps of our founding fathers and the Quaid's first address to the nation, in which he assured that Pakistan, was a sanctuary not only to Muslims but to the followers of every faith and creed who were free to go their place of worship and live in peace⁴⁷, has been flouted with impunity. Islam on the other hand preaches not only tolerance for all faiths but also entrusts the duty of the security and sanctity of the places of worship of minorities upon all Muslims and especially the rulers. Religious intolerance and the total disregard for human lives is such a dangerous trend that if left unchecked will permeate into our society gnawing at the very roots of existence. Whereas, the government can be faulted for not providing adequate protection to the minority group, when they had been receiving threats, it becomes imperative for every Pakistani to share the responsibility of reporting suspicious activities, which if checked in time, can help avert a major crisis.

Simultaneously, it is the duty of every opinion builder in society, the teacher, the religious leader, the politician and above all the media to disseminate the message of tolerance and peaceful coexistence. Unless we root out the dangerous elements of intolerance, the twin headed monster of extremism and terrorism will devour us completely as well as enable the enemies of Pakistan to achieve their machinations against Pakistan easily.

Islam itself teaches moderation, to the extent that Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) is depicted as one of the world's "leading law givers" in the US Supreme Court main hall in recognition of the use of the "Charter of Madina" in the US Constitution's Bill of Rights. Muslim scientists, litterateurs and scholars like Avicenna, Omar Khayyam, Ibn-alHaitham, Ibn-alRushd, Razi, Jabir Al-Hayan, Al-Bairuni and numerous others who lit the torch of knowledge and laid the foundations of modern science, were also acknowledged not only as enlightened humans but also moderate personalities. Is it not ridiculous that the same Islam and its followers are being labeled as harbingers of terrorism and extremism?

The fact that battle lines are being drawn with a war between moderates and extremists is equally pathetic. To expect that persons who have attended Convent schools or are the product of Public Schools or elite private institutions are moderate, while those who have attended the government schools or Madrassas are extremists is also extremely wrong and unjust. Both are in fact extremists. Adoption of western culture devoid of eastern values is one extreme while implementation of Arab culture, ignoring the rich Pakistani culture is the other end of the divide. Pakistani culture by itself is rich, conservative and moderate. Rather than exporting vulgarism from the west or over strict orthodoxy from the Arabs, let us be true to ourselves.

Now let us examine the economic aspect of religious tolerance. Let the government itself display magnanimity and tolerance in its own conduct. Tolerance can be inculcated through moderation, which must come in the standard of living of the ruling class so that the void between the haves and have-nots is bridged. Moderation implies equal distribution of the scarce resources. Overexposure of the armed forces in the civilian institutions has brought them disrepute. The underprivileged perceive the armed forces being nourished through their taxes and when they see them enjoying perks and privileges they themselves are deprived of, it leads to resentment. Moderation must also prevail in the distribution of wealth among the provinces. One province must not become opulent at the cost of the others. Let us learn from European history. Medieval Church lost its undue hold on the people with the advent of the industrial revolution as they turned towards moderation with the availability of opportunities. Terrorism and extremism is being exported by the deprived and downtrodden provinces. Industrial development and

providing them equal opportunities will definitely turn them towards moderation. Herein lies the solution.

All citizens of Pakistan must propagate moderate vibrant culture of Pakistan to promote good will of world community and shun misconstrued beliefs, which lead to religious intolerance and extremism.

The Government of Pakistan can lend a helping hand by mitigating the suffering of the people by cutting down the extravagant expenditure incurred on running of government. The opinion builders of Pakistani society, the politicians, the media and the academia can play their role by guiding the people to shun extremism, get rid of religious intolerance and be wary of the evil designs of the harbingers of hate and revulsion. A united stand will defeat the scourge of extremism.

The country is at a crossroads and decisive action against militant Madrassas and religious leaders calling for 'jihad' within Pakistan can only be ignored at our peril. The need to expedite the implementation of 'Madrassa strategy' in consultation with all stakeholders particularly Wifaqul Madaris is of paramount importance.

If the administration of seminaries can stockpile weapons, conduct vigilante operations through self styled vice squads, kidnap people including foreigners, challenge the writ of the government in the capital and engage security forces in all out operations, resulting in casualties of innocent persons, then the matter is indeed serious. The need of the hour is to enforce the Madrassas Reforms already in place to regulate each and every Madrassa in Pakistan. No Madrassas should be allowed to function if it refuses to register with the authorities. Registration has to be mandatory irrespective of whether or not a Madrassa receives monetary support from the government. The thorny issue of revealing sources of funding must also be enforced, with every seminary obliged to submit itemized accounts of cash inflows, including the names of donors, as well as expenditure.

A monitoring system needs to be put in place to ensure that no texts are taught that promote militancy, sectarianism and religious hatred. This can be achieved in part through surprise visits, which can also help prevent physical abuse of students. To widen the scope of job opportunities available to seminary graduates, curriculum reform must also include the teaching of mainstream subjects such as Science, Mathematics and English. On the other hand, religious subjects included in the curricula of regular schools must move beyond paying lip sympathy to religious studies and bridge the gap between Madrassas and regular schools.

The Pakistani social order, having been exposed to the vagaries of terrorism and extremism, has become prejudiced and intolerant. The

government is expected to play its role in eliminating extremism and terrorism from the society, however to eradicate the twin menaces of extremism and terrorism from the Pakistani environment, every member of the society must join hands.

Terrorism and extremism can only be defeated through a concerted effort, in which we shun radical views, because Islam itself teaches us the path of moderation, tolerance and broadmindedness. Restraint, forbearance and patience are virtues, which can be inculcated through enlightenment, acquisition of information and gaining knowledge about social issues.

It is painful to see the dichotomy in what we practice and what we preach. Prior to the Lal Masjid showdown, Ulema and religious leaders of national and International standing including the Imam-i-Kaaba tried to show them the path of reason to give up their vigilante stance and reach a conciliatory settlement. None of them supported their vice squads or the enforcement of Sharia on their own through threats of terror attacks. However, during the negotiations, some religious leaders on the one hand encouraged them to remain steadfast, yet were unable to convince them to spare their own and numerous women and children's lives, besieged inside. When the government took the ultimate step of the use of force, not only the armed forces and the government are being criticized from every mosque pulpit, the law enforcing agencies are being targeted through suicidal attacks but innocent lives are also being lost in the carnage and mayhem unleashed by the so called custodians of the Sharia.

The gory end to the crisis is regrettable because of loss of lives, but it has taught an important lesson that there is no place for extremism and no safe haven for terrorists in Pakistan.

Conclusion

The current milieu of hate, bigotry and intolerance calls for a concerted effort to tackle the root causes of extremism and terrorism at an urgent basis. There should be no shame for the government to invite the broad spectrum of political and religious leaders from all sides of the divide to put their collective wisdom together and come up with a workable solution. Dividing the society into moderates and conservatives and targeting each other is not the answer. The government's unwavering resolve to tackle the problem can only be displayed by tackling the issue head on and taking the senate, parliament, the opposition and the religious leaders on board. The Army or the government alone cannot stem the rot or avoid Pakistan from turning into another Iraq. It is for every law abiding citizen of Pakistan to help preserve the peace and tranquility and defeat extremism and terrorism.

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14. Non-Traditional Security Threats in Pakistan :

Non- Traditional Security Threats in Pakistan

Imran Ali Sandano

(Ali Imran is an author of “Sufism and Peace: A Counter Strategy of Extremism” book. Currently, he is PhD candidate and Research Fellow at Center of Non-Traditional Security and Peaceful Development Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China. His areas of interest are non-traditional security issues, human society, terrorism, and conflict resolution. Mr. Ali is a regular writer of different national and international newspapers and magazines. He holds M.Phil degree in Peace and Conflict Studies from National Defence University Islamabad.)

Abstract:

Since the very first day when the idea for a separate land, i.e. Pakistan was conceptualized, it had been facing several problems. Initially, the problem was the formation of the country, later the question was about its governance and survival. However, there were several other problems that the country in her early life had to face. One of the major problems that Pakistan had to face throughout the years of its existence is that of security threats. The notion of defense and security was always restricted to the militaristic aspect of a country, but currently it can be noticed that the modern ideologies have introduced a non-traditional form of security threats. The current definition of security goes beyond the conventional definition of security and takes into account numerous other elements, such as; food security, earthquakes, issues of migration, displaced people, climate change, global warming, heavy floods, economic issues etc.

Introduction

The very concept of security has witnessed a huge transformation since the Cold War and a shift was seen from traditional security to non-traditional security. The idea of traditional security is centered towards military and political security. "...the major values are targeted on territory security and sovereignty security; and power, military affairs, military forces and wars become the core manifestation of security, which guarantee the freedom from the survival threat caused by wars.¹" It depends on the ability of any state to protect its interest from external threats and these interests are commonly of territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of the nation. While the non-traditional security is different according to Mely Caballero "non-traditional security challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources, such as climate change, cross border environmental degradation and resource depletion, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking, and other forms of transnational crime.²"

Traditional security issues come under the heading of 'high-politics, such as national defense, territorial disputes, sovereignty, inter-states military posture etc.' This falls under basic survival of a nation, state or a regime. States or governments' actions are responsible for conventional security issues but non-traditional threats are more complex.

NTS issues were not given much importance in the past, but have now begun being looked at more closely and paid heed to; these problems are a consequence of activities undertaken by social or individuals groups that do not align with state policies or laws; this 'above the law' activity, rooted in 'social, economic, cultural soil' of various countries has the potential to easily spill over borders, culminating into global issues.

Non-traditional security threats and challenges, both internal and transnational which can originate from a variety of non-state actors,

human and natural causes, can affect both government institutions and civilian populations. The concerns of the international community have diverted from traditional threats to non-traditional threats. These threats are identified in wide range such as 'nuclear proliferation, terrorism, environmental deterioration, ecological crisis, epidemical diseases, emigrating refugees, multinational crimes, drug smuggling, computer hackers, piracy and racial and tribal conflicts'. The fields of security in these threats have gone from military and political security to all national, human and social security.

The non-traditional security concept is a dynamic one, which shows the real changes of security and the development of new security theories and it is a change responding to the transformation of the globalizing world, a theoretical reflection and a realistic concern differing from traditional security and occurring due to the fierce threats and dangers upon states and human society as a whole that are generated outside military and political fields.

The non-traditional security threats that third world countries are confronting are way too serious than the traditional security threats that were faced by these countries. With the course of time, there is an increased awareness among the people and states regarding the destructiveness that could be caused due to these non-traditional security threats. The developed countries are capable enough to deal with the non-traditional security threats up to a certain extent, due to their advance knowledge and sound economic system. But the developing countries are more prone to it as they lack technological advancement and most of them have a weak economic system too.

Pakistan, like many other countries has been facing many non-traditional security threats. There has been a growing trend in the region to class all non-military threats as "non-traditional security threats", and to encompass a wide range of potential crises, including as terrorism, fragile and interconnected water, food and energy security, population explosion, poverty, irregular urbanization, narcotics, ill health, and deteriorating economic conditions. Other than these the country is also facing sectarian and ethnic violence, gender discrimination, climate

changes, and natural disasters such as floods among many others. While the se challenges are not within the purview of more traditional military concerns, they may nonetheless pose a serious challenge to national security and regional stability. Few of these threats have been explained in this paper.

Energy Security

Energy crisis are one of the leading non-traditional security threat of the Pakistan. It has become the common phenomenon, blamed on years of negligence and mismanagement is devastating the economy and making the lives of millions despondent. Pakistan is moving towards the dark-ages in the absence of any solid effort to tenacity energy crisis by the authorities concerned that has left millions out of work and brought economy to the brink of total collapse. Pakistan's demand for gas and other forms of energy is exceeding day to day. The country fails to provide with the required energy.

The country recently faced a major national power breakdown on February 25th, 2013, when around midnight electricity was suspended in major parts of the country leaving the country in a blackout.³ The energy crisis is severely hurting the country. With almost the non-availability of electricity, gas, oil and petrol, it has become difficult to run businesses, industries and or any other sort of work to keep the economy running. Thousands of industrial units have been shut downed in Punjab and Sindh because of these crises. If this NTS issue could not be solved the situation will thrash the national economy of the country.

Food Insecurity

A problem that has emerged during the past few years due to the change in climate

and recent floods is of food security. According to the food and agriculture organization of United Nations, approximately 60% of the population of Pakistan is suffering through food insecurity.⁴ This is

because a large number of the population does not have access to food, due to food inflation that is being faced by the poor section of the Pakistani society. Wheat sowing has been further cut down by 30% due to the recent year floods in the province of Sindh. This as a result would further increase the prices of grain. It is essential for the country to upgrade its agriculture sector in order to cope up with the dangers posed due to food insecurity. However, sustainable development in this sector cannot be achieved until and unless the issues related to climate change are taken under consideration.

According to World Health Organization “Pakistan is one of the 32 nations that are predicted to have severe food crises and subsequent social unrest if domestic policies are not restructured timely. There are early signs it will exacerbate malnutrition rates. In the coming months many poorer populations will be forced to switch to cheaper, less nutritional food. Moreover, the populations of the country dependent on food from other provinces/districts, particularly those in urban areas, are likely to eat fewer meals. The resultant increase in malnutrition and associated morbidity will have a profound impact on already increasing poverty levels, with subsequent economic costs due to reduced work productivity and increased health care costs.”⁵

In 2012, Pakistan was ranked on 27 out of the 48 countries considered to be at “high” risk of a food crisis.⁶ The prices of the basic food crops like wheat and rice are shooting skies and there is a shortage of the food products in the country. “According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, more than 60 percent people in Pakistan are still experiencing food insecurity, as food is inaccessible to them due to all-time high food inflation being faced by poor segment of society.”⁷

Environmental Security

The term climate change refers to the statistical change in the distribution of weather over a specific period of time. This change may

range from decades to millions of years too. The change in terms of impact can be of both regional and global level. Climate change is turning out to be the most fundamental non-traditional security threat for Pakistan and its impacts can already be felt in the form of floods, droughts, cyclones and sea level rise in and around Pakistan. The rise in the average global temperature has had considerable effect on Pakistan. It has led to different environmental conditions such as population growth and greater number of people living in high-risk areas.

Pakistan is one of those countries which are very high on the vulnerability scale. Due to its geographical location, Pakistan has entered the heat surplus zone of the earth. It is expected that the precipitation level in Pakistan would change drastically. Scientists believe that this change in the level of precipitation might alter or completely take away monsoon from the Indo-Pak. Pakistan is an agricultural country, and due to increase in the population, there already exist an intense pressure on land and other natural resources. An additional pressure due to change in climate will further deteriorate the conditions of the people living in the country and will make life more difficult i.e. in the year of 2010 and 2011, Pakistan was hit by massive floods which affected around 18 million people.

Drug Trafficking:

Pakistan's geographic location next to Afghanistan places the country in a vulnerable position with respect to the illicit trafficking of opiates and precursors. More than 90 per cent of the world's opium comes from Afghanistan which also produces in sizeable quantities. Consequently, large quantities of opium, heroin and cannabis are trafficked via Pakistan onwards for markets in Iran, the Middle East, Africa, East Asia and the West.

Pakistan is also a major route for certain precursors like acetic anhydride entering Afghanistan for conversion of opium to heroin. The

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that the annual revenue generated by Afghan opiate trafficking to and through Pakistan exceeds \$1bn.⁸ This does not include the revenue from illicit trading in associated precursors which may be of a similar value.

Pakistan's importance as a key trafficking route is illustrated by the large number of seizures made by its law-enforcement agencies. During the last 10 years, approximately 150 tons of morphine and heroin entered Pakistan per year, of which quantity 20 per cent was seized. Between 1996 and 2011, the authorities captured an average of 7,200kg of opium per annum, making Pakistan the top country of interception in the world along with Iran. Cannabis seizures increased from 134,622kg in 2008 to 186,876kg in 2011.⁹

As there is growing evidence that the proceeds of crime are being used to fund terrorism, this poses an additional challenge for the Pakistan government. With the increase in public insecurity due to organised crime it is individuals and societies that suffer, particularly from displacement. Women, children and the elderly are the most vulnerable groups.

Water Insecurity

Another serious NTS threat to Pakistan is related to water. Unfortunately, after the partition of Pakistan, great issues began to emerge related to water insecurity. It is mainly due to the wrong partition of the country that created the issue of water insecurity. India has built several dams and have accumulated a huge amount of water that were basically source of water for Pakistan from the six rivers, namely; *Chenab, Ravi, Jhelum, Sutlej, Bias* and *Indus*. These entire rivers instigate from the disputed land of Kashmir that is occupied by India. Hence, it would not be wrong to say that the issue of water insecurity was created due to the wrong distribution of land between India and

Pakistan. The source of water to Pakistan was handed over to India, while avoiding the hydrological unit of Pakistani rivers.

The growing water insecurity can be reduced by two ways. Firstly, the country needs to perk up the way they currently use water, this can be done by managing it in a better way or by co-operating with India. While, the second way is to try to grasp as much water as it can from the neighboring country.

Economic Problem

For a very long period of time, the economy of Pakistan has been stuck into a trap of low-income and low-growth. This is slowly and gradually weakening the economy of the country. Basically, Pakistan is an agriculture country. The productivity of this sector directly effects the development on that nation. It actively participates in the social and economic upbringing of a country. Trade depends highly upon it, unfortunately the mismanagement and unwillingness of the political administrations fall it in the heel.

According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Pakistan is facing a “challenging economic outlook”.¹⁰ The growth rate is expected to range between 3-3.5% in 2012-2013, which has been the average expansion over the preceding five years.¹¹ Recently the rate of inflation has decreased, but it is expected to go back to double digits by the end of the year or by the initial months of the next year. IMF further predicted that inflation will continue to increase unless Pakistan discontinues financing a widening fiscal deficit by printing more notes. These uncertain economic conditions of the country are a threat to the stability and survival of the country.

Illegal immigration

Around five million illegal immigrants have been residing in different cities of Pakistan for more than three decades.¹² The illegal immigrants, around two million Bangladeshis, 2.5 million Afghanis and 0.5 million other nationals including Africans, Iranians, Iraqis and Myanmar, are currently living in Quetta, Peshawar, Lahore, Islamabad, Rawalpindi and other cities.¹³ The main reasons for these illegal immigrants was said to be partition of Pakistan in 1971, Cold War in Afghanistan in 1980's, poor law and order situation in Iraq, and the availability of safe havens in Pakistan.

According to independent sources, there are 1.6 million Afghan refugees registered in Pakistan, as well as over 1.6 million unregistered and illegal aliens.¹⁴ For Pakistan and particularly Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where the overwhelming majority resides, this is too front-and-centre an issue to be conveniently forgotten. Such, indeed, is the scale of the matter that Pakistani authorities have, on occasion, issued deadlines for Afghans to repatriate themselves on pain of having their refugee status revoked. These illegal immigrants have created security risk in big cities particularly in Karachi (the port city).

The government claims that it had taken a number of measures to discourage the inflow of illegal immigrants, including establishment of Anti-Trafficking Units at provincial police headquarters for combating internal human trafficking. For reducing illegal foreigner inflow the government has replaced Personal Identification Secure Comparison Evaluation System (PISCES) with Integrated Border Management System (IBMS) having biometric facility.

Natural Disaster

There have been many disastrous floods in Pakistan, in 2010; almost all of Pakistan was affected when massive flooding caused by record breaking rains hit Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab. The number of individuals affected by the flooding exceeds the combined total of

individuals affected by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2005 Kashmir earthquake and the 2010 Haiti earthquake. At least 2,000 people died in this flood and almost 20 million people were affected by it. Identified at least 14.1 million people who were directly affected by the flood across Pakistan. Other estimates may be higher and include indirectly affected populations. More than 1.1 million houses were completely destroyed or made unlivable and more than 2 million hectares of standing crops were damaged or lost. The people most severely affected were predominantly small farmers and unskilled laborers. They are among the most vulnerable in Pakistan and almost all live below or just above the national poverty line. More than 60 percent lost immediate access to their primary livelihood and are faced with a drop in their already low income by more than half. Natural disasters effects on not only the population of the country but also its economy hence the environmentalist as well as the government officials should work towards mitigating it as much as possible.

Communicable Diseases

Pakistan is among the high ranking countries where people are still get affected of preventable diseases like polio, measles, diphtheria, hepatitis B, tuberculosis – these are some of the diseases that continue to plague country on a large scale. According to statistics, Pakistan had not been able to control the burden of communicable diseases like tuberculosis, malaria, dengue fever, typhoid, viral hepatitis, cholera and other infections which were caused by 2010 floods. At the same time there remained a rising trend of non-communicable diseases like heart disease, stroke, diabetes, hypertension, cancer and polio in the country. It is also believed that the economic downturn has also put ripple effects on health and social spending, especially in developing countries like Pakistan. Protecting investments in health and social structures is essential to maintain stability and security, and accelerate economic recovery.

Majority of population in Pakistan got affected by conflicts like terrorist activities and natural disasters including massive floods across a major part of the country that put millions of people at health risk. Experts say that in the existing situation, the government should invest significantly to improve emergency medical care services. On the other hand the important infectious diseases, which especially hit Pakistan, made headlines in the media were 'gastro', 'dengue fever', 'Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic Fever'.¹⁵ Thousands of cases of gastro and dengue fever were reported in various big cities of Pakistan, however, the provincial governments allocated little budget for prevention and control of the said infections.

The World Health Day was marked on April 7 across the globe to highlight the significance for governments to invest in the key health sector. The WHO has recommended an expenditure of six per cent of national GDP on health. In Pakistan, less than two per cent is the norm. Moreover, the problem also lies in the manner of expenditure of these precious funds.¹⁶ Vested interest lobbies active in the arena represent the biggest hurdle in the way of any effective execution of whatever funds the health sector gets.

Conclusion

The non-traditional security threats prevailing in Pakistan in shape of terrorism and extremism, climate change, food insecurity, water insecurity and other economic problems are the biggest future challenges that the country has to deal with. These NTS threats have a long term impact on the country as compared to the traditional security threats. According to experts, the future war that will take place (if any) would not be for the occupation of land but will occur due to water scarcity. United Nations and its sister organization are jointly collaborating with government authorities to fight such challenges. On the other hand transnational actors are also have assigned special projects on the basis on human security. But Pakistan itself needs to develop a strong and efficient local governance mechanism to overcome non-traditional national security threats. The concerned authorities, i.e. the policy

makers must realize the urgency of this issue and take considerable steps in order to cope up with the situation, before it worsens further.

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15. Governance in Karachi :

FINDING ORDER IN CHAOS ?

A DISCUSSION ON GOVERNANCE IN KARACHI

Nazia Hussain,

PhD Candidate

School of Public Policy

George Mason University Founders Hall, MS 3B1

3351 Fairfax Dr., Arlington, Virginia 22201

nhussai6@masonlive.gmu.edu

(Nazia Hussain is a doctoral candidate at the School of Public Policy, George Mason University and a researcher at its Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Centre (TraCCC). She is currently finishing her dissertation, which focuses on understanding urban governance in megacities of the global south. This piece is drawn from fieldwork in Karachi, Pakistan.)

Complex governance represented by competing centers of power in present day Karachi, Pakistan, poses one of the most formidable threats to the country's existence and to regional stability. Governance in Karachi, one of the fastest growing mega-cities of the world, is very different from the traditional concept of Westphalian governance. Governing power in the city has been diffused into multiple small competing centers of power that lie outside of the dichotomies of legal and illegal, and formal and informal. Whichever of these players (or coalition of a subset of these thereof) controls Karachi will decide the future of the city and will weigh in a powerful role in the path the country will follow. Given the interconnected nature of the groups operating from various mega-cities of the world, the final outcome of the transformation of Karachi's governance mechanism will influence dynamics beyond the borders of Pakistan.

Karachi's strategic importance to Pakistan needs no introduction. Also known as 'mini Pakistan' due to its ethnic diversity, the city has almost 20 million people as its residents. It contributes to at least a quarter of the GDP of the country. Due to its size and density of population, it also

provides a hideout to a vast array of actors, including transnational crime and terror groups, such as the crime-terror group D-Company, TTP, and Al-Qaeda (AQ).

Typically, high crime and violence rates in addition to the presence of elements as TTP and AQ provide a cause for concern to those who are studying the problems of the city. However, these variables while challenging the city's law and order and disrupting the daily lives of citizens of Karachi, pale into insignificance when contrasted by the problems of governance that the city faces.

Over the years, the kind of governance that has evolved in Karachi represents a complex phenomenon in which the actors have co-evolved as their eco-system evolved with them.

They include political parties, religious groups, crime groups, TTP, Al Qaeda, and Islamabad through its institutional representation. These classifications do not represent neatly stacked disconnected elements as these actors collaborate and jostle with each other, and form natural coalitions and arrangements based on mutual interests. However, the state through its sheer power still calls the shots.

Today, Karachi is divided along various lines, ethnic, religious, and political, and the physical geography of the city is representative of this polarization. Parts of the city have been claimed by various political, ethnic, and religious allegiances, where member of an opponent party cannot set foot. There are gated communities everywhere, from middle income housing to high-income housing. The point of contact for settling scores or seeking favors is a local player who could be a toughie or a political party member (usually both). While Islamabad may be adept in pulling strings of various players in the corridors of power, in the streets of Karachi, it is the local players that the people hold allegiance to.

Actors other than the state are contributing to changing governance in Karachi by engaging in activities that are traditionally the domain of the state. They are carrying out extortion and ensuring safety of business, property and life of residents in some parts of the city, and providing water and housing in other parts of the city. Since they are connected at some level or the other with political parties and local government officials, they are pushing the definition of what constitutes formal governance. For those who have not been serviced by the state in provision of basic amenities or protected by extortionists, such

governance might as well be considered formal. The resultant order is outside the fold of formality, and is often violent.

These competing centers of power include political groups as well as transnational actors like Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The coalitions and power arrangements that result in an effort to maintain stability even if tenuous, will be important in deciding if Islamabad plays a central role in the power arrangements or is an auxiliary player in one of its most strategically important urban centers. Thus, what happens in Karachi in the future will set the tone of future trends for the country and by default, the region.

This form of governance, unpredictable in its violence, and yet reliable for its service provision and retribution is what characterizes Karachi of our times. Why is such governance a cause of concern? For one, it is replacing the state's writ of service provision and protection of life and property effectively by outsourcing it to players who operate between margins of legal and illegal, and formal and informal, thereby making it harder to understand where the arm of the state begins and ends. Two, such a pattern of governance is providing a blue print to actors who might not be amenable to the idea of a central state authority calling the shots while not doing more than playing politics. In the past, political representatives of MQM, ANP, and PPP have been using their political influence to provide various services (as best to their capabilities) to their respective constituents. However, since they are political parties, they have a stake in the perseverance of a political system that rewards them and maintains the status quo.

For instance, in areas like Lyari where groups are supported by Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), or in parts of the city controlled by Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), residents of various localities owe their allegiances to those who provide them with uninterrupted water supply or somehow secure electricity connections without their frequenting government offices. Similarly, providing "protection money" to various players ensures that these players, rather than the state, will ensure the properties, businesses, and lives of residents of Karachi.

In today's Karachi, the basic functions of governance as envisioned within the parameters of the Westphalian concept of state are not being carried out by the state of Pakistan. Instead, they are being taken care of by various "mafias" such as land mafia or water mafia, the seemingly shadowy actors who provide housing and water to the residents of

Karachi. However, on close analysis, these actors are not mythical creatures who appeared out of nowhere and who have held the governance of the city hostage. Instead, their linkages can be traced back to major political parties of Karachi. The state of Pakistan, through its selective patronage and punishment of various actors including different political players still retains its control over the ever-evolving landscape of Karachi's governance. However, it remains to be seen as to how long the state will be able to retain its supremacy over different actors. That actors other than the state have the administrative and financial capacity and political support to provide services such as housing (even if in informal settlements) and water on a routine basis to people of Karachi, is a development which can be ignored at the peril of overlooking ground realities.

This pattern of governance did not emerge overnight. Over the years, the lack of government planning in consonance with the city's growing needs provided space for entrepreneurs to address the needs of the local population. For instance, the fact that approximately half of the population lives in informal housing is a development that has taken place over time. In today's Karachi, land and housing have become fiercely contested issues for political parties, which refuse to cede an inch as they have claimed ownership directly or through various mafias or independent contractors to settle people that represent their vote banks in various housing colonies. It was not always such an organized business to buy and sell land and carve out political constituencies, but it entrenched itself in the absence of the state's long-term vision of how the city would grow.

On the other side of the spectrum, there are players like TTP and AQ, who believe in an alternate vision of the state and the governance. TTP has already established pockets of its control in Karachi, where its writ runs supreme. In these areas, the TTP holds Sharia courts dispensing quick justice in the same fashion they did in Taliban-era Afghanistan, as well as in Pakistan's lawless tribal areas. Although the concept of Sharia courts is alien to common Pakistanis, and has been imposed on them by the highly armed and violent Taliban Jihadis and their followers, these courts have nonetheless established law and order through intimidation and fear. In this respect, it is no different than MQM or Lyari groups. The only and most important difference is that TTP does not believe in the political system whatsoever, and considers western styled democracy to be a degenerate secular system of governance.

As a matter of habit, the state of Pakistan has been downplaying the threat of governance originating from Karachi. This downplaying comes from the ill-founded confidence that the government has the capacity to coerce “informal” centers of power into joining the national mainstream. There have been multiple armed operations in Karachi since 1988 to “clean the city” of the “informal” players. Needless to say, each one of these armed operations has failed to destabilize the status quo.

It remains to be seen whether and for how long the state of Pakistan will be able to hold the city together and be able to maintain the semblance of supremacy. However, it is becoming clear that establishing control of the city using military infrastructure (Rangers, Army, Special Police Force etc.) is a temporary solution to deep-seated grievances of various actors in Karachi as well as the needs of a growing city.

Furthermore, the problems of controlling law and order through punitive measures is equivalent to tackling the tip of the iceberg. The evolving complexity of Karachi’s defacto governance structures and players will only become more complex over the years, the players might become more resistant to dialogue and more open to confrontation, the carrot and stick policy might not work forever, and elements like TTP and AQ which control small pockets of the city at present, might form collaborations with other players within the city and across borders.

Thus, whatever happens in Karachi will not stay in Karachi. The implications are far reaching and grave and the stakes high. Just as the problem is evolving and becoming sophisticatedly difficult, so should the solution toolbox to address it by expanding our theoretical and policy understanding.
